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1.
投资者是否被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导?——来自配股融资的证据 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
为了获得配股资格和提高配股价格,上市公司具有通过调整异常应计利润来提升报告盈余的强烈动机。本文使用横截面修正的Jones模型研究了配股公司盈余管理的时间序列分布特征.并分析了异常应计利润与配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益的关系。研究结果表明,配股公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年都具有较高的异常应计利润,而配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益趋于下降,异常应计利润与配股后的股票长期收益具有显著的负相关关系。投资者由于没有能够及时“看穿”配股公司的盈余管理行为而暂时高估了股票价值,从而被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导。 相似文献
2.
本文利用"隧道行为"理论解释我国家族上市公司的盈余管理活动。通过对2002-2004年间我国家族上市公司样本的实证检验,结果发现,控制性家族控制权偏离现金流量权的程度越大,公司盈余管理幅度越高。这说明控制性家族有动机操纵盈余以隐藏其掏空公司资源的"隧道行为",从而补充了现有对公司盈余管理动机的研究。 相似文献
3.
大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据 总被引:10,自引:2,他引:8
在上市公司配股融资过程中,大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本,基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征,并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明:(1)上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为;(2)配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系:当第一大股东持股比例低于53.20%时表现出正相关关系,而当第一大股东持股比例高于53.20%时则表现出负相关关系;(3)盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系.而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。 相似文献
4.
Do Firms Use Tax Reserves to Meet Analysts’ Forecasts? Evidence from the Pre‐ and Post‐FIN 48 Periods
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We examine whether firms decrease tax reserves to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts in the period prior to FIN 48, and whether that behavior changed following FIN 48. We use analysts’ forecasts of pretax and after‐tax income to impute premanaged earnings, or earnings before any tax manipulation. Pre‐FIN 48, we observe that firms reduce their tax reserves (i.e., increase income) when premanaged earnings are below analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, 78 percent of firm‐quarters that would have missed the analyst forecast if not for the tax reserve decrease, meet that target when the decrease is included. Furthermore, we find a significant positive association between the decrease in tax reserves and the deviation of premanaged earnings from analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, post‐FIN 48, we find no evidence that firms use changes in tax reserves to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. Thus, our results suggest that FIN 48 has, at least initially, curtailed firms’ use of tax reserves to manage earnings. 相似文献
5.
This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators. 相似文献
6.
Massimiliano Bonacchi Fabrizio Cipollini Paul Zarowin 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2018,35(3):1332-1362
We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms. 相似文献
7.
Weili Ge Dawn Matsumoto Emily Jing Wang Jenny Li Zhang Wayne Thomas 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2020,37(2):1073-1106
We examine the stock market consequences of disclosing accounting irregularities for U.S.-listed foreign firms. After controlling for the severity of the irregularity and other firm characteristics, we find that foreign firms experience significantly more negative short-window stock market reactions following irregularity announcements than do U.S. firms. Moreover, for a subsample of 64 irregularities of foreign firms that are listed on both a U.S. and home country stock exchange, we find evidence that restating firms' U.S. investors react more negatively to the same irregularity than their home country investors. This differential market reaction appears related to firm-specific information risks that are greater for foreign firms than U.S. firms. Collectively, consistent with the reputational bonding hypothesis in prior literature, our results suggest that accounting irregularities cause U.S. investors to reassess the information risk associated with foreign firms. 相似文献
8.
盈余管理的动机及手段 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
盈余管理的动机可以归纳为契约动机、资本市场动机和政治成本动机三类。出于不同的动机,上市公司会使用不同的盈余管理手段,但是过度的盈余管理不但严重扭曲上市公司的信息,误导投资者,而且使上市公司的利益受到损害。因此,对上市公司盈余管理应进行有效监管,例如完善现有会计准则,健全公司治理结构等。 相似文献
9.
This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year. 相似文献
10.
Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), we investigate whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our study yields three major findings. First, we find that as the control‐ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide their behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action. The result of our full‐model regression reveals that an increase in the control‐ownership wedge by 1 percent leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3 percent of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group‐affiliated firms than for nonaffiliated firms by 0.8 percent of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2 percent of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers. 相似文献
11.
James Jiambalvo Shivaram Rajgopal Mohan Venkatachalam 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2002,19(1):117-145
Articles in the financial press suggest that institutional investors are overly focused on current profitability, which suggests that as institutional ownership increases, stock prices reflect less current period information that is predictive of future period earnings. On the other hand, institutional investors are often characterized in academic research as sophisticated investors and sophisticated investors should be better able to use current‐period information to predict future earnings compared with other owners. According to this characterization, as institutional ownership increases, stock prices should reflect more current‐period information that is predictive of future period earnings. Consistent with this latter view, we find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. This result holds after controlling for various factors that affect the relation between price and earnings. It also holds when we control for endogenous portfolio choices of institutions (e.g., institutional investors may be attracted to firms in richer information environments where stock prices tend to lead earnings). Further, a regression of stock returns on order backlog, conditional on the percentage of institutional ownership, indicates that institutional owners place more weight on order backlog compared with other owners. This result is consistent with institutional owners using non‐earnings information to predict future earnings. It also explains, in part, why prices lead earnings to a greater extent when there is a higher concentration of institutional owners. 相似文献
12.
论新会计准则实施后我国上市公司盈余质量评价 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
上市公司盈余质量评价是投资者、债权人以及政府部门等信息使用者关心的问题。新会计准则的实施,既对上市公司盈余质量有积极影响,也仍然存在上市公司操纵利润的空间,影响了上市公司的盈余质量。政府要采取措施提高上市公司盈余质量,上市公司本身也要采取措施提高盈余质量,以提高盈余质量的决策相关性。 相似文献
13.
This study examines whether cultural dimensions such as individualism and uncertainty avoidance can explain the variation in the profitability of the earnings momentum strategies in international markets. Using the time‐varying cultural indices of Tang and Koveos (2008) for 30,383 firms from 41 countries over the period 1995–2008, we show that the level of individualism in a country is positively associated and the level of uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with earnings momentum profits. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive set of control variables and alternative cultural metrics. The central message is that we emphasize the necessity to go beyond the assumption of perfect rationality and to account for innate differences among international investors to explain how accounting information is incorporated into stock prices. We recommend that cultural dimensions be included in cross‐country research to account for innate differences among international investors. 相似文献
14.
Junxiong Fang Jeffrey Pittman Yinqi Zhang Yuping Zhao 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2017,34(1):39-82
We examine which of two opposing financial reporting incentives that group‐affiliated firms experience shapes their accounting transparency evident in auditor choice. In one direction, complex group structure and intragroup transactions enable controlling shareholders to pursue diversionary activities that they later hide by distorting reported earnings. In the other direction, as outside investors price‐protect against potential expropriation, controlling shareholders may be eager to improve financial reporting quality in order to alleviate agency costs. To empirically clarify whether group affiliation affects company insiders' incentives to address minority shareholders' concerns over agency costs, we examine auditor selection of group firms relative to stand‐alone firms. In comparison to nongroup firms, our evidence implies that group firms are more likely to appoint Top 10 audit firms in China, especially when their controlling shareholders have stronger incentives to improve external monitoring of the financial reporting process. After isolating group firms, we find that the presence of a Top 10 auditor translates into higher earnings and disclosure quality, higher valuation implications for related‐party transactions, and cheaper equity financing, implying that these firms benefit from engaging a high‐quality auditor. In additional analysis consistent with our predictions, we find that group firms that are Top 10 clients pay higher audit fees and their controlling shareholders are more constrained against meeting earnings benchmarks through intragroup transactions and siphoning corporate resources at the expense of minority investors. Collectively, our evidence supports the narrative that insiders in firms belonging to business groups weigh the costs and benefits stemming from auditor choice. 相似文献
15.
Recent research has found that the value‐relevance of accounting variables depends not only on whether a country's accounting rules are code‐law oriented or common‐law oriented, but also on the reporting incentives created by the legal and business environment in which a firm operates. Therefore, for example, the earnings of firms in some countries with common‐law oriented rules but with code‐law incentives have more code‐law‐type characteristics. We further this research by examining whether this is true for firms facing the same accounting regime and institutional environment but different stakeholder‐related incentives. We find significant stakeholder‐related incentives across 23 Japanese firms listed in the United States and 23 Japanese firms not listed in the United States that are matched by industry and size. Although these firms face the same institutional environment and the same accounting regime, consistent with the differences in stakeholder‐related incentives, the earnings and book values of the firms listed in the more shareholder‐oriented U.S. markets have significantly more explanatory power for market value than those for firms not cross‐listed in the United States. These findings are unaffected by whether the reports are based on consolidated or parent‐only accounting or whether they are based on U.S. or Japanese GAAP, emphasizing the potential influence of reporting incentives at all levels on the effect of standardization, conversion, or harmonization of accounting methods globally. 相似文献
16.
SCOTT RICHARDSON SIEW HONG TEOH PETER D. WYSOCKI 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2004,21(4):885-924
It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts. 相似文献
17.
Understanding Cross‐Country Differences in Valuation Ratios: A Variance Decomposition Approach
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Timothy K. Chue 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2015,32(4):1617-1640
We use a variance decomposition approach to examine why aggregate valuation ratios differ across countries. In a cross section of 22 developed countries from 1980 to 2009, we find that 50 percent of all cross‐country differences in the aggregate price‐to‐book ratio (P/B) can be explained by cross‐country differences in expected future five‐year profitability. In the second half of our sample period, this percentage exceeds that of the first half, rising to almost 64 percent. Although international differences in accounting standards and conventions may have made earnings from different countries more difficult to compare relative to dividends, we find that it is still cross‐country differences in expected future profitability, rather than dividend growth rates, that are more closely related to international differences in valuation ratios. Even among 25 emerging markets, we find that expected future profitability at the five‐year horizon can account for 29 percent of all cross‐country P/B variations. Our results show that international investors are able to identify substantial cross‐country differences in future‐earnings prospects and incorporate them into stock market valuations. 相似文献
18.
文章将亏损上市公司按照亏损属性不同分为了四种类型,对每类亏损公司的会计盈余与股票价格的关系进行了深入分析,认为:(1)对于单赤字、虚双赤两类亏损公司,其会计盈余的价值相关性较为微弱,而且其股价变动更多地是与公司发生的各种"表外事件"相关;(2)对于实双赤公司和三赤字公司,由于其已经出现资不抵债的情形,投资者很可能执行清算期权,因而亏损信息引起其股价急剧下跌,而且三赤字公司股价下跌的幅度比实双赤公司下跌的幅度更大. 相似文献
19.
上市公司盈余质量问题是当前会计理论界与实务界共同关注的焦点,一直受到广大投资者、债权人、政府部门等利益相关者的高度关注。盈余信息作为会计信息的核心组成部分,也就显得更加重要。因此,盈余质量分析对引导投资者合理利用财务信息进行投资决策,引导资本合理流动与资源配置,提高公众投资者对会计行业的信心有重要的现实意义。本文从盈余质量的一般定义,选择了影响会计盈余质量因素中的五个重要指标——盈余的真实性、持续性、盈利性、成长性及安全性指标,构建了我国上市公司盈余质量评价体系,运用因子分析法对福建上市公司2005—2007年的盈余质量状况进行了分析评价。 相似文献
20.
Lauren M. Cunningham Bret A. Johnson E. Scott Johnson Ling Lei Lisic 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2020,37(2):917-944
The SEC has long asserted that earnings management practices result in adverse consequences for investors. We examine whether SEC oversight affects firms' accounting quality in terms of earnings management trade-offs. We expect that increased firm-specific regulatory scrutiny, in the form of an SEC comment letter, will induce management to switch from accrual-based earnings management (AEM), which is a main focus of the SEC, to real-activities-based earnings management (REM), which is not likely to be commented on in the SEC's review process. Consistent with our predictions, we find that AEM is lower and REM is higher following the receipt of a comment letter, relative to non-comment-letter years and a propensity-score-matched sample of non-comment-letter firms. However, we do not find a significant difference in total earnings management (i.e., the sum of AEM and REM), suggesting that the higher REM acts as a substitute for lower AEM activity. We further find that our results are driven by accounting comments relating to estimates and accruals and not by classification-only comments, which suggests that a comment letter that does not question specific issues associated with estimates and accruals is not a strong enough signal to induce the firm to change earnings management behavior. Additionally, the shift to REM is attenuated for firms with high institutional ownership. These results collectively suggest that the comment letter process effectively constrains AEM but has the unintended consequence of firms, on average, switching to REM. 相似文献