A Note on the Relation between Frames,Perceptions, and Taxpayer Behavior*

In this study, we incorporate taxpayers' threat /opportunity perceptions into our analysis of taxpayer behavior in order to refine and extend our understanding of the internal cognitive forces that shape taxpayer behavior. Decision‐making frames (that is, the gain and loss domains from the prospect theory value function) and individual perceptions (that is, perceptions of decision alternatives as being threats or opportunities) are both likely to influence behavior, yet prior research has generally ignored the behavioral effects of individual perceptions. The results of our experiment reveal that taxpayers who are due a tax refund (owe additional taxes) prior to considering a judgemental tax deduction tend to perceive the conservative (aggressive) tax deduction to be more of an opportunity/less of a threat. In turn, we find that taxpayer frames have a direct effect on taxpayer behavior and an indirect effect on behavior through their effect on taxpayers' threat/opportunity perceptions. Perhaps the most important message of this study is that researchers can advance our understanding of the internal cognitive processes that shape taxpayer behavior by incorporating taxpayer perceptions into their research designs.     

The Psychology of Billing

Contracting between tax entities and tax professionals occurs millions of times every year, yet little is known about the nature of these economic interactions. This study examines the effect of commonly occurring contextual factors on tax professionals’ billing decisions for tax research. These contextual factors are unrelated to the tax research itself and the time it takes to conduct the tax research, but we find that billing decisions are strongly influenced by the three non‐time‐related contextual factors that we manipulate. Initial client volume impacts amounts billed for tax research, with lower initial client volume resulting in higher per client fees. Further, we find that initial billing decisions serve as value billing benchmarks for unanticipated subsequent clients who benefit from research conducted for initial clients. As a result, subsequent clients are billed higher fees when they follow a smaller number of initial clients. We also find that client referrals are billed higher fees than nonclient referrals because professionals attempt to avoid making initial clients feel as though they have been treated unfairly relative to subsequent clients who would otherwise be billed lower fees. The results of this study are relevant beyond the traditional confines of accounting research—they are relevant to the millions of tax entities that contract with tax professionals each year.     

The Effect of Tax Preparation Expenses for Employees: Evidence from Germany

Using a panel of German income tax accounting data from taxpayers with no business income (employees), we find a negative relationship between tax preparation expenses and tax liabilities. However, preparation expenses are shown to exceed estimated tax savings. Specifically, one additional Euro spent on preparation yields an estimated tax savings of 72 cents in an OLS regression and 24 cents in a fixed effects regression. In addition, we observe substantial heterogeneity in tax savings among income groups, but even if we account for long‐term tax savings, tax liability reductions exceed tax preparation expenses only for the highest income quintile. In all other income quintiles, average preparation expenses exceed the estimated tax and time savings. Based on these results, we also examine whether other specific benefits affect an individual's decision to purchase tax preparation services, and the results indicate the importance of the benefits of coping with complexity and reduced uncertainty. Overall, our findings illustrate that the current tax compliance process violates at least two of Adam Smith's principles of taxation, taxes are neither certain nor fair.     

Should Taxpayers Be Subsidized to Hire Third-Party Preparers? A Game-Theoretic Analysis*

Abstract. This article examines the tax-compliance game between taxpayers, a tax-collecting agency, and third-party tax-return preparers. In our model, taxpayers are uncertain about their taxable income and may hire tax practitioners to reduce tax uncertainty. We examine the viability of tax practitioners as a signaling device (taking into account the effects on the behavior of the tax-collecting agency) and investigate the desirability of encouraging (or discouraging) the use of tax practitioners via the use of alternative tax-crediting rules. Our study establishes that tax crediting enables legislators to deal better with the consequences of taxpayers' strategic reporting. We show that the effects of changes in crediting rates cannot be replicated by changes in tax rates or penalties; the government would generally like to “price discriminate” in subsidizing tax practitioners' involvement in the tax-compliance process. It is suboptimal to permit all taxpayers to take a tax credit for preparers' fees; some taxpayers should be denied such a subsidy. Further, if the government is constrained to adopt an identical credit schedule for all taxpayers, it will often find that a policy allowing no tax credit Pareto dominates any uniform crediting policy. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le jeu auquel se livrent, en matière d'observation de la législation fiscale, les contribuables, les agences de perception de l'impôt et les tiers chargés de la préparation des déclarations de revenus. Dans le modèle retenu par les auteurs, les contribuables sont incertains de leur revenu imposable et peuvent recourir aux services de fiscalistes dans le but de réduire cette incertitude. Les auteurs se penchent sur le caractère indicatif du choix du fiscaliste (en tenant compte de l'influence qu'exerce l'agence de perception sur le comportement) et se demandent s'il convient d'encourager les contribuables à recourir aux fiscalistes ou de les en dissuader au moyen de différents mécanismes de dégrèvement fiscal. L'étude démontre que le dégrèvement fiscal permet au législateur de mieux faire face aux conséquences des stratégies de déclaration des contribuables. L'on constate que la modification des taux d'imposition ou des pénalités ne livre pas les mêmes résultats que la modification des taux de dégrèvement; l'État vise généralement la ? discrimination en fonction du prix ? en subventionnant le recours aux fiscalistes dans le processus d'observation fiscale. Il ne serait pas optimal de permettre à tous les contribuables de se prévaloir d'un crédit d'impôt pour les honoraires des auteurs de leurs déclarations; une telle subvention devrait être refusée à certains contribuables. En outre, si l'État se voit contraint d'adopter un programme de dégrèvement identique pour tous les contribuables, il constatera dans bien des cas qu'une politique ne permettant aucun dégrèvement est supérieure, au sens de Pareto, à toute politique de dégrèvement uniforme.     

The Impact of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: Evidence from State Income Tax Differentials

The relationship between marginal tax rates and taxable income is analyzed with a large cross section of income tax returns filed by individuals who face different marginal tax rates because of state income tax differentials. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the marginal tax rate reduces taxable income primarily because taxpayers claim larger deductions. High-income taxpayers are found to be more responsive to tax rate changes than lower-income individuals. The findings are compared to those of other recent studies incorporating a wider range of taxpayer responses to tax rate changes than considered in this study.     

“金税三期”税收征管对上市公司审计费用的影响

税收征管作为公司外部治理手段,能够作用于公司经营环节,进而影响审计师面临的业务风险和审计风险,由此影响到公司的审计费用。但目前鲜有文献研究税收征管对公司审计费用的影响。本文借助"金税三期"工程这一"准自然实验",以2010—2019年A股上市公司为样本并使用双重差分法,研究发现"金税三期"工程提高了上市公司的审计费用。机制分析表明,"金税三期"工程推高了上市公司实际税率,降低了上市公司的盈利水平,提高了审计师的业务风险,进而提高了审计费用。同时,"金税三期"工程强化涉税信息监管,提高了上市公司会计信息质量,降低了审计师的审计风险,从而降低了审计费用。综合来看前者对审计费用的影响大于后者,导致了上市公司审计费用的提高。进一步分析发现,"金税三期"工程对审计费用的这一影响,在非国有上市公司和由非国际四大会计师事务所审计的上市公司中更为显著。     

Targets' Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums

This paper examines the effect of targets' participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel data set in which targets disclose that they have not participated in tax shelters, we find that targets that make this statement in their merger filings are associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average. These findings suggest that acquirers are concerned about the potential future liabilities when targets have engaged in tax sheltering. Consistent with this interpretation, the results also indicate that the positive association between targets' nonsheltering disclosure and acquisition premiums is stronger for less tax‐aggressive acquirers. This paper demonstrates the importance of targets' aggressive tax positions in the determination of premiums offered to targets' shareholders.     

Innovation and Corporate Tax Planning: The Distinct Effects of Patents and R&D*

Using a large US sample, we find a significant and positive relation between patents and corporate tax planning, and the effect is incremental to the effect of R&D on tax planning. We employ a quasi‐natural experiment based on staggered industry‐level innovation shocks to identify the positive causal effect of patents on corporate tax planning. We also find that patents are not associated with tax planning for domestic firms, but their association with tax planning is concentrated in multinational firms, which have the ability to shift domestic income to low‐tax countries. Moreover, we find that the identified effect mainly exists in the post–check‐the‐box (CTB) rule period when shifting income among affiliates becomes more flexible and convenient. Finally, we use two income‐shifting models and find that patents, rather than R&D, facilitate tax planning through an income‐shifting channel. Overall, our results suggest that R&D and patents facilitate firms' tax planning in distinct ways: R&D facilitates tax planning as intended through tax credits and deductions, whereas patents are used by taxpayers to avoid taxes aggressively through income shifting.     

道光后期州县征漕收支及其与陋规加派的关系——以浙江乌程县为中心的考察

道光时期是重要的社会转型期,学术界从不同视角予以广泛的关注。目前学术界的研究较少涉及州县征漕费用的数额、构成和比例。道光年间尤其道光后期,州县征漕收支数目庞大,弄清数目的实际状况有助于加深对地方弊政的理解。吴煦档案中的乌程县漕用各费的账册资料,记录了该县办漕的收支状况。乌程县征漕费用总计约3万两,由漕务开支、衙门规费、运军兑费三部分构成。清中后期州县的法定漕费远不敷用,州县财政对漕务陋规形成依赖;上级官员、运丁和地方绅衿分润州县漕规收入,形成惯例;州县官则率由旧章,对已有的利益格局通常不做改变。征漕费用和陋规加派具有稳定性和延续性,当需要因事加征时,往往援例加征。征漕陋规虽名义上归州县官所有,但各类开支从规费中支出,所以征漕规费并非州县官的纯收入。州县官借征漕而获利之数,因时、因地、因人而不同。地方财政依赖陋规加派,而陋规又被各利益集团分润,这是清政府腐败集团化的呈现,也是清中后期朝廷囿于“不加赋”之名,惰于进行制度改革的恶果。     

The effect of export tax rebates on export performance: Theory and evidence from China

This paper develops a Cournot quantity competition model to examine the effect of export tax rebate policy on export performance. The main conclusions drawn are as follows: (i) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the output of final goods for export by the domestic firm increases, while the output of the foreign competitor decreases; (ii) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the profit of the domestic firm increases, while that of the foreign competitor decreases; and (iii) the optimum export rebate rate is positive and greater than 1, indicating that the domestic government not only refunds fully the custom duties paid by the domestic firm on imported intermediate goods, but also offers export subsidies for its export of final goods.To corroborate the conclusions drawn based on the theoretical model, empirical analysis was carried out using the statistical data of China from 1985 to 2002. The test results of Spearman rank correlation coefficient show that China's export tax rebate policy has significant positive correlation with its exports, final domestic consumption, and foreign exchange reserve.     

Fiscal Implications of the ECB’s Bond Buying Program

The perception that the government bond buying program (OMT) announced by the ECB may lead to future tax burdens on countries, in particular on Germany, is based on an erroneous application of solvency principles that apply to private agents, but not to central banks. We argue that the creditor nations’ taxpayers, in particular the German taxpayers, will receive tax revenue from the implementation of the OMT. We also measure the size of the bond-buying program that is compatible with price stability. It turns out that this estimate critically depends on whether the Eurozone stays in a liquidity trap situation or not. Today, as the Eurozone is still in a liquidity trap there is no limit to the amount of government bonds the ECB can buy without triggering inflation.     

Discussion of “The Psychology of Billing”

Hansen, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart (2018) examine the effects of three contextual features on tax professionals’ billing decisions in a case involving issue‐specific tax research. In this discussion, we present a tax fee model. In contrast to determining a bill, our model views tax fees in a more comprehensive perspective. We subsequently use this model to discuss the design choices and limitations of their study and to provide suggestions for future research.     

Impact of Rebates and Refunds on Contributions to Threshold Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment

We investigate the impact of rebates and refunds on contributions to threshold public goods using evidence from a field experiment conducted in conjunction with an Australian charity, Life Goes On. We find that offering rebates and refunds has a significant positive impact on both participation and average donations in the absence of seed money. Our results suggest that offering rebates and refunds, and the existence of seed money may, to some extent, play substitute roles in encouraging giving behavior. Seed money has a significant positive effect on participation only. Seed money's impact on average donations may be mitigated by a threshold effect.     

Discretionary Accounting Accruals,Managers' Incentives,and Audit Fees*

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.     

The Tax Effect on Taxable Income from Privately Held Businesses

The implications of the tax elasticity of taxable income have been widely discussed in the literature. This study uses the reported rate of return to capture the effects of tax changes on taxable income from privately held businesses. Households' decisions concerning reporting rates of return are embedded in a selection model of business investment decisions. With 1983-1989 Survey of Consumer Finances panel data, the tax elasticity of the reported rates of return on privately held businesses is found to be positive and large. The tax elasticity of taxable income from privately held businesses is thus crucial for policy evaluation. Several reasons for the high tax elasticity and the implications of it are also discussed.     

The Distributional Effects of the Trump and Clinton Tax Proposals

Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, the Democratic and Republican candidates for President of the U.S. in 2016, proposed several changes in the federal tax code. Hillary Clinton would add a personal income tax surcharge of 4% on high annual incomes, limit the tax benefits of non-charitable deductions, set a minimum tax rate of 30% on taxpayers earning more than one million dollars a year, increase the tax rates on capital gains for taxpayers in the top tax bracket, and expand the base of the estate tax. Donald Trump would reduce the number of personal income tax rates, increase the standard personal deduction, cut all taxes on business income to no more than 15%, and abolish the inheritance tax. Using a tax calculator model, we estimate the static effects of these very different changes. Over a ten-year period, Clinton’s proposals would raise federal tax revenue by a total of $816 billion, an increase of 1.9% over projected baseline revenue, while Trump’s tax changes would lower tax revenue by $9.8 trillion. Clinton’s higher taxes would reduce incomes and revenue somewhat, while Trump’s tax cuts would potentially boost output substantially. Using an extended simulation model, we find that 86% of the incremental tax burden of Clinton’s tax increases would fall on those in the top tenth of the income distribution. Most other taxpayers would see only minor changes in their tax burdens, and the revenue and redistributive effects of her proposed changes are relatively modest. Meanwhile, 70% of Trump’s tax cuts would go to those in the top decile, and the effects are large, with gains of over $15,000 annually per person for this group, compared to gains of less than $500 per person for the poorest 40% of the population. On tax policy, the two candidates propose strikingly different policies.     

Tax Advice and Reporting under Uncertainty: Theory and Experimental Evidence*

Abstract. This study extends the Beck, Davis, and Jung (1992) experimental study by incorporating opportunities for taxpayer subjects to purchase advice before making their tax reporting decisions. Tax advice has two roles in the model and experiment. First, tax advice allows taxpayers to reduce their uncertainty about the amount of taxes owed. This permits us to study the demand for tax advice in conjunction with its effect on tax reporting decisions. Second, the decision to purchase tax advice from an expert provides a means of signaling that may alter tax agency audit policies. The resulting audit policies, in turn, can affect taxpayers' decisions to purchase tax advice. These interdependencies are incorporated in a game-theoretic model and several predictions are tested experimentally. Consistent with theory, subjects sorted themselves into three groups based upon their private information. Another prediction supported by the experiment is that the demand for tax advice increased with the magnitude of an uncertain tax deduction (amount-at-risk). We also found, as expected, that the effects of tax advice on pre-audit tax revenues depend upon the amount-at-risk. When the amount-at-risk was high, subjects in settings with tax advice reported lower average incomes and paid lower taxes than did those subjects in settings without the opportunity to purchase tax advice. The opposite was true for the low amount-at-risk condition, supporting our prediction that tax advice and amount-at-risk would have an interactive effect on tax reporting. Analysis was also performed on post-audit tax collections. Contrary to theory, post-audit tax payments were found to increase when subjects had an opportunity to purchase tax advice. This result apparently was caused by a tendency to over-purchase tax advice and, in some cases, to report a low income regardless of the advice received. Résumé. Les auteurs développent l'étude expérimentale de Beck, Davis et Jung (1992) en y incorporant la possibilité pour les sujets contribuables de solliciter des conseils avant de prendre leurs décisions relatives à l'information qu'ils fourniront aux fins fiscales. Les conseils fiscaux jouent deux rôles dans le modèle et l'expérience. Premièrement, ils permettent aux contribuables de réduire leur incertitude relative au montant des impôts auxquels ils sont assujettis. Les auteurs peuvent ainsi étudier la demande de conseils fiscaux en conjonction avec leurs conséquences sur les décisions relatives à l'information à fournir aux fins fiscales. Deuxièmement, la décision de solliciter les conseils fiscaux d'un expert est un signal pouvant influer sur les politiques de vérification des représentants du fisc. À leur tour, ces politiques peuvent influer sur les décisions des contribuables de solliciter des conseils fiscaux. Ces interdépendances ont été intégrées à un modèle de jeu théorique et les auteurs ont vérifié plusieurs prédictions par expérimentation. Conformément à la théorie, les sujets se sont répartis en trois groupes, en fonction de l'information privilégiée dont ils disposaient. L'expérimentation a confirmé une autre prédiction: la demande de conseils fiscaux augmente avec l'importance de la somme dont la déductibilité est incertaine (montant à risque). Les auteurs constatent également, comme ils s'y attendaient, que les effets des conseils fiscaux sur les recettes fiscales antérieures à la vérification dépendent du montant à risque. Lorsque le montant à risque est élevé, les sujets pouvant solliciter des conseils fiscaux font état de revenus moyens inférieurs et paient moins d'impôt que les sujets n'ayant pas la possibilité de solliciter des conseils fiscaux. L'inverse est vrai lorsque le montant à risque est faible, ce qui confirme la prédiction selon laquelle les conseils fiscaux et le montant à risque ont un effet interactif sur l'information fournie aux fins fiscales. Les auteurs analysent également les impôts perçus postérieurement à la vérification. Contrairement à la théorie, ils constatent que les paiements fiscaux postérieurs à la vérification augmentent lorsque les sujets ont eu la possibilité de solliciter des conseils fiscaux. Ce résultat semble être attribuable à une tendance à solliciter des conseils fiscaux avec excès et, dans certains cas, à faire état d'un faible revenu, malgré les conseils reçus.     

The determinants of tax morale in Pakistan

This paper examines the determinants of tax morale in Pakistan, a country that has struggled with low tax effort over the past decade. We exploit novel data for individual taxpayers collected in 2014 by Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue to estimate a binary probit regression model. Our results are generally in line with the findings of the modern empirical literature on tax morale in other countries. Overall, groups with lower labor force participation show more positive attitudes toward tax compliance. Educated respondents exhibit higher tax morale than the illiterate, but only for those with very low or very high educational attainment is tax morale higher than for those with bachelor’s degrees. Tax morale is highest in major industrialized population centers that serve as seats of government. Females show generally higher tax morale than males, however, their attitudes tend to worsen with age to such an extent that elderly females have lower tax morale than elderly males. Our findings on gender suggest potential gains from increasing female labor force participation rates. More generally, addressing the current failures of tax administration and dealing with horizontal inequity arising from administrative weaknesses may contribute materially to improving voluntary compliance.     

Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.     

Do Mutual Fund Investors Care About Auditor Quality?

We study the influence of perceived auditor quality on investment decisions by bond mutual fund investors. Audits of bond mutual funds require significant auditor expertise. Fund managers estimate daily the fair market values of holdings that are often opaque and illiquid. Managers can use their discretion to manipulate their fund's performance results. While it is known that investment flows into funds that report good past performance, little evidence exists about whether investors' confidence in the reliability of fund financial reports is influenced by auditor quality. Using hand‐collected data from SEC filings, we find that the positive association between reported performance and investment flows is stronger for funds with auditors who are industry specialists and are longer‐tenured, as well as for funds that pay higher audit fees. We do not find that auditor office size strengthens the association. We also find that the presence of industry‐specialist auditors, long‐tenured auditors, and higher audit fees lead to additional disclosure in the form of emphasis‐of‐matter. This study contributes to the streams of research investigating perceived audit quality, fund investment decisions, and auditing for financial services.