The effects of regional tax and subsidy coordination on foreign direct investment

This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalising all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare-enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation. Depending on which motive dominates, tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination.     

The impact of endogenous tax treaties on foreign direct investment: theory and evidence

Abstract .  This paper investigates the effect of tax treaties on bilateral stocks of outward FDI. For this purpose we employ a numerically solvable general equilibrium model of trade and multinational firms to study the impact of tax treaties on both welfare and outward FDI. The model indicates under which factor endowment configurations countries gain in welfare when implementing a tax treaty. This motivates an empirical specification of the endogenous selection into implementing new tax treaties. Using data of bilateral OECD outward FDI between 1985 and 2000, we find a significant negative impact of newly implemented tax treaties on outward FDI stocks.     

Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries

The present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure. We demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications. The key variables in our analysis are intra-regional trade costs, differences in market size, and minimum wages.     

Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition

Abstract We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist's investment is known to result in subsidy inflation, two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non‐cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co‐located production, creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country‐size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.     

Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates.     

On the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization

Using a three-factor knowledge- and physical capital model of trade and multinational activity, we consider a set of policy experiments to assess the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization in general equilibrium. Specifically, we address the question of whether and under which circumstances a single versus a combined trade/investment liberalization strategy or a unilateral versus a bilateral policy change is preferable from a single country's and the world's point of view. The focus of this paper is to look at three relevant questions. First, when is investment liberalization beneficial and when is it harmful for a single economy or the whole world? Second, is pure investment liberalization a welfare maximizing strategy? Third, when is either kind of liberalization (trade, investment, or both) welfare improving and when neither of them?     

Income misattribution under formula apportionment

Alternatives to the current system of separate tax accounting, such as the proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in Europe, would apportion a firm's worldwide profits using formulas based on the location of employment, capital or sales. This paper offers a new method of evaluating the accuracy of these apportionment rules and the ownership distortions they create. Evidence from European company accounts indicates that apportionment formulas significantly misattribute income, since employment and other factors on which they are based do a very poor job of explaining a firm's profits. For example, the magnitude of property, employment and sales explains less than 22% of the variation in profits between firms, and the prediction estimates from using such a formula exceed half of predicted profits 64% of the time, and exceed twice predicted income 11% of the time. As a result, the use of formulas rewards or punishes international mergers and divestitures by reallocating taxable income between operations in jurisdictions with differing tax rates. The associated ownership distortion is minimized by choosing factor weights to minimize weighted squared prediction errors, for which, based on the European evidence, labor inputs should play little if any role in allocation formulas. But even a distortion-minimizing formula creates large incentives for inefficient ownership reallocation due to the enormous variation in profitability that is unexplained by formulary factors, implying that significant resource allocation costs would accompany European adoption of formulary apportionment methods.     

Spatial effects of foreign direct investment in US states

Abstract This paper estimates the aggregate productivity effects of Marshallian externalities generated by foreign direct investment (FDI) in US states, controlling for Marshallian externalities and other spatial spillovers generated by domestic firms. A regional production function framework models externalities and other spatial spillovers explicitly as determinants of total factor productivity. We employ a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of FDI and the presence of spatial lags. Using data for US states from 1977–2003, the results indicate that FDI generates positive externalities, while externalities from domestic firms are negative.     

The demand for tax haven operations

What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R and D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2% greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.     

Welfare, home market effects, and horizontal foreign direct investment

Abstract.  We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a fixed mass of firms, we first fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically. Comparing the equilibrium and the first-best, we secondly show that both organizational and spatial inefficiencies may arise. In particular, when fixed costs are low, when transport costs are high, and when products are close substitutes, the market outcome may well have to too many multinationals operating from a social point of view ('over-investment'). As a by-product, under-agglomeration of exporters in the larger market may arise.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.     

Migrant networks and foreign direct investment

Although there exists a sizeable literature documenting the importance of ethnic networks for international trade, little attention has been devoted to studying the effects of migrants on foreign direct investment (FDI). The presence of migrants can stimulate FDI by promoting information flows across international borders and by serving as a contract enforcement mechanism. This paper investigates the link between the presence of migrants in the US and US FDI in the migrants' countries of origin, taking into account the potential endogeneity concerns. The results suggest that US FDI abroad is positively correlated with the presence of migrants from the host country. The data further indicate that the relationship between FDI and migration is stronger for migrants with tertiary education.     

Core competencies,matching and the structure of foreign direct investment

We develop a matching model of foreign direct investment to study how multinational firms choose between greenfield investment, acquisitions and joint ownership. Firms must invest in a continuum of tasks to bring a product to market. Each firm possesses a core competency in the task space, but the firms are otherwise identical. For acquisitions and joint ownership, a multinational enterprise (MNE) must match with a local partner that may provide complementary expertise within the task space. However, under joint ownership, investment in tasks is shared by multiple owners and, hence, is subject to a holdup problem that varies with contract intensity. In equilibrium, ex ante identical multinationals enter the local matching market, and, ex post, three different types of heterogeneous firms arise. Specifically, the worst matches are forgone and the MNEs invest greenfield; the middle matches operate under joint ownership; and the best matches integrate via full acquisition. We link the firm‐level model to cross‐country and industry predictions and find that a greater share of full acquisitions occur between more proximate markets, in hosts with greater revenue potential and within contract‐intensive industries. Using data on partial and full acquisitions across industries and countries, we find robust support for these predictions.     

Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation

Abstract Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.