Wage/tenure contracts with heterogeneous firms

This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may reject outside job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may accept a wage cut. Such wage cuts are compensated by faster “promotion” rates to higher wage levels in the future. We also generalize previous arguments by showing equilibria exist where the distribution of offers contains interior mass points and find equilibrium wage/tenure contracts need not be smooth.     

Directed search, unemployment and public policy

Abstract .  We examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market, and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with Nash bargaining. Both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered, and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed. As with the random matching model, job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model. Both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified.     

Institutions and training inequality

We analyze how firm-provided training is affected by the interaction among important institutional variables in the labor market: firing costs, minimum wages and unemployment benefits. We find that the degree of complementarity and substitutability among these variables depends on employees' abilities. Thereby the institutional interactions influence skill inequality. We derive how the influence of one of the institutional variables above is affected by other institutional variables with respect to inequality in skills arising from firm-provided training. We derive several striking results, such as: (a) the minimum wage and unemployment benefits generate increasing skill inequality whereas firing costs generate skill equalization; (b) unemployment benefits and firing costs are complements in their effects on skill inequality, (c) firing costs and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill equalization, and (d) unemployment benefits and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill inequality.     

Industrial de-licensing, trade liberalization, and skill upgrading in India

We investigate the relationship between industrial de-licensing, trade liberalization, and skill upgrading during the 1980s and 1990s among manufacturing plants in India. We use a unique dataset on India's industrial licensing regime to test whether industrial de-licensing during the 1980s and 1990s played a role in skill upgrading, as measured by the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers. In addition, we assess the relative contribution of industrial de-licensing and trade liberalization to skill upgrading. We identify two main channels through which industrial de-licensing affects skill upgrading: capital- and output-skill complementarities. Using both difference-in-differences as well as regression discontinuity techniques, we find two important results. First, after controlling for the size-based exemption rule that determined whether or not a plant faced licensing restrictions, industrial de-licensing during the 1980s appears to have increased the relative demand for skilled workers via capital- and output-skill complementarities. Capital- and output-skill complementarities exist for plants in both licensed and de-licensed industries but were stronger in de-licensed industries during the 1980s, prior to India's massive trade liberalization reforms in 1991. Second, regardless of de-licensing, capital- and output-skill complementarities are generally weaker after trade was liberalized during the early 1990s. Together, capital- and output-skill complementarities contributed 75% (57%) and 31% (29%), respectively, of the growth in the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers in de-licensed (licensed) industries before trade was liberalized. After trade liberalization, these contributions were smaller. This suggests that trade liberalization may not have played a major role in raising the relative demand for skilled labor during the early 1990s.     

Directed search with multi-vacancy firms

I construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create. Within this framework, the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously, wages play an allocative role in the matching process, and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms. I characterize the (unique) equilibrium. Comparative statics generate testable implications for cross-sectional variation in matching efficiency, as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment. Moreover, allowing for ex-ante heterogeneity across firms, the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size, wages, profitability, and hiring.     

Termination restrictions and investment in general training

Conditional separation payments efficiently increase firms’ investment in general training if the latter is not directly contractible. Since training is vested in the worker on separation, a firm's return to training is zero when a match ends or, more generally, when the firm's outside return is binding. Large enough conditional separation penalties ensure that, independently from outside opportunities, the ex post situation is one of bilateral monopoly. This allows the firm to capture a positive share of the return to the general component of training in all states of nature. A fixed wage contract and large enough separation penalties ensure that the firm's investment decision is fully efficient if training is general in Becker's (1964) sense.     

Efficiency in a search and matching model with training costs

This paper studies the efficiency of the search and matching model with training costs. I incorporate productivity enhancing firm-specific skill training into the search and matching model of Pissarides (2000). I demonstrate that while the decentralized economy can be efficient if training costs are not sunk at the time of wage determination, the decentralized economy is not efficient due to a hold-up problem if training costs are sunk.     

Occupations,fields of study and returns to education

This paper considers several possible channels behind the well‐documented effect of education on earnings. The first channel is that education makes workers more productive on a given task, as in a conventional human capital framework. The second channel is based on the idea that education helps workers get assigned to higher‐paying occupations where output is more sensitive to skill. A third and final channel is that workers are more productive and earn more when they are matched to a job related to their field of study. Using data from the 2005 National Graduate Survey and the 2006 Canadian Census, I find that channels two and three account for close to half of the conventionally measured return to education. The results indicate that the return to education varies greatly depending on occupation, field of study and the match between these two factors.     

Reservation wages, market wages and unemployment: Analysis of individual level panel data

Using individual level panel data, we analyse the divergence between the reservation wages of individuals who are out of work and their predicted market wages, focusing upon identifying the factors that influence the potential divergence. In addition, using propensity score matching techniques, we explore the implications of such divergences for future employment and wages. Our findings suggest that having reservation wages that are high relative to the predicted market wage influence both future employment and future wages.     

Tenure, business cycle and the wage-setting process

We analyze the interaction between job tenure and external labor market conditions in wage determination. First, we introduce a model that combines job matching with business-cycle effects. As the employment relationship progresses, the worker appropriates a portion of the value of the match-specific human capital she accumulates, gradually becoming shielded from the cyclical variations in external labor market conditions: the employment relationship is progressively “internalized”. Then, we present empirical evidence supporting this prediction: the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate decreases with tenure. This finding is robust to different specifications that allow for job heterogeneity, and it contributes to the interpretation of recent evidence of changes in the effect of the business cycle on wages.     

Economic transition, higher education and worker productivity in China

We investigate the role of education on worker productivity and firms' total factor productivity using a panel of firm-level data from China. We estimate the returns to education by calculating the marginal productivity of workers of different education levels based on estimates of the firm-level production function. We also estimate how the education level of workers and CEO contributes to firms' total factor productivity. Estimated marginal products are much higher than wages, and the gap is larger for highly educated workers. Our estimate shows that an additional year of schooling raises marginal product by 30.1%, and that CEO's education increases TFP for foreign-invested firms. Estimates vary substantially across ownership classes, the effect of schooling on productivity being highest in foreign-invested firms. We infer that market mechanisms contribute to a more efficient use of human capital within firms.     

Respect and relational contracts

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect in a labor market context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort. We study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build relational contracts by manipulating the balance between labor demand and supply in the market. We find that a high proportion of long-term relationships have been initiated by the assignment of symbolic rewards. However, the assignment of symbolic rewards decreases when it becomes clear that the relationship is durable, suggesting that employers mainly use symbolic rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning symbolic rewards in initial relationships is less likely when there is excess demand in the market and more likely when there is excess supply, i.e., when the relationship is more valuable. Receiving symbolic rewards increases the employees’ likelihood of accepting to continue the relationship with the same employer. It also motivates them to increase their effort further but only when the market is balanced. Overall, the ability to assign symbolic rewards does not give rise to higher profits because it is associated with lower rents offered to the employees on average, leading to lower effort levels.     

Minimum wage,on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces “bad jobs” creation and prompts workers to keep their “bad jobs” by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output.     

Wages,selectivity, and vacancies: Evaluating the short-term and long-term impact of the minimum wage on unemployment

Using a circular matching model (Marimon R, Zilibotti F. Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal 1999;109; 266–291), where the wage setting is similar to Weiss (Weiss A. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. Journal of Political Economy 1980; 88; 526–538), we reexamine Card and Krueger's (Card, D., Krueger, A. Myth and Measurement, the New Economics of the Minimum Wage. Princeton University Press; 1995) intuition on the impact of the minimum wage on unemployment. In the short term, a rise in the minimum wage increases the employment level by making firms less selective. In the long term, numerical simulations show that, despite the reduction of job creation, introducing a minimum wage may lower unemployment as soon as workers and jobs are sufficiently differentiated. However, beyond some limit, the wage increase raises unemployment whatever the degree of differentiation is.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

Human capital values and returns: Bounds implied by earnings and asset returns data

We provide theory for calculating bounds on both the value of an individual?s human capital and the return on an individual?s human capital, given knowledge of the process governing earnings and financial asset returns. We calculate bounds using U.S. data on male earnings and financial asset returns. The large idiosyncratic component of earnings risk implies that bounds on values and returns are quite loose. However, when aggregate shocks are the only source of earnings risk, both bounds are tight.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

A note on the life-cycle search and matching model with segmented labor markets

Recently, there has been renewed interest in labor search and matching models that incorporate a life-cycle structure by assuming finite horizons. Existing studies provide detailed analyses on the age dynamics of job creation and destruction, assuming that workers of all ages search for jobs in the same market. This paper examines a related environment that has drawn less attention, where the labor market is exogenously segmented by age. The paper finds sufficient conditions for the model to yield unambiguous predictions on the age profiles of key variables, and compares them with the corresponding conditions in models with a single market. The paper further examines the age profiles of these key variables in the efficient allocation. In particular, with no persistence in idiosyncratic match productivity, the efficient allocation is found to exhibit monotonic age profiles for the job finding and separation rates.     

The ins and outs of unemployment in Canada, 1976–2008

Abstract This paper studies the flows into and out of unemployment in Canada at an aggregate and a number of disaggregated levels. I find that inflows into unemployment are countercyclical and outflows are procyclical. At an aggregate level, changes in the rate at which individuals leave unemployment account for most of the changes in unemployment rates in Canada between 1976 and 2008. However, flows into unemployment matter more at some disaggregated levels. There are also some differences in the contributions of flows into and out of unemployment to changes in unemployment rates across the 1981–82 and 1990–92 recessions.