Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior

We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games. We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are “mice,” behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our experimental design shows that the standard ultimatum game can mask significant inter- and intra-gender differences in strategic behavior. These behavioral patterns in strategic environments are shown to be correlated with preferences for altruism in non-strategic settings. Such gender differences could well manifest themselves in real-world large-stakes transactions, such as salary negotiations.     

Self-confidence and strategic behavior

We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the higher score wins, a player is very likely to choose to compete when he knows that his own stated confidence is higher than the other player’s, but rarely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated confidence is inflated by males when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated (by males and females) when luring (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Overconfident statements are used in environments that seem familiar, and we present evidence that suggests that this can occur on an unconscious level.     

Irreversible investment with uncertainty and strategic behavior

The paper provides a model of technology adoption in the case where adopting alone is more expensive than adopting when others have already done so (network effect). In addition, if each agent gains at the expense of his rivals, he may also have an incentive for ‘preemptive adoption’. We deal with these two issues in a dynamic programing framework, where adoption is seen as a strategic switching time decision problem for agents facing an ongoing stochastic operating benefit plus sunken investment costs. The model defines the option value of investing for a continuous time stochastic game. In the case of network benefits alone, agents follow a stationary bandwagon strategy, representing the effect caused by a war of attrition. Yet, as network benefits reduce adoption costs after an agent has switched, rivals may follow suit. In the opposite case, where going first gives the innovator a higher payoff the bandwagon rule is turned over and the option value of investing first may be lower than that of going second. This gives rise to sequential adoption.     

Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

Trust and gender: An examination of behavior and beliefs in the Investment Game

How does gender influence trust, the likelihood of being trusted and the level of trustworthiness? We compare choices by men and women in the Investment Game and use questionnaire data to try to understand the motivations for the behavioral differences. We find that men trust more than women, and women are more trustworthy than men. The relationship between expected return and trusting behavior is stronger among men than women, suggesting that men view the interaction more strategically than women. Women felt more obligated both to trust and reciprocate, but the impact of obligation on behavior varies.     

Social context reveals gender differences in cooperative behavior

A number of previous researches indicate that men prefer competition over cooperation, and it is sometimes suggested that women show the opposite behavioral preference. In the current study the effects of social context on gender differences in cooperation are investigated. For the purpose, we compared men and women behavior under two social conditions: in groups of strangers and in groups with long-term socialization—groups of friends. The differences were found in changes in the level of cooperation, taking into account the effects of mixing social and gender variables. Social interaction and communication made cooperation of group members strength and sustainable. However, men’s and women’s cooperative behavior in groups differed. Women were initially more inclined to cooperate in interaction with strangers. Men showed greater sensitivity to sociality effects. They tended to make cooperative decisions more often if there were friends in the group. Furthermore, men cooperated with previously unknown people after socialization with them significantly more than women.     

Convergence of outcomes and evolution of strategic behavior in double auctions

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic algorithm. We find that, as the size of the market grows, allocative inefficiency tends to zero and performance converges to the competitive outcome, regardless of the order-clearing rule. The main result concerns the evolution of strategic behavior as the size of the market gets larger. Under simultaneous order-clearing, only marginal traders learn to be price takers and make offers equal to their valuations/costs. Under asynchronous order-clearing, all intramarginal traders learn to be price makers and make offers equal to the competitive equilibrium price. The nature of the order-clearing rule affects in a fundamental way what kind of strategic behavior we should expect to emerge.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

Summary  The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support. Received: January 3, 1996 revised version April 29, 1996     

Culture sometimes matters: Intra-cultural variation in pro-social behavior among Tsimane Amerindians

Agent-centered models usually consider only individual-level variables in calculations of economic costs and benefits. There has been little consideration of social or cultural history on shaping payoffs in ways that impact decisions. To examine the role of local expectations on economic behavior, we explore whether village affiliation accounts for the variation in dictator game offers among the Tsimane of the Bolivian Amazon independently of other factors that could confound such an effect. Our analysis shows that significant differences in altruistic giving exist among villages, village patterns are recognized by residents, and offers likely reflect variation in social expectations rather than stable differences in norms of fairness.     

Of maize and men: the effect of a New World crop on population and economic growth in China

We examine the question of whether China was trapped within a Malthusian regime at a time when Western Europe had all but emerged from it. By applying a difference-in-differences analysis to maize adoption in China from 1600 to 1910, we find that cultivation of this New World crop failed to raise per capita income. While maize accounted for a nearly 19 % increase in the Chinese population during 1776–1910, its effect on urbanization and real wages was not pronounced. Our results are robust to different sample selection procedures, to the control of variables pertinent to Malthusian “positive checks”, to different measures of economic growth and to data modifications. Our study thus provides rich empirical support to the claim that under the conditions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China, new agricultural technologies led to the Malthusian outcome of population growth without wage increases and urbanization.     

Privatizing public services and strategic behavior: The impact of incentives to reduce workers' compensation claim duration

During the 1990s, the state of Ohio contracted out Workers' Compensation (WC) case management, incorporating a large bonus payment intended to reward reduced claim duration. The bonus is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work, excluding claims longer than 15 months. In response, duration is predicted to decrease for claims with moderate injuries and increase for some severe claims so that claimants will miss more than 15 months of work and be excluded from the calculation. I show that contractors increased duration for severe claims but find no evidence that contractors successfully reduced duration for moderate claims. However, contractors received large bonus payments. This is likely because the financial reward to merely excluding a small share of severe claims from the calculation of the bonus payment is large enough to enable TCMs to receive the full bonus. These contractor responses are inconsistent with state intentions, suggesting public entities should anticipate strategic behavior when crafting performance-based incentives.     

Leadership and gender in groups: An experiment

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study gender differences in leadership. We strip the concept of leadership down to its most basic elements. Questions of style and evaluations of a leader based on style of leadership adopted are made irrelevant. Our leader is an average player who is distinguished merely by occupying the leadership position. Legitimacy is conferred on the leader by the special information possessed. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow the better‐informed leader. The effectiveness of the leader is reduced to two simple factors: is the leader willing or not to voluntarily place him/herself in a vulnerable position to achieve an outcome beneficial to both the leader and his/her followers? Do followers trust their leaders to make the right choice? We provide experimental evidence that female leaders and followers are more cooperative than the males in most circumstances. Female leaders show a hesitation to lead in mixed‐gender environments with gender signalling in circumstances where followers' refusal to follow can significantly hurt them. The behaviour of the followers is the same toward the leaders regardless of their gender.     

Of morals,markets and mice: Be careful drawing policy conclusions from experimental findings!

Sometimes experimentalists draw far-reaching policy conclusions from their findings. However, this is dangerous if there is ambiguity with respect to the right interpretation of the results. A good example for this danger is the well-known study by Falk and Szech (Science, 2013), who conclude that “markets erode moral values”. If this were true, economists, who have emphasized the efficiency enhancing effects of markets for centuries, would have to reconsider their judgments fundamentally. In this note we demonstrate that the claim made by Falk and Szech is unfounded for at least four reasons and that their experimental results can be (and should be) interpreted, if anything, in the opposite way.     

Microfinance and gender inequality: cross-country evidence

Microfinance enables poor women to engage in income-generating activities, which helps them become financially independent, strengthening their decision-making power within the household and society. Consequently, microfinance has the potential to reduce gender inequality (GI). Case-study evidence from across the developing world both supports and contradicts this hypothesis. We therefore revisit this issue using macroeconomic cross-country panel data for 64 developing economies over the period 2003–2014. We find that women’s participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in GI. However, regional interactions reveal that cultural factors are likely to influence the GI–microfinance nexus.     

Moonlighting: multiple motives and gender differences

This paper examines the incidence and reasons for moonlighting with a focus on gender differences. The study specifies and estimates a bivariate probit model of labour supply and the decision to hold more than one job. It is found that the factors leading men and women to moonlight are similar. A wage decomposition analysis reveals that 93 percent of the differential between male and female moonlighters' wages is not explained by differences in characteristics, and little connection is found between an individual's human capital and their moonlighting wage. Finally, it is found that moonlighters are less likely to report their income.     

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence

We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed choice coincides with the optimal action given elicited beliefs. We study the relationship between first- and second-order beliefs under a coherence criterion. Weak coherence requires that if an event is assigned, according to first-order beliefs, a probability higher/lower/equal to the one assigned to another event, then the same holds according to second-order beliefs. Strong coherence requires the probability assigned according to first- and second-order beliefs to coincide. Evidence of heterogeneity across participants is reported. Verbal comments collected at the end of the experiment shed light on how subjects think and decide in a complex environment that is strategic, dynamic and populated by potentially heterogeneous individuals.     

International trade warfare: Economic and political strategic considerations

An actor government may seek to change a policy of a target state by exerting an economic toll. Trade warfare can only impose high economic costs on the target if the actor can withhold noncompetitive exports or irreplaceable markets. Economic damage may not be sufficient. Decision-makers in the target will be more concerned with their own benefits and costs than with those of the national economy. Governments seem likely to continue to use economic warfare, despite its weak record of identifiable success, because the measures are valuable as signals to domestic constituencies, the target government and third nations.     

Trends in China’s gender employment and pay gap: Estimating gender pay gaps with employment selection

In contrast to the United States and European countries, China has witnessed a widening gender pay gap in the past two decades. Nevertheless, the size of the gender pay gap could still be underestimated as a result of not accounting for the low-wage women who have dropped out of the labor force. As shown by a large and representative set of household survey data in China, since the 1980s the female employment rate has been falling and the gap between male and female employment rates has been increasing. We estimate the gap size using Heckman’s selection-correction model and bounds of the raw gender pay gap, taking into consideration the different male and female employment rates in China. The results support the view that the gender pay gap estimate is biased without taking into account employment selectivity.     

Paying for freedom: Indentured labour and strategic default

The focus of this paper is on labour arrangements characterized by indenture, bondage, or slavery, and the design of credit market policies to free these labourers. We examine bonded or indentured labourers that pay a fee to their patrons or employers for freedom from bondage in a multi-period game between the patron, labourers, and other lenders, where a labourer borrows the fee from a third party lender. Labourers are heterogeneous: they differ in their cost of committing strategic default in repaying the loan. The patron’s determination of the fee, and the possibility of strategic default by the labourer, are two key features that drive our results. Productivity gains are greatest when labourers with both high and low default costs pay the fee. However, there also exists a less socially optimal outcome where only the low default cost labourer participates. Importantly, we also develop a theory of the existence and persistence of bondage.