考虑消费者行为的零售商延保服务策略研究

基于消费者对延保服务的不同态度,研究了两个制造商竞争环境下,一个制造商提供捆绑延保服务产品,另一个制造商提供无延保服务单独产品,共同零售商针对单独产品的延保服务策略选择问题。分别探讨零售商不销售延保服务以及销售延保服务下的供应链博弈均衡,分析了零售商延保服务策略对供应链成员利润的影响。研究表明：延保服务单位维修成本较低时,零售商才会选择销售延保服务;零售商延保服务和制造商捆绑延保服务存在竞争时,制造商们竞争加剧会降低批发价格,反之提高批发价格;制造商们只希望零售商在延保服务单位维修成本较高时销售延保服务;单独产品制造商和零售商能够通过一次性支付契约在一定范围内实现帕累托改进。     

基于零售商服务偏差风险的双渠道供应链

文中建立了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两阶段双渠道供应链价格和产量决策模型,模型中零售商服务在计划期内具有发生偏差的风险。通常,由零售商服务偏差引起的相对于原定生产计划的改变可能会产生供应链系统偏差成本,进而导致供应链系统利润的变化。文中讨论了在分散决策情形下,当零售商服务存在偏差时,如何调整价格和产量以保证利润的最大化,构建制造商作为领导者,零售商作为跟随者的斯坦伯格博弈模型。研究结果显示最佳生产量在分散决策情况下存在一定的鲁棒性,只有当零售商服务偏差达到某个临界值时,制造商才需要调整生产量策略,否则只需要调整价格策略即可达到利润最大化。     

含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

在含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链中研究了供应链的协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时主导零售商的最优零售价格和服务水平,考虑了线性数量折扣契约,分析了制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

考虑服务溢出因素的双渠道供应链服务策略研究

针对由网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链,在制造商提供服务且考虑网络渠道服务向传统渠道溢出情形下,建立了零售商不实施策略和实施价格补偿策略、成本分担策略的Stackelberg博弈模型;通过制造商、零售商以及供应链系统利润的变化,比较策略优化协调作用,并进一步探讨策略实施的条件;最后通过数值模拟分析了服务溢出率和服务成本系数对供应链的影响。     

供应链信息共享的成本与定价策略

本文提出从制造商定价与零售商信息共享的成本的角度来激励供应链中的下游企业与上游企业的信息共享。本文建立了1个制造商,n个零售商的简单二级供应链模型,在一定的零售商信息共享的边际成本条件下。来制定企业利润最大化为目标的定价策略。分析结果表明：本策略可以有效激励零售商进行积极的信息共享行为：并且随着信息共享规模的扩大,零售商与制造商的总体效益也逐渐增大。     

需求扰动下含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

对含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链,研究了市场需求发生扰动后的供应链协调问题。考虑线性数量折扣契约,首先分析了需求无扰动时制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,然后讨论了需求扰动时制造商对最优批发价格的调整以及生产成本和需求扰动对线性数量折扣契约设计的影响,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

需求扰动下含有主从零售商的供应链线性数量折扣契约

对含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链,研究了市场需求发生扰动后的供应链协调问题。考虑线性数量折扣契约,首先分析了需求无扰动时制造商给予主导零售商的批发价格折扣率和鼓励主导零售商投资于产品服务的补贴率,然后讨论了需求扰动时制造商对最优批发价格的调整以及生产成本和需求扰动对线性数量折扣契约设计的影响,最后给出了算例进行验证。     

闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策研究

基于Stackelberg主从博弈研究了闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策问题.结果表明:当顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较高水平或者服务弹性处于较低水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并自己主动制定网络直销渠道的零售价格;反之,则应完全通过传统零售渠道来销售产品.而在顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较低水平而服务弹性处于中等水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并跟随零售商的零售价格来制定网络直销渠道的零售价格.同时,制造商应努力提高顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度,以主动提升在服务弹性较小时的最大利润.同时零售商的回收努力程度与产品批发价格负相关,制造商如果希望零售商提高回收努力程度以提升企业形象,应控制降低产品批发价格.     

闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策研究

基于Stackelberg主从博弈研究了闭环供应链环境下的双渠道决策问题。结果表明:当顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较高水平或者服务弹性处于较低水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并自己主动制定网络直销渠道的零售价格;反之,则应完全通过传统零售渠道来销售产品。而在顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度处于较低水平而服务弹性处于中等水平时,制造商应引入网络直销渠道并跟随零售商的零售价格来制定网络直销渠道的零售价格。同时,制造商应努力提高顾客对网络直销渠道的接受程度,以主动提升在服务弹性较小时的最大利润。同时零售商的回收努力程度与产品批发价格负相关,制造商如果希望零售商提高回收努力程度以提升企业形象,应控制降低产品批发价格。     

含有主从零售商的供应链Groves批发价格契约

研究了含有一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个从属零售商的供应链协调问题,分析了供应链集中式决策时的最优零售价格和服务水平。然后利用Groves批发价格契约来协调供应链,得出了Groves批发价格契约下制造商的最优决策、主导零售商和从属零售商的利润,并给出了制造商给予主导零售商的最优批发价格。最后通过一个算例进行分析和验证。     

竞争制造商持股关系的供应链分析

考虑两竞争制造商通过共同零售商销售替代产品的两层供应链系统,分别研究制造商未持股和制造商单向持股情形下供应链成员的决策及其对供应链绩效的影响。对制造商单向持股存在持股方与售股方都可以接受的持股成本区间,但这会损害零售商收益和供应链整体绩效,随着持股比例的增加,对供应链绩效的损害会进一步加剧。     

供应链中需求预测信息共享时零售商扭曲信息的动机分析

摈弃了以往研究中普遍采用的信息能被真实共享这一假设,探讨了在两层供应链中共享需求预测信息时,零售商进行人为信息扭曲的动机和趋势,并分析了信息失真对制造商和供应链整体利润的影响,最后指出若制造商和零售商按事先约定的比例来分配整个供应链的利润,则能有效消除此种信息失真现象。     

引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计研究

针对引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制设计问题,首先在对称信息和非对称信息下建立由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链激励机制模型,接着分析引入自有品牌的供应链激励机制均衡结果,最后对自有品牌引入前后的均衡结果进行比较。通过分析发现,零售商在制造商品牌上的努力水平始终不超过其在自有品牌上的努力水平;在对称信息下,零售商引入自有品牌肯定会使制造商受到损失,而在非对称信息下制造商可能会从中获利。     

Optimal joint trade-in rebate strategies in a retailer-led supply chain

This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.     

不对称信息的供应链激励机制研究

研究由单个制造商和单个零售商组成二级供应链,基于市场需求是线性的,且受价格与销售努力的影响。首先,研究在对称信息下,集中模式和分散模式两种情况下的供应链,求出制造商和零售商使得利润达到最优时的最优批发价及销售价;其次,研究了在信息不对称情况下,制造商的机制设计问题,得到了制造商激励批发价的表达式以及零售商的最优零售价的公式;最后利用实例仿真对模型进行分析,结果表明该激励机制对整个供应链的收益有改善作用。     

Dynamic decision and coordination in a low-carbon supply chain considering the retailer's social preference

We establish dynamic game models in a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer with social preference. This study investigates the complex dynamic characteristics of pricing decision and carbon abatement strategy in the supply chain and focuses on the impact of the retailer's social preference on pricing decision, carbon emission abatement strategy, profits, supply chain coordination, and complexity of dynamic models. We find that adjustment parameters of pricing and carbon emission abatement should be maintained in a certain range; otherwise, the system will be unstable and even chaotic through period double bifurcation or wave shape chaos. A higher social preference of the retailer is always beneficial to carbon abatement and the manufacturer and helps maintain the stability of the supply chain system. However, the impact on the long-term profitability of the supply chain is related to the state of the system. Compared with the setting of a centralized decision, the optimal carbon abatement strategy and supply chain profit in a decentralized decision are always less than those in a centralized setting, regardless of whether the retailer has social preference. Therefore, a side-payment self-executing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement. The coordination mechanism proposed in this study not only leads to Pareto improvement but also increases the stability of the supply chain system. Finally, this study enlightens management in operating a low-carbon supply chain.     

农业供应链信息系统需求分析

从农业产业构成者农户、物流商、销售商以及消费者的微观角度研究了农业供应链建设过程中急待解决的三大问题,从而围绕这些问题对农业信息系统的需求作出针对性分析,最后提出了农业供应链信息系统的基本需求及建设框架。     

The Coordination and Preference of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Time-Sensitivity Promotional Mechanism

To encourage retailers to submit orders as soon as possible, manufacturers usually launch a time-sensitivity promotional mechanism that the earlier you order, the cheaper the wholesale price will be in advance of the selling season. This paper aims to investigate if the mechanism can improve supply chain performance. A dyadic decentralized supply chain system comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer is viewed as a research framework. Initially, a benchmark model is proposed to provide a criterion-referenced for coordinating the supply chain in a non-standard distribution environment. Second, a time-sensitive wholesale price contract is constructed to confirm that the mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. However, the retailer accepts the entire forecast risk under the contract. An improved contract called a time-sensitive revenue-sharing contract is constructed based on the notion that the manufacturer shares partial forecast risk. The results show that participants can arbitrarily divide the optimal supply chain’s expected profit between the constructed price contracts; however, two differences exist between the contracts, that is, participants have contract preferences. Finally, a numerical analysis and a few management insights are given.     

The strategic effect of retailers' in‐store advertising services under product variety competition

We study a retailer service model of in‐store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in‐store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between‐firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.     

A Study of Vertical Integration and Vertical Divestiture: The Case of Store Brand Milk Sourcing in Boston

This article investigates whether a retailer’s store brand supply source impacts vertical pricing and supply channel profitability. Using chain‐level retail scanner data, a random coefficients logit demand model is estimated employing a Bayesian estimation approach. Supply models are specified conditional on demand parameter estimates. Bayesian decision theory is applied to select the best fitting pricing model. Results indicate that a vertically integrated retailer engages in linear pricing for brand manufacturers’ products while competing retailers make nonlinear pricing contracts with brand manufacturers for branded products and store brands. A simulated vertical divestiture based on real world events provides evidence for improved channel efficiency.