The impact of CRA agreements on community banks

We develop three empirical models to identify the impact of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements on the mortgage lending behavior of small banking institutions during the period 1990–1997. CRA agreements are pledges banking institutions make to extend levels of credit to targeted populations and are often used by institutions to reaffirm their commitment to the goals of the CRA. We hypothesize that CRA agreements increase the level of competition for mortgage loans in the targeted area, which in turn causes a reduction in the quantity of mortgage credit to be supplied by community banks. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, the results show that CRA agreements are associated with less mortgage lending, including lending in lower-income communities (CRA lending) and in minority communities (minority lending), by small community lenders. Evidence does not support a second hypothesis – that community banks respond to the increased competition by providing credit to riskier individuals.     

Borrower and neighborhood racial and income characteristics and financial institution mortgage application screening

Disparities in mortgage lending patterns between minority and nonminority neighborhoods have refocused attention on the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a statute designed to encourage lending by financial institutions to nearby lower income neighborhoods. Geographic disparities may derive from discrimination, neighborhood and borrower attributes, as well as regulation itself. This article examines possible spatial impacts of the CRA. Tests for differential lender screening across regulated and nonregulated institutions in five metropolitan areas provide no consistent findings of regulatory effects. The article also tests whether lower income and minority applicants are more likely to be accepted when they apply for loans in lower income and minority neighborhoods. Using data for Boston, evidence is found for concentration effects that may result from institutional factors, information economies, or regulation.     

The cultural affinity hypothesis and mortgage lending decisions

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the cultural affinity hypothesis put forth by Calomiris, et al. (1994) in the mortgage lending market. This hypothesis implies that white loan officers, because of a lack of familiarity with minority applicants, will rely more heavily on characteristics that can be observed at low cost (e.g., objective loan application measures) in evaluating the creditworthiness of minority applicants relative to white applicants. Using a cleansed sample of 1,991 loan applications drawn from data collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the results of the analysis were consistent with the cultural affinity hypothesis. In particular, we found that marginal black and Hispanic applicants appeared to be held to higher quantitative standards on such objective factors as credit history and debt obligation ratios than were similarly situated marginal white applicants.     

Mortgage credit availability in low- and moderate-income minority neighborhoods: Are information externalities critical?

This study conducts a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. metropolitan counties to inquire into the factors affecting white and minority mortgage loan approval rates during 1990–1991. In particular, evidence is sought on whether minority loan applicants are denied credit more frequently than white applicants because of information externalities. Within each county, all predominantly minority, low- or moderate-income census tracts are groupted together, and then regression equations are estimated across counties and tract groupings. Separate approval rate equations are estimated for conventional and federally insured (FHA or VA) home purchase loans. In addition, a regression equation for the percentage of applicants applying for federally insured loans is estimated.Both approval rate regressions indicate that across white tract groupings, the depth of the housing market (the number of sales of owner-occupied units during 1989) has a positive and statistically significant effect on the loan approval rate, consistent with the view that information externalities affect mortgage loan evaluations. However, this relationship appears not to hold across minority tract groupings.     

The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending

Subprime lending in the residential mortgage market, characterized by relatively high credit risk and interest rates or fees, has developed over the past decade into a prominent segment of the market (Temkin, 2000). Recent research indicates that there is geographical concentration of subprime mortgages in Census tracts where there are high concentrations of low-income and minority households. The growth in subprime lending represents an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit among households who do not meet prime market underwriting standards. Nonetheless, its apparent concentration in minority and lower income neighborhoods has generated concerns that these households may not be obtaining equal opportunity in the prime mortgage market. Such lending may undermine revitalization to the extent that it is associated with so-called predatory practices.     

Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion

Without a subprime market, some borrowers by virtue of poor credit history, unstable income, and other characteristics are unable to qualify for a mortgage. With a subprime market, there is a more complete credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer credit quality in the mortgage rate. By completing the capital market, subprime lenders reduce borrowing constraints. The result is a social welfare gain. Low-credit applicants otherwise denied funding are able to qualify by paying higher interest rates in exchange for offering more equity or lower loan-to-value ratios. This prediction is consistent with the subprime applicants financing or refinancing their mortgages at relatively low loan-to-value ratios.     

The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending

The presumption that mortgage markets for low-income borrowers and neighborhoods are underserved by lenders has led to a variety of increased government interventions on the supply side of the housing market. Although many studies of low-income lending at the neighborhood level have been published, none is from the firm's perspective. We adopt such a framework to test the twin propositions that the low-income mortgage market is no different from the non-low-income mortgage market and that the low-income mortgage market is underserved.We examine empirically whether the operating costs including credit losses, revenues, and profits of savings and loan institutions engaged in more low-income lending differ systematically from those that do less low-income lending. We find that firms engaged in more low-income mortgage lending have higher costs than those engaged in less low-income lending, which is consistent with higher credit risk for low-income loans. Nevertheless, these firms are no more profitable than those that do less low-income lending, which is inconsistent with a market for low-income mortgage lending that is currently underserved.     

Race,redlining, and residential mortgage loan performance

Theories of discrimination in credit markets suggest that under certain circumstances systematic lender bias may result in creditors holding minority applicants or applicants from minority neighborhoods to higher standards of creditworthiness than other borrowers. This implies lower default rates or smaller dollar losses on loans to marginally qualified minority borrowers or borrowers from minority neighborhoods, compared to loans extended to other similarly qualified borrowers. This study seeks to test this prediction by examining the default-risk characteristics of FHA-insured single-family residential mortgages. All things equal, empirical findings fail to support the theoretical predictions that observed default rates are relatively lower among minority borrowers or neighborhoods.     

Bank Lending to Native American Applicants: An Investigation of Mortgage Flows and Government Guarantee Programs on Native American Lands

We investigate the efficacy of government guarantee programs for mortgage loans made on tribal lands by comparing lending outcomes for White applicants and Native Americans (NAs) living on- and off reservation lands. Simultaneous equations models with the loan-to-income ratio endogenous indicate both on- and off-reservation NA applicants experience higher conditional denial rates compared with otherwise similar White applicants. NAs living on-reservation are equally as likely to be approved for mortgage loans as off-reservation NAs. On-reservation applicants self-select lower loan-to-income ratios, and are held to a higher standard for this credit variable, likely because lower housing values and other economic variables challenge on-reservation applicants. Our findings suggest lack of financial resources, lack of applicant education about and experience with the mortgage process, low creditworthiness, and lender reluctance to confront burdensome bureaucracy limit on-reservation guarantee program success.     

收入差距、信贷约束与房价变动

本文通过构建一个异质性代理人模型,刻画了收入差距通过信贷渠道影响房价的作用机制。研究表明,收入差距的缩小提升了低收入者的收入占比,使该类人群获得了更多的外部融资进行购房,由此产生了两方面效应:(1)信贷约束放松降低了住房流动性溢价,从而对房价产生负向影响;(2)收入上涨增加了住房边际效用较高的低收入者对房价正向影响的权重,从而使住房需求上升的效应抵消了此前的负向影响,最终促进房价上涨。通过对1970-2017年44个国家的进一步分析发现,相比于高收入者收入的下降,低收入者收入占比的上升在放松信贷约束和提升房价方面具有更显著的作用。据此本文认为:一方面要通过增加住房供给来化解城市化率提升与高房价之间的内在矛盾;另一方面,在经济增速放缓的时期,缩小收入差距,推动以“人”为核心的高质量城市化,并引导信贷资源向低收入群体倾斜是当前促进国内大循环、稳定社会融资规模和房地产市场的重要手段。     

CRA Lending in a Changing Context: Evidence of Interaction with FHA and Subprime Originations

This article uses a unique demonstration program to examine the interaction of CRA-related lending with subprime and FHA lending activity. Specifically, the empirical analysis identifies the extent to which the origination of a CRA mortgage substitutes for FHA and subprime originations during the period 1998–2006. The results suggest that in the years prior to the expansion of the subprime market (1998–2001), the origination of CRA loans carried a small substitution effect with respect to FHA originations, with little to no impact on subprime originations. Conversely, during the years of the subprime industry’s growth (2002–2006), CRA originations substituted at a much higher rate for high-cost originations. These findings are suggestive about the dynamic role of community reinvestment lending within the changing context of the broader mortgage market. To the extent that CRA originations carry lower foreclosure risk than many subprime products, they also carry implications for the extent of neighborhood externalities in the wake of the subprime foreclosure crisis.     

How changes in market conditions affect screening activity,credit risk,and the lending behaviour of banks

The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the lending behaviour of banks and their incentives to invest in screening and how this, in turn, affects the level of credit risk in the economy. Our findings reveal that enhanced competition reduces lending cost thus encouraging the entry of new customers in credit markets. Also, that the transportation cost that loan applicants are required to pay to reach the bank of their interest shrinks with respect to the degree of competition. We further lend support to the view that stiffer competition has an increasing impact on the level of credit risk. Notably, we find that competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity and that screening serves as a protection mechanism that can provide banks with a shield against bad loans. Overall, when market conditions are substantially distorted, this has a dilutive impact on the incentives mechanism of banks to screen their applicants. We provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of our theoretical model and the obtained findings.     

An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China

The residential mortgage market becomes a financial engine for the booming residential housing development and sustained economic growth in China. Our study provides the first rigorous empirical analysis on the earlier performance of residential mortgage market in China based on a unique micro dataset of mortgage loan history collected from a major residential mortgage lender in China. We found that while the option theory fails to explain prepayment and default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, other non-option theory related financial economic factors play major roles in determining the prepayment and default risks in China. We also found that borrower’s characteristics are significant in determining prepayment behavior, hence may be used as an effective tool for screening potential high risk borrowers in the loan origination process. Adopting a risk-based pricing in residential mortgage lending in China can improve the efficiency of the market, and enhance the credit availability to the most needed households, i.e., the younger households, blue-collar workers, lower income households, and help them become homeowners.     

三种农户信贷技术的绩效比较研究

农户信贷技术多种多样,适合不同的社会环境条件,具有不同的效率。哪种信贷技术适合中国农户的市场条件和基本经济特征?哪种信贷技术更符合激励相容的要求,更有利于提高信息利用效率,更能够提高全社会的福利呢?本文利用经济机制设计理论对传统的农贷技术、农地抵押技术和小额信贷技术进行了比较分析,主要结论是:(1)在激励相容问题上,小额信贷和农地抵押都是符合激励相容条件的。(2)在有效利用信息问题上,小额信贷技术的信息成本要高于农地抵押技术。小额信贷技术充分揭示信息需要更为复杂的合同,其隐私保障能力不足和信息空间维数过多等问题都使得小额信贷信息处理难度加大。(3)小额信贷技术是市场环境处于中等完善情况下的最优选择,而农地抵押是在市场环境比较完善情况下的最优选择。上述分析表明,选择适用的农户信贷技术并不是一件容易的事。在市场条件并不完善的情况下,即使是选择小额信贷技术,也要考虑其信息有效性问题。当然,最佳的选择是通过完善市场条件,使得农户可以通过抵押农地获得信贷资金。     

Looking Beyond Credit Ratings: Factors Investors Consider In Pricing European Asset‐Backed Securities

In this paper, we empirically investigate what credit factors investors rely upon when pricing the spread at issue for European asset‐backed securities. More specifically, we investigate how credit factors affect new issuance spreads after taking into account credit rating. We do so by investigating primary market spreads for tranches of non‐mortgage‐related asset‐backed securities issued from 1999 to the year prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, 2007. We find that although credit ratings play a major role in determining spreads, investors appear to not rely exclusively on these ratings. Our findings strongly suggest that investors do not ignore other credit factors beyond the assigned credit rating.     

Mortgage Lending,Default, and the Community Reinvestment Act

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) encourages banks to lend to low- and moderate-income individuals. This paper estimates the effect of the CRA on mortgage lending, exploiting variation in the set of banks whose lending performance is assessed in a given neighborhood due to redefinitions of Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 2003. Incorporating a typical tract into one additional banks' assessment area increased mortgage lending there by approximately 2%. Lending to low-income borrowers was particularly affected. While income-conditional default risk was little changed, CRA-induced loans were riskier than average, due to their borrowers' lower incomes.     

Government intervention in the mortgage market: A study of anti-redlining regulations

This paper addresses the question of whether economic incentives exist for mortgage lenders to avoid or to minimize mortgage originations in neighborhoods inhabited primarily by low-income racial minorities. The Option Pricing Model is utilized to determine what mortgage borrower characteristics affect the market value of the mortgage contracts. It is found that existing laws do not enable mortgage lenders to vary either origination prices or mortgage terms so as to adjust for differences in the market values of mortgages. As a result, incentives are created for both the mortgage lender and the mortgage insurer to avoid originations and underwritings in areas with relatively high default probabilities. Various changes in mortgage lending regulations are suggested to eliminate these incentives, and the effects of alternative programs to subsidize mortgage borrowers with relatively high default probabilities are considered.     

Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance

The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in number of foreclosures. The average length of time from onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded dramatically. Although most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled them to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Thus, foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default—suggesting that improvement in credit card performance during the post-crisis period would likely be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures reach completion.     

GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage Securitization

Our paper compares mortgage securitization undertaken by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with that undertaken by private firms, with an emphasis on how each type of mortgage securitization affects mortgage rates. We build a model illustrating that market structure, government sponsorship, and the characteristics of the mortgages securitized are all important determinants of mortgage rates. We find that GSEs generally—but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs implicit government backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector. Using our simulation model, we demonstrate that when mortgages eligible for purchase by the GSEs have characteristics similar to other mortgages, the GSEs implicit government-backing generates differences in mortgage rates similar to those currently observed in the mortgage market (which range between zero and fifty basis points). However, if the mortgages purchased by GSEs are less costly to originate and securitize, and if the GSEs behave competitively, then the simulated spread in mortgage rates can be much larger than that observed in the data.     

The Integration of Mortgage and Capital Markets in Emerging Economies—Evidence from South Africa

Integration of the capital and mortgage markets is an important step in moving emerging countries toward full economic development. With data from South Africa, this research examines the incremental contribution of deregulation and the secondary mortgage market to the integration between the mortgage and capital markets. With deregulation occurring in the early 1980s, the results indicate that the two markets were fully integrated prior to 2001 when a secondary mortgage market was introduced in South Africa. However, we also find that the introduction of the secondary mortgage market has significantly reduced constraints on the supply of mortgage credit.