How Banks Price Loans to Public‐Private Partnerships: Evidence from the European Markets

This article presents the findings of a recent analysis of the drivers of credit spreads in project finance loans to public‐private partnerships, or PPPs, an increasingly popular form of procurement worldwide. PPPs are project finance transactions in which project output is a function of government policy in fields such as health, transport, and education. Because of the controversy that now surrounds the use of private finance in PPPs, understanding the determinants of the cost of debt in such highly leveraged projects is of interest to policy makers as well as originators and participants in the transactions. Using a large sample of credit spreads on debt extended to PPP projects in Europe over the past 15 years, the authors' study reports that market risk is the only significant driver of PPP debt credit spreads in a large portfolio of PPP debt; at the same time, technical risks appear to be diversified “away” by the structuring of the projects. Most important, and contrary to standard debt pricing models, factors like loan size, maturity, and leverage do not show up as significant determinants of the cost of debt in PPPs, reflecting a high degree of confidence by lenders that loans will be repaid or recovered. These results support the view that the use of project finance in PPPs is premised on effective risk management as well as confidence in the private sector's ability to manage public projects.     

Innovation in public–private partnerships (PPPs): the Spanish case of highway concessions

This article identifies the factors that determine innovation in transport PPPs in Spain. Innovation is an important way of achieving efficiency but it is not an intrinsic characteristic of PPP projects. The authors describe the multiple regression model they devised to estimate innovation. The results show that PPP contracts can be designed to maximize innovation in R&D. However, there does not appear to be greater innovation in any other areas. The information provided has important implications for public service organizations considering new contracts with the private sector.     

THE SUBSTANCE OF ACCOUNTING FOR PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

This article evaluates Public‐Private Partnerships (PPP) accounting practice and the related financial accounting and reporting requirements. Governments across the world are seeking to access private finance to improve public infrastructure. Accounting for PPPs has encountered many difficulties, one of which is the practice by which PPPs are not accounted for as fixed assets on the balance sheet of either the public sector client or the private sector operator. Accounting for PPPs has grown in importance at a time of transition from national Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Under UK GAAP, both client and operator accounting adopt the reasoning – familiar from leasing standards – of the allocation of risks and rewards between the parties to determine the party which should recognize the fixed asset on its balance sheet. The gap in IFRS with regard to operator accounting has been filled by the interpretation IFRIC 12 on service concession agreements: this moves the reasoning from risks and rewards to control, familiar from consolidation standards. The UK Treasury and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) have required/proposed the adoption of the mirror‐image treatment of IFRIC 12. In most, but not all, cases, control will be assessed to rest with the client, which will recognize property, plant and equipment, and not with the operator, which will recognize either a financial asset or an intangible asset on the basis of an assessment of which party bears the majority of risks and rewards. Under both UK GAAP and IFRS, accounting policy choices are strongly influenced by, for the client, governmental control frameworks, and for the operator, by the implications for the profile of distributable profits and for taxation. An important public policy issue is that the national accounts, which for European Union member states must comply with European System of Accounts 1995, will remain on a risks and rewards basis. It is these numbers that will be used in assessments of macro‐fiscal policy and fiscal risks, notwithstanding that the Eurostat version of risks and rewards is even more open to manipulation than were the national financial reporting standards.     

Infrastructure public–private partnership project ecosystem – financial and economic positioning of stakeholders

The purpose of this paper is to construct an analytical cash flow-based project model to facilitate project appraisal of both private investors and public sector. With the help of the model that focuses on ecosystem and its stakeholders, it is simpler to identify potential conflicts usually encountered in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. The model construct is based on classical cash flow accounting and cost–benefit analysis. In the model, the flows of cash (private investors) and the flows of costs and benefits (public investors) are integrated in a single framework. The model shows that within the ecosystem the investors' (public vs. private) social, economic and financial targets are not necessarily coinciding. Prospecting of common ground and win–win situations becomes a crucial success factor for any PPP project. The paper discusses the policy and investment strategy implications for successful PPPs.     

Public private partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options

Private financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) has grown in recent decades. Together with changes in conventional construction procedures, there have been changes in the project financing model. The use of PPPs raises questions as to the role of the private sector in infrastructure provision and the conditions governing the long-term contractual relationships between the private and public sectors. In some early examples of PPPs, the government guaranteed a minimum profitability over the cash flows using a set of contractual terms which transferred some of the risk of the project from the private provider back to the government. Using a large toll road project, the Melbourne CityLink Project, as a case study we show how the imposed conditions can be treated as real options, how these options affect the incentive to invest and how the public sector may be transferring considerable value to the private sector through government guarantees.     

PPPs: Nature, Development And Unanswered Questions

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the newest and latest "new public management" development for the public services. PPPs are becoming a worldwide development, although the origins can be traced to the United Kingdom's private finance initiative (PFI), which remains the most advanced and developed form of PPP. This paper explores the development of PPPs, concentrating first on the PFI and then tracing the increasing presence of PPPs in Europe, the Americas and Australasia.     

Learning through Partnership: Private Finance and Managementin the Delivery of Services for London

This article looks at the attractiveness of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to the private sector. One of the authors works for Jarvis plc—the company has been a major participant in PFI projects and, more recently, in various PPPs in London and across the UK. The article aims to identify a realistic model of the role of the private sector in PPPs. The authors use three case studies from London to recommend ways of improving the partnership element of PPPs in order to reach a 'win-win' situation, rather than the traditional adversarial approach between private and public sectors.     

Pricing Final Indemnification Payments to Private Sponsors in Project-Financed Public-Private Partnerships: An Application of Real Options Valuation

The extraordinary global growth in the private funding of public infrastructure projects in the form of public‐private partnerships (or PPPs) is expected to have major social and economic benefits—benefits that result in large part from improving the allocation of project risks between the public and private sectors. But with the financial crisis and severe tightening of credit likely to limit the financing and delivery of new projects, both project participants and their financiers need to manage the technical, economic, legal, and political complexities of infrastructure projects more carefully, especially in less traditional infrastructure deals that involve complex operations, new assets, or emerging markets. This paper proposes and illustrates the application of the real options valuation approach to a critical feature of most PPPs: establishing the final “indemnification” amount to be paid by a public administration to private partners in the project financing of those PPPs that face substantial market risks. In demonstrating this approach, the authors use the case of the Pedemontana Lombarda toll road, a major transportation infrastructure project in Northern Italy for which financial plans have been filed and whose start is now pending. The main function of real options in this case is to capture the effects on value of the major market risk in such projects—namely, the uncertainty about volume of traffic on the new road. The authors interpret the final indemnification price as the value of a real put option sold by the awarding authority to private investors (in the case of a project that would otherwise be unprofitable and have a negative NPV). The put option takes the form of a clause in the concession contract that gives investors the right, under certain circumstances, to sell the toll road back to the government for a fixed sum (in this case, €2.9 billion). According to the authors, this valuation approach is likely to be helpful in any kind of infrastructure project that faces risk stemming from the unpredictability of market demand and future revenue streams.     

Institutional quality,investment efficiency,and the choice of public–private partnerships

We examine a sample of 625 public–private partnership (PPP) firms from 1980 to 2015 that straddle nine countries with varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets. We find that the motivations of the firms that undertake PPP investments vary. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality choose to engage in PPPs to alleviate capital constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality participate in PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment due to an abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP investments are more pronounced in economies with high institutional quality.     

Risk assessment for public–private partnership projects: using a fuzzy analytic hierarchical process method and expert opinion in China

Public–private partnerships (PPP) have been widely used in China to procure public facilities and services. Complicated problems in PPP projects in China arise because of a variety of risk factors. A proper risk assessment model is needed to identify risks and provide risk response strategies for future Chinese PPP projects. The fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (F-AHP) method provides the ability to solve complex risk assessment of PPP projects. Current risk assessment models are limited to PPP projects in specific countries and do not consider unique risks in China, especially political, economic, social, and legal risks. This paper designed a risk evaluation index system for PPP projects based on the Delphi expert investigation method, and then established an optimized risk evaluation model for PPP projects in China using the F-AHP method. The risks identified are confirmed by interviewing experts from Chinese local government departments, private enterprise, third-party intermediary consulting and regulatory agencies, and academic organizations. The results show that the risks that ranked among the top ten are closely related to China’s political and economic policies and relationships among stakeholders. It can be concluded that government authorities play a critical role in providing a favorable political, social, and economic environment and an effective institutional framework for PPP projects. Furthermore, it is also important to deal with relationships among stakeholders based on the public–private ‘win–win’ principle. This study provides risk response strategies, addressing key issues from eight aspects: an impeccable legal and regulatory framework; a central coordinating and regulating PPP authority; supportive governmental authorities; institutional capacity-building; favorable economic conditions and viability; community, partner, and moral accountability; clear division of responsibilities through contracts; and effective advisory management. These effective measures may be useful in reducing the adverse effects of risk for PPP projects in China.     

Development of PPPs IN Victoria

Governments around Australia and internationally have come to recognise that both public and private sectors have roles to play in building modern public infrastructure. Governments are increasingly turning to mechanisms known as public-private partnerships (PPPs) or the private finance initiative (PFI).₁ The nature of PPPs and the reasons governments use them have evolved over the past 20 years and are continuing to do so. This article describes the evolution of PPPs in Victoria since the late 1980s, the accounting treatment of PPPs and future developments.     

Accounting, regulation and profitability: The case of PFI hospital refinancing

The refinancing of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) projects represents one of the most contentious aspects of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the UK. The negative publicity associated with UK PFI refinancing deals is associated with several factors, including, evidence of massive private sector profit making, the failure of private sector financiers to share refinancing profits and, lastly, private sector frustration of adequate regulatory intervention in this area. Utilising a dynamic model of capital market and state interaction, this paper explains these outcomes as a function of effective private sector lobbying of bureaucratic state agencies to alter the structure of accounting, accountability and regulation with the goal of securing favourable profit and risk outcomes. These dynamics are illustrated with reference to the history of UK PFI refinancing and a case study of one of the projects where these gains reached extreme levels.     

Modelling Risk Perceptions of Stakeholders in Public–Private Partnership Toll Road Contracts

This paper investigates the risk perceptions of key stakeholder groups typically involved in public–private partnership (PPP) toll roads. Risk perceptions have an important impact on these PPP schemes for investing in public infrastructure. However, the nature and extent of risk associated with the specification of a PPP contract that commits contracting parties to deliver on their obligations remain unclear. In the context of major transport infrastructure, such as a new toll road, the often‐cited key risk to investors is the traffic (and hence demand) risk. There are, however, other risks, including political risk and media risk, the latter often causing untold harm resulting in modifications to the planned infrastructure. This paper develops a method to capture evidence on how public sector and private sector partners involved in previous PPPs perceive the levels of risk associated with each risk attribute, as a way of identifying the ex ante risk setting brought to negotiations in PPP toll road investments. Using a sample of 101 experts with contract experience in 32 countries, we develop a stated choice experiment and estimate a discrete choice model to quantify a risk profile index (RPI) to capture the perceived (relative) influence of each dimension of risk, and then identify sources of systematic differences in the RPI as a way of understanding the influence of personal traits and contextual and contractual factors.     

政府补贴和国有参股对参与PPP企业外部融资的影响

政府补贴和国有资本参股是政府参与PPP(政府和社会资本合作)的两种主要方式。本文借助一个资本具有外部性的一般均衡模型来分析这两种方式对企业外部融资的影响机制,并进行经验验证。理论分析发现,国有参股的担保效应增加了项目公司对高杠杆的需求,提升了金融中介发放贷款的意愿,使金融中介接受更低的借款利率。政府补贴不影响项目公司与金融中介之间的借贷合约。项目公司外部融资所受影响会进一步传导至参与PPP的企业。因此,国有参股增加稳态时的企业杠杆率,降低借款利率;政府补贴则不影响杠杆率和利率。实证部分通过整合2014-2018年财政部PPP项目库数据和2010-2018年上市公司财务数据,借助PSM-DID分析发现,国有参股程度显著降低参与PPP项目的上市公司的借贷成本并提升其杠杆率,但政府补贴支出没有明显作用,印证了模型结论。此外,市场化程度更高的地区,国有参股程度对参与企业外部融资的影响程度更小。本文研究对PPP模式下如何减少政府债务风险以及控制债务风险向企业转移具有一定的参考意义。     

Unbundling tolls from contracts: a new road PPP model

Considerable evidence from different countries has revealed important shortcomings in most road public–private partnership (PPP) models. In this paper a new PPP model is presented that overcomes some of the problems found in PPP road contracts. The new model is based on separating user tolls from the fees paid to PPP contractors and setting up new institutional arrangements to oversee PPPs.     

Multidimensional principal–agent value for money in healthcare project financing

Value for money (VfM) is a key parameter for the public sector in the choice between a public–private partnership (PPP) and traditional procurement, especially for healthcare infrastructure. This paper investigates the differences in what VfM means to the public and private sectors.     

Accountability and corporate governance of public private partnerships

Brennan and Solomon (2008) identify six new frontiers in accountability and corporate governance research to stimulate research. This paper contributes to such research by devising a reporting framework and research agenda that relates to Brennan and Solomon's fourth frontier, sectors and context, focusing on the regulated hybrid organisational forms of Public Private Partnerships, which operate at the interface of the public and private sectors.As the framework shows, these organisations are subject to multiple influences and demands. There is a need for more and different reporting than is the norm under the private sector's decision-useful reporting framework. Although the framework focuses on what Mulgan (2000) describes as the core of accountability, it is not only a financial reporting framework but it also seeks to make concrete Kamuf's (2007) argument that accountability might include accounting through narrative as well as the prevailing numeric evaluation.The paper stresses the need for information to be accessible to the public, and in particular argues that a stream of information between the public and private sector partners needs to be developed and disseminated to achieve accountability for public money that is increasingly spent in the private sector.     

Public–private partnership meets corporate social responsibility—the case of H-JUMP school

This paper examines tripartite public–private partnerships (PPPs), a new form of partnership between the government, business, and nonprofit sectors. Partly funded by for-profit firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) budgets, this approach reduces a government’s costs for providing a public service. Based on a case study of the H-JUMP school, a recently-formed tripartite PPP in South Korea, the authors explore the motives of each partner organization, the key factors in making the partnership sustainable, and the partnership’s social value implications.     

New development: New global health care PPP developments—a critique of the success story

Health care public–private partnerships (PPPs), where clinical services as well as infrastructure are delivered by the private sector, are coming under the spotlight as governments seek to achieve value for money in health budgets. Existing examples have been widely reported as successful. However, this article urges caution as a closer look at the evidence shows that handing over control of service delivery to the private sector is difficult to monitor and evaluate, carries cost implications which remain largely unquantified and can create additional risk.     

Commentary: Performance Audit of PPPs – Getting the Basics Right

Performance auditing (PA) is an important vehicle for assessing Value for Money (VFM) of Public‐Private Partnerships (PPPs), as well as providing assurance to the Parliament and to the public about the accountability for the supporting strategic and operational frameworks. Experience to date with PPPs in Australia has been limited and mixed in terms of results. Few projects have reached the mature stage, let alone been completed. It has been suggested that we can learn from the audit approaches and systems developed by the National Audit Office in the UK. Australian Audit Offices need to ensure that they have robust PA/VFM auditing systems, analytical methodologies and tools in place to undertake quality evaluations at various stages of a PPP, but experience to date at federal and state levels also indicates that there is still a lot to do to get the basis elements of PPPs “right”.