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1.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
2.
Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make
mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to
buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes
a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity,
or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase.
Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist.
Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian
State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26.
Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy 相似文献
3.
Ted To 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):329-343
Summary. I examine a Knightian (1921) model of risk using a general equilibrium model of investment and trade. A population of agents
with various preference types can choose between a safe production technology and a risky production technology. In addition,
the distribution of types of agents changes through a standard evolutionary dynamic. For a given population distribution,
the equilibrium is in general inefficient, however, by allowing the population distribution to change in response to market
generated rewards, the population will converge to one where the equilibrium is efficient and where the population as a whole
behaves as if all agents were risk neutral.
Received: November 7, 1996; revised version: October 20, 1997 相似文献
4.
Kevin X.D. Huang 《Economic Theory》2002,20(1):189-198
Summary. We develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets over an infinite horizon and discuss implications of this
theory for equilibrium under various portfolio constraints. We characterize a class of constraints under which sublinear valuation
and a modified present value rule hold on the set of non-negative payoff streams in the absence of feasible arbitrage. We
provide an example in which valuation is non-linear and the standard present value rule fails in incomplete markets. We show
that linearity and countable additivity of valuation hold when markets are complete. We present a transversality constraint
under which valuation is linear and countably additive on the set of all payoff streams regardless of whether markets are
complete or incomplete.
Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: February 13, 2001 相似文献
5.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
6.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
7.
Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
8.
E. Colombatto 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2006,19(4):243-260
The paper offers a subjectivist approach to economic growth and an institutional view of development. In particular, the term
development regards the prevailing rules of the game and their effects on the key variables for economic activity to take
off: property rights and productive entrepreneurship. And growth is deemed to be the result of favourable institutional environments
where chances are exploited and individuals succeed in improving their living conditions.
Methodological and normative investigation questions the validity of the recent and increasing literature on institutional
design, where institutional economics actually plays only a modest role.
JEL Codes B53, O10 相似文献
9.
Felix Kubler 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):73-96
Summary. There are a wide variety of theoretical general equilibrium models with incomplete security markets. In this paper we give
a general recipe for using homotopy algorithm to compute equilibria in these models. In many models, taxes, transaction-costs
or other market frictions introduce the additional difficulty that equilibrium prices or choices (but not equilibrium allocations)
may be undetermined. In order to demonstrate how these difficulties can be dealt with, we develop a globally convergent algorithm
to compute equilibria in a model with cash-in-advance constraints, several goods and incomplete financial markets. Furthermore
we describe how to implement the algorithm using a publicly available suite of subroutines for homotopy-pathfollowing.
Received: October 1, 1999; revised version: December 16, 2000 相似文献
10.
Jean-Marc Bottazzi 《Economic Theory》2002,20(1):67-82
Summary. In a multiperiod economy with incomplete markets and assets with payoff depending on the price history (e.g., asset and derivatives),
we show that in order to get endowment generic existence of an equilibrium it is not needed to alter settlement features such
as when payments are made and when the asset is traded. This is non-trivial as each such characteristic introduces a non-generic
subclass of financial instruments. We show essentially that expiry date payments are the only payments that one needs perturbing
(if at all). For previous periods - the P&L discovery map - is the one relevant for wealth transfers. This map transfers wealth
between one period and the next by associating to each portfolio next period potential profit and losses as a function of
the revealed information at the node. All present values involved can in general - because of backward induction pricing structure
- be appropriately controlled via expiry payoffs only. This enables us to extend two-period work and introduce Transverse
Financial Structures for multiperiod economies, where one cannot identify the payoffs of financial instruments to the P&L
discovery map (in other words we introduce some financial ingeneering for Transverse Financial Structures). We capitalize
on that difference using unexploited “maturity payout degrees of freedom” and rolling back the uncertainty tree. As an application
of this approach we prove a conjecture by Magill and Quinzii that commodity forward contracts lead to endowment generic existence
of an equilibrium in a multiperiod set-up.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: April 4, 2001 相似文献
11.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
12.
On the efficiency of markets for managers 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ján Zábojnik 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):701-710
Summary. This paper examines the efficiency of the outside labor market in inducing optimal managerial behavior in the presence of
learning. It shows that the incentives provided by the market can be more efficient than the original analysis of Holmstr?m
[6] would suggest. Moreover, under a mild additional assumption, the existence of an -efficient equilibrium can be guaranteed if a manager is patient. This result supports Fama's [4] original idea that the outside
labor market can be efficient in disciplining top managers. These results also suggest that the empirically documented low
levels of explicit incentives for managers might be due to the presence of implicit incentives provided by the outside market.
Received: March 18, 1997; revised version: April 19, 2000 相似文献
13.
Frederic Palomino 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):683-700
Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market
(OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both
v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both
speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders
use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset.
Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999 相似文献
14.
Summary. We consider a Lucas asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents, exogenous labor income, and a finite number of exogenous
shocks. Although agents are infinitely lived, endowments and dividends are time-invariant functions of the exogenous shock
alone and are thus restricted to lie in a finite-dimensional space; genericity analysis can be conducted on sets of zero Lebesgue
measure. When financial markets are incomplete, that is, there are fewer financial securities than shocks, we show that generically
in individual endowments all competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient.
Received: November 22, 1999; revised version: March 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very insightful comments on earlier drafts. 相似文献
15.
Summary. Consider a general equilibrium model where agents may behave strategically. Specifically, suppose some firm issues new shares.
If the primary market price is controlled by the issuing institution and investors' expectations on future equity prices are
constant in their share purchases, the share price on the primary market cannot exceed the secondary market share price. In
certain cases this may imply strict underpricing of newly issued shares. If investors perceive an influence on future share
prices overpriced issues may occur in equilibrium. This provides an example of strategic price manipulation in general equilibrium
models with sequential markets.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: May 15, 2001 相似文献
16.
Rupa Chakrabarti 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):393-416
Summary. This paper examines the interrelationship between capital accumulation, fertility, and growth by introducing an endogenous
fertility decision into Diamond's (1965) neoclassical growth model. Under the assumptions that children provide old age support
and that individuals incur a variable time cost of raising children, it investigates the potential for cyclical fluctuations
in the capital-labor ratio and fertility, as well as for development trap phenomena to be observed. It is shown that when
capital and labor are highly substitutable in production, there is a unique steady state equilibrium, and either damped or
undamped oscillations in fertility and the capital-labor ratio may occur. However, when the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is less than one, two steady state equilibria may exist; one with a high capital-labor ratio and a high
rate of population growth, and the other with a lower capital-labor ratio as well as a lower population growth rate. The former
is a saddle, while the latter may be either a source or a sink. In the latter case development traps are possible.
Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: December 18, 1997 相似文献
17.
Eduardo L. Giménez 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):195-204
Summary. This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner framework invalidates standard definitions
of complete and incomplete markets. Two threshold values with familiar properties arise in this constrained set-up. If short
sales are not allowed on some security, then financial markets will be incomplete in the standard sense. Beyond a particular
level of the short-sale bound, financial markets are “complete”, since the short-sale constraint is not effective. For intermediate
bounds the distinction between complete and incomplete financial markets is blurred. Although some technical definitions hold,
agents can not fully transfer wealth among states. These intermediate cases, called “technically incomplete markets”, exhibit
interesting welfare properties. For instance, the resulting equilibrium allocations may not be Pareto-dominated by those of
the non-restricted complete markets equilibrium.
Received: November 28, 2000; / revised version: November 9, 2001 相似文献
18.
Summary. This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg
leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient
conditions for existence of equilibrium.
Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001 相似文献
19.
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn
rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche
between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit
equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At
the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy
should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem
but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in
the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit
capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents
in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time
is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account
is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999 相似文献
20.
Fernando Vega-Redondo 《Economic Theory》1999,14(1):203-218
Summary. The paper studies a model of accumulation and growth where a continuum of heterogeneous firms play dynamically optimal strategies along a (rational expectations) equilibrium. The key feature of the model is that
firms' technological decisions are assumed subject to both friction and external effects. This gives rise to a wide multiplicity of equilibrium behavior, any path of sustained growth requiring that the
economy tackle a never-ending chain of fresh coordination problems. This setup is modelled as a (non-atomic) dynamic game,
suitable conditions being provided that partially characterize when sustained growth is a possible (never the unique) equilibrium
outcome.
Received: May 25, 1995; revised version: March 25, 1998 相似文献