我国家族上市公司的股权属性与公司绩效实证分析

作为公司治理的基础，股权结构有重大的研究价值。大量的理论与实证研究证实，股权结构与公司绩效存在紧密的联系。但是从现有的研究成果来看，无论是国外学者还是国内学者。对有关股权结构在公司治理中的作用及效率问题的研究还没有取得一致结论。由于我国上市公司股权结构的特殊性及复杂性，研究股权结构与公司绩效本就存在很大的难度，在这样复杂的背景下，研究更加特殊、复杂的家族上市公司股权结构与公司绩效，并取得一致结论就更加困难。     

家族高管与职业高管薪酬水平的差异及其对公司绩效的影响

本文以沪、深324家家族控股上市公司为样本探讨家族公司聘请职业高管后的薪酬水平变化及其对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明,家族高管的薪酬水平显著高于职业高管的薪酬水平;高管薪酬激励对公司绩效作用的强弱受到高管来源的影响,职业高管的薪酬激励对公司绩效的影响更显著。从而得出家族公司在聘请职业高管后,提高职业高管的薪酬激励水平可作为家族化管理的替代机制的结论。     

家族高管与职业高管薪酬水平的差异及其对公司绩效的影响

本文以沪、深324家家族控股上市公司为样本探讨家族公司聘请职业高管后的薪酬水平变化及其对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明,家族高管的薪酬水平显著高于职业高管的薪酬水平;高管薪酬激励对公司绩效作用的强弱受到高管来源的影响,职业高管的薪酬激励对公司绩效的影响更显著。从而得出家族公司在聘请职业高管后,提高职业高管的薪酬激励水平可作为家族化管理的替代机制的结论。     

美国家族公司的五大成功因素

美国《商业周刊》在美国公司中发现了一个令人吃惊的比例——有160多家公司(占标准普尔股票指数500家公司的1／3)，是由公司的创立者或他们的家族成员掌管的，而这些公司的表现，大多好于非家族公司。为了进一步了解家族公司的情况，《商业周刊》对现有的标准普尔500家公司中的家族公司进行了鉴别，并对它们在过去十年中的业绩进行了追踪。     

我国内地上市家族公司资本结构与高管激励机制的实证研究

本文以深、沪两市场随机抽取的20家直接上市和20家间接上市家族公司为样本进行实证研究发现:现阶段我国内地上市家族公司的资本结构总体上显现出“负债优先的外源性融资为主导,留存收益为主的内源性融资为辅助”的融资格局;直接上市家族公司的激励强度都强于间接上市家族公司;上市家族公司的资本结构选择主要受其上市方式和第一大股东持股比例的影响,高管(董事长和总经理)持股对其资本结构选择无显著性影响。     

家族公司及其治理--引领公司从现在走向未来(上)

家族公司必须奋斗，以期管理水平与其最大竞争对手相当。事实上，与非家族公司相比，家族公司更需要专业化的经营方式。基于其内在优势，家族公司应当建立合理的组织结构与治理结构，以实现公司未来持续发展。     

家族影响、创新与企业绩效——基于广东省家族企业的实证研究

以家族企业中的家族影响为研究视角,通过对广东省127家家族企业进行实证检验,探讨了家族成员的社会资本、家族成员管理参与度和家族成员间和谐度这三个家族影响维度对家族企业绩效和创新的影响。研究结果显示,此三个家族影响维度与家族企业绩效存在正相关,创新在两者之间的关系中起着正向的调节作用。     

家族控制，股权制衡与公司价值——基于中小企业板上市公司的实证分析

基于终极产权观，以中国2007年12月31日前在申小板上市的家族控制上市公司为研究对象，分析了控制性家族企业两权分离封公司价值的影响，并在此基础上着重分析股权制衡的治理效应。研究发现，两权分离与公司价值负相关，与控制性家族无关联的其他股东的制衡作用能有效改善两权分离的侵占效应，而独立董事难以充分发挥其监督和制约作用。     

家族控制、路径选择与公司绩效

家族化是我国民营企业的特征,家族企业控制模式差异对公司绩效是否产生影响及其路径是值得研究的问题。利用沪深A股家族上市公司2007-2014年数据,研究发现,董事长或总经理在集团企业担任高管以及借壳上市的家族企业具有更高的市场业绩,而实际控制人出任上市公司高管和集团管控有损于市场业绩;进一步研究发现,家族上市公司控制模式通过最优资本结构和产业转型升级影响公司绩效。家族企业控制模式差异对公司绩效的不同影响丰富了家族企业治理机制的研究文献,路径分析扩展了家族企业控制的研究内容,为家族企业治理机制的改进提供了思路。     

家族控制企业绩效影响研究综述

本文梳理了关于家族控制与企业绩效的研究文献,对家族控制与企业绩效研究的发展过程、家族控制与企业绩效的关系进行了回顾。将家族控制分为创业者控制、创业者后代控制及创业者家族控制三类,并对这三类家族控制的企业绩效进行了综述和简要评述,以期为相关研究提供参考。     

我国家族企业代际继承和权杖交接问题研究——基于上市家族企业的实证

家族企业已成为中国经济发展的重要力量。但学术界对其代际继承和权杖交接问题的研究却严重滞后,这不仅对家族企业经营和管理产生不良影响,而且对我国经济转型和产业结构调整等宏观经济调控造成一定的阻碍。对387家家族控制上市公司的实证分析结果显示:家族实际控制人对上市公司的控制方式对公司盈利能力和业绩有负相关关系。家族实际控制人出任公司重要管理岗位与公司盈利能力有正相关的关系。     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

Narrow‐Framing and Risk Preferences in Family and Non‐Family Firms

Building upon prospect theory’s concept of narrow‐framing, we explore family firms’ risk preferences across multiple decisions in corporate entrepreneurship. We argue that family firms’ decisions are less likely to be narrowly framed (more likely to be made as a group rather than in isolation) compared to non‐family firms. Examining the interaction between two risky decisions (internationalization and R&D investment) in two samples of publicly traded firms in the USA and China confirms our hypotheses. Family firms appear more likely than non‐family firms to diversify risk when making multiple decisions concerning corporate entrepreneurship. However, given inferior performance, risk taking across multiple decisions in family firms is positively related.     

The Effect of Family Ownership on Different Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Large US Firms

Previous research has shown that family firms differ from non‐family firms with regard to aggregate measures of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue that CSR is a multidimensional concept that comprises several aspects, which range from employee relations to ecological concerns and product issues. Based on an organizational and family identity perspective, we argue that the effect of family ownership can differ across various CSR dimensions. Family firms can be responsible and irresponsible regarding CSR at the same time. We use a dataset of large US firms to test our hypotheses. Our Bayesian regressions show that family ownership is negatively associated with community‐related CSR performance and positively associated with diversity‐, employee‐, environment‐ and product‐related aspects of CSR. The largest positive effect of family ownership on CSR performance exists with regard to product‐related aspects of CSR. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

民营企业公司治理中家族冲突的解决路径

民营企业公司治理的核心任务就是要解决企业治理和家族治理之间的冲突。以血缘和信任为纽带的家族情感与以法律和经济契约为纽带的现代公司理性本身就存在冲突。在民营企业公司治理层面,当所有权与经营权分离时,民营企业家就必须设计和探索出一条既能保障家族权益、又能实现企业有效管控的健康发展的公司治理路径。民营企业的家族商业表现同家族和睦与家族冲突息息相关。代民营企业公司治理需要在经济理性与家族情感、文化传统与现行法律、专业化运营与家族控股中找到合适的平衡点。民营企业公司在成长过程中,需要在公司治理的关键环节上进行设计和把握,从而找到家族冲突的解决路径。通过规范化与专业化的公司治理,实现企业的可持续发展。     

Family ownership and stockholder reactions to environmental performance disclosure: A test of secondary agency relationships

Using the first ever Newsweek “Green Rankings” of the 500 largest U. S. firms in 2009 as a significant historical event, we test for the stockholder reaction to ratings of corporate environmental performance. Both the conventional null hypothesis significance testing and Bayesian approaches show that stockholders react significantly more positively to corporations with higher ratings of corporate environmental performance and that this effect is stronger in family owned firms. Our findings suggest that majority shareholders do not necessarily appropriate minority stockholders' rents when investing in environmental activities, as would be the case in the presence of “Type II” agency conflicts between majority family owners and minority stockholders. The family ownership effect is also found to be stronger in dirty (heavy polluting) industries as well as in more competitive and more opaque industry contexts.     

家族企业公司治理模式对上市公司价值的影响

广东家族控制的上市公司的管理模式,主要有未聘用职业经理人、管理者和职业经理人并行,但家族控制、完全聘用职业经理人管理模式三种,目前有一半以上的企业未聘用职业经理人。通过比较三种不同公司治理模式,其中聘用职业经理人并实现所有权和控制权的完全分离是一种不错的选择;而采用聘用职业经理人但家族仍控制企业经营权的管理模式时,企业价值在总体平均上比由家族单独控制还要低。     

CEO Succession Mechanisms,Organizational Context,and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms

This article extends the literature on CEO succession and financial performance by addressing corporate owners' mixed motives and desires to protect their interest in being in business. We draw on a Socio‐Emotional Wealth (SEW) perspective to investigate how the choice of one of three succession mechanisms – relay succession, ‘horse races’ among internal CEO candidates, and hiring from outside – may effectively balance trade‐offs between corporate owners' non‐financial SEW motives and the firm's financial performance. We find that implementing one of these succession mechanisms reduces the negative impact that typically characterizes CEO transitions in family firms. We also show that family presence on the board of directors offsets the benefits of having selected these balancing succession mechanisms, in either placing too much emphasis on SEW, or creating negative dynamics that make the chosen succession mechanisms less effective.     

Socio-emotional wealth and corporate responses to environmental hostility: Are family firms more stakeholder oriented?

Do family firms care more for different stakeholders than nonfamily firms when operating in a hostile business environment? This study addresses this question and fills the existing void in family business research. It shows that family-controlled firms adopt corporate social responsibility strategies and balance the demands of internal and external interest groups to preserve their socio-emotional wealth while facing fierce competition, resource scarcity, and penurious economic conditions. More specifically, our analysis of an international sample of 956 listed firms from 2006 to 2014 reveals that family firms show a higher level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and better stakeholder orientation than nonfamily firms. Our findings are useful for managers, policymakers, and responsible investors.