Central banking,free banking,and financial crises

A Summary View In the Keynesian view, the central bank is a part of an extramarket remedy to a market malady. Investment markets are inherently unstable; government control of the economy's money supply is an important element in macroeconomic stabilization policy. The case against central banking—and for free banking—reverses the characterization of both remedy and malady. Free banking is a part of a market remedy to an extramarket malady. Even this stark reversal understates the case for free banking. It would remain valid even if we take the dramatic and chronic fiscal irresponsibility of the Treasury as given. Periodic crises that will inevitably occur in such a debt-ridden economic environment would be more ably countered by the market forces of free banking than by the policy moves of a central bank. But the extent of the Treasury's fiscal irresponsibility is itself dependent upon whether the Treasury can count on an accommodating central bank. Free banking limits the scope of this potential source of instability while at the same time enhancing the market's ability to deal with whatever instabilities that may persist.     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

How diverse are national banking systems? An analysis on banking business models,profitability, and riskiness

In this paper, we apply an algorithm developed by Martin Weitzman to quantify the extent of diversity among the business models of financial intermediaries at an international level. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the diversity of the business models of EU national banking systems and their profitability and riskiness. We show how Weitzman's approach can be generally applied to the issue at hand; as a by-product, the analysis allows us to assess whether the diversity among banking systems was affected by the imported systemic financial crises of 2007/8 as well as its domestic sequel centered on the sovereign debt crisis that occurred in 2010–12. The motivation for this paper is twofold. First, we provide an operational measure of the diversity of business models among banking sectors. Second, we enrich the economic literature relating to banking business models by providing a macro-founded analysis. To this end, we highlight the range of diversity of national banking business models correlated with high performances in terms of profitability and riskiness.     

Still unanswered quibbles with fractional reserve free banking

Anthony Evans and Steven Horwitz readily admit that their own understanding of monetary theory is imperfect, and do not even “attempt a rebuttal of [our] claims.” George Selgin accepts that some of the arguments we put forward in Bagus and Howden (2010) make for “interesting theory”. He fails to rebuff our claim that precautionary reserves are unable to constrain credit creation in a fractional reserve free banking system. While calling for us to provide historical evidence to validate the quibbles we put forward, Selgin himself overstates the evidence. He also claims that we have distorted what he has written, and that we use incorrect monetary theory. These allegations are false.     

Free banking as an evolving system: The case of Switzerland reconsidered

Selgin and White (Economic Inquiry 25:439–457, 1987) argue that during its evolution a free banking system can be expected to reach certain stages of development. This paper uses their conceptual framework to investigate the free banking era in 19th century Switzerland and makes three contributions to the literature on free banking. First, I find that the development of the Swiss banking system closely matches the stylized evolutionary path depicted by Selgin and White. Second, I argue that after the introduction of the federal banknote law in 1882, the Swiss banking system can no longer be characterized as one of free banking. Third, I maintain that the evolutionary approach offered by Selgin and White opens the door to a better explanation of inter-bank note exchange complications during the 30 years preceding the introduction of a Swiss central bank in 1907 than alternative approaches.     

On not doing due diligence: Bagus and Howden on free banking

In their recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Bagus and Howden (2010) present “quibbles” with fractional-reserve free banking. Specifically, they raise what they call “unaddressed issues” in this system, with a particular emphasis on Selgin (1988). We deem their arguments to be more substantial than “quibbles” and see them as part of a longstanding debate about fundamental aspects of monetary theory. We respond to their objections and attempt to specify how debate between the two sides might proceed more productively.     

Intricacies of competition,stability, and diversification: Evidence from dual banking economies

This paper investigates the nexus of competition and stability by introducing the interaction of diversification and competition. We use a sample of both conventional and Islamic banks from 14 dual banking economies over 2005–2016. The core finding illustrates that competition does not impact bank stability and that diversification is insignificant in the competition-stability nexus. Further, we find that concentration is beneficial for the banking stability of both types of banks. In most of our results, we found no difference in the impact of competition and diversification on the stability of conventional and Islamic banks. To put our findings in a broader context, we argue that no difference between the business models can be considered an early signal of possible convergence between the two systems.     

Do foreign-owned banks affect banking system liquidity risk?

Existing empirical research shows that foreign-owned banks play a stabilizing role in emerging economies’ banking systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this stabilizing role can be attributed to transnational banks’ access to more diversified sources of liquidity. There exists, however, no empirical evidence so far on transnational banks’ liquidity behavior and its effect on aggregate banking system liquidity. This paper aims at closing this gap. First, we look at the liquid assets holdings of transnational banks and show that in “normal” times they are significantly lower but in crises times higher than those of single-market banks. Second, we find evidence that transnational banks’ presence significantly reduces the risk of aggregate liquidity shortages in emerging economies.     

Credit quality and technical efficiency in banking

We estimate banks’ technical efficiency using directional distance functions, a generalization of the radial distance functions that allow us to credit banks for their efforts to increase outputs and decrease resource use and bad loans. We find that once bad loans are considered, banks’ efficiency increases significantly. In addition, omitting bad loans may result in the underestimation of the performance of good credit quality banks. These results suggest that a significant aspect of banking production, credit quality, needs to be considered when evaluating banks’ performances for regulatory purposes.     

The varying shadow of China's banking system

The rapid rise of shadow banking activities in China since 2009 has attracted a great deal of attention in both academia and policy circles. Most existing studies and commentary on China's shadow banking have treated it as a recent phenomenon that appeared after the Global Financial Crisis and China's response to it. In this paper, I argue that shadow banking is not a new phenomenon; it has always been a part of China's financial system since the 1980s, and arose from the need to get around various lending restrictions imposed by the central government on banks. I also emphasize that there are two types of shadow banking activities, those initiated by banks and those initiated by local governments or state-owned enterprises. I provide evidence suggesting that the shadow banking activities initiated by banks prior to 1996 helped directing credits to the more productive non-state sector and were efficiency enhancing. In recent years, however, I find that the shadow banking loans have a positive effect on real estate investments only, and their effects on investments by private firms outside the real estate sector have been negative.     

Collective relationship banking and private information monitoring in Korea1

This paper introduces the notion of collective relationship banking (CRB) as a mechanism for monitoring private information and characterizes the probability of such a banking relationship existing when the borrowing firms have heterogeneous vertical ownership structures. Using a Korean firm‐level panel dataset, the empirical results of the paper suggest that firms with smaller holding companies’ ownership stakes are more likely to choose CRB. This can be explained in terms of CRB as a means to overcome informational asymmetries as holding companies can provide indirect monitoring. The paper then addresses policy concerns associated with corporate restructuring which may create a more concentrated banking relationship with a few dominant banks.     

Economic reforms,efficiency and productivity in Chinese banking

This paper analyzes the impact of banking reforms on efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) change in Chinese banking industry. Using an input distance function, we find that joint-equity banks are more efficient than wholly state-owned banks (WSOBs). Furthermore, both WSOBs and joint-equity banks are found to be operating slightly below their optimal size, suggesting potential advantages in expansion of their businesses. Overall, TFP growth was 4.4% per annum for the sample period 1993–2002. Joint-equity banks experienced much higher growth in TFP (5.5% per annum) compared to the WSOBs (1.4% per annum).      

Environmental determinants of banking efficiency in Austria

The great majority of Austrian banks operate on a regional or local basis and only a few banks provide their services on a national or even international scale. Obviously, the market environments regional or local banks face are different from that of nationwide operating banks. Casual evidence suggests that local markets condition is a very important external determinant of banking efficiency. Thus, not controlling for market conditions may substantially bias the measurement of managerial efficiency particularly of locally operating banks. In this paper we assess the internal technical efficiency (or X-efficiency) of the Austrian banking sector with the focus on environmental and non-controllable factors critical to banking markets. Analytically, we apply a multiple-stage approach based on a slacks-based DEA model (SBM) and a censored regression model, respectively. In order to cope with the inherent dependency problem of DEA-based efficiency analysis when incorporated into regression analysis we apply a Bootstrap estimator. In so doing we attempt to overcome the dependency problem which plagues the power of standard regression analysis based on DEA processed data. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of data covering more than 800 Austrian banks ranging over 1995–2002.

Deposit insurance scheme and banking crises: a special focus on less-developed countries

This study analyzes the effect of an explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) on the probability of a banking crisis in a country while taking the country’s overall economic development into account. The panel data for the period of 1980–2003 include all the countries having the data on an EDIS. The major finding is that if the interaction between a country’s overall economic development and its use of an EDIS is not controlled for, the country’s use of the EDIS increases the probability of a banking crisis. This increase is greater the more inefficiently designed the EDIS is. However, once the interaction between the overall economic development and the use of the EDIS is controlled for, it is found that the EDIS itself is not a significant factor of a banking crisis. In that case, the less developed the country is that is using an EDIS, the higher the probability of a banking crisis.     

Estimating the speed of adjustment of European banking efficiency under a quadratic loss function

This paper investigates the speed of adjustment of cost efficiency to equilibrium level in the European banking industry. Our analysis provides for the first time insights into the process of convergence across European banking markets as measured by the speed of adjustment of cost efficiency. In particular, we employ a quadratic loss function specification based on forward-looking rational expectations to model the underlying dynamics of efficiency scores in the banking industry of the EU-15 region over the period 1998–2005. Results show that there is considerable variation in the speed of adjustment across banking systems, while over time it appears that continuing efforts to advance financial integration have led to some improvement in the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.     

Banking firm and hedging over the business cycle

This paper examines the behavior of a banking firm under risk. The banking firm can hedge its risk exposure by trading futures contracts. The banking firm is risk averse and possesses a utility function defined over its end-of-period income and a state variable that denotes the business cycle of the economy. We show that the banking firm optimally opts for an over-hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the returns on the futures contracts are negatively or positively correlated with the business cycle of the economy, respectively. Thus, the business cycle of the economy is an important determinant in shaping the banking firm’s optimal hedging strategy.     

Network efficiency and the banking system

Inspired by the Coasean “market versus firm” dichotomy, we offer a new definition of efficiency by applying the notions of network cost and network efficiency as developed in complex network theory. Network analysis is relevant for every system of interconnected exchanging agents. One such system is the banking sector. It is showed that the notions hereby presented may improve upon the results of Allen and Gale’s standard model of the interbank market, where banks exchange liquidity and where troubles in a region of the market may lead to systemic collapse.     

The welfare cost of banking regulation

The Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking sector's stability. Unfortunately, this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive, risky investment projects toward less productive but safer projects. This paper introduces banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a banking crisis is initiated by an aggregated shock (in the risky sector) in a banking system with implicit bailout, and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximal share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off, inherent in this type of regulation, between ensuring banking stability and fostering economic growth. The model implies an optimal level of regulation that prevents crises but at the same time is detrimental to growth. We find that the overall effect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when productivity shocks are sufficiently high (for example, in the subprime banking crisis episode) and economic agents are sufficiently risk-averse. Finally, we find that there is a trade-off between regulating the economy upfront (i.e. before the shock) and facing the challenge of making a huge bailout after the crisis.     

The robust political economy of central banking and free banking

This paper uses robust political economy to assess whether free banking or central banking can better use its institutional structures to minimize macroeconomic disequilibrium. Robust frameworks leverage their incentives, reward structures, and epistemic resources to achieve monetary policy objectives. We relax the assumptions of political pressure, self-interest, and the degree of decision makers’ knowledge to see which arrangements are more robust.     

Dynamic optimal control of pollution abatement under emissions permit banking

In a recent work, Dragone et al. (2010) modeled an optimal control model of pollution abatement, and investigated the adoption of a tax levied on the firm's instantaneous contribution to the accumulation of pollution. In this paper, we extend the work of Dragone et al. (2010) by providing a dynamic optimal control model of pollution abatement with emissions permits banking, where the firm is allowed to purchase, sell and bank emissions permits given a finite planning horizon of length. Our objective is to find the optimal levels of the production, the pollution abatement investment and the quantity of emissions permits bought or sold in continuous time through the use of optimal control theory. We illustrate the results with a numerical example.