共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 421 毫秒
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利他行为对自利人性假设的挑战,要求经济学必须把偏好进行内生化处理。笔者首先构建了一个利他偏好内生模型,使得人类行为统一于效用最大化模式并具有了内在一致的规律性和可预测性;然后对利他偏好内生模型的合理性进行了解释。笔者认为,与利己行为不同,行为主体不是从利他行为后果而是从利他行为本身获得效用;通过整体间的生存适应性补偿机制,利他者不仅可以战胜利己者得以存在和持续,而且利他惩罚行为还为人类走出囚徒困境提供了有力的保证。 相似文献
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辛普森悖论与利他行为的进化 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
利他行为是自然界和人类社会中广泛存在的现象。但长期以来人们无法解释对行为者本身不利的利他行为如何能避免在自然选择中被淘汰。群体选择理论对此提出了一个解释,即尽管由于利他者相对于利己者处于不利的位置,利他者在每一个群体中的频率都会下降,但利他者在总体中的频率却有可能上升。这种看似不可能的现象被称为辛普森悖论。通过对辛普森悖论的阐述,建立了一个群体选择模型,运用模型的结果对正处于社会转型期的我国片面注重个体利益,忽视集体利益的现状进行了分析。 相似文献
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利他行为的“道德人”分析 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
人们普遍认为,利他主义有三种表现形式:即亲缘利他、互惠利他和纯粹利他;而人的行为动机有两种:利己和利他。单纯从利己动机来各种解释利他行为存在着贫困性,引入“道德人”概念则可以对动机上无论是利己还是利他的利他行为有一个统一的解释。 相似文献
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利他行为及其经济学意义——兼与叶航等探讨 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文指出了叶航(2005)和叶航、汪丁丁、罗卫东(2005)建立的“利他行为演化均衡”模型的错误,重新梳理了利他行为与经济学的关系。现代经济学的分析框架并不排斥利他偏好,利他行为难以进入经济学实证分析,主要是由于利他行为难以量化。人类利他行为是生物进化和社会发展的综合产物,道德情感和道德规范在其中起了关键性的作用,但这并不妨碍经济学把利他偏好当作人性的一部分。经济学可以通过解释道德情感的进化根源、道德规范的形成机制以及道德规范对个人行为方式的影响,来解释人为什么有利他行为。 相似文献
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人们的利他行为是存在且普遍的,对提高效用具有显著作用。研究利他行为不仅具有一定的学术价值,还对政策制定有指导意义。梳理近年来与利他行为动机、理论和实证相关的研究发现:动机上,行为经济学者直接利用被试在现实生活中的社交网络来探讨人们利他行为的动机,区分了普遍利他动机、针对特定人群的定向利他动机和未来互惠动机。理论上,基于复杂社会网络的研究打破了简单模型的局限,加深了对利他行为的理解。实证上,学者们在慈善捐赠、公共品提供、社会规范、利他行为人等方面对利他行为做了大量分析。综合而言,后续研究可从利他行为与社会网络动态变化的关系、实证与理论结合、中国情景下的探讨、解释现实问题等方面拓展。 相似文献
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传统的经济学理性是点理性,容易陷入非此即彼的极端——要么是理性的,要么是非理性的。如此,便丝毫不能容纳利他行为,除非将利他行为纳入利己框架中,而用利己统一利他又备受垢病。本文的分析表明,经济学理性是层次理性,是区间理性。传统经济学理性假定是初级层次的,其内涵必须随社会进步予以拓宽;中级层次的理性行为的下限是利己不损人,上限取决于一个社会公认的道德境界。利他行为并非如传统经济学所认为的不理性,它是高级层次的理性。 相似文献
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Edmund H. Mantell 《International Review of Economics》2018,65(4):421-447
In order to fully understand the interaction between selfish and non-selfish actors, social scientists need rigorous formal models of other-regarding preferences. While the current models clearly present progress relative to the self-interest approach, the evidence also makes it clear that further theoretical progress is warranted. There is ample opportunity for improving our understanding of other-regarding behavior. This paper develops a theory of economic altruism entirely compatible with self-interest utility maximization by rational individuals. Sympathy arises when someone is interested in improving somebody else’s condition, and this will also enhance the utility of the one who acts. Construed in that way, sympathetic behavior is essentially self-interested behavior. A question addressed in this paper is whether a sympathetic population of individuals will exert their income-producing labor differently than a population of egoistic individuals. Two parameters suffice to characterize the altruistic conduct of an individual: a parameter governing the individual’s ranking in a social hierarchy and a parameter determining the sensitivity of an individual’s sympathy for others at different social ranks. The main testable implication of the theory is that in a large population, where each individual has a concave utility function embodying sympathy, the altruistic behavior of any specific individual is determined by his rank in the social hierarchy. A second implication is that in a horizontal social hierarchy, the most altruistic people in the population are those in the middle of it. 相似文献
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Terence C. Burnham 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2001,3(2-3):123-148
Economists and biologists have long grappled with the apparent contradiction of altruism in a naturally-selected world. Standard
economic models are built upon an assumption of material self-interest where agents maximize individual outcomes without regard
for the effects on others. This paper begins with a brief discussion of the evidence that human behavior deviates from the
economic assumption. With the goal of more accurately describing human nature, the interpersonal components of preferences
are derived in a genetic model. This model predicts a variety of behaviors that are considered paradoxical within the standard
economic framework. The optimal attitude towards others is parameterized by the genetic relationship between individuals and
by the population size. For interactions between ‘average’ individuals, the standard economic assumption is the limiting case
of the genetic model as the population becomes arbitrarily large.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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An important problem in theoretical biology is to explain how altruism can have positive selection value. We model socialization as a costly public good that raises altruism and we study evolution equations for altruistic preferences. Stable cultural (social) equilibria exist in which socialization is supplied privately and property rights exist without civil government. In equilibrium, agents are altruistic in ways not explained by traditional biological theories. The theory essentially formalizes the story in Adam Smith'sTheory of Moral Sentiments. 相似文献
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《Journal of public economics》2007,91(7-8):1231-1246
The recent literature on the endogenous formation of preferences has emphasized that while some preferences are more conducive to growth than others, economic growth also contributes to the formation of particular tastes [Becker, Gary S. (1996): Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press]. In this paper, we construct a neoclassical growth model where intergenerational altruism can be endogenously reinforced and entails costly sacrifices on the part of parents to acquire such trait. While the incentives to acquire altruistic traits depend on the economic conditions, in turn altruism determines the level of intergenerational bequests and ultimately the pace of capital accumulation and economic growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers are driven by a natural degree of altruism at earlier stages of economic growth. Once individuals have satisfied their own physiological constraint in the course of economic development, they devote resources to shaping their altruistic preferences, increasing their social degree of altruism above its natural level. This in turn increases the share of intergenerational transfers and speeds up economic growth. 相似文献
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This paper continues the development of a theoretical foundation for measuring ‘altruistic’ behaviour with respect to tax versus expenditure preferences in three specific spheres: health, education and welfare payments. Particular emphasis is placed on analysing the choice theoretic calculus that underlies individual preferences. Using this theoretical foundation, econometric techniques allow progress to be made in measuring the characteristics of the underlying utility function. The empirical work relates to the UK and confirms that both self-interest and public interest (with a slight emphasis on the latter) determine overall preferences. The implications of this for the public choice school are then examined. 相似文献
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Maria Alejandra Velez John K. Stranlund James J. Murphy 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2009,70(3):485
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and preferences for altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformity. Using data from experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia that depend critically on a local fishery, we test whether an econometric summary of the subjects’ pure Nash strategies is consistent with one or more of these models. We find that a model that balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. 相似文献
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This paper compares contributions to an experimental public good across the United States and Czech Republic, using a design
that allows us to distinguish between altruism and decision error. Czech subjects contribute significantly more than American
subjects, and further analysis reveals that this result cannot be attributed to the confounding effects of gender or decision
error. Instead, preferences for altruism appear to differ across groups: Czechs are more altruistic than Americans and men
are more altruistic than women. 相似文献
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《Research in Economics》2014,68(1):27-38
Motivated by the recent experimental evidence on altruistic behavior, we study a simple principal–agent model where each player cares about other players' utility, and may reciprocate their attitude towards him. We show that, relative to the selfish benchmark, efficiency improves when players are altruistic. Nevertheless, in contrast to what may be expected, an increase in the degree of the agent's altruism as well as a more reciprocal behavior by players has ambiguous effects on efficiency. We also consider the effects of the presence of spiteful players and discuss how monetary transfers between players depend on their degrees of altruism and spitefulness. 相似文献
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Lucy F. Ackert Ann B. Gillette Jorge Martinez-Vazquez Mark Rider 《Experimental Economics》2011,14(3):307-321
We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features
of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in
a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age.
Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context.
Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution
game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences. 相似文献