Fiscal discipline in the European monetary union

This paper explores the question of how national fiscal policies could be conducted within the European Monetary Union. The discussion touches upon this issue in relation to the theory of optimum currency areas; presents the debt sustainability issue in the context of a monetary union; examines briefly the determinants of debt dynamics; and interprets the restraints imposed on national fiscal policies by the Maastricht Treaty. The tentative conclusion is that the creation of the EMU will be associated with smaller size national government sectors.Invited Address at the Thirty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Athens, Greece, March 8–15, 1994. Financial support by the Economic Research Center of the Athens University of Economics and Business is gratefully acknowledged.     

The European exchange rate mechanism and the European monetary union

Summary This article addresses two central questions related to the prospects of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe: first, is the current exchange rate mechanism viable in the transition stage to EMU or in the period to come if the EMU should be postponed? Second, is a monetary union necessary in an economically fully integrated European Union or would the current or an alternative exchange rate mechanism suffice an integrating Europe? The article reviews the arguments for and against monetary union, the history of European monetary integration, the theoretical and empirical insights into the functioning of targets zones, and the likely developments and prospects for the EMU.The author wishes to thank Martin M.G. Fase and Simon K. Kuipers for their most helpful comments on a previous version of this article.     

Assessing the costs of European monetary union

Much has been made of the importance of asymmetric shocks in arguing against European Monetary Union (EMU). But such shocks are entirely consistent with better monetary policy under EMU. A single money represents the perfect answer to asymmetric shocks coming from currency substitution. In addition, many asymmetric shocks cannot properly be handled through monetary policy; others will not be so because of information problems; still others because of policy mistakes. Some strategic factors also favor EMU if shocks are symmetric. Finally, doubts about the effectiveness of monetary policy in Europe should be kept in mind. On these numerous grounds, little weight can be assigned to criticisms of EMU based on mere asymmetry in the shocks. Distinguished Address presented at the Forty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference, Paris, France, March 12–19, 1996.     

Internal devaluation in a monetary union

Reversing significant cumulative losses in competitiveness has emerged as a core challenge in some Eurozone countries. This brief note takes a closer look at one episode of successful internal devaluation, the experience of the new states following German reunification. The case suggests that substantial cumulative competitiveness gains are possible but require significant time. The case further points to relative productivity gains—and hence to structural reforms—as an important aspect of the adjustment process.     

A New Keynesian model for analysing monetary policy in Mainland China

This paper adopts a four-equation New Keynesian model to evaluate the appropriateness of China's monetary policy framework. Our simulation results show that a hybrid rule that uses both interest rate and quantity of money as instruments outperforms the rules using one instrument alone at the current stage of economic and financial market development. Our analysis also shows that a sharp appreciation of the renminbi exchange rate, though effective in containing inflation pressures, would be quite disruptive to growth.     

Reserve requirements,currency substitution,and seigniorage in the transition to European monetary union

This article considers a transition toward European monetary union that combines increased substitution of currencies and greater monetary, financial, and fiscal policy coordination. It explores how such a transition would affect national inflation and interest rates and required reserve ratios when governments depend in part on seigniorage funding for public expenditures. We find that greater coordination of policies would lead to lower inflation and interest rates but higher reserve-requirement ratios. Because higher reserve-requirement ratios could place European banks at a competititve disadvantage, we conclude that the interaction between reserve requirements and seigniorage concerns makes it less likely that the gradualist approach of the Maastricht treaty is a sustainable means of transition to European union.     

The euro and the monetary union

The Eurosystem established a single monetary policy and has the three guiding principles of independence, transparency, and decentralization. These three principles helped to successfully formulate and implement the euro on 1 January 2002. Major criticisms against establishment of the euro failed to come true and, in fact, the euro has quickly become a major currency in the world. Challenges facing continued success of the euro include structural reforms, financial stability, and the accession of new members to the EU and EMU. TheRobert A. Mundell Distinguished Address presented at the Fifty-Third International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 13–17, 2002, Paris, France.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

Deep habits and the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks

We introduce deep habits into a sticky-price sticky-wage economy and examine the resulting models ability to account for the impact of monetary policy shocks. The deep habits mechanism gives rise to countercyclical markup movements even when prices are flexible and interacts with nominal rigidities in interesting ways. Key parameters are estimated using a limited information approach. The deep habits model can account very precisely for the persistent impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate consumption and for both the price puzzle and inflation persistence. A key insight is that the deep habits mechanism and nominal rigidities are complementary: the deep habits model can account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shock at low to moderate levels of nominal rigidities. The results are shown to be stable over time and not caused by monetary policy changes.     

Symmetric and asymmetric persistence of labor market shocks

Within the insider-outsider paradigm, this paper examines persistence of shocks in the labor market. We distinguish “symmetric persistence” where the extent of persistence is independent of the initial direction of the shock, and “asymmetric persistence” where beneficial and adverse shocks of equal magnitude have effects of different size. The paper offers a theoretical rationale for how the symmetry or asymmetry may depend on the extent to which the shock was anticipated in wage setting and then develops a framework in which the possibility of asymmetric persistence can be tested empirically. Using annual UK data, we obtain empirical evidence of significant asymmetry in the response of employment (and wages) to shocks. Small beneficial shocks are reflected entirely in wage increases, although sufficiently large favorable shocks also elicit increases in employment. In contrast, adverse shocks lead to reductions in both wages and employment. Evidence from Japan and West Germany provides some evidence of the presence of asymmetry, although this is less marked than in the United Kingdom. The policy implications are discussed.     

Analysis of a monetary union enlargement in the framework of linear-quadratic differential games

This paper studies the effects of a monetary union enlargement using the techniques and outcomes from an extensive research project on macroeconomic policy coordination in the EMU. Our approach is characterized by two main pillars: (i) linear-quadratic differential games to capture externalities, spillovers and strategic behaviour of (fiscal and monetary) players; and (ii) endogenous coalition formation concepts which enable us to study a creation and stability of different cooperation arrangements. In this paper we focus on the first pillar and construct a multi-player linear-quadratic continuous-time model of 5 countries and 4 central banks to evaluate effects of accession of a new member to an existing MU. Our findings stress the importance of an asymmetric shock confirming basic results of the OCA theory. It comes out that in our setting it is never profitable to enlarge the monetary union when there is a risk of an asymmetric shock. What is more, the potential losses from accession are so high that it can be barely possible to design a transfer system to compensate for a worse situation of some countries.

The economics of convergence: Towards monetary union in Europe

The Economics of Convergence: Towards Monetary Union in Europe. —In this paper, the literature on monetary integration has been surveyed in order to discover the economic rationale of the Maastricht convergence requirements. The traditional theory of optimum currency areas is silent on the need for Maastricht-type convergence requirements. Similarly, the “new” view of monetary integration using credibility concepts cannot easily be used to justify these convergence requirements. It is also argued that the dynamics of the convergence requirements will almost certainly lead to a “Great Divide” of the European Union. The paper concludes that less emphasis should be put on prior convergence conditions and more on strengthening the functioning of the future monetary institutions in the Union.     

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.     

Credibility and monetary policy in a model with growth

We examine the implications for monetary policy design of includinglearning-by-doing effects in a macroeconomic model. We showthat an inflation bias arises because monetary surprises maybe exploited to maximise potential output by temporarily raisingthe rate of human capital accumulation. Our model also providesan alternative explanation for the empirical evidence linkinginflation and growth, where the causal link goes from slow growthto high inflation. Unlike traditional credibility models, aninflationary bias can persist even when the authorities do notwish to offset labour market distortions through monetary surpriseswhich undercut the median voter's income.     

European monetary unification and the eurodollar market

Zusammenfassung Europ?ische W?hrungsintegration und der EurodollarMarkt. — In diesem Aufsatz wird ein Portfolio-Modell konstruiert und verwendet, um die Wirkung einer europ?ischen W?hrungsintegration auf den Eurodollar-Markt zu analysieren. Die Untersuchung geht von festen Wechselkursen aus und konzentriert sich auf internationale Investitionsentscheidungen, wie sie von Grubel, Rich, Spraos, Tsiang und White verwendet werden. In einem solchen Rahmen verringert die Bildung einer W?hrungsunion das Wechselkursrisiko zwischen den beteiligten Staaten. Das Modell liefert kurzfristige, komparativ-statische L?sungen für eine Welt mit drei L?ndern, von denen nur zwei dem Integrationsraum angeh?ren. Für eine derartige Integration gibt die Studie die Ver?nderungen des Eurodollar-Zinssatzes und der Terminkurse der drei W?hrungen an. Die Ergebnisse zeigen zum einen, da\ die W?hrungsintegration die Gr?\e des Eurodollar-Marktes vermindert, weil das innereurop?ische Risiko sinkt, und zum anderen, da\ die Integration aber auch eine unbestimmte Ver?nderung des Zinssatzes auf dem Eurodollar-Markt bewirkt. In der Untersuchung der Zahlungsbilanz der einzelnen L?nder wird die Entwicklung aufgeteilt in: (1) die Verteilungswirkungen innerhalb der W?hrungsunion unter der Voraussetzung des unver?nderten Eurodollar-Zinssatzes und (2) die Zahlungsbilanzwirkungen aufgrund einer ?nderung dieses Zinssatzes. Mit Hilfe dieser Kategorien und nach Festlegung der Beziehungen zwischen den Zinss?tzen vor Bildung der W?hrungsunion werden dann die Zahlungsbilanzen analysiert.

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Résumé L’unification monétaire européenne et le marché d’eurodollar. — Cet article construit et emploie un modèle de portefeuille pour analyser l’effet de l’unification monétaire européenne sur le marché d’eurodollar. L’investigation assume des taux de change fixes et se concentre sur les décisions d’investissement international comme presentées par Grubel, Rich, Spraos, Tsiang et White. Sous ce cadre l’unification monétaire conduit à une réduction du risque de taux de change parmi les pays unifiants. Le modèle presente des conclusions comparatives statiques à court terme dans un monde de trois pays — deux pays unifiants et un pays non-unifiant. Sous les conditions d’une telle unification l’étude analyse les changements du taux d’intérêt d’eurodollar et des trois taux de change à terme. Les résultats indiquent que l’unification monétaire réduit l’extension du marché d’eurodollar parallèlement à la diminution du risque intraeuropéen, mais cause un changement indéterminé du taux d’intérêt d’eurodollar. Concernant la balance des paiements de chaque pays l’investigation divise les mouvements dans deux parts: (1) les effets des distribution parmi une union monétaire présumant que le taux d’intérêt d’eurodollar reste invarié et (2) les effets de la balance des paiements qui résultent d’un changement du taux d’intérêt d’eurodollar. En utilisant ces catégories et en spécifiant les relations de taux d’intérêt avant l’union, nous puis analysons la balance des paiements.

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Resumen La unificatíon monetaria europea y el mercado del eurodólar. — En este artículo se construye y se emplea un modelo de portafolio para analizar el impacto de la unificaeión monetaria europea sobre el mercado del eurodólar. La investigación asume tasas de cambio fijas y se centra sobre las decisiones internacionales de inversión tal como son presentadas por Grubel, Rich, Spraos, Tsiang y White. Dentro de este marco, la unificaeión monetaria tiende a reducir el riesgo cambiario entre paises que se unifican. El modelo presenta conclusiones estático comparativas de corto plazo en un mundo de tres países — dos países que se unifican y un país que no se unifica. Dada tal unificatión, el estudio traza los cambios en la tasa de interés del eurodólar y las tres tasas de cambio a futuro. Los resultados indican que la unificación monetaria reduce el tama/~no del mercado del eurodólar en la medida que el riesgo intraeuropeo declina, pero causa un cambio indeterminado en la tasa de interés del eurod?lar. En cuanto a la balanza de pagos de cada país, la investigation divide los movimientos en dos partes: (1) los efectos de distributión dentro de la unión monetaria, asumiendo que la tasa de interés del eurodólar permanece inalterada y (2) los efectos de la balanza de pagos debido a un cambio en la tasa de interés del eurodólar. Usando estas categorías y especificando las relaciones de las tasas de interés de pre-union se analizan las balanzas de pagos.

     

Restructuring European union trade with central and eastern European countries

Central and eastern European countries (CEECs) participate in the European economy with trade shares of the European Union (EU) and levels of intraindustry trade comparable to peripheral EU countries. However, the opening of CEECs has induced increased specialization in EU countries, which contrasts with the development in previous decades. This partially explains the cautious approach to the eastward enlargement in the EU. Furthermore, CEECs are more similar to each other than to EU countries. The pattern of the CEECs' trade with the EU resembles that of Turkey. Trade diversion is likely to present a significant burden for countries omitted from the first wave of the enlargement.