OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

中国外汇冲销干预和货币政策独立性研究

2002年以来,中国国际收支"双顺差"加剧,外汇储备急剧增长,货币供应量增长,通货膨胀压力凸现。为了稳定人民币汇率和抑制通货膨胀,中央银行采取了一系列外汇冲销干预措施。文章在分析外汇冲销干预有效性理论的基础上,分析外汇储备急剧增长下外汇冲销干预的效力和制约因素,认为外汇冲销干预短期内能抵消外汇占款、控制信贷增长,但效力有限;在长期内,外汇冲销干预不仅会影响货币政策独立性,还可能导致通货膨胀、利率上升、汇率升值乃至经济"滞胀",因而难以具有可持续性,最后,文章提出加强外汇储备管理,增强外汇冲销干预效力和货币政策独立性的政策建议。     

Monetary Disequilibrium, Endogenous Money, Stability and the Determinacy of Inflation

This paper examines the stability of the disequilibrium money model, with endogenous money and transitory interest rate control by the Central Bank. In the tradition of the post-Keynesian literature, the money supply is determined by bank lending and disequilibrium between money demand and supply determines the business cycle. The rate of interest is assumed to react to an inflation target and inflation responds to the business cycle. The paper examines the stability of the model under three inflation response systems: the accelerationist model, adaptive expectations and rational expectations.
(J.E.L.: E3, E4, E5).     

中国货币供给与通货膨胀的关联性研究

关于货币供给与通货膨胀的关联性,学者们还没有形成一致的看法.理论上,货币供给与通货膨胀具有一定的关联性.通货膨胀有需求拉动型和成本推动型,在通货膨胀的原因中有“货币因素”,也有“非货币因素”.实证检验表明:中国货币供应量与物价指数不存在长期的稳定均衡关系,但货币供应量是物价指数的格兰杰原因,反之则不然.事实上,中国通货膨胀或通货膨胀压力一方面是与货币供给有关,另一方面还与结构性因素有关.因此,要实现中国经济的低通胀运行:一是实行总量均衡和结构合理的货币供给模式;二是采取更有效的货币政策;三是推进经济结构调整,实现国际收支平衡;四是深化金融体系改革,增强中央银行货币控制能力;五是进行汇率机制改革;六是通过财政政策调整供需结构.     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

Central bank instruments, fiscal policy regimes, and the requirements for equilibrium determinacy

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s results for interest rate feedback rules [Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2001. Monetary policy and multiple equilibria. American Economic Review 91, 167–185], the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for one with inflation when the primary surplus is raised with public debt. Under an exogenous primary surplus, money supply should be accommodating—such that real balances grow with inflation—to ensure local equilibrium determinacy. When the central bank links the supply of money to government bonds by controlling the bond-to-money ratio, an inflation stabilizing policy can be implemented for both fiscal policy regimes. Local determinacy is then ensured when the bond-to-money ratio is not extremely sensitive to inflation, or when interest payments on public debt are entirely tax financed, i.e., the budget is balanced.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries

We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.     

Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data

It has long been held that central bank independence (CBI) from political control is a necessary requirement to curb inflation. In recent times, however, this long held belief has been challenged. Using a recently compiled panel data set on central bank independence measures, the proposition that greater CBI leads to lower inflation is tested, using latent variable analysis. The use of this alternative econometric technique, along with two additional indicators that capture more appropriately the degree of de facto independence, leads to empirical results that are highly supportive of the negative relationship between CBI and inflation, thereby restoring faith in the conventionally held wisdom, that greater CBI is needed to lower inflation.     

Money,prices and causality: monetarist versus structuralist explanations using pooled country evidence

The direction of causality between changes in money supply and aggregate prices has long been a matter of controversy between structuralists and monetarists. This paper addresses deficiencies in this literature in three ways. First, a large sample of countries with alternate measures of money and price variables is used to evaluate the evidence on money, inflation and causality. Second, combined data are tested for causality, with the combinations based on variables suggested by the literature - level of per capita income, magnitude of inflation, degree of financial market development, and independence of the central bank. Finally, because the choice of lag length is often arbitrary, results are generated with varying lags and consistency across different lag periods looked for. Two presentation methods are developed - categorical and graphical. Evidence of structural inflation, was found only in Chile and Sri Lanka. Evidence of money supply exogeneity on the other hand was found to be strongest in Kuwait, Paraguay and the USA. Most countries exhibited mixed evidence of money supply endogeneity, with bidirectional causation between money supply and aggregate prices a common result.     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY DISCIPLINE ON BUDGETARY OUTCOMES

This article extends the model of Von Hagen and Harden that analyzed the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes. We modify the model by adding monetary discipline to interact with fiscal discipline in order to analyze the effects of both on budgetary outcomes. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents internalizing the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, empirical findings also support these predictions. ( JEL D73, E58, H61, H72)     

INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period monetary policy before the fiscal authority joins the policy‐making game. If the central bank would like the fiscal authority and the public to believe that it is wet (dry), the central bank would distort the money supply upward (downward) in order to reveal its actual type.     

Central bank communication on fiscal policy

The issue of central bank communication on fiscal policy has so far received very little attention in the literature. This article aims to shed light on the determinants of central bank communication on fiscal policy by analysing the intensity of central banks’ fiscal communication for five central banks (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank) over the period 1999–2011. The ECB communicates intensively on fiscal policies, in a normative way. The other central banks emphasise foreign fiscal developments, fiscal policy as input to forecasts, or the use of government debt instruments in monetary policy operations. The empirical analysis indicates that the financial crisis has overall increased the intensity of central bank communication on fiscal policy. The evolution of the government deficit ratio is a driver of the intensity of fiscal communication in the euro area, the US and Japan, and for Sweden since the start of the crisis, while in the UK its intensity is related to government debt developments as of the start of the crisis.     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Debt,inflation and central bank independence

Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions.     

Understanding policy in the great recession: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

I use the valuation equation of government debt to understand fiscal and monetary policy in and following the great recession of 2008–2009. I also examine policy alternatives to avoid deflation, and how fiscal pressures might lead to inflation. I conclude that the central bank may be almost powerless to avoid deflation or inflation; that an eventual fiscal inflation can come well before large deficits or monetization are realized, and that it is likely to come with stagnation rather than a boom.     

财政赤字规模应把握社会承受力限度

平衡财政赤字有举债和银行透支两个途径，二者可兼用。举债要视当期财政收入状况为前提，银行透支超越社会承受力一定限度将致发通胀。因此，必须关注财政赤字规模的社会承受力。从全国看，财政赤字规模---一定限量银行透支应以一定限量社会闲置货币资金的存在---社会承受力为依托。财政赤字宜用积极手段平衡。     

Korean inflation during the US military administration of 1945-1948: a further analysis

This paper investigates the dynamic process of Korean inflation under the US military administration using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) incorporating cointegration relations among the variables. The results show that government expenditure shocks are primarily responsible for price movements together with money demand shocks having noticeable short-run impacts. The study also shows that government expenditure shocks are the most important source of fluctuations in each of the other variables investigated. The paper concludes that a reform of fiscal and monetary system is necessary to stop the sustaining process of inflation as well as fluctuations in other macro-variables.     

Monetary policy and transmission mechanism in Brazil: an empirical model

We propose an econometric model for the transmission mechanism in Brazil after the inflation target regime (IT) implementation. We follow the statistical approach based on the LSE methodology by means of the Spanos (J Econom 44:87–105, 1990) categorization. Our proposed model includes the ratios of the debt and primary surplus to the GDP representing the government fiscal effort. We identify two long run relationships that produce new information on how to evaluate the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate links, respectively, with the output gap and the nominal inflation derived from the IS and the interest rule theoretical models. Such specification explores the role played by fiscal variables in monetary transmission; considering the government fiscal effort, a relevant issue for Brazil. We were also able to identify a third long run relationship that might help to uncover how output gap is related not only with nominal variables but also with the debt to the GDP ratio.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.