TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING: TOWARDS A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET?*

Despite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe, prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels that are surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariff is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two‐country two‐firm framework the functioning of the current system governing wholesale international roaming agreements based on interoperator tariffs. The focus is on the role of traffic management; thanks to the emergence of traffic direction techniques, mobile network operators are allowed to select the roaming partner. We show that, unless these techniques do not allow for perfect control on traffic flows, traffic management does not improve the market's efficiency. In line with the regulatory mechanism recently adopted by the European Commission, we show that a simple price cap mechanism may restore partial efficiency in the wholesale market. We also show that although cross‐border cooperation at the wholesale level is Pareto efficient, it will not emerge as an equilibrium of a two‐sided matching game.     

Market structure in mobile telecoms: qualified indirect access and the receiver pays principle

Scarcity of spectrum limits the number of competing network operators in mobile telecoms. In the United Kingdom a regulatory review is currently enquiring into the effects of limited competition in the mobile market. The European Commission is also reviewing competition in roaming across mobile networks in Europe. In the UK the industry regulator Oftel claims that the prices for calling mobile phones are too high. We show that such relatively high prices stem from asymmetric incentives. The convention in the UK is for the originating party to pay for a telephone call. If instead the receiver were to pay for some or all of a call, we show that prices of calls to mobiles would be lower. We also argue that qualified indirect access could stimulate more effective competition in mobile telecoms.     

Cross-border rent shifting in international telecommunications

While scholars have questioned the merits of strategic trade policy, such policies have played a major role in international telecommunications. Countries have traditionally linked bilaterally their termination prices for international telephone calls. I show that this linkage can be rationalized as a mutually beneficial constraint on rent seeking. Linkage becomes more challenging to maintain with telecommunications liberalization, competition, and the growth of alternatives for terminating traffic. I consider possible policy approaches to such developments. Overall, this case study suggests that constraining cross-border rent shifting will present a major transitional challenge in international efforts to liberalize services.     

Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

In this paper, we estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and national calls services for private users as well as cross-price elasticities to mobile services using time series data from 2002 to 2007 from the Austrian markets. Using instrumental variable estimates and considering cointegration, we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation.     

Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities

This paper describes a model involving two interconnected networks offering different degrees of quality. In these networks, there are call externalities enabling consumers to assess the quality of the calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two-part tariffs. Our aim is to show that the “profit neutrality” result no longer applies due to network asymmetry and call externalities. In the case of non reciprocal access charges, call externalities generate private incentives enabling each competitor to charge low access prices. This reduces the risk of tacit collusion as competitors are free to negotiate their access charges.      

电信企业的兼并、分拆和接入的规制

电信企业在不同的纵向结构和接入规制制度下表现出不同的行为和效率。在强制接入但接入费率不受规制的情况下,市话长话兼营结构下的长话资费比分离结构下的资费高。但在接入全面规制或完全市场化的情况下,兼营结构的效率较分离结构为高。在三种规制制度下,生产者的利润在分离结构下都比较高,而消费者却在兼营结构下得利较多。这些结论表明接入的规制应该跟产业政策和竞争政策结合起来考虑。本文还发现如果互联费率高于边际成本,那么网络经营者越多,市话资费可能会越高。     

Network effects and the choice of mobile phone operator

This paper explores the role of network effects in the consumer’s choice of mobile phone operators in the UK. It contributes to the existing literature by taking a new approach to testing for direct network effects and by using individual-level data, which allows to analyse the impact that the immediate social network has on consumer choice in network markets. For our empirical analysis we use two sources of data: market-level data from the British telecommunications regulator OFCOM and micro-level data on consumers’ usage of mobile telephones from the survey, Home OnLine. We estimate two classes of models which illustrate the role of network effects. The first is an aggregate model of the comparative volume of on-net and off-net calls. This finds that the proportion of off-net calls falls as mobile operators charge a premium for off-net calls, but even in the absence of any price differential between on-net and off-net, there is still a form of pure network effect, where a disproportionate number of calls are on-net. The second is a model of the individual consumer’s choice of operator. This finds that individual choice shows considerable inertia, as expected, but is heavily influenced by the choices of others in the same household. There is some evidence that individual choice of operator is influenced by the total number of subscribers for each operator, but a much stronger effect is the operator choice of other household members.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale

We consider a seller who can either sell exclusively through resellers, or allow potential consumers to purchase directly from him. The consumers’ willingness to pay is private information. All transactions are in the form of second-price sealed bid auctions. We show that, if the resellers can gain access to a substantially bigger portion of the market than the seller himself, the seller obtains a higher revenue by dealing exclusively through them, i.e., by committing to not sell to any consumer. The result is due to a “winner’s curse” effect: the resellers win only if the consumers that they compete against submit lower bids, i.e., if part of their customer base has low valuations. This depresses the resellers’ willingness to pay relative to what they would be willing to pay under an exclusive resale contract. Our results do not depend on the presence of transaction costs: exclusive dealing yields strictly higher revenue even when the resellers can market the item at zero cost. We would like to thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Michael Rothkopf and seminar participants at Iowa State University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics meetings, the Milken Institute, Rutgers University, SUNY at Stony Brook Summer Workshop on Game Theory, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Welfare-optimal pricing and capacity selection under an ex ante maximum demand charge

This paper deals with the simultaneous determination of welfare-optimal pricing and investment rules under a multi-period ex ante maximum demand charge by allowing the possibility of purchasing electricity from third party generators at some cost when excess demand occurs. I show that at the optimal size of capacity, expected short-run marginal shortage cost and long-run marginal capacity cost should be equal. The optimal maximum demand tariff does not entail marginal cost pricing. In general, it is shown that maximum demand charges are welfare superior to marginal cost pricing when tariffs must be set ex ante, before demand is known.     

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY REVISITED: AN EXTENSION TO STACKELBERG COMPETITION

This paper revisits De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which is the seminal paper on mixed oligopoly, in order to pay more attention to Stackelberg competition. First, we show that, even in Cournot competition, if the number of private firms is sufficiently small, privatization necessarily reduces social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when a public firm is a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily reduces welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Moreover, we show that even when a public firm remains a follower, privatization reduces welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.     

When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering

Should voters always pay attention to politics? I explore the role of endogenous costly attention allocation in politics, combining insights from the growing literature on rational inattention with a standard model of political agency. I show that when attention to the action of the politician is endogenous, voters may choose to pay too much attention in equilibrium, and this induces too much political pandering. Moreover when attention to the action and to the state of the world are both endogenous, voters may not pay enough attention the state with respect to the ex ante optimum. A reduction in the total cost of attention does not correct this inefficiency and can even reduce welfare. This model can be a demand‐driven explanation of the under‐provision of analytical contents by news channels.     

Distributive politics of public goods networks through multistage voting

Public goods networks create conflict between districts needing the network and districts that pay the costs. Thus, it is difficult for pork barrel politicians to achieve logrolling with other districts. I show that logrolling is possible for such politicians if they set their agenda properly. To show this, I model the centralized decision‐making process as a multistage vote among representatives from different districts. I assume the districts are better off if and only if the public good “connects” them to the network. Public goods can be provided universally by setting the agenda properly, even when costs exceed the benefits.     

Income based price subsidies and parallel imports

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.     

Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Mobile Termination Rates and Firms' Profits

The theoretical literature on mobile termination rates (MTRs) is inconclusive on how the level of MTRs affects overall consumer charges and firms' profits. We show that when firms offer bundles with fixed included usage – a tariff structure that has become more common in recent years – an identical change in all MTRs does not affect firms' retail prices or profits. We use a panel dataset from saturated European markets to estimate the effect of MTRs on mobile operators' profits. As predicted by the theoretical model, we cannot reject the fact that firms' profits are unaffected by an identical change in all MTRs.     

Exclusive contents and next generation networks

This paper analyzes the interaction between the market of contents and the development of the next generation network (NGN) industry. We assume structural separation between the network and service operators and the comparative advantage of the service operators depends on the access to premium contents. On one side, we analyze how the structure of the market of contents (the scope of exclusivity contracts) may affect deployment and competition in a NGN setting. On the other side, we endogenize the structure of the market of contents given the presence of NGNs, where a content provider can sell contents directly to consumers, by-passing telecom operators (disintermediation, over-the-top content). In this context, we show that exclusivity only occurs when the content is not highly valued by consumers. Finally, the implication of our analysis for the evolution of the telecommunications industry is discussed.     

Entry and Innovation in Maturing Markets: Virtual Operators in Mobile Telecommunications

In the last few years the mobile telecommunications industry has witnessed the entry of a large number of new service providers. Traditionally, mobile users get their mobile services from the service providers owned by vertically integrated mobile network operators (MNOs). The new entrants do not own a network of their own however, because they use the existing mobile infrastructure, i.e. they are 'mobile virtual network operators' (MVNOs). By granting these virtual operators access to their networks, MNOs actually facilitate the entry of potential competitors for their own downstream service providers. These new entrants might attract additional users by offering competitive services and create extra value with their well-known brand names and other complementary assets. This study focuses on the mobile market of the Netherlands, where competition is intense and MVNOs proliferate. The aim of this research is to improve our understanding of the entry of virtual operators in general, and specifically by explaining why and how virtual operators enter the mobile market and the impact they have on competition in the mobile market.