R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Timing of technology adoption and product market competition

This paper examines how product market competition affects firms' timing of adopting a new technology, as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives. It demonstrates that adoption dates differ, not only among symmetric firms, but also among markets with different market features. More specifically, technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with Cournot competition than in a market with Bertrand competition. It can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes. Therefore, this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives. When goods are sufficiently differentiated, adoption occurs later than is socially optimal.     

Remedies for tying in computer applications

Recent anti-trust decisions have proposed remedies for tying of different computer software and applications. The remedies have drawn criticism for being ineffectual. This paper develops a model tailored to deal with the specific issue of tying in computer applications. It provides a rationale for such tying and also any associated harm to social welfare. It then examines proposed remedies and finds conditions under which those remedies will be effective in improving social welfare.     

Price and quantity experimentation: A synthesis

This paper compares experimentation about product differentiation in a linear setting under four market structures: quantity-setting and price-setting monopoly, Cournot and Bertrand duopoly. Quantity-setting firms always experiment by raising their quantities and the monopolist experiments relatively more than the duopolists. A price-setting monopolist does not experiment. The value of information to Bertrand duopolists may be positive or negative depending on the degree of product differentiation. When information is valuable, price-setting duopolists experiment by lowering prices. A numerical example indicates that the intensity of experimentation is higher in a Cournot duopoly than in a Bertrand duopoly.     

Optimal best-price policy

A best-price policy (BP) is a promise by a seller to give her customer a refund if she reduces her price after the customer has already purchased the product. We characterize the optimal BP policy as when the seller can control both the policy length (when the promise expires) and the refund scale (what portion of the price difference is refunded). We explain why the policy length is finite and varies across industries. In a setting where consumers' valuations decline over time, we show that a finite-length BP allows the seller to commit to not lowering her price too soon, while at the same time letting her capture some of the benefits of intertemporal price discrimination. However, because the decline in consumers' valuations is uncertain, a BP does not allow the monopolist to achieve the profit she could earn with a full commitment.     

Shared ownership and pricing in a network switch

We observe that many wholesale switches in automated teller machine (ATM) networks are jointly owned by their members and that this tends to occur more frequently when the wholesale industry is highly concentrated. We also observe that network switches are ‘natural monopolies’, their costs being largely fixed and their demand exhibiting substantial network externalities. Motivated by these observations, we model the competition for members between wholesale switches and the role joint ownership can play in attracting members. The model analyzes both the adoption decision (which network a bank chooses to join) and the subsequent pricing of switch and ATM services. We compare competition between two solely owned switches with competition between one solely owned and one jointly owned switch. Our analysis shows that a more concentrated structure results under the latter and that retail prices are higher. This calls into question the leniency of antitrust policy toward jointly owned structures.     

Brand-specific tastes for quality

This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing with competition. The novel element is that each consumer's willingness to pay for quality is private information and is allowed to differ across brands. The consumer's preferences are represented by a multidimensional type containing the marginal value of quality for different products. Buyers with high willingness to pay for quality also display strong preferences for particular brands, and require higher discounts in order to switch away from their favorite product. Therefore, competition is fiercer for buyers with lower tastes for quality, and hence more elastic demands. This is in sharp contrast to earlier models in which competition is fiercer for higher-taste, more valuable buyers. In equilibrium, firms either compete intensively for the entire market (providing strictly positive rents to all consumers) or shut down the least profitable segment of the market. Quality levels are distorted downwards for all buyers, except for those with the highest type. The number of competing firms and the degree of correlation across brand preferences enhance the efficiency of the allocation.     

Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm

This paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common (privately informed) regulated firm under various degrees of coordination. In the model, the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self-dealing, and incentives can be input-based (monitoring) and output-based (demanded cost targets). Full coordination between the regulators leads to the second best allocation. A setting in which the regulators do not fully coordinate leads to (i) higher overall monitoring (more aggressive input-based incentives) and (ii) higher demanded cost targets (i.e., more lenience in terms of output-based incentives). As a consequence of (i), in all possible equilibria, the effort toward cost reduction will be smaller when the agent reports to two regulators who do not coordinate. (i) and (ii) imply that the impact on the effort toward self-dealing activities is ambiguous. In our leading example, self-dealing will be larger if the regulators coordinate on monitoring levels but smaller if they choose monitoring levels independently.     

On optimal scarcity prices

This article contributes to the debate of missing money (compare Joskow(2007a)). This debate has seriously questioned the desirability of limiting scarcity prices in markets with fluctuating demand by emphasizing their potentially negative impact on firms' investment decisions in the long run. A prominent example are recently liberalized electricity markets, where competition authorities have imposed price caps³ or adopted other measures to mitigate high scarcity prices.The impact of reduced scarcity prices in the long run still is only incompletely explored. We thus analyze investment of firms in base load and peak load technologies in a market with fluctuating demand under imperfect competition. We show that an appropriately chosen limitation of scarcity prices is not only beneficial in the short run but also in the long run. It leads to a strict increase of investment in peak load technologies, leaving investment in base load technologies unchanged. Furthermore, we characterize the optimal limit on scarcity prices.     

Location and competition in retail banking

We investigate the impact of banking deregulation during the 1990s on consumer welfare. We estimate a spatial model of consumer demand for retail bank deposits that explicitly accounts for consumer disutility from distance traveled. This is important given the substantial changes in banks' branch networks observed in the data. Our model indicates that cross-price elasticities between banks whose branches are close to consumers (‘close’ banks) are larger than those between ‘far’ banks and more than double the cross-price elasticity of ‘close’ banks with respect to ‘far’ banks. We distinguish between thrifts and other banks and find that within-thrift competitive effects are stronger than within-bank effects or those between thrifts and banks. We use our estimates to predict the effect of changes in market structure on consumer welfare following the branching deregulation of the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994. Our results indicate that the median household gained around $60 per year from the changes. Approximately two thirds of the gains come from within-market changes in market structure. The gains were greater in markets with high initial numbers of banks than elsewhere.     

Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.