Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Training, search and wage dispersion

This paper combines on-the-job search and human capital theory to study the coexistence of firm-funded general training and frequent job turnovers. Although ex ante identical, firms differ in their training decisions. The model generates correlations between various firm characteristics that are consistent with the data. Wage dispersion exists among ex ante identical workers because workers of the same productivity are paid differently across firms, and because workers differ in their productivity ex post. Endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation between work experience and human capital, which yields new insights on wage dispersion and wage dynamics.     

Benefit duration and unemployment entry: A quasi-experiment in Austria

Apart from being an important aspect of job-search behavior of individuals, potential benefit duration can also have effects on unemployment entry rates. In this paper, the causal connection between the two is investigated for the case of Austria, using a quasi-experimental situation that arose following the enactment of a law that extended benefit duration for older workers in specific regions of the country. Unemployment entry is found to have risen between 4 and 11 percentage points due to the new law. Several robustness checks are presented to see if a causal interpretation of this result is possible. Preliminary analysis shows that this increase in unemployment entry can be best understood not as voluntary quits but layoffs by firms who want to get rid of high-tenured and expensive older workers.     

Employment shifts, economic reform and the changes in public/private sector wages in Mexico: 1987–1997

Over the last decade, the public sector in Mexico experienced substantial fiscal reform, divestiture of public enterprises, and the elimination of many regulations affecting pay and employment. This study analyzes the changes in the public/private sector differences in wages during the 1987–1997 period. The results from analyzing microdata from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano show that relative public sector wages increased from 1987 to 1997. Most of the relative wage increase in the public sector can be explained by increases in the price of skills and by changes in sorting across sectors. The results have important public policy implications since they suggest that public sector workers earn more and their wages have grown faster than those of their private sector counterparts. As such, policies contemplating public sector reform should take into account the effect of these measures on the inter-sectoral income distribution and the overall economic growth. First version received: April 2000/Final version received: December 2000     

Estimating labour market transitions and continuations using repeated cross sectional data

This paper proposes a population cohort approach for estimating labour market continuations (or transitions) using repeated cross sectional data. This approach allows for the construction of consistent standard errors that account for the full variability of cross sectional data.     

Gender wage differentials and discrimination in Korea: comparison by knowledge intensity of industries

This study estimates the relative size of the non-productivity-related gender wage gap across industries with differing knowledge intensities. More specifically, a gender wage premium was estimated from a modified Mincerian earnings equation, and an Oaxaca's discrimination coefficient was computed. Empirical evidence indicates that gender wage differentials tend to be less subject to potential discrimination in knowledge-based industries than in other industries with lower knowledge intensity. The estimated discrimination effect is least noticeable in top hierarchical occupations such as professionals and technicians, while it is most sizeable in production workers and sales/service workers, regardless of industrial affiliation.     

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Unemployment and inflation persistence in Spain: Are there Phillips trade-offs?

This paper studies the dynamic behavior of inflation and unemployment in Spain during the period 1964–1997. In particular, we analyze the implications of high persistence in both unemployment and inflation dynamics for inference regarding the size of Phillips trade-offs and sacrifice ratios in the Spanish economy, in response to a demand shock. To do so we use a Stuctural VAR approach with several identification outlines which give rise to alternative interpretations of the joint unemployment-inflation dynamics. When using a bivariate VAR we cannot reject the existence of a permanent output loss of one-half of one percentage point for each percentage point of permanent disinflation. However, when the VAR is augmented with a third variable, in order to disentangle monetary from non-monetary shocks within the demand class, the evidence favours a lower and marginally permanent trade-off with an output loss of about one-fourth of one percentage point.     

The effects of differences in year‐round,full‐time labor market experience on gender wage levels in the United States

This paper utilizes longitudinal information on annual hours worked to construct a more robust measure of labor market experience for young workers in the USA. This enhanced experience measure is then used to assess recent gender wage differentials. Our experience measure yields a dramatic improvement in the ability of standard earnings regressions to explain the variation in wages across individuals, especially for young women. In addition, our results indicate that approximately one‐fourth of the gender difference in average wages is attributable to the higher work experience levels of men.     

Treasury auctions in Spain: a linear approach

Abstract. The majority of Treasuries use discriminatory auctions to sell government debt. A few Treasuries use uniform auctions. The Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid format of discriminatory and uniform auctions. All Treasury auctions are multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions, usually assumed to be common and unknown value auctions. Taking in account these features, we analyze the Spanish auction format, taking a linear approximation to bidders' multiple bids, and characterize a parameter set in which the Spanish format gives higher expected seller's revenue than discriminatory and uniform auctions. Policy implications are obtained by calibrating theoretical results with data. We thank S. Nu?ez, and seminar participants at GREQAM, CEFI, the 1999 CEF meeting in Boston and the 57th European Meeting of the Econcometric Society for suggestions. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for detailed comments that greatly improved the paper. Any error is our responsability. The authors express their thanks for financial support to Ministerio de Ciencia y Teconologia from Proyecto SEC2000-0723, n_o 9114.     

Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indifferent among all the allocations in it. Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

Sample attrition and labor force dynamics: Evidence from the Spanish labor force survey

In this paper we examine a number of issues that arise in investigating labor force dynamics using the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA). These issues are by no means specific to the Spanish case and apply to most European-style labor force surveys. Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows. First, survey nonresponse cannot be neglected. Second, the EPA tends to underestimate employment and participation of high-educated young people, and to overestimate those of the low-educated elderly. Finally, we find little evidence that attrition causes important selection biases in estimating quarterly transition probabilities.     

A comparison between the log-linear and the parameterized expectations methods

This paper compares the performance of a log-linear method and a parameterized expectations method in solving a dynamic general equilibrium endogenous growth model with human capital. Quantitative evaluation based on second moment statistics shows that the results provided by the two numerical methods are very similar in this framework whenever the propagation mechanism of technology shocks is weak. However, the cross correlations of some relevant variables in the RBC literature obtained from the two methods are significantly different when the model exhibits a strong propagation mechanism. The parameterized expectations method captures the sensitiviness of second moment statistics to the curvature of the utility function while the log-linear method does not.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Directed search with multiple job applications

We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not constrained efficient.     

Population age structure and private consumption in Spain

In this paper we study the effect of population age distribution upon private consumption expenditure in Spain from 1964 to 1997 using aggregate data. We obtain four main results. First, changes in the population pyramid have substantial effects upon the behaviour of private consumption. Second, the pattern of the coefficients of the demographic variables is not consistent with the simplest version of the life cycle hypothesis. Third, we estimate the impact of the demographic transition upon consumption and find positive values associated with episodes in which the shares of groups of individuals with expenditure levels higher (lower) than the mean increased (decreased). Fourth, the results are robust to alternative specifications for the population age distribution.     

Randomly available outside options in bargaining

We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements. Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations, in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist. In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early.     

Stabilization mechanisms in a monetary union

The stability of a monetary union entails the establishment of mechanisms that allow the member countries to smooth their paths of consumption after negative shocks in their income. A centralized fiscal institution could help countries through a mechanism of taxes and transfers. In this paper we study the stabilizing effects of different mechanisms of compensation in a two-country general equilibrium model subject to asymmetric technology shocks. In particular, we have focused on an optimal system of taxes and transfers as opposed to a discretionary transfer mechanism, finding that the optimal transfer consists in an intertemporal distribution to the economy that experiences the negative shock instead of a current high transfer as in the non-optimal mechanism. Lastly, we have assessed the degree of stabilization related to the mechanisms in question, showing that the optimal mechanism can match the degree of stabilization the empirical literature attributes to the case of the United States.     

Minimum wage,on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces “bad jobs” creation and prompts workers to keep their “bad jobs” by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output.