When no news is good news

For as long as can be remembered, BestBaby Corporation, a manufacturer of baby equipment and furniture, has enjoyed a solid reputation with retailers, a good track record with consumers, and a supportive relationship with stockholders. But then the child of a celebrity is injured when her stroller tips over because its brakes failed. The media go wild, and CEO Greg James finds himself in uncharted territory. The morning after the accident, Greg calls an emergency meeting of his executive staff. As he searches his memory to prepare for it, he thinks about Arzep Enterprises, BestBaby's main provider of parts and materials. He remembers his COO, Keith Sigismund, telling him that Arzep had switched suppliers at some point in order to cut its own costs. Nevertheless, Keith had assured Greg that the new material, although not quite as sturdy, hadn't affected the quality of Arzep's components. By the time the meeting is set to begin, several employees have threatened to quit, and stories are surfacing in the press and on the Web about other consumers who have had problems with their strollers. Then in the meeting, Keith drops a bombshell: he reads from a year-old memo sent to him by an employee in manufacturing stating that the new brake fittings delivered by Arzep don't grab the front brakes as well as the ones previously supplied. The same employee, and others, had complained in the past that Keith hadn't adequately attended to concerns they brought up to him. In this fictional case study, four commentators offer advice to Greg on how BestBaby should respond to the victim's family, the media, the public, and the company's own employees during this PR crisis.     

The decision to trust

Surveys have shown that 80% of Americans don't trust corporate executives and--worse--that roughly half of all managers don't trust their own leaders. Mergers, downsizing, and globalization have accelerated the pace of change in organizations, creating a crisis of trust that didn't exist a generation ago. Leaders who understand how trust is built can actively influence its development, resulting in a more supportive and productive work environment and, not incidentally, a competitive advantage in the war for talent. Building on research in social psychology, and on his 15 years of experience consulting on trust, the author has developed a model for predicting whether trust or distrust will be chosen in a given situation. It helps managers analyze ten factors at play in the decision-making process. Hundreds of top executives have used it to diagnose and address the root causes of distrust in their work relationships. Some of the factors in the model relate to the decision maker: How tolerant of risk, how well-adjusted, and how relatively powerful is he or she? Others relate to the specific situation: How closely aligned are the interests of the parties concerned? Does the person who is asking to be trusted demonstrate competence? Predictability and integrity? Frequent and honest communication? Sue, a relatively new VP of sales, used the trust model to manage her relationship with Joe, an employee nearing retirement who was not performing well in a new sales role. Fearing for his job, Joe wasn't initially inclined to trust her. Sue took concrete steps to communicate openly with Joe, explore other options for him, and show concern for his well-being. When joe was transferred, he let his former colleagues know how pleased he was with Sue's handling of the situation. As a result, the level of trust increased in Sue's department, even though it was experiencing major change.     

A question of character

For the most part, Glamor-a-Go-Go's board has been thrilled with CEO Joe Ryan's performance. Ryan, after all, had transformed the private-label cosmetics company into a retail powerhouse with flashy outlets from New York to Los Angeles. In addition to saving the company from bankruptcy shortly after his arrival in 1992, Ryan had made Glamor-a-Go-Go a fun and exciting place to work, increasing workers' wages and creating boundless opportunities for anyone willing to work hard and think out of the box. He had also brought more women and people of color on board. And he had made many employees wealthy, with generous stock giveaways and options for the most senior employees down to the most junior. Glamor-a-Go-Go's stock price had grown tenfold during Ryan's tenure. But Ryan's personal affairs were beginning to call into question his leadership abilities. The local paper's gossip column recently ran a photo of Ryan--a married man--leaving a gala event with a beautiful young woman from the company, with the headline "Who's That Girl?" Indeed, rumors about Ryan's philandering were starting to take on a harsher edge. Some people believed his secretary left because Ryan had sexually harassed her. Others believed a mail-room employee had been promoted to factory supervisor because of her affair with the CEO. Having warned Ryan several times about his alleged infidelities, the board is stuck. What should it do about Ryan's extracurricular behavior? Does Ryan's personal behavior even affect the company? Is what Ryan does outside the office the board's concern? Six commentators weigh in.     

Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co., Ltd

The case deals with the decision in mid-1997 of StarInvest, an American investment company, on whether to subscribe to a new issue of 230 million B shares by Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co., Ltd. Qingqi Motorcycle is incorporated in the People’s Republic of China, and B shares were tradable only among foreign investors. The case solution is in the form of policy report from Daniel Campbell, asset manager at StarInvest, to his Investment Committee. The report contains his assessment of the opportunities and risks from China investment in general, and his recommendations on the Qingqi Motorcycle stock issue in particular. The objective of this case is to introduce students to the unique accounting issues and investment environment in China. From working on this case, the students should become familiar with the developmental steps and basic features of China’s accounting standards and capital markets. An important theme that should be emphasized by the instructor is that institutional environments are more important at influencing the accounting information in a country than the accounting standards as written on paper. The case has been used in an international accounting course offered to the MBA students. It could also be used in a similar course offered at the undergraduate level. Students having completed an introductory financial accounting course should have the required knowledge and skills to work on this case. The case can be used either as an individual assignment or as a group assignment.     

Can analysts predict rallies better than crashes?

We use the copula approach to study the structure of dependence between sell-side analysts’ consensus recommendations and subsequent security returns, with a focus on asymmetric tail dependence. We match monthly vintages of I/B/E/S recommendations for the period January–December 2011 with excess security returns during six months following recommendation issue. Using a mixed Gaussian–symmetrized Joe–Clayton copula model we find evidence to suggest that analysts can identify stocks that will substantially outperform, but not underperform relative to the market, and that their predictive ability is conditional on recommendation changes.     

The moonlighter

Jeremy Hicks, Zagante Systems' lead programmer, walks into the office at eight o'clock on a Sunday night and does a double take when he spots his boss, Melanie. She's equally surprised to find she isn't alone. Before leaving for the evening, Melanie pays Jeremy a visit, only to discover that he isn't hard at work on Zagante's new product--he's programming a game for another company. The next day over lunch, Melanie confronts Jeremy and lets him know that he needs to stay focused on Zagante's new software. Jeremy insists that he's fully engaged in it. So Melanie agrees to keep the moonlighting under wraps so long as it doesn't interfere with Jeremy's job. That night, Melanie sits down at her laptop and opens up a Google window. "Moonlighting," she types. Dismayed at the number of hits, she changes her search to "Fired for moonlighting." This search leads her to case after case, but none helps her with Jeremy. She tries one more time. "Promoted for moonlighting," she types. No surprise. Zero hits. Frustrated with Jeremy, yet anxious to keep such a talented employee, Melanie turns to Jill Darby, Zagante's HR director, for guidance. Jill has both good and bad news. The bad news is that the company has no moonlighting policy. The good news is that Jill can arrange for Jeremy to receive a low-interest loan. But when Melanie tells Jeremy about the loan, he doesn't go for it. He's not just freelancing for the money, it turns out; he's downright enjoying the work and doesn't appreciate his boss butting in to his private business. How should Melanie handle this moonlighting issue? Commentators Bill Jensen, author of Work 2.0: Rewriting the Contract; attorney Barry LePatner; economics professors Jean Kimmel and Karen Conway; and HR director Sandra Davis offer advice in this fictional case study.     

The best-laid incentive plans

Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd only been at Rainbarrel a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work: "Hiram's going to give us some very good news about cost reductions and operating efficiencies, all due to the changes he's designed and implemented this year." Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. Then, too, an employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? Commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for Chevron Texaco, offer their advice in this fictional case study.     

Losing it

"It's worse than I thought.... She's completely lost her mind," says Harry Beecham, the CEO of blue chip management consultancy Pierce and Company. The perplexed executive was in a hotel suite with his wife in Amsterdam, the latest stop on his regular trek to dozens of Pierce offices worldwide. In his hand was a sheaf of paper--the same message sent over and over again by his star employee and protégée Katharina Waldburg. The end of the world is coming, she warned. "Someone is going to die." Harry wouldn't have expected this sort of behavior from Katharina. After graduating with distinction from Oxford, she made a name for herself by single-handedly building Pierce's organizational behavior practice. At 27, she's poised to become the youngest partner ever elected at the firm. But Harry can't ignore the faxes in his hand. Or the stream-of-consciousness e-mails Katharina's been sending to one of the directors in Pierce's Berlin office--mostly gibberish but potentially disastrous to Katharina's reputation if they ever got out. Harry also can't dismiss reports from Roland Fuoroli, manager of the Berlin office, of a vicious verbal exchange Katharina had with him, or of an "over the top" lunch date Katharina had with one of Pierce's clients in which she was explaining the alphabet's role in the creation of the universe. Harry is planning to talk to Katharina when he gets to Berlin. What should he say? And will it be too late? Four commentators offer their advice in this fictional case study. They are Kay Redfield Jamison, a professor of psychiatry and a coauthor of Manic-Depressive Illness; David E. Meen, a former director at McKinsey & Company; Norman Pearlstine, the editor in chief at Time Incorporated; and Richard Primus, an assistant law professor at the University of Michigan.     

On the inversion of a moving average

Abstract

At the request of the Faculty of Science of Stockholms Högskola I had the pleasure to act as opponent at the doctoral discussion on Mr. HERMAN WOLD?s dissertation: »A Study in the Analysis of Stationary Time Series». Both the reading of the book, the public discussion and a subsequent private correspondance with the author, I have found very interesting and stimulating. I have also had the pleasure to discuss to some extent this matter with Professor CRAMÉR. Some of the points raised during our exchanging of views have been covered by Mr. Wold in his note in this issue of the »Aktuarietidskrift», but not all. It may therefore be worth while to add a few remarks. I need not dwell upon the various merits of the book, they speak for themselves. Here, I shall confine myself to one particular point where some difference of opinion still seems to persist, namely the significance of the formula (255) in the dissertation, which is the same as (13) in Mr. WOLD? note in this issue. This formula is intended as an inversion formula for a moving average on a random variable in the singular case where the characteristic equation of the moving average has at least one root on the unit circle.     

PAPER PROPHETS AND THE CONTINUING CASE FOR THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT ACCOUNTING RESEARCH

This review of Tony Tinker’s Autocritique presented at the First International Accounting Seminar, Department of Finance and Accounting, Glasgow Caledonian University, is not a critique of what Tinker thinks of his own book. He should know best about what he wrote or wanted to write. It also does not assess the validity of his interpretation of the works of Marx or Hegel. What it does is to reflect further on an important issue underlying much of Tinker’s presentation—namely, the concern with research methodology. The review welcomes Tinker’s desires for change in approaches to accounting case studies but suggests that the underlying problems are more complex than Tinker suggests and demands a broader scale of response than that highlighted in his presentation.     

When salaries aren't secret

No one seemed to think Treece McDavitt was a malevolent employee. "Just mischievous," one person said. Whatever her motivation, the day before Treece was to leave RightNow!, an off-price women's fashion retailer, the 26-year-old computer wizard accessed HR's files and e-mailed employees' salaries to the entire staff. Now everyone knows what everyone else is making; they are either infuriated that they are making too little or embarrassed that they are making too much. Salary disparities are out there for everyone to see, and CEO Hank Adamson has to do something to smooth things over. Hank's trusted advisers talk extensively with the CEO about his options, ultimately coming down on two sides. Charlie Herald, vice president of human resources, takes a "You get a lemon, you make lemonade" approach: keep making the salaries public to ensure fairness and to push employees to higher performance, he advises. Meanwhile, CFO Harriet Duval sees the need for damage control: apologize, clean up the company's compensation system, and continue to keep--or at least try to keep--salaries private, she says. Should Hank side with Charlie or Harriet? Or perhaps find a compromise between their two views? What should he do about this serious salary debacle? Four commentators offer their advice on the problem presented in this fictional case study.     

Connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond

By now, most executives are familiar with the famous Year 2000 problem--and many believe that their companies have the situation well in hand. After all, it seems to be such a trivial problem--computer software that interprets "oo" to be the year 1900 instead of the year 2000. And yet armies of computer professionals have been working on it--updating code in payroll systems, distribution systems, actuarial systems, sales-tracking systems, and the like. The problem is pervasive. Not only is it in your systems, it's in your suppliers' systems, your bankers' systems, and your customers' systems. It's embedded in chips that control elevators, automated teller machines, process-control equipment, and power grids. Already, a dried-food manufacturer destroyed millions of dollars of perfectly good product when a computer counted inventory marked with an expiration date of "oo" as nearly a hundred years old. And when managers of a sewage-control plant turned the clock to January I, 2000 on a computer system they thought had been fixed, raw sewage pumped directly into the harbor. It has become apparent that there will not be enough time to find and fix all of the problems by January I, 2000. And what good will it do if your computers work but they're connected with systems that don't? That is one of the questions Harvard Business School professor Richard Nolan asks in his introduction to HBR's Perspectives on the Year 2000 issue. How will you prepare your organization to respond when things start to go wrong? Fourteen commentators offer their ideas on how senior managers should think about connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond.     

Bob's meltdown

Annette Innella is just coming into the lunchroom at Concord Machines when Bob Dunn starts screaming at her. After throwing his lunch tray against the wall, he stomps out, leaving Annette stunned. Naturally, Annette, the new senior VP for knowledge management, is beside herself. She knows her proposal to establish a cross-functional knowledge management committee is progressive thinking for this oldline manufacturer, but Bob's reaction is totally over the line. If Bob stays, she goes--that's all there is to it. Bob is contrite, but he's under a lot of pressure. The general manager of the Services Group, he's just returned from a two-week trip around the globe to gear up his troops to beat revenue targets again, despite shrinking budgets and hiring freezes. And what does he see when he gets back? An e-mail from Annette requesting that two of his best people devote half their time to what he calls her "idiotic" Knowledge Protocols Group. He's carrying the company on his back, and she's throwing this nonsense at him. Graphics specialist Paula Chancellor is surprised. Sure, Bob's gruff, but his staff loves him, and he's the only one of the big shots who ever talks to her. But HR director Nathan Singer is incensed; Bob's never been a team player, Singer complains, and it's time he learned a lesson. CEO Jay Nguyen is in a bind. Bob is his top manager; he brings in all the money. And even though future revenues are going to have to come from somewhere else, Jay is not totally behind Annette's initiative in the current business climate. He can't afford to lose Bob. But if he reins in Annette, it will look like he's condoning Bob's outburst. What should he do? Four commentators offer advice in this fictional case study.     

徐曙光 董事长专业户的成功法则

他曾连续成功创业,并跨越不同的国家、涉足不同的领域。他正是董事长专业户徐曙光。     

Right away and all at once: how we saved Continental

In 1993, when Greg Brenneman started working at Continental Airlines, it was the most dysfunctional company he had ever seen. It had been through two bankruptcies and ten presidents in ten years. There was next to no strategy. The company was burning through money. And employee morale couldn't get any worse. Today Continental is flying high. It posted revenues of $7.2 billion and a net income of $385 million in 1997. It regularly ranks as one of the top five U.S. airlines for key performance measures such as dispatch reliability. And employee turnover has been drastically reduced. What happened? In this first-person account, Brenneman, now Continental's president and COO, describes how he and the new team at Continental's helm transformed the company "right away and all at once." More specifically, he describes the five lessons he learned during this dramatic turnaround. At the beginning, there was so much wrong with Continental that he felt as if any one misstep could bring the whole effort down. But in a time of crisis, when time is tight and money is tighter, you can't afford to mull over complex strategy. With Gordon Bethune, Continental's chairman and CEO, Brenneman devised the Go Forward Plan, a straightforward strategy focused on four key elements: understanding the market, increasing revenues, improving the product, and transforming the corporate culture. He admits that the plan wasn't complicated--it was pure common sense. The tough part was getting it done. "Do it now!" became the rallying cry of the movement, and the power of momentum has carried Continental to success.     

Rediscovering market segmentation

In 1964, Daniel Yankelovich introduced in the pages of HBR the concept of nondemographic segmentation, by which he meant the classification of consumers according to criteria other than age, residence, income, and such. The predictive power of marketing studies based on demographics was no longer strong enough to serve as a basis for marketing strategy, he argued. Buying patterns had become far better guides to consumers' future purchases. In addition, properly constructed nondemographic segmentations could help companies determine which products to develop, which distribution channels to sell them in, how much to charge for them, and how to advertise them. But more than 40 years later, nondemographic segmentation has become just as unenlightening as demographic segmentation had been. Today, the technique is used almost exclusively to fulfill the needs of advertising, which it serves mainly by populating commercials with characters that viewers can identify with. It is true that psychographic types like "High-Tech Harry" and "Joe Six-Pack" may capture some truth about real people's lifestyles, attitudes, self-image, and aspirations. But they are no better than demographics at predicting purchase behavior. Thus they give corporate decision makers very little idea of how to keep customers or capture new ones. Now, Daniel Yankelovich returns to these pages, with consultant David Meer, to argue the case for a broad view of nondemographic segmentation. They describe the elements of a smart segmentation strategy, explaining how segmentations meant to strengthen brand identity differ from those capable of telling a company which markets it should enter and what goods to make. And they introduce their "gravity of decision spectrum", a tool that focuses on the form of consumer behavior that should be of the greatest interest to marketers--the importance that consumers place on a product or product category.     

The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations

Inflation inertia may be quite tenacious because of the simultaneousinteraction between policy actions and inflationary expectationsunder imperfect credibility. This result is particularly relevantfor understanding some of the failed efforts to stabilize inflationin South America. This article deals with the issue of inertiain the framework of imperfect information about the type ofthe policymaker and extends the existing models to an infinitehorizon. Because policymakers do not have perfect control ofinflation, a "frivolous stabilizer" may deviate from the policiesof a "serious stabilizer" without necessarily being unmaskedimmediately. When the difference in the ability of "strong"and "weak" policymakers to control inflation is large, unexpectedinflation may be persistently negative for quite a while, thuscausing reduced economic activity and giving the indicationthat credibility is low. If the policymaker persists with thestabilization, this pattern gradually disappears as his reputationrises. But before this final stage the serious policymaker hasto compromise his inflation objective in view of adverse expectationsabout his type and pay the cost of imperfect credibility.     

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.     

I was greedy,too

Americans are outraged at the greediness of Wall Street analysts, dot-com entrepreneurs, and, most of all, chief executive officers. How could Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski use company funds to throw his wife a million-dollar birthday bash on an Italian island? How could Enron's Ken Lay sell thousands of shares of his company's once high-flying stock just before it crashed, leaving employees with nothing? Even America's most popular domestic guru, Martha Stewart, is suspected of having her hand in the cookie jar. To some extent, our outrage may be justified, writes HBR senior editor Diane Coutu. And yet, it's easy to forget that just a couple years ago these same people were lauded as heroes. Many Americans wanted nothing more, in fact, than to emulate them, to share in their fortunes. Indeed, we spent an enormous amount of time talking and thinking about double-digit returns, IPOs, day trading, and stock options. It could easily be argued that it was public indulgence in corporate money lust that largely created the mess we're now in. It's time to take a hard look at greed, both in its general form and in its peculiarly American incarnation, says Coutu. If Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan was correct in telling Congress that "infectious greed" contaminated U.S. business, then we need to try to understand its causes--and how the average American may have contributed to it. Why did so many of us fall prey to greed? With a deep, almost reflexive trust in the free market, are Americans somehow greedier than other peoples? And as we look at the wreckage from the 1990s, can we be sure it won't happen again?     

The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.