The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets

We report the results of twelve ‘double-auction’ market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric induced supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path toward a competitive equilibrium. The proposition (convergence bias) that prices tend to approach the competitive equilibrium from above (below) when consumer surplus is greater (less) than producer surplus cannot be rejected. We do, however, reject the proposition (convergence symmetry) that these convergence biases are of equal absolute magnitude. Excesses of producer over consumer surplus are found to have a more pronounced effect on the sequence of contract prices.     

Ad valorem tariff and spatial equilibrium models

The objectives of this article are to illustrate theoretically and empirically how to incorporate an ad valorem tariff in spatial equilibrium models and show the equivalence of three approaches (primal, dual and MCP) of spatial equilibrium trade modelling. The article lays out in detail the theory, empirical applications and the results for all three approaches so that trade modellers can easily follow and apply them in their work. The primal approach is commonly used by spatial equilibrium modellers, though the dual approach corresponds to the textbook depiction of consumer surplus, producer surplus and gains from trade. The Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) is not commonly used by spatial equilibrium modellers, though it is relatively simpler if the modeller knows the equilibrium conditions. This article also presents advantages and disadvantages of each approach.     

The welfare impact of policy interventions in the foodgrain markets in Bangladesh

The paper attempts to estimate the welfare impact of different policy interventions in the foodgrain markets in Bangladesh using an economic surplus approach. Over the period of analysis, 1980–2003, the loss in consumer surplus exceeded the gain in producer surplus plus the gain in government revenue. Therefore, the interventions resulted in a deadweight welfare loss for society. In contrast, in the policy of liberalization, the gain in consumer surplus and in government revenue is larger than the loss in producer surplus, producing a net welfare gain to society.     

Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition

We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of ρ-concavity and ρ-convexity. The “more concave” is demand, the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus, the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus, and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus. Deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at first increasing with demand concavity, then eventually decreasing.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: WEIGHTED WELFARE AND PRICE COMPETITION*

In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (weighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weight given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also analyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly With Network Compatibility Effects

We consider the efficiency of price and quantity competition in a network products market, where we observe product compatibility with network externalities (hereafter, network compatibility effects). In particular, if network compatibility effects between firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the Cournot equilibrium is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of larger consumer, producer and total surpluses. Then, we consider an endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity. If the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, then choosing prices (quantities) is a dominant strategy for the firm. Thus, if the network compatibility effects of both firms are larger (smaller), the Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium arises. Furthermore, if the network compatibility effects between the firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the firm with a larger (smaller) network compatibility effect than a certain level of product substitutability chooses quantities (prices). In this case, the Cournot–Bertrand equilibrium arises, which is less (more) efficient than the Cournot equilibrium in terms of consumer (producer) surplus.     

The effects of rent asymmetries in posted offer markets

We report the results of six posted-offer market experiments designed to analyze the effects of asymmetric supply and demand configurations on the price convergence path to competitive equilibrium. The posted-offer experiments are compared with twelve double-auction experiments reported by Smith and Williams (1982). Results differ markedly across trading institutions. Unlike trading under double-auction rules, we cannot reject the proposition that contract price convergence paths are unaffected by the distribution of consumer and producer surplus. Posted-offer contract prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium from above regardless of the distribution of the exchange surplus.     

Trade frictions and welfare in the gravity model: how much of the iceberg melts?

Abstract.  A key element missing from the structural gravity literature is an examination of the implied general equilibrium. By design the gravity equation is adept at predicting bilateral trade flows. To make inferences beyond trade flows, however, the theoretic models should be consistent with other observables. Structural econometric estimates from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) allow us to evaluate their proposed general equilibrium along several dimensions. We find that their gravity model predicts too large a difference between consumer and producer prices; excessive variation in the geographic distribution of consumer price indices; and an exceptionally large portion of output devoted to overcoming trade frictions. Under plausible parameterizations of the model at least 50% of output 'melts' in transit. JEL classification: F10     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

封闭模型下稻米生产技术进步的福利效应分析

运用误差修正模型,估计我国稻米供给和需求弹性,在此基础上,采用Akino和Hayami提出的福利效应模型,具体测算我国稻米生产技术进步的福利效应并进行分解,基本结论为：稻米具有较低的供给弹性和需求弹性,稻米技术进步的福利效应表现为消费者剩余的增加和生产者剩余的减少,但消费者剩余的增加值远远大于生产者剩余的减少值,从而整个社会经济福利水平呈现上升趋势。     

基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究

研究了共性技术的R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、RJV(ResearchJointVenture)竞争3种基本研发组织模式;在考虑投入溢出和成果溢出共存、溢出总量随时间T变化的基础上,引入研发风险率函数,通过对各组织模式的生产者剩余、消费者剩余和R&D投资率进行比较,总结出更适合共性技术研发和扩散的组织模式。结果表明:市场机制下,企业不一定会选择RJV;从社会福利角度,RJV产生的社会剩余大于R&D卡特尔和R&D竞争模式的社会剩余;为使社会福利最大化,政府应引导企业形成RJV。     

Labor market distortions and China's WTO accession package:: an applied general equilibrium assessment

The economic implications of China's accession to the World Trade Organization have been analyzed using applied general equilibrium techniques. We explore the consequences of trade reform in the presence of labor market distortions. A formal model of imperfect labor mobility is incorporated into a large-scale, stochastic applied general equilibrium framework with which the consequences of China's trade reform for net welfare are considered. The simulations suggest that distortions in China's labor market, including imperfect labor mobility, rural-urban migration, dual urban markets and surplus rural labor, have significant effects on trade liberalization outcomes and in some cases produce unexpected second-best results. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 774–794.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

品牌经济学的理论基础——引入品牌的需求曲线及其经济学分析

需求定律是经济学分析的理论基础之一,品牌经济学的理论基础为引入品牌的需求曲线或考虑选择成本的需求定律。把品牌引入经济学中后,品牌信用度的提高使需求曲线右移并变得更为陡峭,同时品牌信用度的提高改变了需求曲线的位置,使得均衡价格提高,均衡数量增加,增加了消费者剩余和生产者剩余,提高了社会福利水平。文章为“品牌战”替代“价格战”提供了理论依据,即通过品牌建设提高品牌信用度,使得在价格提高的条件下需求量增加,而这只有在需求曲线改变位置时方能做到。     

Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers’ net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers’ risks, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.     

QUALITY-ASSURING PRICE AND BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY

If consumers cannot discern quality prior to purchase, firms may use both court enforcement and the market mechanism to assure quality. But the level of warranty protection that firms choose to offer depends on the efficiency of the market. As the ability of consumers to communicate information concerning quality among themselves (market efficiency) increases, the level of warranty protection that maximizes consumer surplus falls. In highly efficient markets, producers do not offer a warranty. Thus, courts should not imply a warranty if producers do not specify one. In addition, the level of warranty protection depends on the courts' ability to distinguish between producer and consumer moral hazard.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

品牌经济学的理论基础——引入品牌的需求曲线及其经济学分析

把品牌引入经济学后,品牌信用度的提高使得需求曲线发生变化,一方面在其他条件不变的情况下,品牌信用度的提高将有效地降低消费者的选择成本,消费者“趋利避害”的本性使得在任意价格下需求量增加,需求曲线右移;另一方面品牌信用度的提高使得品牌商品的需求弹性变小,需求曲线变陡峭。引入品牌后改变了需求曲线的位置和形状乃品牌经济学的理论基础。在此基础上,品牌信用度的提高通过改变需求曲线的位置将使得均衡价格提高,且均衡数量增加,同时将会增加消费者剩余和生产者剩余,提高社会福利水平。     

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.