A dynamic model of OPEC trade and production

A dynamic simulation model is presented of the world energy market, covering the period 1974–1995. It is used to assess and rank six possible price or output policies that OPEC may adopt with respect to oil exports, given a range of assumptions relating to such important variables as the rate of growth of domestic absorption of oil revenues within OPEC, the rate of capacity expansion for oil production, the responsiveness of investment in alternative sources of energy to changes in oil prices, and the rate of growth of world demand for energy. Furthermore, an illustrative analysis is given of possible conflict situations within OPEC, and their impact on the choice of price or output policy is discussed. The main conclusion drawn is that the supply response of alternative energy sources to OPEC oil will be the key to predicting whether oil prices will go up or down.     

An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government

Endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents, each enjoying some degree of autonomy. In this paper, policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and the agent at the other tier. Our results concerning multi-tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one-tier lobbying. In particular, the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies. Moreover, the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier. It is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight. Extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures, like federations or firms.     

A dynamic analysis of an endogenous growth model with leisure

Summary. The main goal in this paper is to analyze an economic model of endogenous growth where human capital accumulation acts as the engine propelling economic activity. The added ingredient in our model is that agents derive utility from consumption and leisure, where leisure is defined as the amount of time devoted to those activities augmented by the level of education. Under regular conditions we show that there is a unique globally stable balanced growth path. We also provide a characterization of the behavior of our economic variables along the transition. Received: May 26, 1998; revised version: September 9, 1999     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.     

Committing and reneging: A dynamic model of policy regimes

Actual policy decisions are made in real time and are not irrevocable, but most policy modeling has largely neglected these mundane factors. In an environment of uncertainty, the ability to switch policies adds an option value to the choice problem. This “option to wait” makes the incumbent regime relatively more attractive (compared to the traditional once-and-for-all analysis), as does increased uncertainty, which increases the value of the option. Furthermore, because the commitment decision takes place in real time, policy choice displays hysteresis.     

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model

In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length. We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite patent length does not maximize social welfare. Furthermore, we show that, in a growth model that does not exhibit scale effects, a finite patent length maximizes social welfare on the balanced growth path.     

A comparative dynamic analysis of a growth model under alternate policy regimes

Comparative dynamic analysis is conducted on a growth model with variable price levels and wage rates. A perturbation technique is used to compare the economy's time paths near a balanced growth path in response to alternate policy regimes. Various dynamic policy multipliers are calculated in response to some of the alternate policy regimes such as the balanced-budget fiscal regime, the constant price regime, the full-employment regime, etc., to examine their dynamic implications on the economy's behavior. Temporary deviations in the fiscal variables are found to leave no permanent effects under all but one of the regimes examined.     

South African trade policy mattersTrade performance and trade policy*

South African trade policy has exerted a major influence on the composition and aggregate growth of trade. In the Apartheid period, South Africa developed a comparative advantage in capital‐intensive primary and manufactured commodities partly because of its natural resource endowments, but also because the pattern of protection was particularly detrimental to exports of non‐commodity manufactured goods. By contrast, trade liberalization from 1990 not only increased imports, but by reducing both input costs and the relative profitability of domestic sales also boosted exports. This evidence suggests that additional trade liberalization and policies that afford South African firms access to inputs at world prices could well be part of the strategy to enhance export diversification.     

An agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence

This article explains trade credit policy based on the agency theory. According to this theory, we have developed an agency model based on the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena arising from the relation between sellers and buyers. This model has been estimated by using panel data methodology applied to UK companies. Our findings strongly support the model proposed. We find that smaller firms, those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets, and those that are less profitable extend more trade credit, whereas firms with a high proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less.     

Economies of scale and trade policy: The median voter model revisited

Why do some political economy models perform so poorly in predicting actual trade policy? Do scale economies provide the missing puzzle to our understanding of the anti-trade bias? By integrating economies of scale in production, this paper theoretically reinstates the median voter model as in Mayer [Mayer, W. (1984). Endogenous tariff formation. The American Economic Review, 74, 970–985] as a suitable political economy model in predicting trade policy. The modified model generates the scope for the anti-trade bias and predicts that sometimes economic, rather than political, considerations may lead to restrictive trade.     

Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with endogenous growth

We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian (NK) model with endogenous growth and knowledge spillovers external to each firm. We find that, in contrast with the standard NK model, the Ramsey dynamics implies deviation from full inflation targeting in response to technology and government spending shocks, while the optimal operational rule is backward looking and responds to inflation and output deviations from their long-run levels.     

Electoral regime and trade policy

We study how trade protection varies with the electoral rules for legislative representation. In particular, we investigate different hypotheses about why trade policy differs between countries with legislatures elected by a plurality election rule in single member constituencies and legislatures elected by a proportional, or party-list, rule. Our results, which are in line with the existing literature, show that countries with list-PR systems tend to have lower trade barriers than countries with majoritarian systems. We expand on this literature by looking at the mechanisms through which this correlation can be explained. Our findings indicate that, contrary to existing theory, neither constituency size nor party strength are important when explaining this correlation. Country size does matter, but does not explain the whole of the correlation.     

China's foreign trade policy and world trade organization membership

This paper provides an overview of China's major economic reforms and how they impacted certain key domestic economic indicators such as income, production, employment, and prices. More importantly, the paper concentrates on China's foreign trade focusing on such issues as import and export policies, exchange rate controls, foreign investments, balance of payments, traded commodities, and major trading partners. China's chance of becoming a member of the World Trade Organization is also addressed.     

Specialization in a dynamic trade model: An overlapping generations case

Abstract

We explore a small open economy with overlapping generations to show that demographic structure is an important factor for the determination of a production pattern in the dynamic trade theory. In the representative agent model, Baxter (1992) shows that even if there are two commodities and two production factors, there is a Ricardian implication that opening up to trade leads to perfect specialization in a small open economy. In contrast, using the overlapping generations model, we find that the heterogeneity of the economic agents generally makes imperfect specialization occur. We also find that whether the stability condition holds or not is crucial for the determination of the long-run production pattern.     

贸易自由化渐进性与中国外贸政策的适应性

经济全球化代表着一种新型的国际经济关系的产生与发展,其最核心的内容包括生产的一体化、贸易的自由化与金融的国际化,而贸易自由化既是经济全球化的先导,又是经济全球化程度加深的主要促动因素。不论是过去,还是现在,乃至可预见的未来,贸易自由化的过程都具有鲜明的渐进性特征。本文拟对贸易自由化的渐进性进行历史考察并作出理论解释,以便为我国”入世“后外贸政策的调整及体系构建提供一种思路。     

Rising trade costs? Agglomeration and trade with endogenous transaction costs

Abstract.  While transport costs have fallen, the empirical evidence also points at rising total trade costs. In a model of industry location with endogenous transaction costs that seeks to replicate features from the machinery industry, we show how and under which conditions a decline in transport costs can lead to an increase in the total cost of trade. The subtle relationship between (endogenous) transport costs and the sensitivity of trade to distance is also explored.     

Research policy and endogenous growth

This paper studies the effects of different types of research policy on economic growth. We find that while subsidies to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at public institutions have unambiguously positive effects on growth, performing applied research at public institutions could have negative growth effects. This is due to the large crowding out of private research caused by public R&D when it competes with private firms in the patent race.JEL Classification: O31, O38, O40I thank the helpful comments of Jordi Caballé, David Pérez-Castrillo and two anonymous referees. I also aknowledge the financial support of Fundaci ón Séneca project PB/3/FS/02.