Monetary and fiscal coordination in preventing bank failures and financial contagion

This paper uses a theoretical model to analyze the optimal combination of monetary response (lowering of interest rates) and fiscal bailouts in preventing bank failures and financial contagion. I show that the optimal way of rescuing failing banks is to combine the two. This is because lower interest rates reduce the size of the bailout required to rescue failing banks as they reduce the cost for banks to raise and retain deposits. The main result of the paper is that banks are willing to monitor their investments more closely when they anticipate a monetary response in addition to bailouts in case of a banking crisis. Additionally, capital requirements such as the Basel Accords do not always incentivize banks to monitor their investments if there is a potential contagion from unhealthy to healthy banks.     

Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts

This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts through a joint analysis of the two. We consider a model with informed short sales, as well as uninformed predatory short sales, which can trigger the inefficient liquidation of a firm. We obtain several novel results: A government commitment to bail out insolvent firms with positive probability can increase welfare because it selectively deters predatory short selling without hampering desirable informed short sales. Contrasting a common view, bailouts can be optimal ex ante but undesirable ex post. Furthermore, bailouts in our model are a better policy tool than short selling restrictions. Welfare gains from the bailout policy are unevenly distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose. Bailout taxes allow ex ante Pareto improvements.     

International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality

The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis.     

Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments

Central government bailouts of local governments are commonly viewed as a recipe for local fiscal indiscipline, as local governments learn that the center will come to the rescue in times of trouble. However, little is known about the consequences of bailouts granted conditional on local governments first making efforts to improve the situation. We examine a case in which the Swedish central government provided conditional grants to 36 financially troubled municipalities. We use the synthetic control method to identify suitable comparison units for each of the 36 municipalities. To compare the development of costs and the fiscal surplus of admitted municipalities to that of their most similar counterparts during the decade after the program, we then estimate fixed effects regressions on the resulting sample. The analysis suggests that conditional bailouts did not erode, and may even have improved, fiscal discipline.     

Weight Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change

Equity considerations may justify the use of weight factors when estimating the costs of climate change. This paper reviews different weight factors that have been used in the climate economics literature. Based on a simple model, it is shown that although the different weight factors imply substantially different cost-damage estimates, they actually yield the same optimal emission reductions. This paradox is explained by the fact that some of the approaches require that also the abatement costs are weighted – and this offsets the effect of the diverging cost-damage estimates. The model is then used to analyse the importance weighting may have on the overall cost-benefit analysis. At present, when most of the global emissions of (fossil) CO2 originate from the industrialised countries, the global optimal emissions are considerably lower if costs are weighted. However, the more the emissions in developing countries grow, the less important becomes the introduction of weight factors in cost-benefit analysis of climate change for the global emission reductions, in the model developed here. On a regional level, the introduction of weight factors continues to play an important role, implying substantially lower emissions in the rich region and slightly higher (!) in the poor.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

Financial intermediary's choice of borrowing

This research investigates several dynamic stochastic models of a bank's management problem of the term structures of its assets and liabilities. A bank can either eliminate most of its interest risk with appropriate options, or it can utilize its expertise in its core business and seek extraordinary profits. This research concerns a bank with the latter goal. In this model, the bank seeks to maximize the expected present value of dividend issued subject to the Federal Reserve's regulatory constraint and liquidity constraint. With this model, we find that if the available deposits are not too high and the level of liquid assets is high enough, then it is optimal for a bank to accept all of the available deposits. However, if the level of liquid assets is too low, then a bank should not issue a dividend or to accept any deposits. The properties are still valid even if the bank is not risk neutral.     

Beliefs, Bailouts and Spread of Bank Panics

This article highlights the spread of bank panics across countries, as the public reassesses governments' propensity to bailouts. Policymakers decide whether to save collapsing banking systems by weighing social costs of crises against the costs associated with raising taxes to finance rescue packages. Policymakers know those social costs of bank liquidation whereas the public does not. In this setup, financial crises may result from the public's self‐fulfilling prophecies about equilibrium outcomes, as lenders' expectations impinge on the taxation cost of bailouts. It follows that a banking crisis in a country leads creditors to reexamine policymakers' willingness to bailouts in other countries, which eventually makes their banks more vulnerable to self‐confirming depositors' runs.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Vehicle choices, miles driven, and pollution policies

Mobile sources contribute large percentages of each pollutant, but technology is not yet available to measure and tax emissions from each vehicle. We build a behavioral model of household choices about vehicles and miles traveled. The ideal-but-unavailable emissions tax would encourage drivers to abate emissions through many behaviors, some of which involve market transactions that can be observed for feasible market incentives (such as a gas tax, subsidy to new cars, or tax by vehicle type). Our model can calculate behavioral effects of each such price and thus calculate car choices, miles, and emissions. A nested logit structure is used to model discrete choices among different vehicle bundles. We also consider continuous choices of miles driven and the age of each vehicle. We propose a consistent estimation method for both discrete and continuous demands in one step, to capture the interactive effects of simultaneous decisions. Results are compared with those of the traditional sequential estimation procedure.     

Can cohort data be treated as genuine panel data?

If repeated observations on the same individuals are not available it is not possible to capture unobserved individual characteristics in a linear model by using the standard fixed effects estimator. If large numbers of observations are available in each period one can use cohorts of individuals with common characteristics to achieve the same goal, as shown by Deaton (1985). It is tempting to analyze the observations on cohort averages as if they are observations on individuals which are observed in consecutive time periods. In this paper we analyze under which conditions this is a valid approach. Moreover, we consider the impact of the construction of the cohorts on the bias in the standard fixed effects estimator. Our results show that the effects of ignoring the fact that only a synthetic panel is available will be small if the cohort sizes are sufficiently large (100, 200 individuals) and if the true means within each cohort exhibit sufficient time variation.The authors thank Bertrand Melenberg, Robert Moffitt, Guglielmo Weber, seminar participants at Texas A & M University, Rice University and the Conference on The Econometrics of Panels and Pseudo Panels (Venice, October 1990) and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Rob Alessie and Pim Adang kindly provided the data. Financial support by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (K.N.A.W.) and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (N.W.O.) is gratefully acknowledged.     

人工智能技术对碳排放的影响

随着新一轮科技革命和产业变革的深入推进,人工智能技术在应对气候变化方面扮演重要角色,并赋能“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的实现。利用2006—2019年中国内地省级面板数据,考察人工智能技术对碳排放的影响。研究发现：人工智能技术与碳排放之间呈倒U型关系,即当人工智能技术达到一定阈值后,其碳减排效应逐渐凸显;人工智能技术主要通过提高能源利用效率实现碳减排;在东部和西部地区,人工智能技术与碳排放之间存在显著倒U型关系,而在中部地区,人工智能技术对碳排放发挥持续促进作用。因此,在推进“双碳”目标过程中,需要以绿色低碳发展为目标开发人工智能技术,正确引导人工智能在碳减排领域的研发应用,针对不同区域实际制定差异化发展政策。     

Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution

This paper presents a model of pollution regulation in an oligopolistic market. Two forms of regulation are considered: performance standards which regulate pollution directly by an upper limit on emissions, and design standards which regulate pollution indirectly by a minimum usage requirement of an enissions control input. Equilibria under each regulatory regime are characterized. A welfare analysis reveals that performance standards are preferred to design standards if the objective is minimization of emissions plus pollution damage costs. However, the comparison is indeterminate if the regulator's objective is total surplus less pollution damage. An equivalence between emissions taxes and performance standards is established, so the above welfare comparisons also apply to emissions taxes versus design standards.     

Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirty activity, while the impact on the clean activity is ambiguous. Both long-run emissions of each firm and total emissions decrease. This result does not necessarily hold if both firms face different policy instruments: Each firm's investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm.     

Relative standards: A positive and normative analysis

The paper considers relative standards which limit the level of emissions per unit of output. The representative firm is characterized by a cost function describing the actual production process, a separate abatement technology, and the fact that (gross) emissions are proportional to output. At first, the implications of a relative standard and of its marginal change for a single firm are examined. It is shown that the standard cannot be replaced by a corresponding tax. Afterwards a positive analysis is performed for an industry consisting of identical firms under perfect competition. Comparative statics are used to analyze the impacts of changes in the relative standard in a short-run and long-run equilibrium. It turns out that the standard always possesses a price effect. Moreover the relevant factors which govern price, quantity, and profit changes are revealed. Then the paper characterizes the optimal standard for the same framework. A main result is that the first-best allocation can never be obtained by means of a relative standard, even if firms are identical. The influence of the demand and supply side on an optimal standard can be demonstrated since the underlying model is simple and transparent. The resulting market price is compared to social marginal costs. Finally the investigation is extended to monopoly and symmetric oligopoly.     

The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs

Permitting allowance banking in emissions trading programs can reduce expected compliance costs by giving capped firms flexibility to adjust the time path of abatement and to hedge against future uncertainty. Recent literature suggests that this compliance cost dividend is significant (Fell and Morgenstern Environ Resour Econ 47:275–297, 2010). Allowance banking may yield an environmental dividend (a) if the growth rate of marginal damages from emissions is less than the discount rate and (b) if emissions are lower in the short run as firms bank permits for use in later periods. A discrete, stochastic dynamic programming model is considered to simulate the two dividends of allowance banking in the context of the most recent Federal United States greenhouse gas cap-and-trade legislation. Simulation results show that under a range of parameter values, the environmental dividend has the same order of magnitude as the compliance cost dividend. Under the central set of parameters, allowance banking increases expected present value of benefits by about $350$ million dollars per year of the program. The environmental dividend, however, is completely eliminated if capped firms can borrow permits from future periods without limit.     

Waste management regulation: policy solutions and policy shortcomings

A model of packaging waste management is presented to explore the policy options available to governments to implement waste regulation in light of the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR ). Our model endogenizes the packaging design as an additional determinant for the overall amount of waste jointly with consumers’ sorting effort and producers’ output decisions. The model shows that the policies that yield the first‐best allocation may not find public support. Furthermore, if the set of available policy instruments is limited, production and consumption of the good is likely to settle on a sub‐optimal level even though the optimal allocation may be achievable. Finally, the model demonstrates that a landfill tax may actually increase landfill waste in the presence of tradable credits for recycling activities. The results shed light on some shortcomings of existing regulatory schemes such as the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations of the UK .     

Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry

The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made.     

International Cooperation on Climate-friendly Technologies

We examine international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions. We show that without any R&D cooperation, R&D in each country should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. We also show that a second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.     

Measuring the effectiveness of voluntary emission reduction programmes

This paper examines the evaluation of state environmental policies aimed at reducing ground level ozone in order to meet air quality standards set by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Several states with metropolitan areas that violate federal air quality regulations have adopted voluntary emission reduction programmes. These programmes focus on emissions from mobile sources, with the chief source being the automobile. States are allowed to claim credit towards bringing their metro areas closer to compliance with regulations only if they can provide credible evidence that these voluntary programmes are successful in reducing emissions. A model is developed to forecast aggregate traffic volumes so that one can assess the impact of the programme in reducing traffic flows during ‘Ozone Action Days’. Background information on the difficulties of measuring the ozone problem and on the recent policies adopted by the US EPA is provided. Using data from the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan area, the accuracy of the model is demonstrated and preliminary analysis of whether the programmes which began in the summer of 1998 has had the desired impact is provided.