Initial credit ratings and earnings management

Credit rating agencies assert that they rely on financial information provided by issuers and that they value rating stability as well as accuracy. In an environment where rating agencies depend on issuer-reported information and are reluctant to adjust ratings promptly, managers of issuing firms can utilize the discretion afforded by GAAP to obtain the most favorable credit ratings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that current accruals are unusually positive and high around initial credit ratings. The increase in abnormally high accruals leading up to the initial credit rating year is followed by a reversal in the subsequent years. Multivariate regression analyses suggest that accounting accruals, abnormal current accruals in particular, are significantly positively related to initial credit ratings after controlling for several issue- and issuer-related characteristics indicative of default risk. Our results are robust to additional tests that account for endogeneity between credit ratings and earnings management, adjust for performance, and account for firms issuing debt and equity simultaneously.     

基于市场定价测算信用评级指标权重

一般而言,投资者会参考一系列指标来综合评估企业债券的信用水平,合理设定这些指标的权重是相对准确地衡量债券信用水平的关键。文章基于有效市场假定,在分类梳理备选信用指标的基础上,将由加权信用指标计算的债券信用估值差异与债券实际收益率差异进行拟合,以此确定最优的信用指标权重组合,以期为简要分析企业信用资质和债券定价判断提供一个参考。     

Divergence in credit ratings

During the recent credit crisis credit rating agencies (CRAs) became increasingly lax in their rating of structured products, yet increasingly stringent in their rating of corporate bonds. We examine a model in which a CRA operates in both the market for structured products and for corporate debt, and shares a common reputation across the two markets. We find that, as a CRA’s reputation becomes good enough, it can be optimal for it to inflate its ratings with probability one in the structured products market, but inflate its ratings with probability zero in the corporate bond market.     

Information effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers' ratings

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.     

Political similarities in credit ratings

We investigate whether political similarities between credit rating agencies (CRAs) and bond issuers impact credit rating quality. We find that a higher degree of similarity of political affiliation leads to a decrease in timeliness and accuracy of downgrades prior to default events. Our finding supports the notion that CRAs tend to maintain/assign preferential ratings to politically similar firms via delaying negative signals as favourable rating activities. We further show that these politically similar firms tend to increase the proportion of donations to their favoured party following favourable credit ratings. Interestingly, this result is confined to Republican-leaning firms. The results indicate that CRAs successfully use biased credit ratings as an indirect channel of political party support. Our findings support the political similarities in credit ratings hypothesis.     

Pushing the future back: The impact of policy uncertainty on the market pricing of future earnings

We examine whether policy uncertainty triggered by presidential elections pushes the future back by reducing the extent to which current prices reflect information about future earnings. We estimate future earnings response coefficients (FERCs) for the years 1975–2013, a period that covers ten presidential elections. We find that FERCs are significantly lower (by 11.8%) during presidential election years compared to other years. Additional analyses using pseudo election years, ex‐ante polls, contract prices from the Iowa Electronic Political Market, and cross‐sectional firm characteristics provide corroborating evidence that the lower FERCs during election years are related to policy uncertainty. We also investigate potential explanations for the lower FERCs during election years. We find that the lower FERCs relate to forecasting difficulty rather than to changes in the discount rate or in the amount of noise trading. Finally, we find that market prices move toward future earnings to a greater degree during presidential election years compared with other years once the policy uncertainty is resolved. A trading strategy based on this drift yields significant abnormal returns. Overall, we contribute to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence that shocks to policy uncertainty influence the pricing of earnings information.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

Market-implied ratings and their divergence from credit ratings

In this article, we investigate the divergence between credit ratings (CRs) and Moody's market-implied ratings (MIRs). Our evidence shows that rating gaps provide incremental information to the market regarding issuers' default risk over CRs alone in the short horizon and outperform CRs over extended horizons. The predictive ability of rating gaps is greater for more opaque and volatile issuers. Such predictability was more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis but weakened in the post–Dodd–Frank Act period. This finding is consistent with credit rating agencies’ efforts to improve their performance when facing regulatory pressure. Moreover, our analysis identifies rating-gap signals that do (do not) lead to subsequent Moody's actions to place issuers on negative outlook and watchlists. We find that negative signals from MIR gaps have a real economic impact on issuers’ fundamentals such as profitability, leverage, investment, and default risk, thus supporting the recovery-efforts hypothesis.     

Time series patterns in credit ratings

This article offers a substitute setting to simulate credit rating migrations. The internal correlations model tracks time-series movements within credit rating entries, rather than cross-ratings correlations. The proposed nonhomogeneous process is authenticated through the likelihood ratio Dickey–Fuller test, and is found to be statistically and economically significant, by better fitting observed cumulative default rates. Several nonlinear regression models assist to better identify these time-related patterns. The economic structure underlying the time dependency often corresponds to changes in GDP, business cycles, and market risk. Furthermore, significant positive autocorrelation is detected mostly among downgrade probabilities.     

The information content of credit ratings: evidence from European convertible bond markets

Prior research has investigated the information content of credit ratings for standard financing instruments such as stocks and corporate bonds, while this question has been neglected for convertible bonds (CBs) so far. CBs are simultaneously determined by the bond floor and the conversion value, which makes it more difficult to assess price effects following rating announcements. In this context, we compare price effects of CBs with those of stocks and corporate bonds of the same issuer using robust event study methods. Our findings indicate that rating changes convey new information for investors in European CBs. In terms of the direction of the expected price reaction, we find CBs to react in a more debt-like manner to the announcement of a rating change. Moreover, our results provide evidence that the magnitude of price reactions differs among different types of securities.     

The efficiency of earnings forecast pricing

Prior research has suggested that the information content associated with analysts’ forecast revisions is not immediately incorporated into a firm’s stock price. We find that the apparent anomaly is concentrated in low-priced firms that receive favorable earnings revisions. Variables (such as analyst coverage and celebrity status) cannot reliably explain variations in price formations. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the post-forecast revision drift has decreased after 2002. Overall, our results suggest that the analysts’ forecast revisions anomaly can be explained by a combination of random statistical variations and transaction costs.     

Firstborn CEOs and credit ratings

Our study examines whether CEOs’ birth order can predict firms’ credit ratings. Consistent with studies that document a positive relationship in the general population between being firstborn and being conservative, our study finds that firms managed by firstborn CEOs tend to have higher credit ratings than those managed by later-born CEOs. Our results are robust to controlling for additional personal CEO traits, such as political identity, and to using a propensity score matching sample. A change analysis supports the causality of the firstborn effect. We suggest that return on assets and free cash flow are possible channels through which firstborn status affects credit ratings. Cross-sectional analyses show that the positive association is less (more) pronounced for firstborn CEOs who have a pilot license (run firms in less competitive industries). These results suggest that managerial conservatism may be an important factor in credit rating agencies’ credit risk assessments.     

Determinants of heterogeneity in European credit ratings

In this study, we empirically analyze the determinants of heterogeneity in rating assessments across different segments of the European loan market. We conduct a benchmarking analysis using rating information on European corporate obligors from nine major Austrian banks that have a large share of foreign lending, particularly in the Central and Eastern European region. We provide evidence that, generally, overall heterogeneity among rating outcomes for foreign markets is higher than for domestic markets. Furthermore, we show that heterogeneity increases in transition economies and those markets where Austrian bank involvement is relatively low. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that heterogeneity in the assessment of credit risk is determined not only by the objective quality of information, which is deemed to be lower in transition economies, but also by the subjective access to information about obligors measured by the level of domestic bank involvement in the respective foreign market. Furthermore, we quantify potential effects on regulatory capital requirements.     

Credit ratings and IPO pricing

We examine the effects of credit ratings on IPO pricing. The evidence from U.S. common share IPOs during 1986–2004 shows that when firms go public, those with credit ratings are underpriced significantly less than firms without credit ratings. Credit rating levels, however, do not have a significant effect on IPO underpricing. The existence of credit rating reduces uncertainty about firm value. It is the value certainty that matters, not the value per se. Credit ratings also reduce the degree of price revision during the bookbuilding process and the aftermarket volatility in the post-IPO period. The evidence suggests that credit ratings convey useful information in reducing value uncertainty of the issuing firms as well as information asymmetry in the IPO markets.     

The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

Leads and lags in sovereign credit ratings

This paper analyses lead–lag relationships in sovereign ratings across five agencies, and finds evidence of interdependence in rating actions. Upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are much higher, and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign issuer with a recent upgrade (downgrade) by another agency. S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence on other agencies, and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of the larger agencies, although there is some evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades.     

The information content of three credit ratings: the case of European residential mortgage-backed securities

We assess the information content of three credit ratings for tranches of newly issued European residential mortgage-backed securities. We find that tranches rated by three credit rating agencies where the rating by Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Ratings Service or Fitch is inferior to Moody's lead to higher funding costs and reflects what we refer to as rating risk. Our results suggest that market participants do not view credit ratings by Fitch and S&P's as redundant despite the fact that both employ the same rating approach.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.     

CEO political preference and credit ratings

This study investigates whether a CEO's personal political ideology, as captured by his or her political contributions, is associated with a firm's credit ratings. Republican CEOs, we find, are associated with higher credit ratings, especially when their firms are headquartered in conservative areas. In addition, the link between political ideology and credit rating is more pronounced in firms that exhibit high financial distress or weak corporate governance. Changes in political ideology are associated with changes in credit rating. Our results support the behavior consistency, upper echelon, and social identity theories, as well as the risk acceptance hypothesis, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications as well as when alternate approaches and measures of credit risk are introduced. Using Republican CEOs as a proxy for conservative CEOs, our evidence implies that credit rating agencies justifiably view a CEO's political ideology and conservatism as indicative of corporate policies and, therefore, as an important determinant of the firm's credit ratings.     

Dividend tax signaling and the pricing of future earnings: a case of taxable stock dividends

The purpose of our study is to explore what types of information content are conveyed by dividends on future earnings. We examine this issue by investigating the effect of dividends on the association between current year stock returns and future earnings (i.e. the future earnings response coefficient, FERC). Based on exploring the Taiwan market, our results reveal that taxable stock dividends enhance the FERC while nontaxable stock dividends do not, consistent with the tax-based signaling argument. We also find a positive relation between cash dividends and the FERC in firms with severe free cash flow problems, and this suggests that higher cash payouts mitigate manager over-investment so future earnings are more highly valued, consistent with the agency argument. Our main contributions are to specify what factors make dividends informative with regard to future earnings and the provision of evidence to support the tax-based signaling model.