Central bank communication on fiscal policy

The issue of central bank communication on fiscal policy has so far received very little attention in the literature. This article aims to shed light on the determinants of central bank communication on fiscal policy by analysing the intensity of central banks’ fiscal communication for five central banks (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank) over the period 1999–2011. The ECB communicates intensively on fiscal policies, in a normative way. The other central banks emphasise foreign fiscal developments, fiscal policy as input to forecasts, or the use of government debt instruments in monetary policy operations. The empirical analysis indicates that the financial crisis has overall increased the intensity of central bank communication on fiscal policy. The evolution of the government deficit ratio is a driver of the intensity of fiscal communication in the euro area, the US and Japan, and for Sweden since the start of the crisis, while in the UK its intensity is related to government debt developments as of the start of the crisis.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England

Central bank independence has raised questions of accountability ever since its global diffusion in the 1990s, and especially since the financial crisis. Yet, whilst the literature on central banks’ legislative oversight has expanded, the role of the media as account holders has been left largely unexplored. We assess media scrutiny by using an original dataset of news articles about the Bank of England published between 1997 and 2020, and by analysing the relationship between central banking outcomes and scrutiny in the form of evaluative and negative coverage of the Bank. We find that the variation in such coverage can be traced back to policy outcomes, but the association is largely confined to the post-crisis period. The findings support a view of the media as instrumental in central bank oversight, but also show the limits of this form of accountability.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy

The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.     

Financial Structure Changes and the Central Bank Policy

In a response to the financial collapse of 2007–2009, central banks overstepped their narrow role of lender of last resort (LLR) and acted as dealers or market-makers of last resort (MMLR). Such an evolution of the central bank policy stems from the endogenous process of growing securities markets, financial innovations, and market-based credit intermediation. This article examines how changes in the structure of the banking and financial system transforms the central bank policy in financial stability. It considers the separation or integration of the LLR and MMLR functions, revisits the debate opposing lend-to-market and lend-to-institution theses, and discusses the LLR standard rule and its transposition to the MMLR rule. Inasmuch as private securities markets and financial innovations determine the structure of the credit system, central banks endogenously adopt the integrated approach, so that the extensive LLR policy prevails.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

The Choice Among Interbank Settlement Systems: The European Experience

This paper addresses the choice of banks between alternative channels for interbank payments. The conventional view assumes a tradeoff between the safety of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and the liquidity savings of multilateral netting. Moreover, correspondent banking is believed to be inefficient, both in terms of liquidity and of administrative costs. In the last decade, however, the impulse of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, technological changes and the management of RTGS systems by central banks have reduced the difference between the various systems. This is especially true for risk, whereas liquidity cost crucially depends on the refinancing policy adopted by the central bank and the co-ordination among the participants. On the basis of the recent evolution of payment systems in Europe, we verify the importance of liquidity, as well as other variables like transaction costs, for the choice of banks among different settlement systems. Cost factors imply that the nature of payments flows (value, commercial versus financial) and some structural features of the banking systems (dimension of the intermediaries, concentration of the banking sector) become important. The analysis is carried out both through a theoretical model and a cross-country comparison based on three data sources: ECB (European Central Bank, EBA (Euro Banking Association) and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).     

Explaining European Union Citizens’ Trust in the European Central Bank in Normal and Crisis Times

We study the determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) as measured by the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey, in particular during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. We find that the fall in trust in the ECB in crisis times can be rather well explained based on the pre‐crisis determinants. We also show that the fall in trust reflected the macroeconomic deterioration, a more generalized fall in the trust in European institutions in the wake of the crisis, and the severity of the banking sector's problems, to which the ECB was associated in the public opinion.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

How does capital regulation react to monetary policy? New evidence on the risk-taking channel

Before the subprime crisis, financial stability was a microprudential issue addressed by capital regulation and unrelated to monetary policy. The financial crisis put this paradigm to the test and turned the spotlight on the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy. Hence, the following question arises: how does capital regulation react to monetary policy? This article seeks to answer this question. We analyze the link involving monetary policy and capital regulation through the risk-taking channel in Brazil. The findings suggest that banks react to monetary policy by changing the amount of loan provisions as well as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). An important novelty of the study is the evidence that there is no trade-off between provisions and CAR, which are important tools used by banking supervisors. The key result of the article is that banks react to the macroeconomic environment differently from what is expected by banking supervision, i.e., there exists a paradox between the microprudential view and the macroprudential view. Thus, in terms of practical implication, a banking supervision strategy for financial stability must take into account the effects of monetary policy.     

Cyclical behavior of the financial stability of eurozone commercial banks

In light of the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, we investigate the cyclical behavior of the financial stability of banks of the Eurozone, using an unbalanced dynamic panel of 722 commercial banks covering the period 1999–2013, and the generalized method of moments system. We find a negative relationship between business cycle and bank risk-taking, indicating that financial stability is procyclical. In addition, the study shows that lending activity increases risk-taking while rising capital requirements boost financial stability. Moreover, our findings suggest positive co-movements between the business cycle and lending, compared to bank's capital, whereby the procyclicality of lending and bank capital have negative effects on the financial stability of commercial banks in the Eurozone. We notice then that the cyclical behavior of commercial banks, in terms of capital requirements and lending activities, depends on their size. Therefore, lending and capital of smaller banks are procyclical while lending and capital of larger banks are countercyclical. Finally, we find the Troika institutions’ bailouts programs significantly impacted banking stability in the Eurozone.     

The Myth of Market Neutrality: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases

ABSTRACT

Monetary policy operations in corporate security markets confront central banks with choices that are traditionally perceived to be the prerogative of governments. This article investigates how central bankers legitimise corporate security purchases through a comparative study of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). As we show, central bankers downplay the novelty of corporate security purchases by relying on familiar pre-crisis justifications of Central Bank Independence. Citing an ideal of ‘market neutrality’, central banks present corporate security purchases as pursuing a narrow objective of price stability and obfuscate their distributive consequences. In this way, central bankers depoliticise corporate security purchases: they reduce the potential for choice, collective agency, and deliberation concerning both the pursuit of corporate security purchases and the choices made in implementing these policies. We also describe the undesirable democratic, social and environmental dimensions of these practices, which we propose to address through enhanced democratic accountability.     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

POLONIA dynamics during the years 2006–2012 and the effectiveness of the monetary Policy of the National Bank of Poland

In the study we investigate the effectiveness of the National Bank of Poland in counteracting the negative results of the financial crisis in the Polish interbank market. The situation was exceptional in a sense, that during the period of the financial crisis the Polish interbank market experienced liquidity surplus, and the main problem of the central bank was to regain confidence among commercial banks and stimulate interbank transactions. We concentrate on the spread between the rate of overnight interbank loans and the reference rate and based upon its dynamics we assess the monetary policy of the Polish central bank. Using econometric techniques we study how the central bank influenced the spread, when its control over it weakened and when was it strengthened. The study is supported by the results of the survey directed to the headquarters of commercial banks. We conclude that the ability of the central bank to control overnight rate was temporarily lost during the first phases of the financial crisis, but gradually regained after implementation of the confidence pact.     

The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Japan

Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, central bankers around the world have been forced to abandon conventional monetary policy tools in favor of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing, forward guidance, and even lowering the interest rate paid on bank reserves into negative territory. Japan, which faced a crisis in its banking sector and came up against the theoretical zero lower bound on interest rates nearly a decade earlier, was a pioneer in the use of many of these unconventional policy tools. This article analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of quantitative easing policy on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. These results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis.     

Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.     

European banks’ executive remuneration under the new European Union regulation

We review how the new European regulation of bank executive compensation could affect the future of banking in Europe. Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the relation between bank executive remuneration and the financial crisis, authorities have intensively regulated the compensation of bank managers to eliminate risk-taking incentives in the financial industry. However, the new regulation could have unintended consequences of creating an adverse selection problem at European banks, reducing the number of best-performing managers available for European banks, and motivating an excessive increase in fixed remuneration over total remuneration, altering the way incentive systems work.     

Money and the ‘Level Playing Field’: The Epistemic Problem of European Financial Market Integration

ABSTRACT

Financial market integration processes in the European Union (EU) are characterised by an epistemic problem of economic theory. This problem encompasses what ‘the market’ is, how it is to be ‘integrated’, and the nature and role of ‘money’ as infrastructure of the fully integrated market. The EU’s legal framework has imported this epistemic problem along with the competitive conception of the market as described in economic theory – as a ‘level playing field’ for private exchange, under free, fair and ideally unrestrained competition. It manifests itself in European financial market integration processes, as exemplified in the article, via two otherwise disconnected areas of European Central Bank (ECB) activity: (a) the provision of central bank credit for the purpose of financial transaction settlement in the Eurozone; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary policy in the Eurozone. While the problem can be stabilised through legal, technical and other means, it remains latent, and may manifest itself again in unexpected ways, as happened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, contrary to ideologies that are widely understood as more or less coherent systems of doctrines, epistemic problems are characterised by specific tensions, contradictions and conceptual uncertainties.     

How do mega-bank merger policy and regulations contribute to financial stability? Evidence from Australia and Canada

Although the role of financial regulatory failures in the global financial crisis (GFC) has been explored extensively in the post-GFC literature, our knowledge of the role of bank merger and takeover policy and regulation in reinforcing financial stability is limited. Based on an exploratory case study of Australia, which is examined in comparison to Canada, this article argues that competition policy and regulation contributed to financial stability by insulating the largest Australian and Canadian banks from domestic or foreign hostile takeover threats, and by limiting their asset size, and thus their internationalization and interconnections with the global banking community.