基于博弈论的房地产开发商行为决策研究

商品房的高空置率问题使得时房地产开发商决策行为的研究显得极为重要,但目前这方面的研究成果还不够全面。本文运用博弈论的建模思想,通过对房地产开发商之间的价格博弈研究,分析发现避免开发商之间出现价格战的最有效途径就是实现市场差异化;通过开发博弈的研究,论证了在各开发商理性的情况下谁优先开发谁就具有市场的主动权,从而对政府在减少房地产开发过程中寻租活动的监管提出了更高的要求。     

房地产宏观调控的博弈分析

调控房地产市场的“新国八条”已经出台半年多,但中央政府稳定房价的调控目标并未实现.本文从我国房地产宏观调控中地方政府与中央政府的博弈、地方政府与开发商的博弈、开发商与消费者的博弈3个方面来分析调控房价政策效果不明显的深层次原因.     

不对称信息下物业管理的委托代理分析

从不对称信息的角度，分析了物业管理第一阶段中3方当事人——业主、开发商、物业管理公司之间的委托代理关系：即业主和开发商之间，开发商与物业公司之间的博弈关系。提出在业主和开发商之间，开发商应承担物业管理的责任，并应建立信誉机制，创立品牌形象；在开发商与物业公司之间应建立固定总价合同分阶段支付的契约，以降低物业公司的经营风险和维护业主的利益。     

不对称信息下物业管理的委托代理分析

从不对称信息的角度,分析了物业管理第一阶段中3方当事人——业主、开发商、物业管理公司之间的委托代理关系:即业主和开发商之间,开发商与物业公司之间的博弈关系。提出在业主和开发商之间,开发商应承担物业管理的责任,并应建立信誉机制,创立品牌形象;在开发商与物业公司之间应建立固定总价合同分阶段支付的契约,以降低物业公司的经营风险和维护业主的利益。     

期房交易中房地产开发商和业主的动态博弈

中国房地产市场上期房交易频繁,开发商的诚信问题是广大消费者关注的重点。文章通过建立一个两阶段完全非完美信息博弈模型,对期房交易合同签订以后开发商和消费者的行为进行分析,并评价了政府在抑制房地产开发商不诚信行为中所起的作用。     

市场化手段出让国有土地使用权的博弈问题研究——基于地方政府和房地产开发商视角

随着我国土地使用制度改革的深入和土地管理体系的日渐完善,以市场化手段出让国有土地使用权已成为政府供地的主要方式。在博弈相关理论下,招标、拍卖、挂牌出让城市土地使用权过程中,地方政府和房地产开发商之间会产生相应博弈。欲合理利用土地资源,就须规范房地产开发商行为和规避地方政府操纵土地出让价格等现象。     

社区参与乡村旅游利益相关者分析

乡村旅游中社区居民与政府、开发商等利益相关者的博弈行为,可使利益相关者之间的博弈过程沿着＂多赢＂的目标前进,最大程度满足各方的利益要求。政府应发挥主导、协调作用,在公开公平的制度框架内满足各方利益,建立有效的行为监控机制。开发商要完善利益分配、保障机制,鼓励社区居民参与社区旅游的发展。     

互补性专利下创业企业协同创新投资策略研究

运用期权博弈和合作博弈理论,基于对称双寡头模型,从技术互补程度出发,将专利价值的影响因素（互补程度、专利经济寿命、市场波动率）作为数学模型中的输入量,专利价值和投资阈值作为输出量,研究了互补性专利下创业企业协同创新的金融性质。结果表明,具有互补性专利的企业协同创新能够获得理想的专利投资价值,并且专利互补程度越大,企业越倾向于采取合作策略。     

企业间专利组合收益分成的信号博弈策略

利用信号博弈理论,对专利组合策略领导者存在逆向选择情况下的专利组合收益分成策略进行了规范性分析。主要结论如下:当专利组合策略的领导者有高素质与低素质两种类型时,若低素质领导者的模仿成本大于模仿收益,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率完全可以作为一种传递领导者类型的信号,此时的信号博弈存在一个序列分离均衡;反之,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率的信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在,此时的信号博弈存在一个混合策略均衡或混同均衡。最后,从实践角度给出了对策和建议。     

非对称信息下节能建筑开发商激励机制研究

基于信息经济学中的委托-代理理论,通过分析政府与开发商之间的利益博弈,建立了非对称信息下的开发商激励机制模型。结果表明：开发商风险规避度越大,成本系数越高,风险分担越小,需要的激励强度越大。在一定条件下,由于外部相关因素与激励模型中产出相关性的存在,因此,在激励机制设计中需要包含这些因素,以提高对开发商的激励强度。     

Is piracy sustainable?

We develop a model of international trade between three countries, one of which hosts pirates. When the number of pirate ships increases, the probability for one of the pirate ships (for one commercial ship) encountering a commercial (pirate) ship decreases (increases). Then, the commercial ships have an incentive to spend more on defence and pirate ships to invest less on attack. If pirates operate under free entry, they do not internalize the entry externality. Then, their number rises until it reaches a level such that their attack power has become negligible and the defence of the commercial ships has reached a high level. The economy settles in a full deterrence equilibrium. However, if the number of pirate ships is controlled by an authority, which maximizes piracy's profit, the economy settles in an equilibrium where piracy is active and commercial ships spend less on defence. Piracy is a substitute for trade. Piracy depends on the terms of trade of the pirate country and on the relative efficiency of the attack versus the defence.     

Avoiding commercial piracy

In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.     

The impact of unsuccessful pirate attacks on financial markets: Evidence in support of Leeson's reputation-building theory

This paper examines the effect of unsuccessful Somali pirate attacks on financial-market returns in the Arabian Peninsula. Specifically, it tests Leeson's (2010a) reputation-building theory of pirate signaling behavior postulating that unsuccessful pirate attacks may trigger subsequent future attacks by pirates as pirates attempt to maintain and build their reputation for effective piracy. We test this theory empirically by studying the relationship between pirate attacks and financial-market returns in the Arabian Peninsula. The result of our empirical test supports Leeson's theory: unsuccessful pirate attacks are associated with lower financial-market returns, suggesting that market participants expect unsuccessful pirate attacks to be followed by future pirate attacks.     

我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为分析

文章以知识产权得到有效保护时计算机软件的价格和产量为比较标准,分析了我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为及其后果。文章得出结论认为:与知识产权完全实施时相比较,侵犯知识产权的行为不仅降低了国内类型软件产量,提高国内软件的价格,而且也降低了国外软件开发商在中国市场的利润,而这正是发达国家与我国在与贸易相关的知识产权问题上存在摩擦的主要原因。从短期静态利益考虑,地方政府在追求社会福利最大化时,零查处概率是最佳选择。政府查处盗版的最优概率是查处侵犯知识产权的边际收益等于边际成本时的概率,盗版现象虽不可能被完全杜绝,但却可以被控制在一定的范围和程度内。     

Dynamic common agency

A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting.     

不完全信息静态条件下企业总成本领先战略探究

从迈克尔·波特教授的著作中引入总成本领先战略的概念，从博弈论不完全信息静态模型出发来建立我们要分析问题的一般化模型，分析不完全信息静态模型，并得到均衡解。通过对其均衡产量和均衡利润来分析相关结论，得到在不完全信息静态这一模式下，如果企业在行业竞争中采取总成本领先战略，那么企业显然是可以得到高于不采用此战略的企业均衡产量；在两个企业之间的相关系数不大的前提条件，可以得到采取总成本领先战略的企业就可以得到更高的利润空间。     

BOOMS AND SLUMPS IN A GAME OF SEQUENTIAL INVESTMENT WITH THE CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS

Many less developed countries have experienced prolonged periods of expansions and reversals in foreign investment inflows. This paper presents a simple game-theoretic model that can explain hysteretic patterns of serial correlation in investment behavior. We develop a sequential move game of coordinated investment played by short-run players under the changing economic environment and demonstrate that in a unique equilibrium of the game, the economy fluctuates over multiple static equilibria, generating hysteresis.     

Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game

The two-person centipede game is one of the most celebrated paradoxes of backward induction in complete information extensive form games. An experimental investigation of a three-person centipede game shows that the paradoxical results are strongly affected by the size of the stakes. When the number of players in the game is increased from two to three and the game is played for unusually high stakes with group composition being randomly changed from trial to trial, the paradox is considerably weakened as players approach equilibrium play with multiple iterations of the stage game. When the game is played with low stakes, there is no evidence for equilibrium play or learning across iterations of the stage game. An adaptive learning model that assumes updating of the individual probabilities of choice outperforms alternative static and dynamic models in accounting for the major results observed in the high-stake experiment.     

低碳经济下煤炭企业排污行为的博弈分析

基于我国长期处于"政府主导型"的环保模式中,运用博弈论方法,建立简单的政企双方完全信息静态博弈模型,在局中人混合策略解的基础上,对影响政府监管与企业排污概率的因素进行重点分析。研究结果表明,通过控制企业排污处罚金及政府监管成本等参数,是提高政府监管概率、降低企业排污概率的有效途径。进而,为相关政府部门提供若干指导性建议。     

海盗犯罪的经济分析及对策

借助"理性经济人"理论和波斯纳理论分析海盗的犯罪成本构成,可得出海盗的犯罪成本包括直接成本和惩罚成本。增加海盗犯罪的惩罚成本是目前预防和制止海盗活动唯一可行的选择,并且应体现惩罚成本的可能性、严厉性和及时性。