Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets

This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.     

Individual Agents,Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process

This study examines how individual agents affect house selling prices and time on the market while controlling for brokerage firm-specific effects as well as supply and demand conditions that vary by neighborhood. Firm size effects disappear once firm specialization and agent characteristics are taken into account but geographic concentration by firms leads to higher selling prices. For individual agents, neither sex nor selling own listings affects price or selling time, but there are gains from partnering transactions across firms. Agents who specialize in listing properties obtain higher prices for their sellers while those who specialize in selling obtain lower prices for their buyers. Houses nearer to other transactions of an agent sell for higher prices. Finally, greater scale of listing and selling activity by an agent tends to lower selling price or lengthen the time on the market.

Single-family housing transactions: Seller motivations, price, and marketing time

Factors such as relocation and financial distress motivate the seller of a single-family home to facilitate sale by posting a lower list price, communicating the motivations to the marketplace, or offering sales incentives to agents. Impacts of seller motivations on selling prices and marketing times are estimated using data for single-family homes sold in Arlington, Texas, from 1991 to 1993. Results show selling price discounts for houses with sellers who are either eager, motivated, or anxious, houses with sellers who have relocated, foreclosures, and vacant houses. Only foreclosure houses show the reduced marketing time expected for properties with motivated sellers. The results further suggest that the list price is the seller's primary mechanism for selling the property. Reducing the list price fosters faster sales at the sacrifice of the selling price.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding

We study dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other's purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information increases future rent extraction, the monopolist has an incentive to subsidize learning by charging a price that results in information revelation. Nonetheless, in the long run, the monopolist generally induces herding by either selling to all buyers or exiting the market.     

List Price Information in the Negotiation of Commercial Real Estate Transactions: Is Silence Golden?

We examine the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing commercial real estate. While housing market research suggests that list prices can serve as a strong anchor and/or signal, list price information is included in less than one-third of the commercial property sales and is less likely to be included as part of the sellers’ offering information for larger and more complex properties. Given the potentially powerful effect of list prices (first offers) on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers’ interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties. Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that office properties which provide list price information are, on average, associated with lower price outcomes (ceteris paribus) and that these outcomes vary by price cohort and economic condition. It is important to note, however, that while these findings identify a correlation, they do not necessarily imply causation. Our results support the notion that asymmetric information and information signaling play a dominant role in explaining the sellers’ strategic non-use of list price information in the commercial real estate market and that the signaling effect is more pronounced in higher priced properties and during periods of strong economic growth.     

Price spreads and residential housing market liquidity

Most studies of housing market liquidity have measured liquidity in terms of time on the market (TOM), and have sought to explain TOM in terms of property characteristics and measures of market conditions. This paper departs from past studies of housing market liquidity by examining the spread between the listing and contract prices.We develop theory to explain the price spreads in the residential housing market. The model includes the list price of the home, the cost of the search, the standard deviation of offer prices, and TOM. Empirical tests using 3,597 sales for 25 months show a robust relationship of housing market spreads and these variables. Listing price and cost of search have the predicted positive coefficients, and the standard deviation of price offers is found to be negatively related to the price spread.     

信息传导与市场整合——基于商品期货上市的准自然实验

从制度设计上打破市场分割、促进市场整合,对提高市场效率、促进经济有序健康发展具有重要意义。本文以商品期货上市作为准自然实验,构建双重差分模型,实证检验了商品期货上市交易对现货商品市场价格整合的影响。研究发现,现货商品市场价格整合程度在相应商品期货上市后显著提升,这是因为商品期货上市显著地促进了价格信息在全国范围内的传导,且这种提升效应主要体现在价格信息传导比较顺畅的地区。此外,商品期货上市提高了现货商品市场价格同步性,缓解了现货商品价格信息滞后程度,降低了现货商品交易成本。进一步研究发现,商品期货市场的交易信息质量越高,越有利于提高现货商品市场的整合程度。本研究为当前我国建设全国统一大市场提供了一定参考。     

The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting

When a house is placed on the market, the seller must choose the initial offer price. Setting the price too high or too low affects the marketability of the property. While there is near universal agreement that the seller faces a trade-off between selling at a higher price and selling in less time, there is less agreement about how to measure this trade-off. This paper offers a framework for analysis and shows that an increase in the list price increases expected time-on-the-market (TOM). Because house buyers must solve a type of signal extraction problem, the effect of a higher list price is magnified for houses in a market segment having a low predicted variance of the list price. This paper also shows that the list price of houses which are withdrawn before sale has a higher mean and variance, and that the possibility of withdrawal censors information about the time-on-the-market.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

Trading and Manipulation Around Seasoned Equity Offerings

We investigate the potential for manipulation due to the interaction between secondary market trading prior to a seasoned equity offering (SO) and the pricing of the offering. Informed traders acting strategically may attempt to manipulate offering prices by selling shares prior to the SO, and profit subsequently from lower prices in the offering. The model predicts increased selling prior to a SO, leading to increases in the market maker's inventory and temporary price decreases. Further, since manipulation conceals information, the ratio of temporary to permanent components of the price movements is predicted to increase.     

Buying a house and the decision to use a real estate broker

This study examines the factors that affect the decision by home buyers to use real estate brokers and the subsequent effect this decision has on home prices. Buyers with high opportunity costs and the least amount of information about local market conditions are the most likely to use brokers; a finding consistent with the role of the real estate broker as a market intermediary. Not surprisingly, these were some of the same factors that also have a positive impact on selling price. An important finding of this study is that when selection bias is adequately controlled, the real estate broker has no appreciable, independent impact on selling price. This, in turn, suggests a nonsegmented, highly competitive housing market.     

Earnings shocks,price responses,and short selling behavior

Existing researches usually study short sellers' behavior along a single dimension such as earnings news without considering the implications of multiple signals. In this paper, we investigate short selling behavior at earnings announcement period by using the shorting data from the Regulation SHO pilot program for the period January 2005 to July 2007. First, we document that, in about one third of our sample, earnings surprises and corresponding market price changes have opposite signs. By investigating how short sellers trade when earnings shocks and market price responses are of opposite signs, we find that there are more short selling activities when the market responds positively to negative earnings surprises; and that there are fewer short selling activities when the market responds negatively to positive earnings surprises. Overall, the shorting intensity at announcement period depends on both the earnings shock and price response signals.     

Short-sale constraints and stock price informativeness

Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), in their pioneering study of international differences in stock price synchronicity, emphasize the effect of market development on investors' ability to incorporate firm-specific information into prices. We use a unique institutional feature in the Hong Kong market to investigate one of the important tools investors use to do this and hence reduce stock price synchronicity: short selling. Examining the cross-sectional and time-series variation in short-sale constraints in the Hong Kong market, we find that after the removal of short-sale constraints, stock prices become more informative and move less in tandem with the market.     

Another Look at Effects of “Adults-Only” Age Restrictions on Housing Prices

This study reexamines the price effects of age restrictions on housing prices. Our data cover a period when the housing market is taking a steep downturn. We argue that, when housing prices are falling, seniors are more likely to avoid investing in housing for at least two reasons. First, seniors are relatively more sensitive to their immediate equity loss than younger homeowners, mainly due to the limited remaining lifetime over which they can afford to wait; second, age-restriction acts as a luxury good, with seniors not willing to pay for reduction in neighborhood uncertainty, eliminating buyer demand for this segment of the population. If this “larger demand loss” outweighs the positive externality of the reduction in neighborhood uncertainty during the market downturn, we would observe that age-restrictions reduce property values. Using data from Broward County, Florida for the years of 2005–2007, we find a significant discount in residential condominium prices due to age-restrictions. In particular, we find that imposing age-restriction on properties decreases housing prices by 17.9% during the period May 2005 to April 2006, while the discount is worse, 22.7%, during the later period May 2006 to May 2007.     

卖空机制能够约束内部人减持吗？——基于融资融券制度的经验证据

本文以我国放松卖空管制为视角,探究其对内部人减持的影响。研究表明,卖空机制能够抑制企业内部人减持行为。机制分析发现,卖空对内部人减持的抑制作用是通过缓解股权高溢价实现的。进一步研究表明,卖空能够抑制大股东、董事以及管理层减持,但对监事减持无影响;卖空能够降低内部人减持的获利程度,并且在内部人减持动机更大时,对内部人减持的抑制作用更强;卖空通过约束内部人减持提升了股票定价效率,还有助于降低内部人增持行为。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和内部人减持领域的文献,并对政府部门完善制度设计具有启示意义。     

Principal–Agent Conflict and Broker Effort Near Listing Contract Expiration: The Case of Residential Properties

In the real estate market the seller/agent relationship changes over the course of the listing contract. As the contract expiration nears, brokers may increase efforts generating more potential buyers and, perhaps, a higher offered price. Brokers may also persuade the seller to reduce the reservation price. These two aspects have different implications for the selling price of the property. Employing a sample of 24,100 properties sold in Clark County, Nevada, we investigate the relationship between the selling price and the time-to-expiration of the listing contract. We find that prices are lower if the property is sold near the expiration of the listing contract, indicating that the price-reduction effect dominates the broker-effort effect.

Does short selling improve stock price efficiency and liquidity? Evidence from a natural experiment in China

China introduced short selling for designated stocks in March 2010. Using this important policy change as a natural experiment, we examine the effect of short selling on stock price efficiency and liquidity. We show that the introduction of short selling significantly improves price efficiency, as measured by the differences in individual stock responses to market returns and the delay in price adjustments. Short selling also enhances stock liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spread and Amihud [2002. ‘Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-section and Time-series Effects.’ Journal of Financial Markets 5: 31–56] illiquidity measure; and reduces stock volatility. Overall, our results suggest that short selling helps to stabilize asset prices, provides additional liquidity and improves market quality, even in an emerging economy with a less developed stock market than that in the US and Europe.     

Presale Contract and its Embedded Default and Abandonment Options

The presale contract is a popular property selling method that allows a buyer to default on the remaining payment and/or a developer to abandon a project. Using a simple two-period game theoretical model, we derive a closed-form pricing equation for a presale contract that explicitly accounts for a developer??s abandonment option and a buyer??s default option. Although a developer has an abandonment option under either a spot sale or a presale method, the option is more valuable under a presale contract because of an additional cash inflow from the presale downpayment. A presale also provides a buyer a default option, which is valuable in a real estate market with uncertain demand and price risk. We analyze the implications of the abandonment option on a developer??s construction decision and choice of selling method, as well as the implications of the default option on a buyer??s purchase decision. Furthermore, our model framework has implications to the pricing of futures contracts that involve both stochastic revenues and costs.     

Messages from market to management: the case of IPOs

An IPO's initial return contains new information about the true value of the firm and, hence, provides vital feedback for the investment decision. A high initial return encourages managers to expand, while a lower than expected post-IPO price leads to a reduction of the capital budget. Information production by market participants increases the precision of the market feedback captured in the first competitively determined stock price. Managers can entice investors to produce more information by selling larger stakes at lower prices. A too low offer price, however, attracts uninformed investors and decreases information production.