2011—2021年美国科技法律制定分析框架及颁布情况分析

通过建立“美国科技法律的需求-供给分析框架”，对2011—2021年美国科技法律进行案例分析，由此得出：第一，从数量来看，美国关于科技方面的立法数量呈现增长趋势；第二，从领域来看，美国对科技的关注较全面，包括国家安全、教育、信息通信、农业、基础设施、能源、航空航天、企业创新和民生需求；第三，从对象来看，美国科技方面立法占比最大的是民生需求领域；第四，从趋势来看，美国立法越来越注重对标准和规则的制定；第五，从针对国来看，美国从2017年开始关于涉华科技方面的法律条款日益增多，对华科技打压呈日益激烈的态势。基于上述分析，中国对内应加强科技相关立法，增强立法针对性，并增加民生领域的科技投入；对外应积极应对美国对华科技打压，在国际标准和规则体系的制定中发挥主动作用。     

中美发明专利区域分布比较

本文运用分散度指数、标准差、基尼系数、系统聚类等方法，对中美两国发明专利在区域分布差异和区域等级方面进行了比较分析。在区域差异方面，从发明专利总量的区域集聚度来看，中国和美国的差距较小，相似性较强；从发明专利均量的区域均衡度来看，美国各区域间的差异要大于中国，中国发明专利较多区域和较少区域间的差异要大于美国。在区域等级方面，从绝对数量上看，美国最低等级比中国最高等级的数量要多；美国的区域分布集中在D和E等级，中国的区域等级分布比较均衡；具体区域的比较，中美有相似的特点。但是美国高等级区域的科技和产业关联比较强。     

美国经济增长中潜伏着危机因素

由于经济全球化、国民经济信息化、军事技术转民用、知识经济快速发展等方面的作用，美国在９０年代实现了国民经济的持续增长。但我们在看到美国经济增长的同时，也应看到存在于美国经济中的一些隐患，以及对美国经济稳定发展具有负面影响的主要因素或条件。如：经济运行中出现的在量泡沫成份；实际通货膨胀率高于公布的通货膨胀率；国际收支逆差加大、外汇亏空严重；社会收入分配不等日益严重；等等。如果美国经济一旦出现问题，必     

通讯产业中的异国之鹰──访美国ADC电讯公司中国首席代表袁天沛先生

中国通讯市场的巨大潜力，引得无数国际性大企业竞相折腰，美国ＡＤＣ电讯公司就是其中之一。 近日，记者慕名来到美国ＡＤＣ电讯公司驻京办事处，中国区首席代表袁天沛先生接受了记者的采访，就企业目前的经营理念和营销策略；公司的未来发展远景和战略布署；中国的市场经济和改革开放；世界经济一体化和中国加入ＷＴＯ；东西方文化的交融、对接和碰撞等话题发表了自己的看法，以下是记者与袁先生的访谈内容： 记：请您谈谈美国ＡＤＣ电讯公司的基本情况？ 袁：美国ＡＤＣ电讯公司总部位于美国明尼苏百叶窗州，目前员工２２４００人，分布…     

美国顶尖大学学术不端行为处理机制研究——以美国四所顶尖大学为例

学术不端行为处理机制是美国顶尖大学尊重学术创新、捍卫学术诚信的重要保障。通过对美国四所顶尖大学处理学术不端行为政策和实践的分析，发现美国顶尖大学学术不端行为处理机制由处理依据、处理主体、处理程序和监督救济构成，在制度保障、组织支持、过程保障和理念引领方面具有以下特征：提供制度规章，确保有章可循；职责分工明确，兼顾专业性和自主性；注重程序规范，保障审理及时严密；坚持以人为本，注重教育为主、惩罚为辅。美国顶尖大学学术不端行为处理机制对我国高校完善学术诚信体系建设具有重要借鉴价值。     

真要像换阎世铎一样,把尚福林也换了,未必好

关键词；最大消费国 春节刚过，国内许多报纸都刊载了一条消息，消息称，根据美国一家研究机构的调查报告显示，中国目前已超过美国，成为全球最大的消费国。报纸转引的有关数据显示，在粮食、肉类、钢铁、石油和煤炭等5种主要产品的消费上，中国正逐项赶超美国——2004年，中国消费的粮食总量为3．82亿吨，美国则为2．78亿吨；     

美国经济近10年持续发展的原因及其启示

美国经济在20世纪90年代持续发展的原因是重点发展信息业，提高劳动生产率；调整产业结构，发展虚拟经济；扩大内需和外贸，促进投资和消费。当然美国经济在其发展中也有许多经验和教训值得我们深思，美国经济发展的这些因素对我国经济持续快速发展有所启示。     

美国科技创新的基本特征

美国是当今世界最发达的国家．科学技术得到高度重视和充分发展。不但科技投入的数量和规模稳居世界第一．而且拥有世界上最庞大的科学家、工程师队伍；不但在基础研究的众多领域处于世界领先地位，还是世界上发明专利最多的国家。20世纪90年代。美国有35位科学家获得了自然科学类的诺贝尔奖．占总数的61％；在世界公认的四大科技文献检索系统中。美国发表的论文数占到了总数的近40％；在绝大多数新兴高技术领域，如：信息技术、生物技术、纳米技术等，美国都代表着当今世界技术发展的最高水平。此外．美国的科技条件、创新环境、高科技产业发展也均首屈一指。这使美国成为名符其实的头号科技强国。     

美国的思想库及其在政府决策中的作用

本文分为四个部分，首先对思想库在美国的产生和发展过程进行了考察；然后对美国的思想库进行了分类并指出了各类思想库的长处和局限；接着对美国思想库的基本特点进行了探讨；最后对美国思想库与美国政府的关系以及思想库在政府决策中发挥作用的方式作了简要的概括。     

美国农业现代化及其启示

美国农业现代化及其启示戴军美国实现农业现代化的政策措施发达国家在４０－７０年代不同程度地实现农业现代化，美国１９１０年开始使用拖拉机，１９４０年基本实现农业现代化。分析其原因，主要得力于：（１）政府保护；（２）发达的农业教育、科研、推广体系；（３）农...     

A Comment on “The Dilemmas of Technology”

This paper documents Hohfeld's influence on interwar American institutionalism. We will mainly focus on three leading figures of the movement: John Rogers Commons, Robert Lee Hale, and John Maurice Clark. They regarded Hohfeld's contribution on jural relations as a preliminary step toward the understanding of the adversarial nature of legal rights. Albeit with substantial differences in style, method and emphasis, Hohfeld's schema provided a powerful analytical and rhetorical tool for their analysis.     

Technological races and stock market value: evidence from the pharmaceutical industry

We provide estimates of the abnormal stock market returns associated with pharmaceutical firms’ announcements of technological and regulatory successes in drug development. On the basis of these estimates, we find empirical support for two key features of technological race models. First, we observe that leaders in the innovation race record higher abnormal returns than do latecomers when they announce a success. Hence, firms should indeed be racing to complete the innovation process before their rivals. Second, pharmaceutical firms are adversely affected by the technological and regulatory success of their rivals, implying that interfirm spillovers in drug development are not sufficient to offset technological rivalry. Additional results are also produced regarding the impact of competition on R&D racing and the extent of therapeutic competition.     

Information and transparency in wholesale electricity markets: evidence from Alberta

We examine the role of information transparency in Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Using data on firms’ bidding behavior, we analyze whether firms utilize information revealed in near real-time through the Historical Trading Report (HTR), which is released 10 min after each hour and contains a complete (de-identified) list of every firms’ bids into the wholesale market from the previous hour. We demonstrate that firms are often able to identify the offers of specific rivals by offer patterns adopted by those firms. For one of these firms, these patterns are associated with higher offer prices. This is consistent with allegations by Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator that firms may be utilizing unique bidding patterns to reveal their identities to their rivals to elevate market prices. We show that certain firms respond to rival offer changes with a lag consistent with responding to information revealed through the HTR, and that they respond differently to different firms, suggesting that they are able to infer identification.     

Leader Survival and Cabinet Change

Political leaders face both internal and external threats to their tenure as leaders. To retain office leaders need mass support, for instance to win elections. However, they also need to deal with potential internal party rivals. Using a game theoretic model, we examine how the incentives created by these competing pressures affect the retention of ministers across different political systems. Since non‐democratic leaders face relatively little threat from the masses, their concern is to reduce internal party risk. Therefore, they remove high performing ministers and retain mediocre and poor performers. As it becomes easier for the masses to replace the party in power, leaders must tradeoff internal and external threats. Retaining competent leaders improves party performance but generates an internal party rival.     

Location decisions: The role of uncertainty about consumer tastes

This paper analyzes to what extent firms make decisions about location based on uncertainty about consumer tastes. The model used in this analysis incorporates a linear city and quadratic consumer-transportation costs. In this framework, when firms choose locations, or in other words, choose the kind of product they are going to manufacture, they ignore the location, or real tastes, of their consumers. The existence of uncertainty raises the degree of product differentiation, because the anti-competitive effect that arises as distance from rivals increases counteracts the reduction in the degree of differentiation provided by the demand effect.     

Import Protection, Export Promotion, and Product Positioning

The argument that import protection may lead to export promotion is examined from the marketing standpoint. The model shows that protection allows home firms to cover a larger portion of the domestic market than they otherwise would and to target market segments that are closer to the mainstream. At the same time, foreign competitors are forced to retreat to more idiosyncratic market segments of narrower appeal. Thus, protection gives home firms a product positioning advantage over their foreign rivals; this advantage translates into higher market share and profits—not only in the protected home market, but also in export markets.     

PROFITABLE STRATEGIC DELEGATION WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS

Firms delegate strategic decisions to managers because they find it profitable to do so. In the product market, when agents make conjectures about the reaction of their rivals to marginal changes in their own strategies, the set of equilibriums can be enlarged with respect to the case of no conjectures. This paper takes a duopolistic linear market parameterization where firms selling differentiated products can delegate either price or output decisions to managers. We show that it is a dominant strategy for firms to delegate no matter whether firms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors, although the equilibrium is not necessarily efficient. Futhermore, in equilibrium Cournot competition is more profitable for firms than Bertrand competition. Finally, requiring consistency in conjectures yields the same outcome no matter what type of strategic interaction and managerial choice there is on the part of firms.     

Contagion and competitive effects of plan confirmation of reorganization filings: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Market

This paper aims to examine the intra-industry effects of confirmation of a reorganization plan. Using unique Taiwanese data on announcements of reorganization confirmation, I find evidence that such announcements elicit positive stock price reactions for the announcing firms and negative stock price reactions for other firms within the same industry. Specifically, negative competitive effects dominate positive contagion effects for industry rivals in the context of the announcement of a reorganization confirmation. Moreover, a hybrid neuro-fuzzy model is constructed, where five industry- and firm-level inputs are considered, to investigate which rivals enhance their position and which do not. Results show that my model is consistent and stable, and is good at classifying both contagion- and competitive-effect candidates.     

代码共享影响民航产业竞争的实证分析

代码共享作为一种有效的竞争手段,既是市场竞争的产物,又是航空公司战略联盟排挤竞争对手的有力工具,在一定程度上限制了市场竞争。采用代码共享的航空公司通过在伙伴航空公司的航班上使用自己的代码,扩展了航线网络,提高了运营效率,但却形成了联盟之间以及联盟和非联盟航空公司之间新的竞争格局,并限制了非代码共享航空公司的发展。因此,在加强政府监管的同时,国内航空公司应积极应对,提升自身竞争力。     

Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect

A new competitive effect of vertical mergers, based on the Nash bargaining model, has begun to play an important role in antitrust authorities’ evaluations of vertical mergers in the United States, Canada and abroad. The key idea is that a vertical merger will increase the bargaining leverage of the merged firm over its downstream rivals. Its bargaining leverage increases because it now takes into account the additional profit that its own downstream division will earn if it withholds inputs from downstream rivals, which changes its threat point in the bargaining game with downstream rivals. Consequently, the merged firm can increase the price that it charges rival downstream firms for inputs. One strong appeal of this theory is that it provides a simple and very intuitive formula to measure the upward pricing pressure caused by a vertical merger due to changes in bargaining leverage, based on variables whose values can generally be estimated using available data. This article describes this new competitive effect, which will be called the bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR) effect, and derives the upward pricing pressure formula. It also explains why this new competitive effect is distinct from the older raising rivals’ costs (RRC) effect that has been widely discussed in the economics literature, and discusses the relationship between the two different effects.