Allocation problems among sharing groups

We deal with allocation problems among sharing groups. There are n agents. The agents are divided into several sharing groups. A homogeneous good is allocated among sharing groups rather than among the agents. The good is a private good for sharing groups, and a public good for the members of each sharing group. That is, all of them in the same sharing group can consume it without rivalry. We introduce some allocation rules and axioms. The utilitarian allocation rule and the egalitarian allocation rule are characterized by some axioms.     

Mechanism design in queueing problems

Summary.   A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing problems are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing problems are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable problems can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality. Received: October 19, 1999; revised version: March 13, 2000.     

A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents’ impatience, and an equal responsibility property.     

The separability principle in bargaining

Summary. We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.Youngsub Chun: This work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2003. I am grateful to William Thomson, a referee, and an associate editor for their valuable comments.     

Monetary policy strategies in the New Normal: A model-based analysis for the euro area

A calibrated New Keynesian model of the euro area is used to evaluate the stabilization properties of alternative monetary policy strategies when the natural rate of interest is low (“new normal”) and the probability of reaching the effective lower bound (ELB) is non-negligible. Price level targeting is the most effective strategy in terms of stabilizing inflation and output and reducing the duration and frequency of ELB episodes. Temporary price level targeting is also effective in mitigating the ELB constraint, although its stabilization properties are inferior to those of price level targeting. Backward-looking average inflation targeting performs well and is preferable to inflation targeting. The effectiveness of these alternative strategies hinges upon the commitment of a central bank to keeping the policy rate “lower for longer” and is influenced by agents’ expectation formation mechanism.     

Amplification of shocks at the zero lower bound in a small open and large closed economy

This letter compares the consequences of hitting the zero lower bound in small open and large closed economies. I show that in a large economy shocks are modified by the zero lower bound on interest rate much more than in a small one – as a result, the large economy may suffer more.     

Absorbing sets in roommate problems

We analyze absorbing sets as a solution for roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution provides the set of stable matchings when it is non-empty and some matchings with interesting properties otherwise. In particular, all matchings in an absorbing set have the greatest number of agents with no incentive to change partners. These “satisfied” agents are paired in the same stable manner. In the case of multiple absorbing sets we find that any two such sets differ only in how satisfied agents are matched with each other.     

Women and Minorities in Introductory Economics Textbooks: 1974 to 1984

The authors conducted a painstaking review of widely used economics textbooks to determine if or how issues relating to race and gender are treated. In doing so, the authors also shed light on the nature of the treatment of these issues.     

Deleveraging,deflation and depreciation in the euro area

During the post-crisis period, economic performance has been highly heterogenous across the euro area. While some economies rebounded quickly after the 2009 output collapse, others are undergoing a protracted further decline as part of an extensive deleveraging process. At the same time, inflation has been subdued throughout the whole of the euro area and intra-euro-area exchange rates have hardly moved. We interpret these facts through the lens of a two-country model of a currency union. We find that deleveraging in one country generates deflationary spillovers which cannot be contained by monetary policy, as it becomes constrained by the zero lower bound. As a result, the real exchange rate response becomes muted, and the output collapse—concentrated in the deleveraging economies.     

Links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy

We analyse determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB). Our main finding is that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in interest rates have an adverse effect on their trust in central bank. This result is in accordance with the ‘lack-of-confidence shock’ hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and in contrast with the ‘fundamental shock’ hypothesis which implies positive effects of aggressive cuts for trust in the ECB. The result is robust to various changes in the modelling approach.     

事业单位会计管理存在问题与解决对策

事业单位对促进社会发展发挥着独特的作用。事业单位会计管理的优化,对确保事业单位各项业务活动的健康运行、实现事业单位的发展目标有着重大影响。着重论述了强化事业单位会计管理的必要性,分析了事业单位会计管理工作中存在的问题,提出了加强事业单位会计管理的对策。     

经管类应用型毕业生论文常见问题探讨

毕业论文作为学生实践教学的最后环节,其目的在于提高学生运用知识的能力,是实践教学中的重要一环。但随着高等教育迈向大众化,经管类应用型毕业生的论文质量也出现了一些问题,质量管控随之成为教育质量管理的焦点,如何管控成为重要课题。     

改革开放以来我国劳动关系发展的问题及对策

改革开放以来,我国劳动关系经历了不断变化和发展的过程。但在现阶段,我国劳资力量仍然存在较大的不平衡,劳动者处于相对劣势的地位,劳动者权益也受到较大影响,劳资关系中存在诸多亟待解决的问题。解决的办法主要是要完善劳动法律法规,从制度上明确并完善三方协调机制,以求建立起公平、公正、和谐的劳动关系。     

State-dependent fiscal multipliers in NORA - A DSGE model for fiscal policy analysis in Norway

We develop a novel medium-scale DSGE model, called NORA, for fiscal policy analysis in Norway. NORA contains a sheltered and exposed sector allowing us to model wage bargaining between a labor union and the exposed sector, reflecting Scandinavian wage formation institutions. Wages are subject to a downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). Inspired by many countries' fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession and the coronavirus pandemic, we investigate the model's ability to generate state-dependent fiscal multipliers. We find, that both the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and DNWR individually can account for higher fiscal multipliers during recessions. In joint presence, however, the existence of DNWR reduces the multiplier at the ZLB. Moreover, the DNWR significantly relaxes the paradox of toil at the ZLB. We show that the state-dependency is robust to alternative assumptions about the origin of the recession, the nature of the fiscal stimulus and its financing source.