The limit of oversight in policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincinnati riot

Oversight in policing involves investigating officers for complaints against them and punishing them if found guilty. Officers commit errors in policing and, since reducing the error rate is costly, they cut down policing to avoid complaints. This paper tests the hypothesis that oversight reduces policing by exploiting a quasi-experiment: In April 2001, a riot erupted in Cincinnati after a white officer shot dead an unarmed African-American adolescent; the sharply increased media attention, a Justice Department investigation, together with a “racial profiling” lawsuit, exogenously raised the expected penalty of an officer's errors. Compared with the period from January 1999 to March 2001, arrests during the remaining months of 2001 fell substantially. The decline was more significant for offenses where the error rate was higher. Communities with a greater percentage of African-Americans experienced greater arrest reductions. Felony crime surged during the same period.     

Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation

Self-reporting of compliance status has become a common feature in the enforcement of environmental regulation. In this paper, I generalize existing models of enforcement with self-reporting to include the possibility of private enforcement of regulation through citizen suits. This allows me to identify an additional argument for the efficiency of self-reporting: it can increase the likelihood of a successful suit and thus facilitate private enforcement of regulation. Specifically, if self-reporting sufficiently increases the expected penalty for losing a citizen suit, if the costs of private enforcement are low, and if inspection costs are high enough relative to enforcement costs, self-reporting lowers expected regulatory and social costs by allowing the regulator to rely on private enforcement and decrease his enforcement efforts.

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Semicollusion vs. Full Collusion: The Role of Demand Uncertainty and Product Substitutability

We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: full collusion, under which firms collude on both price and quality, and semicollusion, under which firms collude on price only. We show that, in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement, firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only. However, a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and the relative profitability of semicollusion exists only for low levels of demand substitutability. The converse is true for high levels of demand substitutability. Therefore, if demand substitutability is sufficiently high, no level of demand uncertainty will make semicollusion the optimal organizational form. In contrast, semicollusion is guaranteed to be optimal for a sufficiently low level of demand substitutability. The market structure described is motivated by and closely parallels that of shipping cartels. Received September 29, 2000; revised version received December 10, 2001 Published online: November 11, 2002     

THE IMPACT OF LOW‐PRIORITY LAWS ON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA

We examine the impact of low‐priority initiatives on criminal activity. Low‐priority initiatives mandate that minor marijuana possession offenses be the lowest enforcement priority for police. Localities pass these laws because they believe if officers devote fewer resources toward minor marijuana crimes, more resources will be available to deter more serious crimes. Using data from California, we find that jurisdictions that adopted low‐priority laws experienced a reduction in arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses. However, we do not find evidence of a consistent effect of enacting a low‐priority initiative on the crime or clearance rate of other felonies. (JEL H1, H4, K4)     

Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

Requirements that individuals or companies self-report violations are common in regulation and law enforcement. This paper studies how violators’ aversion to lying affects the design and merit of enforcement regimes that require self-reporting. Even when a self-reporting requirement produces costs of lies and enjoys no economic advantage in the absence of lie aversion, I find that self-reporting improves enforcement efficiency. With lie aversion, self-reporting enables greater deterrence of violations at a lower cost of monitoring. Corollaries to this result are that (1) the presence of lie aversion enhances social welfare; (2) enforcement regimes that elicit more noxious lies when false reports are made—for example, a compulsory versus voluntary self-reporting feature—are advantageous; and (3) under an optimal enforcement regime, lying generally occurs and the self-reporting sanction is higher than the average sanction for a false report.     

ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF LABOR MARKET AND DETERRENCE VARIABLES ON CRIME RATES IN MEXICO

Many studies examine the relationship between crime rates and various economic and/or sociodemographic variables in high income countries, but similar efforts for middle and low income countries are less common. Utilizing an 8‐year panel data sample for all 32 states in Mexico, this study assesses the impact of Mexican labor market and deterrence variables on various Mexican crime rates. The principal results indicate that: (1) State gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has ambiguous effect on crime rates under different conditions. Both wages and unemployment rates are negatively linked with crime rates. (2) Although the Mexican judicial and public security systems are widely believed to be ineffective, increased federal police forces and incarceration rates are associated with lower crime rates, but higher public security expenditure per capita is associated with higher crime rates. (3) The impacts from labor market and deterrence variables presented in (1) and (2) continue to hold under the Fox administration as well as for non‐border states. Their respective impacts diminish, however, under the Calderon administration as well as for border states because of the small number of observations. Overall, the results indicate that increasing average wages, federal police forces, and incarceration rates would have significant impacts on reducing crime rates in Mexican states. (JEL O54, K42)     

Violent crime and female victimization: evidence from metropolitan regions in South Korea

In the economics of crime literature, victimization by crime has received less attention than the supply side of crime. This article investigates the relationship between violent crime and female victimization. We show that violent crime increases with both the overall female exposure and female proportion in the victim-target group. Potential interactions between these female characteristics and income inequality are also shown to influence the incidence of violent crime. Empirically, we introduce proxies for female characteristics that better reflect our hypotheses – for example, young unmarried female-headed households (for exposure to crime) and new job gains among females (for economic status). Using a panel of South Korean metropolitan regions, 2000–2011, we find that a certain limited change in these female characteristics could account for as much as 16% of violent crime.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO,CRIME, AND ECONOMIC FORCES

This paper re‐examines inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 32 subnational Mexican states based on quarterly data from 2005 to 2015, which includes rising drug‐related crimes. We estimate our models using panel data methods by type of crime, state‐level indicators (real wages and electricity consumption), macroeconomic forces (the real exchange rate and interest rate), and a dummy variable for the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We employ a flexible lag‐length method and find that homicides and thefts have negative and statistically significant effects on FDI, while other crimes have no effects. Subsample work suggests higher negative effects in the most violent states. (JEL F15, F21, F23, F36)     

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

We investigate how the patent policy affects economic growth and social welfare based on an endogenous growth model with R&D activities. We show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is finite. Moreover, by introducing compulsory licensing, we also show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is not infinite even if the royalty rate can be controlled. Received June 29, 2001; revised version received February 5, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We also thank Akira Yakita for his helpful comments.     

Crime deterrence role of Romanian churches

We analyse the crime deterrence role of Romanian churches using a data sample of crime in all 42 Romanian counties from 2001 to 2013. We aim to determine whether the public funding of churches can be justified by the role Romanian churches play in deterring illegal behaviour. The decision to build a new church in a certain location can be endogenous; therefore, we use as an instrument the built-up area of counties’ cities in the 1990s. After controlling for the endogeneity of the number of churches, our estimations show that Romanian churches significantly diminish local crime rates. Adventist, Baptist, Catholic and Orthodox churches tend to play an active role in the deterrence of local crime. Hence, Romanian churches not only provide religious services, but also promote religious norms and strengthen the social ties between parishioners, help prevent crime.     

The Neoclassical Investment Model and a New Conservation Law

q ratio is derived. We also show that, along the quasi-turnpike path, Tobin's marginal q is equal to the maximum value of average q. But along the turnpike path, marginal q becomes equal to the limiting value of average q. Received September 15, 1999; revised version received January 25, 2001     

Determinants of violent and property crimes in England and Wales: a panel data analysis

We examine various determinants of property and violent crimes by using police force area level (PFA) data on England and Wales over the period of 1992–2008. Our list of potential determinants includes two law enforcement variables namely crime-specific detection rate and prison population, and various socio-economic variables such as unemployment rate, real earnings, proportion of young people and the Gini Coefficient. By adopting a fixed effect dynamic GMM estimation methodology we attempt to address the potential bias that arises from the presence of time-invariant unobserved characteristics of a PFA and the endogeneity of several regressors. There is a significant positive effect of own-lagged crime rate. The own-lagged effect is stronger for property crime, on an average, than violent crime. We find that, on an average, higher detection rate and prison population leads to lower property and violent crimes. This is robust to various specifications. However, socio-economic variables with the exception of real earnings play a limited role in explaining different crime types.     

Capital Maintenance and Investment: Complements or Substitutes?

This paper studies the properties of demand for capital maintenance services and its interaction with investment under variable capital utilization rate and adjustment costs. The depreciation rate varies with the maintenance effort and the utilization rate of capital. We show that the properties of the demand functions for maintenance services and capital goods depend closely on the sign of the cross derivative of the depreciation function, i.e., on whether the marginal efficiency of maintenance decreases or increases when the rate of capital utilization rises. In our model, it is impossible to reconcile some unquestionable empirical facts and some minimal regularity conditions on the demand function for maintenance services if this cross derivative is positive. In all cases, investment and maintenance are gross complements. Received September 9, 2001; revised version received April 22, 2002 Published online: December 5, 2002 ? Springer-Verlag 2002     

The inflationary bias of real uncertainty and the harmonic Fisher equation

Summary. We argue that real uncertainty itself causes long-run nominal inflation. Consider an infinite horizon cash-in-advance economy with a representative agent and real uncertainty, modeled by independent, identically distributed endowments. Suppose the central bank fixes the nominal rate of interest. We show that the equilibrium long-run rate of inflation is strictly higher, on almost every path of endowment realizations, than it would be if the endowments were constant.Indeed, we present an explicit formula for the long-run rate of inflation, based on the famous Fisher equation. The Fisher equation says the short-run rate of inflation should equal the nominal rate of interest less the real rate of interest. The long-run Fisher equation for our stochastic economy is similar, but with the rate of inflation replaced by the harmonic mean of the growth rate of money.Received: 25 February 2005, Revised: 26 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, C73, D81, E41, E58.An earlier version of this paper “Inflationary Bias in a Simple Stochastic Economy,” as a 2001 Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1333.     

Prudence, Intertemporal Substitution, and Savings under Uncertainty

This paper derives the relations between the coefficient of absolute prudence, the equivalent precautionary premium, risk aversion to concentration, and the normality and shift of current consumption under uncertainty, without the time-separable utility assumption. Examples show that Kimball's coefficient of absolute prudence does not fully characterize precautionary saving or saving behavior under uncertainty. It is proved that, whereas a higher rate of intertemporal substitution and a larger coefficient of absolute prudence imply more savings when current consumption is normal, a larger coefficient of intertemporal substitution and a smaller coefficient of absolute prudence imply more savings when current consumption is inferior. Received July 17, 2001; revised version received November 20, 2001     

Market Instability in a Stackelberg Duopoly

m -period duopoly model with inventory costs, where each firm chooses when to produce. We find that, in contrast to most existing works concerning endogenous roles of the firms, no pure strategy equilibrium exists when m is strictly larger than two. This result indicates that no stable pattern of allocation of roles exists except for a two-period model; thus the leader-follower relationship inevitably becomes instable. Received August 1, 2000; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Four factors that explain both the rise and fall of US crime, 1970–2003

Previous research has failed to explain the rise and fall of US crime since 1970. This study uses cointegration, error correction and common long-memory components analyses to demonstrate that four basic crime factors explaining both the increases in US violent and property crime between 1970 and 1991 and the dramatic declines in crime after 1991. The four factors include arrest rates, income per capita, the proportion of criminal-justice resources devoted to drug crime and alcohol consumption. Error correction models and common long-memory factors show an especially close link between crime rates and the percentage of prison resources devoted to drug offenders. Similar factors result in cointegrated models for murder, rape, robbery, assault and larceny. Additional modelling shows that effective abortion rates computed along the lines of Donohue and Levitt (2001 Donohue, JJ and Levitt, SD. 2001. The impact of legalized abortion on crime. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 379–420. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) do not help in explaining the rise and fall of US crime.     

THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON PROPERTY CRIME

Using U.S. data from 1950 to 2010, we analyze to what extent inflation raises the incidence of property crime. To match our theoretical predictions, we consider different types of property crime (larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery) and broad and narrow definitions of inflation separately. We control for the state of the business cycle and demographic changes over time explicitly. Unobserved or difficult‐to‐measure determinants of property crime are captured through a stochastic‐trend specification within a state‐space framework. We find a robust statistical link between inflation and each of the four property crime rates. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of inflation and the inclusion or exclusion of different control variables. In terms of policy, our findings suggest that monetary policy that creates inflation has costly spillover effects. (JEL J10, J11)     

Private protection and public policing

This paper looks at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by being connected to a local police station: if the police do not respond to a home alarm, the home alarm on its own is virtually useless in halting a crime in action. We make a distinction between gross and net complementarity and substitution, where the latter takes into account the effect on the crime rate. We show that when public and private protection are complements, the optimal provision of public protection trades off the manipulation effect of encouraging private protection with the compensatory effect of providing protection to households that do not privately invest. We discuss the implications of our results for policy and empirical research in this area.