成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

A Pre-purchase Product Trial of a Monopolist with Multiple Products

For the heterogeneous consumers who do not know their individual utilities from a new product, a pre-purchase product trial would be helpful. We found out that a monopoly firm with two similar products would have a strong incentive not to allow a pre-purchase product trial, even though it is socially optimal to allow it. Furthermore, it is more likely for a monopoly firm with a pre-purchase product trial policy to introduce a new product to the market when introducing a new product is socially optimal.     

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.     

Growth,Distribution, and External Constraints: A Post-Kaleckian Model Applied to Brazil

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether the Brazilian economy behaved under a wage-led or profit-led regime between 1960 and 2011, considering a Post-Kaleckian model in a context of external constraints. The time span is limited by data availability (i.e., 2011). To answer the question of whether the Brazilian economy works under a wage-led or profit-led regime, we propose a simple Post-Kaleckian model. The model suggests that a profit-led regime is more probable for Brazil. Moreover, a wage-led regime occurs when a balance of payments constrained growth model is taken into consideration. Likewise, the real exchange rate has a positive impact on economic growth through the export channel. This result is a novelty in the recent literature about the relationship between real exchange rate and economic growth within a Post-Kaleckian model. The Brazilian economy was chosen as it is one of the biggest economies in Latin America.     

关于城市化的理性思考

城市化是人类社会经济发展的共同趋势。中国要在未来加快城市化进程首先要正确认识城市化,城市化不是一个可有可无的过程,也不是一个人为可以随意控制的过程。加快城市化进程既是解决中国当前社会经济发展中所存在的各种问题的一个关键性问题,又是中国在２１世纪保持续稳定发展的一种重要因素。城市化是一自然经济过程,是一个经济、空间和人口相互协调的过程,是一个资源在空间优化配置的过程,它是经济城市化、空间城市化和人口     

Is it still economic to build a new coal-fired power plant in the U.S.? A real option analysis

In the U.S., virtually no new coal-fired power plants have been built in recent years. Both industry experts and academics seem to believe that no rational firm will build a new coal-fired plant. Will such a trend continue in the future? To provide insights into this question, we investigate the optimal decision of an electricity company with an irreversible and deferrable opportunity to build either a new coal-fired or natural gas-fired power plant as its new base-load resource. According to our real option analysis, the optimal decision depends on the location. In the case of the eastern U.S., it is optimal to choose a natural gas plant if a firm is given a choice among a new natural gas plant, a new coal plant and deferring the investment. However, contrary to the common sentiment in the industry and academia, building a new coal plant in the western U.S. is still more economical than building a new natural gas plant in the absence of emission pricing. Furthermore, introducing carbon pricing to western U.S. states, as California did, can substantially increase the probability that a firm will optimally choose a natural gas plant over a coal plant.     

Nonlinear stochastic effects of substitution — an evolutionary approach

Technological innovations have been investigated by means of substitution and diffusion as well as evolution models, each of them dealing with different aspects of the innovation problem. In this paper we follow the well known research traditions on self-organisation models of complex systems. For the first time in the literature we show the existence of a specific niche effect, which may occur in the first stage of establishment of a new technology. Using a stochastic Master equation approach, we obtain analytical expressions for the survival probabilities of a new technology in smaller or larger ensembles. As a main result we demonstrate how a hyperselection situation might be removed in a stochastic picture and thresholds against the prevailing of a new technology in a step-by-step process can be overcome.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Opinion convergence in location: A spatial version of the Delphi method

This paper proposes a modified version of the Delphi method, starting from the assumption that in many situations the convergence of opinions can be considered in a spatial context. The Spatial Delphi we suggest is based, like the classical Delphi, on the judgments of experts, and it is useful in the consultations for decision and/or forecast purposes, provided that they concern matters of spatial location. The basis for the questionnaire is a map, on which each expert provides, as answer(s), one or more opinion-points, i.e., locations that, according to their opinion, are best for a specific purpose. We propose a method for narrowing the area of convergence along a multi-step procedure so that the final result of the consultation is a small portion of the initial territory with respect to the initial area considered. Besides a simulation study, we report also a prototype application with a panel of twelve experts.     

Appropriability,services and reputation

The appropriability regime (Teece 1986) that innovating service firms face is generally weaker than what firms in manufacturing sectors face. An important means to appropriate benefits from innovation that service firms can use is their reputation. This conceptual paper offers insights into how a firm’s reputation helps in appropriating value from innovation. Depending on the nature of a service, different kinds of third parties come into play in establishing reputation. In helping firms establish a reputation, such third parties influence customer decisions to acquire a service. While ‘to produce a service is to organise a solution to a problem’, and thus does not involve a third party, is true for pure services in particular, for a service firm to benefit from innovation such others are involved.     

Strategy-proof Location on a Network

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

The benefits of the reciprocal grantback clause in patent licensing

This paper shows that a reciprocal grantback clause could potentially be a better licensing provision than a one-way type. There are two benefits associated with the use of a reciprocal grantback clause. First, it improves efficiency by reducing the (minimum) contract compatible royalty rate to zero. As a result, the production becomes efficient because both the licensor and the licensee produce at the same marginal cost. Second, a reciprocal grantback clause is a more effective provision than a one-way grantback clause to guarantee the transfer of superior technology, hence it promotes better technology diffusion.     

Congestion with heterogeneous commuters

We study a congestion model where a continuum of heterogeneous commuters make a binary choice between riding a bus and driving private vehicles for their commutes. Formulating the model as a large game, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and analyze how a gasoline tax affects the allocation of commuters between public transportation and private vehicles at the equilibrium. Based on the analysis, we provide a sufficient condition under which a gasoline tax is Pareto improving. We also prove the existence of a socially optimal policy that minimizes the aggregate loss to all commuters.     

带约束条件的K最短路问题

在本文中,我们研究了一个生成K条满足一组约束条件的最短路问题。为了求解此问题,我们设计了一个结构化分支策略,将此问题划分为最多必｜N｜个子问题,这里｜N｜表示网络中的结点数。每个子问题通过一个网络修正步骤均可转化为一个带约束的最短路问题（constraint shortest path problem,CSP）。当这些约束条件满足所谓的可分性质时,子问题便可得到进一步简化。基于这个结构化分支策略,我们针对一个需要考虑资源和无回路约束的应用问题设计了一个专门的算法。数据实验表明,我们的算法十分有效而稳定。     

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.     

Sequential decisions with tests

We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal wishes to be endorsed by a sequence of agents, but cannot truthfully reveal type. In the standard “herding” model, the agents learn from each other's decisions, which can lead to cascades on a given decision when later agents' private information is swamped. We augment the standard model to allow the principal to subject herself to a test designed to provide public information about her type. She must decide how tough a test to attempt from a continuum of test types, which involves trading off the higher probability of passing an easier test against the greater impact from passing a tougher test. We find that the principal will always choose to be tested, and will prefer a tough test to a neutral or easy one.     

The synchronization club: classification of global economic groups by inequality

We find that, from 1970 to 2006, the GDPs of 181 countries are described by a log-normal with a power law tail before 1992, but by a kinked power law distribution after 1992. In the 15 years from 1992 to 2006, there are two obvious scale-free zones for annual GDPs, ranked from the largest to smallest. If the countries in each scaling region are regarded as a group, the world is divided into two groups, each with a roughly stable number of members. The power exponents of the two groups are different and hence lead to different inequalities. Therefore, the basis for classification is the macro-consistent inequality within each group. The wealth grows in a synchronous nonlinear manner within groups that have a stable wealth distribution and rank structure. If each group is considered as a club, we name it a ‘synchronization club’.     

Targeting the biotechnology clusters in North Carolina and Israel: lessons from successful and unsuccessful policy making

This paper analyses the development of biotechnology clusters in North Carolina (NC) and Israel. In both NC and Israel, when the biotechnology was identified as a potential strategic priority, the framework conditions were suitable for successful policy-targeting. NC presents a case of a successful transition from a traditional manufacturing economy to a knowledge economy. The most successful part of this transition was a policy-led development of a biotechnology cluster in the Research Triangle. While Israel also presents a case of a successful transition from a low-tech economy to a knowledge-intensive economy, Israel failed to develop a successful biotechnology cluster. We suggest that this failure is mostly due to a failure to implement policy to encourage such development. We argue that the elements, which separate NC's success from Israel's failure, are: a clear vision and strategic planning; timely response, long-term commitment; strong leadership; cooperation between the government, private sector and academia, and an adjustable policy-making process.