Rethinking the Role of State-owned Enterprises in China’s Rise

The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China’s ‘rise’ to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs’ role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ‘grand strategy’? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state’s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs.     

The dynamics of wage determination in Romania

This article examines wage developments in Romania over the last 20 years, discusses the evolving role of government wage policy and structural labour market changes, and analyses the dynamics of the wage determination process. It finds that government wage policy has had a significant demonstration effect on private sector wages, driven mainly by policy decisions over the past few years. The article also finds strong causality from private sector wages to wages in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and government. No causality was found for changes in government wages to wages in SOEs or from SOE wages to private sector wages.     

中国电力行业规制效果实证分析

2002年国务院批准的《电力体制改革方案》确定了电力体制改革的基本方针,据此,国家采取了诸多规制手段,目的是通过合理规制自然垄断环节,促进相对有效竞争,提高经济效率。4年过去了,中国电力改革的效果究竟如何呢?文章从价格水平、价格结构、行业利润和经济效率等方面进行了实证分析,以检验我国电力行业的规制效果,结果显示:规制制定了合理的价格水平和价格结构,改进了电力行业效率,但在规制垄断利润和制止A-J效应方面仍未成功。     

政策支持、创业激情与技术创业成功：政策感知的调节作用

为了厘清政策支持对技术创业成功的作用机制,将创业激情作为中介变量、政策感知作为调节变量,构建政策支持影响技术创业成功的理论模型,并结合云南地区291家技术创业企业数据开展实证研究。结果表明：政策支持促进技术创业成功;政策支持通过激发技术创业者创业激情进而促进技术创业成功;政策感知强化政策支持对技术创业成功的正向影响,同时增强政策支持对创业激情的正向影响,对创业激情的中介过程具有调节作用,即在不同水平政策感知下,创业激情的中介效用存在明显差异。     

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES AS A MEANS TO MITIGATE POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO SWISS STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES

When governments act as owners of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is also an agent, vis‐à‐vis the parliament, because democratic constitutions stipulate some form of parliamentary oversight of the government. This oversight includes checks on how the government steers SOEs. However, this oversight function gives the parliament the power and opportunity to interfere into steering SOEs, which may lead to parliamentary interventions that are not coherent with governmental steering. We draw on principal–agent literature and public‐accountability literature to show that arbitrary and hands‐on parliamentary interference pose problems for steering SOEs. We analyze whether strategic objectives for SOEs, as recommended by public corporate governance guidelines, are appropriate to minimize parliamentary interference. We hypothesize that the Swiss government avoids or mitigates parliamentary interference by mid‐term strategic objectives for SOEs, which counteract short‐term parliamentary requests. We find that the Swiss government uses mid‐term strategic objectives, particularly financial ones, to reject parliamentary demands for more intervention into SOE activities.     

Economic policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from China

This study examines the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China. Using all listed Chinese companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as well as 4188 ​M&A deals from the period of 2001–2018, we show that Chinese firms are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US firms. We further show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. SOEs are less likely to use only cash for their acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. These results indicate the prudence of SOEs regarding acquisitions relative to non-SOEs during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Moreover, acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty are associated with an increase in shareholder wealth for acquirers, and this wealth effect is more pronounced for SOEs.     

Chinese lessons: state-owned enterprises and the regulation of foreign investment in Canada

A recent influx of Asian investment is changing the character of the Canadian oil and gas industry and reviving old debates on the regulation of foreign investment. Particular attention has been placed on investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), driven in part by public suspicion about investment from China, which has been the largest source of SOE capital flows to Canada. Recent amendments to the Investment Canada Act have made SOE investment more difficult and have raised questions about the country’s attractiveness as an investment destination. This paper makes the case for non-discrimination of SOEs in the investment review process. In the context of a policy framework that is fundamentally supportive of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), the Canadian government does not require a set of redundant measures to protect against the relatively low risk of undesirable investment.     

Provincial economic performance and underpricing of IPOs: Evidence from political interventions in China

We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.     

Technology innovation and entrepreneurial state: the development of China's high-speed rail industry

China proactively promotes indigenous technology innovation towards developing an innovation-based economy. This contradicts the developmental state literature that puts emphasis on technology imitation. Drawn from the strategic entrepreneurship perspective, this article explores the role of the government in China's technology innovation process. Carrying out a case study in the high-speed rail (HSR) industry, it suggests that it is best to understand the Chinese government as an entrepreneur in moving China's HSR industry towards technology innovation-driven development, through three dimensions of state-led strategic entrepreneurship: alertness to opportunities, resource exploration and consolidation, and strategic learning. This article highlights the importance of strategic entrepreneurship to the government in an emerging economy context and contributes to the literature by building a conceptual framework of ‘entrepreneurial state’.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

产业政策对企业间工资差距的影响—来自中国工业企业的经验证据

中国产业政策的执行对企业间工资差距有何影响?文章首先考虑加入了产业政策因素的异质性企业模型,从理论上将产业政策对企业工资影响分解为补贴转移效应与竞争效应两种机制,并提出如下假说:企业将部分政策补助用于生产,此时支付的更多工资等同于财政的直接补贴;同时,企业工资水平也取决于企业的生产效率,产业政策通过促进或抑制行业竞争改变企业效率,从而对企业的工资水平产生一种间接影响,即竞争效应.使用1998?2007年中国工业规模以上企业数据对理论假说进行实证检验,可以发现:"中国式"产业政策抑制企业效率带来的负向竞争效应超过了正向的补贴转移效应,最终造成了企业工资水平下降;然而,一旦产业政策的施行促进了行业竞争,竞争效应则为正,那么企业的工资水平也会随之提高.文章研究的结论有助于理解经济改革过程中产业政策对企业工资的影响,对推进企业工资体制改革也具有启示意义.     

政府干预是如何影响企业对外直接投资的 ?——基于制度理论视角的研究

政府干预经常被视为推动和鼓励企业对外直接投资中的重要力量 ,但事实果真如此吗?政府是否会有所选择地影响企业对外直接投资呢?文章从制度理论的视角 ,基于2003-2013年沪深 A 股非金融上市公司数据 ,考察了政府干预对企业对外直接投资的各种影响.研究发现:(1)政府干预对企业对外直接投资的行为和数量都具有显著的负向影响 ,即政府干预程度越高的企业 ,越不可能进行对外直接投资以及具有较低的对外直接投资数量;(2)政府会支持那些具有较高"营销资源"的企业进行对外直接投资和增加投资额,即在营销资源丰富的企业中 ,政府干预对企业对外直接投资的正向影响关系更强 ;(3)政府干预对企业对外直接投资的绩效具有显著的正向影响;(4)政府主要是通过控制企业决策层和审批企业投资申请两个渠道来影响企业的对外投资决策.文章为政府制定相应的对外直接投资政策以及企业如何响应政府的"走出去"战略提供了有益启示.     

开放式创新对制造业企业研发投入的影响——政府补助与市场竞争的调节作用

开放式创新已成为发展趋势,但是关于开放式创新如何影响制造业企业研发投入尚未达成一致结论。以2009-2019年中国沪深A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,对开放式创新与企业研发投入关系进行理论和实证检验,并探讨政府补助和市场竞争的调节作用。研究表明：①开放式创新有助于提高企业研发投入;②企业获得政府研发补助越多,外部组织越愿意与其进行开放式创新,企业可用于研发投入的内外部资源也越多;③企业所在行业市场竞争越激烈,企业越倾向采取开放式创新,以通过与外部资源拥有者合作增加研发投入、保持竞争优势。该研究发现可为推动制造业企业实施开放式创新以及加快转型升级提供决策依据与理论支持。     

产业政策视角下的国有企业分类改革与政策调整*

本文从产业发展政策和自然垄断领域的规制政策两个角度,分析了国有企业在产业政策实施中的积极意义,探讨了目前产业政策所存在的问题,并提出了相应的政策建议。研究表明,国有企业在保证产业发展战略的实现和对自然垄断产业的规制中具有积极作用;在产业发展战略的实施中,应慎重把握行政性干预和市场机制之间的平衡,实现政企分开,侧重于创造鼓励创新的制度环境;在自然垄断行业中,应区分竞争性环节和自然垄断环节,并侧重于通过机制设计和价格管制限制自然垄断环节的市场势力。     

MASSIVE DIVESTITURE AND PRIVATIZATION LESSONS FROM CHILE

Between 1974 and 1989, the Chilean government privatized 550 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before 1974, all but a handful of major corporations were SOEs. About 50 of the largest enterprises privatized during the 1970s fell into government hands again, only to be re-privatized later. This was due partly to the economic and financial crisis affecting most Latin American countries during the early 1980s but also was a consequence of the privatization modes used. This paper analyzes that unique privatization experience so as to extract policy lessons. The analysis focuses on economic conditions, objectives of government policy, privatization modes, and the divestiture effects on employment, fiscal revenues, public sector wealth, spread of ownership, and capital market development.     

Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China’s stated-owned enterprises

This paper explores the effect of policy burdens of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on senior executives’ excessive perks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that SOE policy burdens are significantly and positively correlated with senior executives’ excessive perks, indicating that SOE policy burdens increase agency cost. The results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. Moreover, we find the following evidences. Strategic policy burdens of SOEs have a significantly greater impact on their senior executives’ excessive perks, compared with social policy burdens. The positive impact of SOE policy burdens on excessive perks is significantly weaker in east China due to the higher degree of marketization. The central government’s stricter supervision can also alleviate the positive correlation between policy burdens of centrally administered SOEs and senior executives’ excessive perks.     

市场环境变迁和政府政策冲击对民营企业创新绩效的影响——考虑企业竞争战略和政治关联的调节作用

在文献梳理和理论分析的基础上,以中国制造业的655家民营企业为研究样本,构建回归模型,对市场环境变迁和政府政策冲击对企业创新绩效的影响进行实证分析,并进一步检验了企业竞争战略和政治关联在其中的调节作用。结果显示:市场竞争程度对民营企业的创新行为不具有显著影响;政府制定的创新激励政策会显著影响企业的创新绩效,而税收等行业政策及创新抑制政策对民营企业的创新绩效没有显著影响;在当前中国经济进入软着陆时期,自主创新战略比成本领先战略更适合于中国民营企业;与政府保持良好关系有助于民营企业降低市场竞争压力、获取额外资源,从而提升创新绩效。     

How much of the world economy is state-owned? Analysis based on the 2005–20 Fortune Global 500 lists

This paper analyzes the share of state-owned enterprises on the Fortune Global 500 lists from 2005 to 2020. The purpose is to answer two research questions—what is the share of SOEs among the world's largest companies, and is this share increasing over the years? Regarding studies of large sets of companies, the novelty of this article is the method in which SOEs were identified—based on the criterion of actual corporate control of the state and not the threshold of state ownership. The results show that the share of SOEs in the group of the world's largest companies is higher than indicated in previous similar studies, and this value has increased significantly over the last 15 years. In 2005, there were 64 SOEs on the list; in 2020, there were 141 (with the highest number—142—in 2015). In this period, the share of SOEs in revenues doubled (to almost 30%), in assets more than tripled and the total number of employees from SOEs from the list more than doubled. However, these increases were almost solely due to the growth of the Chinese economy, which resulted in more Chinese SOEs being included on the list.     

高管降薪政策是否影响国有企业创新*——基于A股上市公司数据的实证研究

本文选取A股上市公司2010—2019年经营数据，利用双重差分模型（DID）实证探究了国企高管降薪对企业创新的影响。研究结果显示，相较于非国有上市公司，国企高管降薪抑制了国有上市公司的创新研发投入；进一步研究表明，国企高管降薪政策对企业创新的抑制程度在不同功能定位的国有企业之间存在差异，公益类国有企业受第二次高管“降薪令”的抑制影响比商业类国有企业更加严重。本文为国企高管降薪对企业创新的影响提供了经验证据，丰富了国企高管降薪政策方面的文献，对未来国企高管薪酬政策的制定具有一定的参考意义。     

我国西部地区的国企改制困境:一个文献综述

本文针对我国西部欠发达地区目前的国企改制困境问题,对国内外相关文献进行了综述分析,发现造成我国西部国企改制困境的原因中既有"外生"的因素,也有"内生"的因素.西部地区不利的自然禀赋、不合理的产业结构以及中央逆市场调控的政策等,造成西部市场机制发育迟缓,仅靠市场的力量无法消化国企改制的成本;而我国转轨时期特定的体制结构使得政府在国企改制成本支付过程中充满了机会主义行为.针对这种情况本文提出了相应的政策建议.