Does corruption impede economic growth in Pakistan?

The present study reinvestigates the impact of corruption on economic growth by incorporating financial development and trade openness in growth model in case of Pakistan. We have used time series data over the period of 1987–2009. We have applied structural break unit root test to test the integrating order of the variables. The structural break cointegration has also been applied to examine the long run relationship between the variables.The long run relationship between the variables is validated in case of Pakistan. We find that corruption impedes economic growth. Financial development adds in economic growth. Trade openness stimulates economic growth. The causality analysis has exposed the feedback effect between corruption and economic growth and same inference is drawn for trade openness and corruption. Trade openness and economic growth are interdependent. Financial development Granger causes economic growth implying supply-side hypothesis in case of Pakistan.     

How does economic policy uncertainty drive gold–stock correlations? Evidence from the UK

In this article, we investigate the effects of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on correlations between the UK stock market and gold market. We find that less certain economic policies result in lower correlations, while more certain economic policies result in higher correlations. The correlations are symmetric and show no structural breaks caused by the recent financial crisis. The recent financial crisis has not changed EPU effects on the correlations. The effects of one positive one-standard-deviation shock of the logarithmic change rate of the EPU on the correlations last approximately 19 months.     

How does firm diversification impact innovation?

This study sheds light on the relationship between business diversification and innovation. A diversification strategy is both a driver of sunk costs and strategic slack. Strategic slack is a valuable reserve of knowledge, usable to foster innovation. Using linear models, we explore the interplay between research and development (R&D) and organisational slack in large and diversified companies listed on the Euronext 100 Index. We consider the diversification pattern over time, and its interactions with the following three categories: sunk costs, slack resources, and R&D. The results show an antithetic effect of diversification and slack on R&D expenditures. In contrast to unabsorbed and potential slack, diversification and sunk costs hinder innovation. However, diversification is a huge source of strategic slack and, thus, has a positive effect on innovation, indirectly.     

How much does schooling disutility matter?

Studies on structural education choice models are often inconsistent in choosing whether and how to include a disutility of education, especially in an environment with risk and wealth inequality. We show that adding a disutility term to the education decision, a human capital investment option, is equivalent to assuming a relationship between wealth, risk, and education. Utility gain from education is increasing in the riskiness of future consumption. A riskier environment further propels an agent to choose the human capital investment option that maximizes future income. If the degree of risk increases heterogeneously across multiple human capital investment options, risk aversion and the precautionary savings motive can compound or negate each other depending on which option has a greater increase in risk.     

How does consumption change upon retirement?

In this paper, we investigate the way consumption changes around retirement in Italy. Using micro data covering the 1985–1996 period, we document the existence of a one-off drop in consumption at retirement of the household head, as in the UK and the US, but (at 5.44%) smaller in size, and show that consumption of work-related goods falls around retirement and home production of food and other goods increases.     

How does organizational structure affect executive compensation?

Does the rise of the CFO as the second-ranked executive increase the status of the CEO? We find that, as a CFO becomes #2, a CEO receives higher pay in relative terms compared with other top executives. This result corresponds to the literature on span-of-control of executives in top management team.     

How close to home does charity begin?

ABSTRACT

This paper uses a field experiment to analyse the extent to which people are more inclined to support a charity focused on people or causes in their own region, compared to regions in other parts of the country. New Zealand landowners were incentivized to take part in an online survey by being told they could choose a charity from a list of four that would receive a $10 donation if they completed the survey. Importantly, the charities are based in different regions of the country. We find evidence of a significant declining radius of altruism: not only do people prefer to support charities in their own area, the further away a charity is located, the less likely people are to support it. These findings highlight the importance of geographic distance (independent of social distance) in charitable giving.     

How does informal employment impact income inequality?

This study investigates how informal employment impacts total income inequality in urban China. Finite mixture methodology is employed to examine the segments that exist in the informal labour market, and the Theil index (T0) is used to break down total income inequality according to different subsamples. We found that the two-segment model (upper-tier and lower-tier) best describes the structure of the informal labour market in urban China and that the upper-tier segment contributes most to the total income inequality.     

What leads to official corruption in China? A politico-economic analysis of economic opportunities and government corruption across China’s provinces

This paper investigates the relationship between economic opportunities and official corruption in China. We construct a cross-province sample of corrupted officials to analyse the effects on official corruption of mineral reserve, coal production, real estate and road construction, while including control variables such as population, GDP per capita, economic growth rate, private assets, provincial government capacity, fiscal transparency and distance of the province from Beijing. Spanning from December 2012 to November 2015, our sample contains 526 high-level government officials who worked in various provinces in China. We find through multivariate regression that economic opportunities represented by coal, minerals, real estate and road construction all have a positive and significant effect on official corruption in China at the levels of provincial department director or deputy director; meanwhile, capacity of political extraction, road construction and coal production are better indicators of official corruption at the level of governor or deputy governor.     

How will good economic policy environments emerge in Africa?

In Africa, institutions were not established at independence that took proper account of the pluralism of the societies, while civil society failed to press for institutions to control the state. Political leaders have had little self‐interest in pursuing good economic policies, and there is weak civil societal demand for such policies. Foreign aid and the proposed peer review mechanism of the African Union could help strengthen this demand. Social scientists can help by focusing on corruption in top political leadership, reducing ethnicity, and improving political leadership. Selectivity for aid can be ex ante, with resoluteness in withdrawing aid for not keeping promises.     

How do currency misalignments’ threshold affect economic growth?

Based on panel smooth transition regressions, this paper determines for a large sample of developed and emerging countries, the value of currency misalignments from which we observe a regime shift in economic growth, over the 1980–2009 period. Misalignments, defined as the difference between the current real exchange rate and its equilibrium counterpart, are derived from the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach. Our estimate relies on recent panel cointegration techniques that allow for heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependencies. We also control for the presence of structural breaks. Our findings show that our misalignments index plays a key role in the reversal of trend growth. Although the undervaluation of their currency acts positively on their growth, emerging countries cannot base their strategy on this finding to promote growth. We relate this result to the adverse effects of depreciation, as in “original sin”. The implications of our findings, in terms of economic policy, clearly emphasise the economic leverage role of undervaluation: it remains a powerful cyclical instrument but has to be, nevertheless, employed with precautionary to be globally and internationally consistent.     

How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? Experimental evidence from Egypt

How far does democracy decrease corruption? And which specific aspects of democracy help generate such effects? Corruption is famously one of the strongest obstacles to social and economic development. Whereas there has been extensive research identifying the causes of corruption, there is little experimental research on the impact of political institutions on corruption using designs that control for significant confounders. This paper uses a series of laboratory experiments conducted in 2013 Egypt in which a government official decides whether to spend tax revenues paid by subjects on a self-serving good or a good that benefits everyone equally. We have two experimental manipulations: (a) whether the official is electorally accountable to subjects or not; (b) whether subjects could send messages of protests to the official (and one another). We find evidence that electoral accountability does decrease the probability of the official choosing the self-serving good by 17% whereas voice accountability generates such outcome only in the authoritarian treatment (a reduction of corruption by 29%). We also find suggestive evidence that, in the authoritarian treatment, the likelihood of funding the self-serving good decreases by 27% when taxes paid by citizens fall short of the official’s threshold. Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: (a) we are able to single out the effect of specific democratic mechanisms on government corruption; (b) we test outcomes of democratic mechanisms on a traditionally understudied subject pool.     

When does inflation hurt economic growth? Different nonlinearities for different economies

The effects of inflation on growth are shown to change substantially as the inflation rate rises. Moreover, the nonlinearities are quite different for industrial economies than for developing countries. Whereas it is often assumed that inflation does not significantly hurt growth in developing countries until the 20–40% range, we find that the threshold falls within single digits. Marginal growth costs for developing countries then decline significantly above 50% inflation. Failure to account for nonlinearity biases downward the estimated effects of inflation on growth. Mixing industrial and developing economies together also produces unreliable results.     

Does democracy facilitate economic growth or does economic growth facilitate democracy? An empirical study of Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the relationship between democracy and economic growth in 30 Sub-Saharan African countries. As our proxy for democracy we first use the democracy index constructed by Freedom House and then check the sensitivity of our findings using, as an alternative proxy for democracy, the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC). We find support for the Lipset hypothesis - in the long run, real GDP Granger causes democracy and an increase in GDP results in an improvement in democracy - in Botswana and Niger with both datasets, for Chad with the Freedom House data only and for Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon with the LIEC data only. Support for the compatibility hypothesis - in the long run democracy Granger causes real income and an increase in democracy has a positive effect on real income - is found for Botswana with the Freedom House data and for Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa and Swaziland with the LIEC data. Support for the conflict hypothesis - in the long run democracy Granger causes real income and an increase in democracy has a negative effect on real income - is found for Gabon with the Freedom House data and Sierra Leone with the LIEC data.     

Does transparency reduce political corruption?

Does a better monitoring of officials' actions (transparency) lower the incidence of corruption? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but raises the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent's favor. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.     

Does financial development reduce corruption?

We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls.     

How does monetary policy transmission mechanism work in Fiji?

The study aims to examine the impact of changes in policy variables namely, monetary aggregate (M1), exchange rate and interest rate on two monetary goal variables, namely output and price level in Fiji from 1970 to 2006 by applying the procedures of variance decomposition and impulse response functions. We conclude that the money channel is the most effective channel of transmission mechanism among the three channels.