The Post-Reform Bid-Ask Spread Disparity between Nasdaq and the NYSE

We report further evidence of the difference in execution costs between Nasdaq and the NYSE before and after the 1997 market reforms. We find that informed trading costs are consistently higher on Nasdaq both before and after the reforms. In the pre‐reform period the Nasdaq‐NYSE disparity in bid‐ask spreads cannot be completely attributed to the difference in informed trading costs. However, in the post‐reform period the spread difference between these two markets becomes insignificant with the effect of informed trading costs controlled. Our findings are consistent with the contention that the reforms have largely reduced noninformation trading costs and dealers' rents.     

Effects of Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of Nasdaq Stocks

The relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate. On January 20, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with Nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders. Additionally, superior quotes placed by Nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the Nasdaq market. We measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance, including trading costs and depths. Our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality.     

What Explains the Bid‐Ask Spread Decline after Nasdaq Reforms?

This paper examines whether the decrease in bid‐ask spreads on Nasdaq after the 1997 reforms is due to a decrease in market‐making costs and/or an increase in market competition for order flows. Unlike previous studies, we jointly examine how competition and trading costs affect bid‐ask spreads. In addition, we separate the effects of informed trading and liquidity costs on bid‐ask spreads. Informed trading cost is directly estimated for each Nasdaq stock using a Bayesian theoretic model. Empirical results show that market‐making costs and competition significantly affect bid‐ask spreads. The post‐reform decrease in bid‐ask spreads is largely due to both an increase in competition and a decrease in informed trading and liquidity costs on Nasdaq.     

The Impact of Market Maker Competition on Nasdaq Spreads

This study utilizes a comprehensive database containing monthly information on the number of market makers for about 5,288 Nasdaq securities over an eight-year period to investigate the impact of competition on spreads. A variety of models are estimated in order to demonstrate the robustness of the results that include four specific findings: (1) the number of market makers has a negative and highly significant impact on spreads; (2) the relation is nonlinear with a decreasing impact by the marginal market maker; (3) Nasdaq spreads have been declining over time; and (4) structural changes in Nasdaq are associated with significant changes in the relationship between spread and the number of market makers. One improvement over the literature includes allowing endogenous competition through the use of instrumental variables.     

Nasdaq Trading and Trading Costs: 1993–2002

Nasdaq spreads decline from 1993 to 2002, largely independently of tick‐size reductions. Trade size declines, consistent with greater retail investor activity. Using the method of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), we find that concurrent market returns strongly affect liquidity and trading activity. Liquidity exhibits distinct day‐of‐the‐week patterns. There is little evidence that macroeconomic announcements or changes in key interest rates affect Nasdaq stocks overall; but in the bear market, we find a relation between some of these variables and effective spreads, which we interpret as consistent with Nasdaq participants' paying greater attention to fundamentals after the market crash.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.     

Market structure and bid-ask spreads: IBIS vs Nasdaq

A comparison is made between the bid-ask spreads of 30 high volume German stocks traded on IBIS and 30 high volume US stocks traded on Nasdaq. IBIS and Nasdaq are best described as agency and dealer auction markets, respectively. On average, the market spread for these IBIS and Nasdaq stocks is the same, but for the 10 most active stocks in each market, IBIS spreads are considerably lower. For these latter stocks, IBIS spreads change in a predictable manner throughout the day. Nasdaq spreads do not. The critical factor appears to be the unrestricted access of suppliers of immediacy that is distinctive for agency auction markets.     

The Quality of ECN and Nasdaq Market Maker Quotes

This paper compares the quality of quotes submitted by electronic communication networks (ECNs) and by traditional market makers to the Nasdaq quote montage. An analysis of the most active Nasdaq stocks shows that ECNs not only post informative quotes, but also, compared to market makers, ECNs post quotes rapidly and are more often at the inside. Additionally, ECN quoted spreads are smaller than dealer quoted spreads. The evidence suggests that the proliferation of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, may promote quote quality rather than fragmenting markets. Moreover, the results suggest that a more open book contributes to quote quality.     

Competition on the Nasdaq and the growth of electronic communication networks

This paper examines the growth of electronic communication networks (ECNs) and their competitive impact on the Nasdaq. We find that the development of these alternative trading platforms is associated with tighter quoted, effective, and relative bid–ask spreads, greater depths, and less concentrated markets. Further, our results show that an increase in ECN trading may have caused some traditional market makers (wholesaler and national retail dealers) to exit the market for market making. Overall, our results suggest that ECNs provide a source of competition to traditional Nasdaq dealers.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market

This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using Nasdaq data over the 1973–1990 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Chen and Kan (1989) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) . I conjecture that the stronger evidence on the Nasdaq is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the Nasdaq being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the Nasdaq dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.     

The Impact of the Reduction in Tick Increments in Major U.S. Markets on Spreads,Depth, and Volatility

This study presents an analysis of the impact of the introduction of quotes in sixteenths of a dollar on the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE in mid-1997 on select market characteristics such as spreads, effective spreads, quoted depth, and volume. The findings of the study document reductions in the bid-ask spread, effective spread, and a statistically significant increase in the number of quotes. Interestingly, we find that liquidity, as measured by the total depth at the bid and ask, declines significantly on the AMEX and NYSE, but increases on the Nasdaq. Trading volume increases on the NYSE, but remains unchanged for the AMEX and Nasdaq. We also find that the proportion of even-increment quotes is a relevant factor affecting percentage spreads for Nasdaq both before and after and for the NYSE only after the change in quoting increments.     

Order imbalance and liquidity supply: Evidence from the bubble burst of Nasdaq stocks

In this study we analyze the effect of order imbalance on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that Nasdaq market makers use both price and quantity quotes when dealing with order imbalances. However, order imbalance affects only price movement, not spreads. We also find that Nasdaq market makers quote more shares and compete more intensively on bid-side (ask-side) when public sells (buys) exceed public buys (sells). These suggest that market makers increase liquidity supply when order imbalances exist. More interestingly, we show that both market conditions and price movements affect investors' trading behavior.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.     

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market.     

Electronic Communication Networks and Liquidity on the Nasdaq

This paper examines the growth of electronic communication networks (ECNs) and their impact on the liquidity of Nasdaq stocks. I find that the recent growth of trading through ECNs has resulted in tighter bid-ask spreads, greater depths, and less concentrated markets. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that electronic communication networks have improved Nasdaq liquidity.     

Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions costs are held by investors for longer holding periods, and vice versa. We examine average holding periods and bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted, the length of investors' holding periods is related to bid-ask spreads. We also find that the relation between holding periods and bid-ask spreads is much stronger on Nasdaq, where spreads are larger, than on the NYSE, where spreads are smaller.     

Tick Size,Spreads, and Liquidity: An Analysis of Nasdaq Securities Trading near Ten Dollars

Quoted and effective bid–ask spreads on Nasdaq are two to four cents per share narrower, ceteris paribus, when stocks trade with a smaller tick size below $10 per share. There is no evidence of a reduction in liquidity with the smaller tick size. The largest spread reductions occur for stocks whose market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes. This finding provides support for models implying that changes in the tick size can affect equilibrium spreads on a dealer market and indicates that the relation between tick size and market quality is more complex than the imposition of a constraint on minimum spread widths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G29, D34, N20.     

Market Maker Quotation Behavior and Pretrade Transparency

We examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks, and to actively narrow the spread, when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on Nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further.     

An Empirical Examination of The Nasdaq/CHX Dual-Trading Experiment

We analyze the effects of the SEC's experimental Nasdaq/CHX dual-trading program. The program, which began in 1987 and continues to the present, establishes an experiment in which the costs and benefits of competition between dealer and specialist market structures can be observed directly. Our primary finding is that the program led to significantly reduced mean quoted and percentage spreads for the dual-traded issues. Further, even though the CHX specialists quote lower spreads, they are not able to garner a significant number of trades from Nasdaq.