Manipulating uncertainty

Uncertainty about the distributional incidence of policy reforms may, if it impinges selectively on particular subsets of voters, alter the direction of the majority vote. This possibility should be a matter of special concern when subject to potential manipulation by a purposeful agent such as a Leviathan-like bureaucracy. This paper discusses a constitutional defense against such prospect. This paper was prepared for a conference on “Constitutional Status Quo and Prospects for Change” held at George Mason University in April, 1994. I am grateful to participants in that conference and to my colleagues at Nova, especially to Mário Páscoa, for their comments and criticisms. I also benefited from comments of an anonymous referee. Responsibility for errors remains with me.     

Existence and specific characters of rentiers: a savers-spenders theory approach

Summary. Using the savers-spenders theory developed by Mankiw (2000, AER), we propose microfoundations to the existence of rentiers in macroeconomic growth models. From an OLG model which acknowledges the great heterogeneity of consumer behavior apparent in the data, we capture the dynamic considerations of potential rentiers as a natural consequence of intertemporal utility maximization and we analyze realistic characteristics (proportion, wealth, propensity to save) of rentiers.JEL Classification Numbers: E13, D64, J22.This paper is adapted from the fourth chapter of my Ph.D Thesis. Then, I thank Alain VENDITTI, my Ph.D Supervisor and Antoine dAUTUME and Pierre PESTIEAU my Ph.D Referees. Earlier version of this paper were presented at the International conference: New perspectives on (un)stability: the role of heterogeneity at Marseille, June 7-9, 2001 and at the X-th Spring School of the Associated European Laboratory (CNRS-FNRS/CORE-GREC-GREQAM) at Aix, 2001. I thank conference participants, in particular Olivier CHARLOT, Christian GHIGLINO, Kiminori MATSUYAMA and Philippe MICHEL for suggestions, helpful comments and discussions. I also thank a referee of this journal for his constructive comments.     

Human capital and economic growth revisited: A dynamic panel data study

This paper examines the role of human capital on economic growth by using a large panel of data including 93 countries. Given the cross-sectional character in most of the relevant studies, there is a possibility that when the long-run dynamics are considered, education might not be a significant determinant of growth. Following a dynamic panel data approach, the analysis indicates that education has, indeed, a significant and positive long-run effect on economic growth. Moreover, the size of this effect is stronger as the level of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary) increases. This has a straightforward policy implication that governments taking actions towards an expansion of their higher education may well expect larger gains in terms of higher economic growth in their countries. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Fifty-first International Atlantic Economic Conference, Athens, Greece, March 13–20, 2001, and also at the conference on Post-Euro Era at the University of Ioannina, Greece, January 27–28, 2000. The authors would like to thank participants in both conferences and, in particular, Nick Apergis for his comments and useful suggestions on earlier drafts. The authors remain responsible for any shortcomings of the paper.     

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

We investigate how the patent policy affects economic growth and social welfare based on an endogenous growth model with R&D activities. We show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is finite. Moreover, by introducing compulsory licensing, we also show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is not infinite even if the royalty rate can be controlled. Received June 29, 2001; revised version received February 5, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We also thank Akira Yakita for his helpful comments.     

On justifying a minimum welfare state

Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law. I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University for hospitality both during the period in which this paper was written and on other occasions. I am deeply indebted to the people at the Center for their criticisms and comments. As far as this paper is concerned Geoffrey Brennan's and Richard Wagner's comments were particularly helpful. I should also like to acknowledge helpful oral comments from Kevin Mulligan and Philip van Parijs, who of course is much more of an expert on demogrant schemes than I am. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. The general caveat applies.     

Examining the consistency of spatial association patterns across socio-economic indicators: an application to the Greek regions

This paper addresses an important empirical question for spatial economics that has so far attracted little attention in the literature, namely, how patterns of spatial association differ across socio-economic indicators. This issue is examined here with a large socio-economic dataset from the Greek prefectures. We start by identifying spatial patterns of association in the data through an exploratory spatial data analysis and then explore the persistence of spatial clustering across socio-economic indicators through the application of a number of simple statistical tests. Greece presents an interesting case for examination, given its complex nature of geographical disparities and spatial heterogeneity. The derived results are important for Greek regional policy, as they help highlight yet another dimension of the challenges it faces for regional development, but they are also of particular relevance for applied spatial analysis, as they offer new insights in the analysis of spatial processes. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented in the 2005 RSAI (British and Irish Section) conference in Stratford-upon-Avon and the 2006 International Workshop on Spatial Econometrics and Statistics in Rome. I am thankful to participants in these two conferences for useful comments and suggestions. I have also benefited from comments by Andreas Antoniadis, Giuseppe Arbia, Badi Baltagi, Eckhard Bode, Yiannis Chorianopoulos, Bernard Fingelton, Ian Gordon, Stamatis Kalogirou, Yiannis Kaplanis, Yiannis Psycharis and two anonymous referees. All errors and omissions remain with the author.     

Ramsey fiscal policy and endogenous growth

This paper examines the effects of fiscal policies on capital accumulation and economic performance in a simple endogenous growth model with elastic labor supply by focusing on the implementability of a competitive equilibrium with productive public spending and distortionary taxation. Given a feasible exogenous fiscal policy, productive public spending can, at first, lead to positive short-run and long-run growth in the unique competitive equilibrium. However, although strictly positive growth is possible in the short run, a Ramsey policy with productive public spending does not implement positive capital accumulation in the long run. Also, the local indeterminacy of Ramsey allocations, in conjunction with the global multiplicity, arises as an implementable competitive equilibrium with Ramsey policies: namely, a continuum of transitional dynamics and multiple balanced growth paths. I am grateful to Kazuo Nishimura, Theodore Palivos, Sang Hee Won, John Conlon, Apostolis Philippopoulos, Arved Ashby, In Ho Lee, Katsuaki Terasawa, and an anonymous referee of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at Ioannina University, Kyoto University, University of Mississippi, and Seoul National University. This paper is supported by 2006 Sabbatical Project, Kyung Hee University.     

Environmental Externalities in the Presence of Network Effects: Adoption of Low Emission Technologies in the Automobile Market*

The paper considers a market currently dominated by a dirty technology that imposes significant environmental costs. A clean technology, with zero environmental costs, is introduced after the maturity of the dirty technology’s network. Adoption of the clean technology is not possible due to the network benefits in favour of the dirty technology. The paper considers two types of policy intervention to correct for the environmental externality. First, we find that the tax necessary to induce adoption of the clean technology is very high implying that a tax equal to the marginal environmental damage would not resolve the externality problem in many cases. Second, if tax revenues are earmarked towards subsidizing the clean technology, the tax is lower than in the previous case and can be set equal to the marginal external damage. *The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We would also like to thank Robert Androkovich, Jim Seldon, Gordon Tarzwell, Christos Constantatos, participants of the EAERE 2002 conference, and the Sevilla Workshop on Public Economics and the Environment 2004 for their suggestions. Financial support by the Scholarly Activity Committee of the University College of the Cariboo is acknowledged by both authors. Eftichios Sartzetakis acknowledges also financial support by the Pythagoras I research grant of the Greek government.     

When will a Dictator be Good?

Dictatorship is the predominant political system in many developing countries. However, different dictators act quite differently: a good dictator implements growth-enhancing economic policies, e.g., investment in public education and infrastructure, whereas a bad dictator taxes her citizens for her own consumption. The present paper provides a theoretical model by deriving underlying determinants of dictatorial behavior. We assume that the engine of economic growth is private investment. It can increase the productivity of individuals who invest, as well as the aggregate technological level. A good dictator encourages this investment in order to tax more. However, the cost of this encouragement is that the ensuing higher growth rate will induce earlier democratization. In this paper we will illustrate the risk of choosing a growth-enhancing policy, while leading to additional tax revenues in the short-run will also increase the likelihood of a revolution resulting in the eventual overthrow of the dictator. Furthermore, we will find that the higher the return from private investments the less likely the dictator will be a good one. Contrary to McGuire and Olson (J Econ Lit 34:72–96, 1996) we find that a long life-time does not always induce positive incentives among dictators. I wish to thank Monika Merz, who carefully read the earlier version of this paper and provided many valuable suggestions. I also would like to thank the editor, the anonymous referee, Uwe Sunde, Philipp Kircher and participants at the 4th international annual conference of JEPA for helpful comments. I am grateful to Stephan Heim for his assistance. All possible errors are, of course, mine.     

Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality

This paper investigates the testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individual rationality on finite data sets in exchange economies with finitely many commodities and agents. Efficiency alone provides no restrictions other than a trivial “no waste”-condition. Efficiency together with individual rationality implies robust restrictionsI appreciate the comments of Don Brown, Truman Bewley and Charles Steinhorn. I also thank seminar participants at Yale, Zuerich and Mainz, as well as conference participants at the 12th European General Equilibrium Workshop in Bielefeld. The generous support of the Cowles Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The paper also benefited greatly from the comments of an anonymous referee     

Modeling the European cycle with factor structure and regime switching

This paper compares the stylized facts of the European growth cycle stemming from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the European Monetary Union with an unobserved common factor derived from a dynamic factor model with regime switching. The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence about the most adequate indicator for short-term monitoring of the cyclical state of the European economy. Previous versions of this article have been presented at the 55th International Atlantic Economic Conference (Vienna, Austria, March 12–16, 2003) and at the VI Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Granada, Spain, June 5–7, 2003). The author would like to thank the conference participants and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions.     

Limited participation,private money,and credit in a spatial model of money

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of private money issue for the effects of monetary policy, for optimal policy, and for the role of fiat money. A locational model is constructed which gives an explicit account of the role for money and credit, and for limited financial market participation. When private money issue is prohibited, there is a liquidity effect as the result of a money injection from the central bank, but this effect goes away when private money is permitted. Private money issue changes dramatically the nature of optimal monetary policy. With private money, fiat currency is no longer used in transactions involving goods, but currency and central bank reserves play an important part in the clearing and settlement of private money returned for redemption.Received: 5 May 2003, Revised: 1 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E4, E5.The author thanks seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Duke University, conference participants at the Texas Monetary Conference at U.T. Austin, February 2002, and the Conference on Recent Developments in Money and Finance at Purdue University, May 2003, as well as Gabriele Camera, Ed Nosal, Will Roberds, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Real and nominal exchange rate variability

Keynote lecture presented to the annual convention of the Austrian Economic Association in Vienna, October 5 and 6, 1989. I would like to thank Paul De Grauwe, Helmut Frisch, and other participants at the convention for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Jack Glen for providing the monthly exchange rate data used in Table 1.     

Inflation Dynamics in the Euro Area and the Role of Expectations

This paper examines the empirical performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and its hybrid specification in the euro area. Instead of imposing rational expectations, direct measures, i.e. OECD forecasts, are used as empirical proxies for economic agents’ inflation expectations. Real marginal costs are proxied by three alternative measures. The results suggest that once the rational expectations hypothesis is relaxed and directly measured expectations are used, the European inflation process can be modeled using the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. However, when allowing for possible non-rationalities in expectations, inflation can be modeled more accurately by the hybrid Phillips curve with the additional lagged inflation term. In this approach, output gap turns out to be at least as good as labor income share as a proxy for real marginal cost. Moreover, the inflation process seems to have become more forward-looking in the recent years of low and stable inflation.The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. Special thanks are due to the editor, two anonymous referees, Juha Tarkka, Jouko Vilmunen and Matti Virén for useful comments. I am also grateful to David Mayes and Geoffrey Wood for helpful suggestions and to Heli Tikkunen for excellent research assistance. For their constructive comments, I would also thank participants in the conference on the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network at the ECB, which was held in Frankfurt in December 2003.     

Market efficiency broadcasted live: ECB code words and euro exchange rates

This paper examines the impact of the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy on euro exchange rate returns using an event study with intraday data for five currencies (the euro exchange rate versus the US dollar, the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen). I construct two indicators of news about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and the press conference. Estimation results show that the surprise component of communication has highly statistically significant effects on exchange rates, whereas the response of euro exchange rates to the unanticipated change in the policy rate is more muted. I also estimate the financial market impact on euro exchange rates of US, European and German macroeconomic news, and I show that the impact of the ECB press conference is economically important. The process of fully incorporating the ECB news shock takes about 1 h, and thus this result suggests that the whole press conference (both the Introductory Statement and the Q&A part) provides valuable information to market participants.     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.     

Price setting and the steady-state effects of inflation

This paper examines how price setting plays a key role in explaining the steady-state effects of inflation in a monopolistic competition economy with transactions-facilitating money. Three pricing variants (optimal prices, indexed prices, and unchanged prices) are introduced through a generalization of the Calvo-type setting that allows price indexation. We found that in an economy with less indexed prices, the steady-state negative impact of inflation on output is higher. Regarding welfare analysis, our results support a long-run monetary policy aimed at price stability with a close-to-zero inflation target. This finding is robust to any price setting scenario.JEL Classification: E13, E31, E50The writing of this paper commenced during the time I spent on the Research Visitors Programme 2001 of the European Central Bank and an earlier version of the paper became ECB Working Paper No. 140. I would like to thank Bennett T. McCallum, Frank Smets, and Oscar Bajo-Rubio for their valuable comments and suggestions, and the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain for its financial support (Research Project 2002/00954).     

North-South interaction and commod control

A simple model of North-South interaction is presented with a Keynesian North producing industrial goods and a Classical South producing corn. If the terms of trade clear the corn market then commodity price stabilisation can only slightly increase the average value of Northern real consumption. But if there is real wage resistance in the North then output deflation in the North is necessary to avoid inflationary pressure whenever the terms of trade tend to turn against the North; commodity price stabilisation could, in such circumstances, greatly improve Northern welfare. The paper also examines whether fiscal policy in the North, instead of commodity price stabilisation, could provide equally large improvements in Northern welfare.     

Financial variables as leading indicators in Greece

This paper presents business cycle stylized facts for the Greek economy and extends the relevant Greek literature in the following directions. First, the index of industrial production (IOP) is used to represent real economic activity and business cycle conditions. Second, the behavior of certain financial variables throughout the various phases of the business cycle is analyzed in order to assess their leading indicator properties. Third, possible non-linearities in these variables are investigated and tested for their relation to the business cycle states. The results imply that the most reliable leading indicators are real Treasury bill rates. Volatilities of real short-term interest rates may also contain useful predictive information for IOP volatility. Finally, mean non-linearities seem to be associated with business cycle asymmetries in the mean. The author wishes to express his gratitude to conference participants at the 55th International Atlantic Economic Conference held in Vienna, Austria, March 12–16, 2003, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions. The author is responsible for any shortcomings in the paper.     

Money,price dispersion and welfare

Summary. We introduce heterogeneous preferences into a tractable model of monetary search to generate price dispersion, and then examine the effects of money growth on price dispersion and welfare. With buyers search intensity fixed, we find that money growth increases the range of (real) prices and lowers welfare as agents shift more of their consumption to less desirable goods. When buyers search intensity is endogenous, multiple equilibria are possible. In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth reduces welfare and increases the range of prices, while having ambiguous effects on search intensity. However, there can be a welfare-inferior equilibrium in which an increase in money growth increases search intensity, increases welfare, and reduces the range of prices.Received: 25 July 2003, Revised: 12 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E31, D60.B. Peterson, S. Shi: We thank Gabriele Camera, Aleksander Berentsen and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We have also received valuable comments from the participants of the workshop at Michigan State, the Purdue Conference on Monetary Theory (2003) and the Midwest Macro Meeting (Chicago, 2003). Shi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bank of Canada Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The opinion expressed here is the authors own and does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada.Correspondence to: S. Shi