钟彬娴的“美丽之路”

机遇垂青有准备的人 雅芳公司百年历史上，出现了第一位华裔女性CEO，她就是钟彬娴。她曾多次入选《财富》杂志“全美50位最有影响力的商界女性”。在谈到成功的秘诀时，她的答案却非常简单明了：热爱自己的工作和家庭，无论什么时候都牢记中国文化中谦虚的美德。     

永不衰变的人生之梦

饶芃子如果不搞理论研究而去搞创作,将是怎样的情景? 我们在探讨一个人的生命轨迹时常常会遇到这样永无标准答案的问题。 但是有一点是可以肯定的,那就是:在饶芃子心中有一个自少年时期就凝聚的作家情结。她是兴冲冲地怀着这个情结跨入大学中文系的。受社会左右的命运使她叩开了另外一扇门,成为一个文艺理论家、文艺批评家,但是直到近耳顺之年的今天,她依然没有从心的深     

梨乡花海

每年谷雨时节，素有北方“梨乡”之称的莱阳，梨花盛开，那连阡接陌的梨花，如皑皑白雪，似渺渺轻烟，漫步于梨花丛中，徘徊于梨树下，使人飘飘若仙、流连忘返。每到这时，“梨乡”莱附都游人如织，宾客满园，是最热闹的时候。     

野菜撷趣

野梨花春天来了,野梨花开得满山遍野。初是灰白,后是一树树白雪般的花在暖暖的风中轻轻地飘摇。在红土高原西部的万水千山中,到处都有野梨花在树林里随意地生长。每当寒冬刚刚过去,它们就在沟边、路边、山梁、村头率先撑出一片片灰白。无论你在哪里碰到它,都会像遇着自己的乡亲似的,看它们露出一脸的憨厚,对着你笑。野梨花,又叫棠梨花或刺梨花。到了秋后,野梨的果实成熟,只有手指头大小,又酸又涩难以下咽,而它的树干又常年稀稀落落地长着些刺,让人很难采摘果实。但在缺吃少穿的年代,野梨果仍被童年的我们摘回去,放入米糠或新采的松毛里捂起…     

传奇女人邓文迪

嫁给默多克的邓文迪，被公认为是中国最富有女人，拥有“一个传奇的中国女人”之誉。但是，在不少外国人心目中，她只是一个来自中国的掘金娘子，不知用什么妖术驯服了老眼昏花的默多克；在自己同胞眼里，她也绝不是什么为国争光的英雄。她太不符合东方女性的价值观。 尽管邓文迪的自我评价是，“在家人和朋友需要帮助的时候，我总是随时伸出援助的双手”，但大多数人却对此嗤之以鼻，认为她在关键时刻第一个想到的肯定是自己。然而，在7月19日英国议会针对《世界新闻报》“窃听门”召开的听证会上，邓文迪却实打实地展示了一回她那“援助的双手”。让所有人大开眼界。     

刘宁:享受工作,享受生活专访中山大学岭南(大学)学院EMBA08春季班刘宁

在事业上,她是成功的女性企业家;在生活里,她是自由的现代女性;她做事扎实,沉稳,不张扬,不爱表现自己。她用最朴实的脚步走出了不平凡的道路,她就是刘宁。     

冯玉庭：把美丽带给人间

冯玉庭出生在台北，从一个普通的会计做到主管会计。1980年移民美国，创办了天使窗帘公司。她采取的是设计，制作，安装一条龙服务。作为华人较早踏入窗饰领域的拓荒者，她在探索中形成了自己独特的中西合璧的窗帘设计风格。她的客人遍布全美50多个州，还有台湾，香港，大陆和新加坡。她创办的天使窗帘公司不但在华人中享有盛誉，有许多的白人老美也主动找她设计。冯玉庭用自己的成功为华人在美创业闯出了一条路，她用自己的智慧创造了一个平凡人的神话。     

古今之间的哲学与政治——Manha C．Nussbaum访谈录

纳斯鲍姆是当代最有影响的思想家之一。作为一名杰出的古典学家,她在访谈中就古希腊悲剧和哲学中的多元主义、哲学与民主的关系提出了自己的积极评判,并对施特劳斯学派表达了哲学上的不满;作为在情感研究方面颇富造诣的哲学家,她对理性与情感的二分以及我们如何反思启蒙提出了自己的独特见解;作为可行能力思路中的代表性政治哲学家,她批评罗尔斯所承续和推进的契约论传统,并阐述了可行能力思路视野中的社会正义理想;作为极富声名的公共知识分子,她就战争、博雅教育等问题表达了自己的鲜明主张。     

古今之间的哲学与政治——Martha C.Nussbaum访谈录

纳斯鲍姆是当代最有影响的思想家之一.作为一名杰出的古典学家,她在访谈中就古希腊悲剧和哲学中的多元主义、哲学与民主的关系提出了自己的积极评判,并对施特劳斯学派表达了哲学上的不满;作为在情感研究方面颇富造诣的哲学家,她对理性与情感的二分以及我们如何反思启蒙提出了自己的独特见解;作为可行能力思路中的代表性政治哲学家,她批评罗尔斯所承续和推进的契约论传统,并阐述了可行能力思路视野中的社会正义理想;作为极富声名的公共知识分子,她就战争、博雅教育等问题表达了自己的鲜明主张.     

袁媛：爱和光的歌者

一个勇敢、坚韧、热情的女孩儿，在庞繁如林、迅疾如飞的“网生代”中，以她箴言一般的同感文学异军突起，被网民称为“掀起了一场爱情革命与拯救心灵的运动”。对她来说，这些在网上点击量动辄百万的精致诗文，刻录下的正是自己青春记忆中最宝贵的光芒。     

Technical progress in Joan Robinson's view: an attempt at systematisation and formalisation

This paper deals with Joan Robinson's contributions to the issue of technical progress and her attempts at treating this subject in accordance with the Keynesian theory of employment and income distribution, mainly in the long run. The paper aims to review this aspect of her work and to establish a systematisation and a formalisation of her approach. At the same time, the paper exposes the problems she faced—but did not always solve. Looking through her main contributions, the paper concludes that she used different criteria for the classification of innovations and that they depended on the specific situations described by the models in which she used the classification.     

Concentric circles of limits to the rate of accumulation: an interpretation of Joan Robinson's theory of economic dynamics

In addition to her well-known contributions to the theory of capital, Joan Robinson provided, in her Accumulation of Capital and Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, a theory about the determinants of the rate of growth. The growth rate was limited by entrepreneurs' animal spirits. Within that constraint, growth might be further limited by the inflation barrier, which could occur either because of a floor to real wages or because of full employment. This paper provides a series of simple dynamic models that illustrate these situations, drawing attention to this neglected aspect of her work and making it easier to compare her work with the monetary growth models produced by her neoclassical contemporaries.     

In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm

Many centralized entry-level labor markets use the firm-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms. We propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the DA-algorithm. Then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal, the firms from which they might receive a proposal, and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal. If a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others, then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms. Furthermore, it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her.     

Partially Revealing Campaign Promises

Candidates competing for political office give promises to voters. There are no legal restraints preventing incumbents from breaking their electoral promises. This paper models campaign promises as pure cheap talk and asks why is it influential. We propose that a candidate's campaign promises are a partially revealing signal of her policy preference type. The incumbent's policy choice is yet another signal of her type. Policy choice is a costly signal (unlike campaign promises). The incumbent keeps her electoral promises in order to preserve ambiguity about her type, which is necessary to assemble a winning majority for reelection. She keeps her promises regardless of information about the efficiency of different public policies which she receives upon taking office. Therefore, campaign promises generate inefficiencies in public policy.     

Olson's Logic of Collective Action: A Review Article

This comment is offered as a defense of humanistic economics whose feminist credentials have been questioned by Julie Nelson. To her, our contribution is little less than orthodox economics, an ideology enshrining masculine values. We find her arguments based on a clear misreading or misinterpretation of our work. Especially needing correction is her charge that our key notion of a dual self is contaminated by traditional hierarchy and masculinized reason, and the idea of a ‘mushroom man’ operating in a social vacuum. Once her arguments, which we find contrived, are deconstructed it can be readily seen that there remains little difference between her own and our economics.     

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.     

Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling

This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.     

Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment

Experiments frequently use a random incentive system (RIS), where only tasks that are randomly selected at the end of the experiment are for real. The most common type pays every subject one out of her multiple tasks (within-subjects randomization). Recently, another type has become popular, where a subset of subjects is randomly selected, and only these subjects receive one real payment (between-subjects randomization). In earlier tests with simple, static tasks, RISs performed well. The present study investigates RISs in a more complex, dynamic choice experiment. We find that between-subjects randomization reduces risk aversion. While within-subjects randomization delivers unbiased measurements of risk aversion, it does not eliminate carry-over effects from previous tasks. Both types generate an increase in subjects’ error rates. These results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RISs to more complex and dynamic tasks.     

Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory

We present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro-social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children. Differently from existing models of cultural transmission of values (such as Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Tabellini, 2008) we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children's material welfare. If parents coordinate their educational choices, a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries, with whom she may interact. A parent may thus choose to instill pro-social values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted. This implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare, even if their children's material welfare is all they care about.