会计准则制定导向悖论

安然事件后,不少人认为,一些上市公司可以通过交易设计规避规则导向会计准则的规定,因而原则导向会计准则可能会有效地防止上市公司对准则的规避.事实怎样呢?文章研究非货币性交易准则变化前后上市公司利用非货币性交易操纵利润行为的变化,得出原则导向会计准则下,上市公司可以利用原则导向会计准则赋予的职业判断操纵利润;规则导向会计准则下,上市公司可以通过交易设计规避准则规定,形成会计准则制定导向悖论.     

移动通信产业技术标准形成机制比较及启示

由于移动通信产业具有强烈的网络外部性,因而移动通信技术标准对于移动通信产业的发展具有很强的战略意义。美、欧、日、韩等发达国家和地区围绕着移动通信3代产业标准展开了激烈的竞争,结果显示,由于各国技术标准形成与扩散机制不同,其标准化市场绩效也迥然不同。技术标准联盟成为通信产业技术标准形成和扩散的主流模式。     

我国节能减排技术及支撑体系的构建——以珠海市为例

改革开放以来,我国综合经济实力显著增强,基础设施相对完善,生态环境质量不断改善,主要污染物排放得到有效控制。但相比较我国环保标准而言不仅现实的差距很大,而且受投入等因素的影响,其研发和创新能力差距更大,文章对建立节能减排技术研发及支撑体系提出建设性意见。     

美国会计准则制定的经济后果及其启示

人们对会计准则性质认识的经济后果观认为，会计准则的选择会影响相关利益集团的决策行为。会计准则具有经济后果。经济后果学说的提出对会计准则制定理论产生了重大影响。在美国，会计准则的制定过程实际上已演变为政治过程。笔者对此进行了考察。列举了若干反映美国会计准则制定经济后果的事例，希冀从中能得到一些启示，以裨益于我国会计准则的建设与发展。     

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard.     

医院多重耐药菌监测分析及应对策略

目的探讨医院多重耐药菌(MDRO)检出、分布、趋势及感染因素,并采取针对性应对措施。方法对我院2012年1月至2013年12月临床微生物室检出的细菌及MDRO株数进行统计分析。结果 2012-2013年细菌检出2144例,MDRO检出281例,其中大肠埃希菌、鲍曼不动杆菌、耐甲氧西林金黄色葡萄球菌(MRSA)和肺炎克雷伯菌居多,主要集中在重症监护病房(ICU)、泌尿外科、儿科和普外科,MDRO检出标本来源依次是患者的痰液、尿液、伤口分泌物、血液、脓液、胆汁、引流液、腹水和穿刺液。结论 2012-2013年细菌菌株检出率呈上升趋,MDRO检出率呈下降趋势;鲍曼不动杆菌、奇异变形菌和大肠埃希菌检出率呈上升趋势。临床应引起关注MDRO感染情况,制订有效的预防措施,降低MDRO检出率,控制其在院内传播。     

低碳经济背景下广州市产业碳排放特征及发展对策

在全球经济发展低碳化的趋势下,基于广州2003~2012年的统计数据,通过对碳排放进行计算,研究发现,不同产业部门碳排放情况变化明显,10年来,第一产业碳排放量比重较小且增加缓慢,第二产业碳排放量比重一直较大但增速放缓,第三产业碳排放量增长迅速且比重逐渐加大,2012年第三产业碳排放量首次超过第二产业。通过聚类分析,将工业部门内部行业划分为优先发展、重点发展、优化发展、限制发展和深化发展五类。最后,对不同的产业部门提出相应的政策建议。     

Weitzman Revisited: Emission Standards Versus Taxes with Uncertain Abatement Costs and Market Power of Polluting Firms

Studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets. By introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of Weitzman (Rev Econ Stud 41:477–491, 1974), this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power. Since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price, their total abatement effort, including the restriction of output, is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price-taking firms. Consequently, the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes. In a further step, the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric.     

产业链的合作机制选择与低碳产品定价及碳减排策略

生产链上下游企业选择合适的合作机制对低碳产品定价及碳减排有重要影响。通过构建博弈模型分析三种不同合作机制下的低碳产品定价及碳减排问题:第一种合作机制即制造商与零售商进行合作,当两条生产链都选择这种合作机制时,能带来较高的碳减排率和较低的零售价格,这对制造商、零售商、消费者和环境都是有利的。第二种合作机制即两条生产链的制造商之间、零售商之间分别合作,这会带来较低的碳减排率和较高的零售价格,对两个制造商有利,而对零售商和消费者不利。分析前两种合作机制的利与弊提出第三种合作机制,即零售商和制造商共享利润下的有利于碳减排的策略。最后,结合案例讨论和数值分析的研究结果表明:当制造商和零售商收入共享比在一定范围内时,第三种合作机制可以给制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。由此为企业选择最佳的合作机制及合理的碳减排策略提供了理论指导。     

GATT/WTO框架中环境标准和劳工标准

从环境标准和劳工标准的视角,探究GATT/WTO在尊重国家主权和提高全球效率之间寻找平衡的制度安排.在引入关税和国内环境标准与劳工标准的模型中,产生单边的贸易政策引起的非效率均衡点.而在GATT/WTO构建的多边贸易协定平台上,能解决国内和国际环境与劳工标准的分歧,增加贸易的透明度,达到更有效率的互惠贸易均衡点.     

The Ramaswami Argument in a Multi-commodity Setting

This paper considers the optimum taxes and tariffs in a multi-commodity setting. Using the argument in Ramawami (1968), I show that when all goods and factors are tradable, the home country should buy out all the foreign factors. Conditions for the optimal terms of trade are also analyzed. In a single consumption good model, the foreign factors should be bought out at the foreign autarky prices. This result is only partially true in the more general setting. While factor mobility should be prohibited before the buy-out, non-prohibitive tariffs have to be imposed on trade in goods to attain the optimum terms of trade.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

Environmental Standards in a Large Open Economy

The small‐country price‐taking assumption of Oates and Schwab is relaxed to consider a large open economy that can influence its net capital return. This creates an incentive for the country to distort its policies. The key question asked is whether this induces inefficient outcomes. The result is that if the country has a dedicated tax on capital and uses this tax optimally, the Oates and Schwab first‐best result still holds. However, efficiency in a large open economy requires that the tax on capital be nonzero, unlike Oates and Schwab where the capital tax must be zero for first‐best efficiency.     

基于排放税与排放权交易的企业生产减排优化

为了改善环境绩效,政府需要采取有力的环境规制工具来控制企业污染物排放,那么这些规制工具的实施会对企业生产减排产生怎样的影响?文章基于排放税与排放权交易两种经济激励型环境规制工具,通过将污染物的净化成本和排放成本引入生产决策模型,给出了污染物的净化条件,求解了最优净化水平、最优产量与利润等决策变量。分析结果表明,排放税与排放权交易的实施,会促使企业转向更经济的内部净化处理方式,同时降低产品产量,提高产品价格,以实现利润最大化。对企业利润的影响上,征收排放税会直接减少企业利润,但排放权交易具有不确定性,与企业的减排成本、排放权价格、排放配额等因素有关。     

Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting

Extraction from a common pool resource (CPR), such as a fishery, can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems. Through regulation of the CPR, users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome. Feeny et al. (Land Econ 72(2):187–205, 1996) delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional CPR models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy. In the theoretical models we develop, we relax two of those assumptions: CPR users are homogeneous and are unable to create, or influence, management of the resource. We note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more, and relate this to the slippage effect concept. Regarding resource sustainability, we document situations where incentives exist for CPR users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence.     

Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship

This paper develops a principal‐agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more bribes. The model identifies a tradeoff between bribery and efficiency. This helps to reconcile some conflicting results on the implications of corruption for the size of the public sector. It also provides new results on the circumstances under which an improvement in the auditing technology is beneficial. The paper identifies conditions under which corruption is welfare enhancing. However, the paper also shows that under precisely these conditions private provision, even by an unregulated monopolist, would be better than public provision.