Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections

Quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history. We use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self-report excess extraction. This system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare.     

Fishing Revenue, Productivity and Product Choice in the Alaskan Pollock Fishery

A key element in evaluating fishery management strategies is examining their effects on the economic performance of fishery participants, yet nearly all empirical studies of fisheries focus exclusively on the amount of fish harvested. The economic benefits derived from fish stocks involve the amount of revenue generated from fish processing, which is linked to both the way fish are harvested and the products produced from the fish. In this study we econometrically estimate a flexible revenue function for catcher-processor vessels operating in the Alaskan pollock fishery, recognizing potential endogeneity and a variety of fishing inputs and conditions. We find significant own-price supply responses and product substitutability, and enhanced revenues from increased fishing days and tow duration after a regulatory change introduced property rights through a new fishing cooperative. We also find significant growth in economic productivity, or higher revenues over time after controlling for observed productive factors and price changes, which exceeds that attributable to increased harvest. These patterns suggest that the move to rights-based management has contributed significantly to economic performance in the pollock fishery.     

Consumption Externalities in a Commercial Fishery: the Queensland Beam Trawl Fishery

Demand and contingent valuation models are used to analyze survey data obtained from a sample of recreational boat and shore fishers in southern Queensland. The value of the recreational fishery to the average fisher in the sample and the value of marginal increases in catches of target species are estimated. These estimates are used to calculate the value of Pigovian taxes representing the marginal cost of catch and congestion externalities imposed by the beam trawl fishery on the recreational fishery. The results suggest that the cost of these externalities does not justify the closure of the beam trawl fishery.     

我国个人征信体系建设的模式选择

我国的个人征信体系建设刚刚起步,明确其运行模式有利于个人征信业的长期稳定发展。文章分析了美国和欧洲各国所选择的个人征信模式及其背景,并以此为借鉴,同时结合本国实际国情,探讨了我国个人征信体系建设的模式选择。     

The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement

We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs. Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty.     

Decentralized Management of a Fishery

We construct an economic mechanism to realize in Nash equilibrium an optimal consumption time path of a natural resource. For exposition convenience, the analysis is conducted within the model initiated by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:322–334, 1980). This framework allows us to explicitely compute the consumption time paths of the resource, associated with an open-access regime, with a cooperative management and with a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the difference game induced by the proposed mechanism.     

构建和谐房地产市场的路径选择

房地产可用于居住和投机,在过度自由的市场环境下,供给方利用房地产天然的垄断势力进行定价或抬价,以获取高额垄断利润,导致投机盛行。对于垄断行业,不适合完全市场化运作。政府应该重新审视并严格监管房地产市场,构建和谐房地产市场秩序。区别对待真实需求与投机需求,落实并增加经济调控手段,减少不恰当金融支持,降低流动性遏制过度投机,纠正房地产价格,以降低经济风险。     

Implications of a Discard Ban in Multispecies Quota Fisheries

We present an analysis of quota regulation and discarding in multispecies fisheries, explicitly taking into account the costs of non-compliance with quotas and a possible discard ban, as well as the costs of selective fishing (avoidance effort). We examine the impact of a discard ban on vessels’ profit maximising behaviour, in particular where species quotas are not set in proportion to their availability on the fishing grounds, considering both non-tradeable quotas and ITQs. We show the interdependence between penalty rates for both discards and over-quota landings in determining quota market outcomes. We find that quota prices are sensitive to penalty rates and to the presence of restrictive quotas for “choke” species.     

Centralised Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker

The paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation-averse monopoly union as a positive mark-up over its market-clearing value. The analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract. The optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society, combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union's degree of inflation-aversion.     

生态学视野下的水库渔业可持续发展困境及路径选择——千岛湖保水渔业例证

水库渔业是我国淡水渔业的重要组成部分,为维护健康的水库生态环境和提高人民生活水平发挥了重要的作用,也是部分水利职工和库区农民收入主要来源之一.针对当前对水库渔业发展观念认识上的误区,从千岛湖渔业发展过程中遇到的问题到“以鱼养水,鱼水共生”的可持续发展举措及产生影响为例证,提出了基于生态学视野下的水库生态系统“保水渔业”思路,为水库渔业的发展提供了路径和管理借鉴.     

Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system

Should the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances be appointed to a unique supranational regulator or decentralized to several local regulators? To answer this question, we develop a two stage-two country game where environmental regulators set the amount of emission allowances and the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance while the regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. Various, possibly conflicting, spillovers between countries arise in a decentralized setting. We show that decentralization is socially harmful if no asymmetry among institutional settings is introduced and can be suboptimal even when decentralization features lower monitoring costs than a centralized setting. Lower monitoring costs are therefore necessary, but not sufficient, to justify decentralization. Also, our analysis reveals that welfare can be higher under decentralization even if the corresponding environmental quality is worse than under centralization. Indeed, better environmental quality is sufficient but not necessary for higher welfare under decentralization. Finally, we discuss how these results can provide a theoretical rationale for the recent evolution of the EU ETS design.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

Enforcement and Information Strategies

In this paper we show that, if the relation between the actual monitoring probability and the extent of compliance in the regulated population is concave to the actual probability axis, providing perfect information raises compliance rates, relative to what might be called the “keep-them-ignorant” option. We also illustrate that a quite simple method is available for checking whether, in a particular setting with a particular class of regulated parties, the full information or the keep-them-ignorant policy ought to be pursued.     

略论清代的渔盐

有清一代的渔盐①制度多所变化,不同的地域有所不同,有的因习惯相沿已久乃变为成法。如广东沿海有干标、帮饷制度,两淮江浙地区实行渔盐配制度。渔户要给官方或地方交纳渔盐税,名目不一。渔汛期渔盐用量相当巨大,而渔获量却非定数,因此往往不可避免地造成渔盐走私。一些地方官认为,因沿海地区特定的地域和产业关系,相沿已久的地方制度自有其合理性,部分渔盐进入走私渠道情有可原。根据估算,清代道光年间每年所需渔盐约为五十六万二千五百吨。     

Storage and Viability of a Fishery with Resource and Market Dephased Seasonalities

In this study we analyse the role of the storageregulation in a fishery's production process when theresource exploited and the market to which theproduction is exported are characterized by seasonaldephased oscillations. For this purpose we built up adynamic model drawn from the French Guyana shrimpfishery example. The underlying objective of the modelis not the maximisation of a given criterion (as wouldbe in the optimal control approach), but merely themaintenance of the fishery's economical viability. Thefundamental principle is here to try to preserve asmany as possible viable control options. Theconditions to achieve and maintain this viability arecaptured in a certain number of constraints. Theanalysis points out periods and situations within theseason where the fishermen must anticipate theevolution of their storage to avoid violating thoseviability constraints. The study also indicates howthe fishery's viability can be ensured even if theexploitation costs exceed the commercial value of thelandings for a finite part of the year. However, whenthe resource's and/or market's oscillations are toolarge, the fishery may be not viable any longer and itappears that the crisis can not be removed byinvesting in larger storage capacities.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

The Ramaswami Argument in a Multi-commodity Setting

This paper considers the optimum taxes and tariffs in a multi-commodity setting. Using the argument in Ramawami (1968), I show that when all goods and factors are tradable, the home country should buy out all the foreign factors. Conditions for the optimal terms of trade are also analyzed. In a single consumption good model, the foreign factors should be bought out at the foreign autarky prices. This result is only partially true in the more general setting. While factor mobility should be prohibited before the buy-out, non-prohibitive tariffs have to be imposed on trade in goods to attain the optimum terms of trade.