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1.
In their recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Bagus and Howden (2010) present “quibbles” with fractional-reserve free banking. Specifically, they raise what they call “unaddressed issues” in
this system, with a particular emphasis on Selgin (1988). We deem their arguments to be more substantial than “quibbles” and see them as part of a longstanding debate about fundamental
aspects of monetary theory. We respond to their objections and attempt to specify how debate between the two sides might proceed
more productively. 相似文献
2.
3.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
4.
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Ananish Chaudhuri 《Experimental Economics》2011,14(1):47-83
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary
punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants
in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively
correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high
contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions
of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching. 相似文献
5.
This paper discusses Bryan Caplan’s “rational irrationality” theory. In particular, it shows that this theory neglects the
impact of social construction of information in the beliefs formation process. Conversely, Kuran and Sunstein’s competing
theory which explains the beliefs formation process through information and reputation cascades mechanisms takes into account
this influence (Kuran and Sunstein in Stanford Law Rev 51: 683–768, 1999). Besides, this theory keeps the rational ignorance assumption into the analysis and emphasizes the role of activist interest
groups who strategically use voters’ ignorance. In this way it provides an economic theory of irrational beliefs formation
based on sound political epistemology. 相似文献
6.
Antonio Ribba 《Empirical Economics》2006,31(2):497-511
In this paper, by using a combination of long-run and short-run restrictions, we identify a small structural VECM which includes inflation, unemployment and the federal funds rate and study the dynamic interactions at different frequencies among these variables. Our results show that: (a) in accordance with the traditional view of economic fluctuations, aggregate demand shocks and monetary policy shocks push inflation and unemployment in opposite directions in the short run; (b) the permanent supply shock explains the long-run movement of inflation and unemployment. These conclusions are at odds with the prediction of “natural-rate” models but are consistent with the idea of a propagation mechanism which links productivity shocks to inflation and unemployment at medium and low frequencies. Thus, with respect to some recent studies (e.g. Beyer and Farmer, ECB Working Paper 121, 2002, and Ireland, J Monet Econ 44:279–291, 1999), we offer a different interpretation of the low-frequency comovements between inflation and unemployment characterizing the US economy in the last decades.
相似文献
Antonio RibbaEmail: |
7.
This paper examines data from the Norwegian television game show Joker, where contestants make well-specified choices under risk. The game involves very large stakes, randomly drawn contestants,
and ample opportunities for learning. Central models of risk choice, including expected utility theory, give a simple prediction
of choice under weak conditions, as one decision is always first-order stochastically dominating. We document frequent, systematic
and costly violations of dominance. Many contestants appear to have a systematic expectation bias that can be related to Tversky
and Kahneman’s (Cogn. Psychol. 5(2):207–232, 1973) “availability heuristic”. In addition, contestants seem to make systematic calculation errors that are well captured by
the so-called Fechner model. 相似文献
8.
Coordinating activity among members is an important problem faced by organizations. When firms, or units within firms, are
stuck in bad equilibria, managers may turn to the temporary use of simple incentives—flat punishments or rewards—in an attempt
to transition the firm or unit to a more efficient equilibrium. We investigate the use of incentives in the context of the
“minimum-effort,” or “weak-link,” coordination game. We allow groups to reach the inefficient equilibrium and then implement
temporary, flat, “all-or-none” incentives to encourage coordination on more efficient equilibria. We vary whether incentives
are positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), whether they have substantial or nominal monetary value, and whether they
are targeted to a specific outcome (the efficient equilibrium) or untargeted (apply to more than one outcome). Overall, incentives
of all kinds are effective at improving coordination while they are in place, but there is little long-term persistent benefit
of incentives—once incentives are removed, groups tend to return to the inefficient outcome. We find some differences between
different kinds of incentives. Finally, we contrast our results to other recent work demonstrating greater long-term effectiveness
of temporary incentives.
相似文献
9.
Andrew T. Young 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2011,24(1):19-28
Murphy et al. (2009) criticize Young’s (2005) test of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) using US industry-level quarterly job reallocation data and the federal funds
rate as a monetary policy indicator. I argue that not only are Murphy et al.’s specific criticisms misguided; more importantly,
they all but completely rule out the type of empirical study that Young (2005) advocates: specifically, one that (1) is quantitative and distinguishes between statistical and economic significance and
(2) attempts to exploit a hypothesis that is both a prediction of ABCT and not a prediction of competing monetary theories of the cycle. I argue that empirical studies embodying (1) and (2) are critical
to ABCT as a research program. Furthermore, I review the existing econometric studies of ABCT from the last 10 years and conclude
that there is much room for improvement along these lines. 相似文献
10.
Robert F. GarnettJr. 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2011,24(1):71-76
Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas.
From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent
by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary
and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue
it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood
as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny
and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce
Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues
to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers. 相似文献
11.
Roberto Tamborini 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):49-72
The knowledge of human knowledge claims a place of its own in economics. Beyond the walls of our discipline, spectacular
progress is taking place in the field of empirical research into human knowledge -the so-called “cognitive sciences”. In the
light of such advances, the old and new classicals' axiom that nothing scientific can be said beyond the axioms of substantive
rationality now looks very much like the protective belt of a degenerating programme. On the other hand, criticisms and alternative
programmes will hardly be effective so long as their arguments are purely negative or are drawn from armchair introspection.
In the present study I wish to outline a pattern of human knowledge emerging from cognitive research that may be called “constructivist”,
and to point out the restrictions it sets on economic analysis. It is also my argument that such a pattern is consistent with
the present non- or post-Walrasian trends in economic theory, and that it may provide them with firmer cognitive foundations. 相似文献
12.
Spatial Welfare Economics Versus Ecological Footprint: A Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Strong Sustainability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The aim of this paper is a sensitivity analysis with the core-periphery model of ‘new economic geography’ put forward in Grazi
et al. (Environ Resour Econ 38:135–153, 2007). This model comprises interregional trade, agglomeration advantages and resource (land) use or environmental externalities.
Grazi et al. (2007, GBR) compare a social welfare (SW) indicator with the ecological footprint (EF) indicator for measuring spatial sustainability
of a set of land use configurations. Their main result is that the SW and the EF indicator can yield completely different
rankings and only for extreme parameterizations of environmental externalities the rankings coincide. We adapt the model by
interpreting total natural land as a resource constraint and differentiate between weak and strong sustainability. In a sensitivity
analysis we show that the main results of GBR (2007) correspond to the case of weak sustainability in our adapted model version. In the case of strong sustainability our adapted
model version shows the same welfare rankings for both indicators without the extreme parameterization that is necessary to
obtain the same results in the original GBR (2007) model. 相似文献
13.
Gianluigi Guido M. Irene Prete Alessandro M. Peluso R. Christian Maloumby-Baka Carolina Buffa 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(1):79-102
The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention
of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche”
market to a broader diffusion of these products. 相似文献
14.
Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary
we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading
(rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution. 相似文献
15.
Pavel Pelikan 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(1):1-8
I thank Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen for their thought-provoking response to my latest generalization of Darwinism,
and welcome their proposal to cooperate, after many years of our independent searches. I agree with them that our searches
contain more similarities than both they and I had previously seen, but consider our remaining differences—especially in the
terms employed and in the definitions of the terms we both employ, including “information,” “instructions,” “programs,” and
“Lamarckism”—more important than they do. Their response also exaggerates or distorts some of my arguments. All this needs
to be clarified before our cooperation can start. 相似文献
16.
Erik J. Balder 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):47-65
For games with discontinuous payoffs Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) introduced payoff indeterminacy, in the form of endogenous sharing rules, which are measurable selections of a certain payoff
correspondence. Their main result concerns the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. Its proof
is based on a discrete approximation scheme “from within” the payoff correspondence. Here, we present a new, related closure
result for games with possibly noncompact action spaces, involving a sequence of Nash equilibria. In contrast to Simon and
Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990), this result can be used for more involved forms of approximation, because it contains more information about the endogenous
sharing rule. With such added precision, the closure result can be used for the actual computation of endogenous sharing rules
in games with discontinuous payoffs by means of successive continuous interpolations in an approximation scheme. This is demonstrated
for a Bertrand type duopoly game and for a location game already considered by Simon and Zame. Moreover, the main existence
result of Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) follows in two different ways from the closure result. 相似文献
17.
Global warming is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. One of the
key challenges in mounting a global response to it is the seeming unwillingness of the fastest growing economies such as China
and India to sign a treaty that limits their emissions. The aim of this paper is to examine the differential incentives of
countries on different trajectories of capital growth. A benchmark dynamic game to study global warming, introduced in Dutta
and Radner (J Econ Behav Organ, 2009), is generalized to allow for exogenous capital accumulation. It is shown that the presence of capital exacerbates the “tragedy
of the common”. Furthermore, even with high discount factors, the threat of reverting to the inefficient “tragedy” equilibrium
is not sufficient to deter the emissions growth of the fastest growing economies—in contrast to standard folk theorem like
results. However, foreign aid can help. If the slower growth economies—like the United States and Western Europe—are willing
to make transfers to China and India, then the latter can be incentivized to cut emissions. Such an outcome is Pareto improving
for both slower and faster growth economies. 相似文献
18.
Steven Horwitz 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2011,24(2):171-184
This paper honors Don Lavoie’s work on the relationship between theory and history in Austrian economics by using the current
recession as an example of many of the ideas found in his paper on the “Interpretive Dimension of Economics.” More specifically,
I start from the premise that all history comes from theory because it is theory that guides what we count as “facts” or “data.”
From Menger onward, a core element of the Austrian approach has been to see the purpose of theory as rendering human action
and its unintended consequences intelligible. We do that by telling historical narratives where theory is the logical glue
that holds the story together. I look at the Austrian story of the Great Recession in light of these ideas. What the Great
Recession demonstrates is that the core theoretical elements of Austrian business cycle theory are narrower than we might
think, but that consciously recognizing the contingent elements gives the theory additional flexibility to explain more of
various real-world crises when augmented by additional ideal typifications properly used. 相似文献
19.
Gerald H. Lander 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(4):475-490
I investigate the mean reversion tendency of small growth stocks. Using a carefully articulated research design employing established and empirically tested principles, my findings should support or refute the anecdotal evidence that small growth stocks make superior investments. The primary motivation for the study springs from the documented differential preference among investors for value and growth stocks. Despite evidence that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks, investors retain strong interest in growth stocks. Yet in examining the performance of Business Week’s (BW), smaller capitalization companies (called “Hot Growth Companies”) with respect to the overall financial market, Bauman et al. [2002] found positive excess returns in the pre-publication period but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. A limitation of their study is that their analyses relied on only three criteria: sales, BW rank and return on capital, which do not represent completely a firm’s financial health. I replicate Bauman et al.’s study but use a more robust and representative variable set to test the mean reversal hypothesis — Forbes’ financial criteria — and I focus on six variables. In the current study, I look at 4,200 companies listed in Forbes from 1980 to 2000. The results of the expanded study substantiate Bauman et al.’s [2002] study showing that there are positive excess returns in the pre-publication period, but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. An expanded future study will look at five additional variables to see if they make a significant difference on the effects of the returns of small growth stocks. 相似文献
20.
This paper's goal is to construct a positive theory of economic fairness. Using the theoretical schema developed by Hurwicz
and others, the paper makes precise the notions of an “institution,” “fairness fraiming,” and “institutional framing.” Four
fairness propositions yield an important corollary: the economic environment, the operative institution and history give meaning
to the often used FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequellay, in
proportion to relevant similarities and differences”). We support these four propositions and corollary by an analysis of
laboratory, survey, and anecdotal evidence. Finally we describe a number of areas for future research.
The authors would like to thank Allen Buchanan, James Buchanan, Joel Feinberg, Elizabeth Hoffman, David Schmitz, Linda Schnabel
Stizer, Vernon Smith, Richard Wagner, the participants in the Aspen Institute's Conference on “Local Justice and Fair Allocation”,
the members of the Industrial Organization Workshop of the Department of Economics at the University of Arizona, and panel
participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting for their help and comments at various stages of this paper's preparation.
Responsibility for errors is the authors' alone. 相似文献