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1.
We combine household surveys and national accounts, as well as recently released tax data to track the dynamics of Indian income inequality from 1922 to 2015. According to our benchmark estimates, the top 1 percent of earners captured less than 21 percent of total income in the late 1930s, before dropping to 6 percent in the early 1980s and rising to 22 percent in the recent period. Our results appear to be robust to a range of alternative assumptions seeking to address numerous data limitations. These findings suggest that much more can be done to promote inclusive growth in India. We also stress the need for more transparency on income and wealth statistics, which is key to allow an informed democratic debate on inequality.  相似文献   

2.
Rising inequality since the 1980s has spurred much research examining the underlying causes and potential policy responses. Among the more controversial, One of the more controversial policy proposals is a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world proposes a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world. This paper introduces rank-based econometric methods for dynamic power laws as a tool for estimating the effect of progressive capital taxes on the distribution of wealth under different assumptions about the impact of these taxes on household behavior. In most scenarios, we find that a small tax levied on 1% of households would substantially reshape the US wealth distribution and reduce inequality.  相似文献   

3.
Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000–2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.  相似文献   

4.
In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990–2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 64 percent, compared to 37 percent in Western Europe, 47 percent in the US and 55 percent in Brazil (see Alvaredo et al. 2018). This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil‐rich and population‐rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under‐estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment.  相似文献   

5.
Using the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, I find evidence of sharply increasing house-hold wealth inequality over this period. Whereas mean wealth increased by 23 percent in real terms, median wealth grew by only 8 percent. The share of the top one-half percentile rose by five percentage points, while the wealth of the bottom two quintiles showed an absolute decline. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.80 to 0.84. Almost all the growth in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealthholders. In contrast, the degree of wealth inequality was almost identical in 1983 as in 1962, and real wealth growth was more evenly distributed across the wealth distribution. There is also evidence that the sharp increase in wealth inequality from 1983 to 1989 was due to a correspondingly sharp rise in income inequality, the increase of stock prices relative to housing prices, and relatively slow inflation.  相似文献   

6.
This article provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 22 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The data on wealth are collected at the household level, while individual-level data are needed for the estimates of gender wealth gaps. We propose a novel approach using machine learning and model averaging methods to predict individual-level wealth data for multi-person households. Our results suggest that random forest performs best as the predicting tool for this exercise, outperforming elastic net and Bayesian model averaging. The estimated gender wealth gaps tend to be in favor of men, especially at the top of the wealth distribution. Men have 24 percent more wealth than women on average. We also find that a high home ownership rate is associated with a smaller country-level gender wealth gap. Our estimates suggest that the individual-level wealth inequality is on average 3 pp higher than the household-level wealth inequality in multi-member households.  相似文献   

7.
The Asia–Pacific region's rapid growth and poverty reduction in recent decades have been accompanied by rising income and wealth inequality. Technological progress, globalization, deregulation and market-oriented reform, and financialization have generated many new opportunities, but rewarded capital more than labor, benefited skilled workers more than the unskilled, widened spatial inequality, and produced a growing number of the superrich. For some countries, population aging has also contributed to rising inequality. The present paper provides an update on recent trends of income and wealth inequality in the Asia–Pacific region, examines causes behind rising inequality, and discusses policy actions needed to tackle inequality. It also assesses how the COVID-19 has likely worsened inequality in the region.  相似文献   

8.
I provide lower and upper bound estimates of inequality of opportunity (IOp) for 32 European countries, between 2005 and 2019. Lower bound estimates use machine learning methods to address sampling variability. Upper bound estimates use longitudinal data to capture all-time invariant factors. Across all years and countries, lower bound estimates of IOp account from 6 percent to 60 percent of total income inequality, while upper bound estimates account from 20 percent to almost all income inequality. On average, upper bound IOp saw a slight decrease in the aftermath of the Great Recession, recovering and stabilizing at around 80 percent of total inequality in the second half of the 2010s. Lower bound estimates for 2005, 2011, and 2019 show a similar pattern. My findings suggest that lower and upper bound estimates complement each other, corroborating information and compensating each other's weaknesses, highlighting the relevance of a bounded estimate of IOp.  相似文献   

9.
Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two‐thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.  相似文献   

10.
Status Aspirations, Wealth Inequality, and Economic Growth   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper argues that an increase in the inequality of wealth prompts a stronger quest for status that in turn fosters the accumulation of wealth. It proposes a measure for an individual's want of social status. For a given level of a population's wealth, the corresponding aggregate measure of want of social status is shown to be positively related to the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality. Hence, the Gini coefficient and growth are positively correlated, holding the population's wealth constant.  相似文献   

11.
The last three decades saw a sharp decline in traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions and a corresponding rise in defined contribution (DC) plans. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983 to 2010, I find that after robust gains in the 1980s and 1990s, pension wealth experienced a marked slowdown in growth from 2001 to 2007 and then fell in absolute terms from 2007 to 2010. Median augmented wealth (the sum of net worth, pensions, and Social Security wealth) advanced slower than median net worth from 1983 to 2007 and its inequality rose more, as DB wealth fell off. However, from 2007 to 2010, the opposite occurred. While median wealth plummeted by 41 percent and inequality spiked by 0.032 Gini points, median augmented wealth fell by only 21 percent and its Gini coefficient rose by only 0.009 points. The differences are due to the moderating influence of Social Security wealth.  相似文献   

12.
We study wealth concentration in Sweden over 130 years, from the beginning of industrialization until the present day. Our series are based on new evidence from estate and wealth tax data, foreign and domestic family firm‐wealth, and pension wealth estimates. We find that Swedish wealth concentration was high in the agrarian state, and changed little during early industrialization. From World War I until about 1950, the richest percentile lost ground to high‐income earners in the rest of the top‐wealth decile. This equalization continued postwar; the entire top decile lost‐out relative to the rest of the population. Around 1980, wealth compression stopped and inequality increased. We approximate the effects of international flows and find that the recent increase in wealth inequality is probably larger than what official estimates suggest.  相似文献   

13.
There has been a great deal of interest in the data on income and wealth inequality collected by Thomas Piketty. This paper does not question that data; rather, it questions the framework of Piketty's analysis, both theoretically and empirically—namely the alleged upward tendency of the ratio of wealth to national income and the rise of wealth inequality. First, in the mechanism put forward, wealth can only grow as a result of savings, thus ruling out any form of price effect (as in urban land). Second, Piketty’s second law defines an asymptotical trajectory, in which variables grow in parallel, something incompatible with the rise of the ratio between two variables. In addition, Piketty’s model does not match data for the USA. The historical profile of the ratio of wealth/national income is actually the inverted image of the productivity of capital (the ratio of output/firms’ fixed capital). Doubts are also expressed concerning the dramatic fall of the ratio of wealth/national income in Europe around World War I.  相似文献   

14.
Using the British Household Panel Survey, we investigate the role of inheritance in shaping the distribution of household wealth in Great Britain during 1995–2005a period characterized by a substantial increase in wealth and an equally important decrease in wealth inequality. Abstracting from behavioral effects, we find that inheritances received during this period accounted for 30 percent of the increase in wealth of inheritors. Regression estimates of the effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation suggest that households spend 30 percent of their inheritances on average, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in household responses. Households that accumulated more wealth saved a larger share of their inheritances, as did middle aged households and those with lower initial wealth. Although inheritances are highly unequal they had a small impact on overall wealth inequality. This mainly reflected the fact that their size relative to other sources of wealth was very small.  相似文献   

15.
Drawing on the author's work, this lecture presents evidence on U.S. income and wealth inequality. It presents series for top income and wealth shares, and the distribution of economic growth by income groups. It discusses the mechanisms behind the evolution of U.S. income and wealth inequality from historical and comparative perspectives. It analyzes the role of public policy and in particular taxation in the evolution of inequality. (JEL D31, F66, J24)  相似文献   

16.
This paper investigates why the upsurge of top income shares has coincided with economic slowdowns in the US since the late 1970s. I argue that a fast-growing unearned income from ‘wealth residual’ – the unexplained increase in wealth that is not accompanied by any increase in real output – lies behind them. To support this hypothesis, I measure wealth residual from the national accounts and associated statistics, and then perform a set of panel regressions using a comprehensive panel dataset of the US at the state level. The estimation results demonstrate that the rapid growth of wealth residual during the last four decades has contributed to a co-evolution of fast-growing inequality and falling growth.  相似文献   

17.
This paper focuses on men and women engaged in China's sexual economy, which is dominated by the exchange between wealthy and politically influential men and unmarried young women who trade their femininity and sexuality for material wealth and financial security from these men. Drawing on analyses of the popular 2009 television serial, Woju (Dwelling Narrowness), coupled with recent ethnographic studies, the paper shows how this sexual economy thrives in the increasingly competitive and commercial urban landscape of present-day China. The study then examines the impact of commodification and materialism on men and women. The paper places these gender dynamics within the context of socioeconomic changes during the last thirty years and investigates how gender inequality became assimilated into both official and popular discourses of Chinese life, thereby facilitating the ascendancy and power of the sexual economy.  相似文献   

18.
Intimate partner violence (IPV) by men against their partners is one of the most glaring indicators of women's lack of empowerment. Drawing upon the 2010 Ecuador Household Asset Survey (EAFF) and the 2010 Ghana Household Asset Survey (GHAS), nationally representative surveys for Ecuador and Ghana, respectively, this study investigates the relationship between women's ownership of assets and physical and emotional abuse by spouses against currently partnered women over the previous twelve months. It uses the value of a woman's total assets compared to those of her partner as the main proxy for a woman's bargaining power. Differentiating between physical and emotional violence in both countries, the study finds that women's share of couple wealth is significantly associated with lower odds of physical violence in Ecuador and emotional violence in Ghana. Moreover, the association between women's share of couple wealth and IPV is contingent on the household's position in the wealth distribution.  相似文献   

19.
In this article, we correlate the key features of the distribution of wealth of the 500 wealthiest individuals in the Netherlands with economic growth and stock market returns for the period 1998 to 2009. We show that each year the distribution obeys a power law and that the key parameter measures the degree of inequality. Our main finding is that more inequality amongst the wealthiest is associated with higher economic growth.  相似文献   

20.
This article on the distribution of wealth among individuals in the United Kingdom presents recent work on the effects of including pension rights and the significance of sex, age and marital status. It describes the rationale for including the accrued rights in occupational and State pension schemes (funded or unfunded) and the methods of estimation used. For funded schemes the rights are valued as the accrued liability of the schemes to their members, and for unfunded schemes similar liabilities are hypothecated; these estimates of the value of accrued pension rights involve assumptions about future earnings and interest rates. The trend in average marketable wealth with age is upwards until advanced years when it slows down or slightly reverses. Adding occupational pension rights only slightly raises the trend for females but has a bigger effect for males. Adding State pension rights raises these upward trends until the age of 60 after which there is a decline. For marketable wealth on the average males are wealthier than females but less wealthy if single, divorced or widowed. Adding occupational pension rights improves the relative position of males; adding State pension rights cancels this out. The effect of marital status rises with both age and sex and therefore a detailed three-way analysis is made. For females widows are on average the wealthiest; for young males the married; for older males the single. Using Theil's coefficient of entropy for comparing the inequality of wealth, the addition of pension rights reduces inequality by two-thirds. Age accounts for only 6 percent of inequality for marketable wealth but for 31 percent if pension rights are included.  相似文献   

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