Liquidity,innovation and growth

Many countries simultaneously suffer from high inflation, low growth and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation on welfare, growth and the size of the financial sector. A novel feature is that the innovation sector is decentralized. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquidity to this sector. Consistent with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large growth gains. These large gains cannot be easily reproduced by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint in the innovation sector.     

Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium

We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs. Workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest-bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns. Each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information. Moreover, restricting borrowers and lenders to use static (one-period) contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate economic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small. Finally, the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in U.S. data.     

Phasing out the GSEs

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.     

Financial Crises and Recapitalizations

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods‐producing firms. Since financial intermediaries are highly leveraged, we show that the welfare gains from their recapitalization in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating typical business cycle fluctuations. We also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss, are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector, and can be larger when lower idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage.     

Liquidity and leverage

In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, and eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos – the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries – forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.     

The impact of joint participation on liquidity in equity and syndicated bank loan markets

Market liquidity is impacted by the presence of financial intermediaries that are informed and active participants in both the equity and the syndicated bank loan markets, specifically informationally advantaged lead arrangers of syndicated bank loans that simultaneously act as equity market makers (dual market makers). Employing a two-stage procedure with instrumental variables, we identify the simultaneous equations model of liquidity and dual market maker decisions. We find that the presence of dual market makers improves the liquidity of the more competitive and transparent equity markets, but widens the spread in the less competitive over-the-counter loan market, particularly for small, informationally opaque firms.     

Piggy Banks: Financial Intermediaries as a Commitment to Save

Banks and other intermediaries may help savers commit to investment plans that savers could not stick to if they held assets directly. We illustrate this commitment function using a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model where savers’ short-run liquidity needs are correlated with shocks to investment opportunities. The investment securities are all freely tradeable, yet savers still do better if they delegate their investment decisions to an intermediary that overrides the savers’ liquidity demands when investment opportunities warrant. Bank CDs, insurance annuities, pensions, and even social security, by locking funds out of reach, may all constitute real world examples of this commitment role of financial intermediaries.     

Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance

This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.     

Valuation,Capital Structure,and Shareholder Unanimity for Depository Financial Intermediaries

The theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision-making. The lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm. First, when intermediaries accept deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources. Second, the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid. In this paper, a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived.     

Liquidity needs and vulnerability to financial underdevelopment

This paper provides evidence that financial development has a large causal effect in the reduction of macroeconomic volatility resulting from the role of the financial system in liquidity provision. In particular, financial system development leads to a comparatively larger reduction in the volatility of output in sectors with high liquidity needs. Most of this decline results from the stabilization of the output of existing firms, although the volatility of the number of firms also drops significantly. Among different aspects of the financial system, the depth of financial intermediaries plays the main role in the reduction of volatility.     

Inefficient liquidity creation

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.     

Financial Frictions,Investment Delay,and Asset Market Interventions

We construct a dynamic macro model to incorporate financial frictions and investment delay. Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who face liquidity frictions in the equity market and a collateral constraint in the debt market. After calibrating the model to the U.S. data, we quantitatively examine how aggregate activity is affected by a shock to equity liquidity and a shock to entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity. We then analyze the effectiveness of government interventions in the asset market after such financial shocks. In particular, we compare the effects of government purchases of private equity and of private debt in the open market. In addition, we examine how these effects of government interventions depend on the option to delay investment.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Understanding commonality in liquidity around the world

We examine how commonality in liquidity varies across countries and over time in ways related to supply determinants (funding liquidity of financial intermediaries) and demand determinants (correlated trading behavior of international and institutional investors, incentives to trade individual securities, and investor sentiment) of liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with and during times of high market volatility (especially, large market declines), greater presence of international investors, and more correlated trading activity. Our evidence is more reliably consistent with demand-side explanations and challenges the ability of the funding liquidity hypothesis to help us understand important aspects of financial market liquidity around the world, even during the recent financial crisis.     

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff [1989. Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review 79, 43-50]. From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

2013年1月国内金融形势评述

2013年1月份,受假日等因素影响,当月金融运行多项指标有所波动。主要特点是：广义货币和狭义货币增速明显上升;各类融资活跃,社会融资规模创月度历史新高;贷款投放同比多增较多,住户部门信贷需求显著增强;企业存款增速大幅上升,储蓄存款增速有所回落;银行间市场交易活跃,市场利率回落,流动性较为充裕;与上年末比,月末人民币汇率升值0．10％,海外市场对人民币汇率的贬值预期有所减弱。     

Bank liabilities channel

The financial intermediation sector is important not only for channeling resources from agents in excess of funds to agents in need of funds (lending channel). By issuing liabilities it also creates financial assets held by other sectors of the economy for insurance or liquidity purpose. When the intermediation sector creates less liabilities or their value falls, agents are less willing to engage in activities that are individually risky but desirable in aggregate (bank liabilities channel). The paper shows how financial crises driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the liquidity of the banking sector are transmitted to the real sector of the economy. Since the government could also create financial assets by borrowing, the paper analyzes how public debt affects the issuance of liabilities by the financial intermediation sector.     

Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.     

Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Using a sample of foreign acquisitions of US targets, this study examines the extent to which cross-listing in the US leads to legal and regulatory bonding, and/or whether reputational bonding proxied by financial intermediaries monitoring, an often ignored component of the bonding mechanism, is an important factor in US investors decision to hold shares in cross-listed firms. We find that compared to US firms, cross-listed firms are less likely to use equity in takeovers of US targets. Further, cross-listed firms from countries with poorer legal protections are less likely to finance with equity and pay higher premiums than cross-listed firms from countries with better legal protections. Using analysts’ coverage and institutional following as proxies for financial intermediary monitoring, we find some support for the importance of reputational bonding. The evidence suggests that while cross-listing reduces barriers to investment, there are limits to its ability to completely subsume both the legal environment and the importance of the monitoring of financial intermediaries. This further suggests that the extent of actual legal and regulatory bonding by cross-listed firms may be more limited than often assumed.