经济政策不确定性与家族企业创新——融资约束及政府补助视角

家族企业作为社会发展的主要参与者,在促进经济增长方面发挥着不可替代的作用。家族企业若想实现长期发展,必然依靠创新。然而,我国家族企业普遍面临创新投入不足、创新产出效率低下等问题。基于2010—2018年中国上市家族企业数据,分析经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新是否存在激励作用。结果发现,经济政策不确定性提高,会对家族企业创新研发活动投入与产出产生正向激励作用,促进家族企业创新。从融资约束与政府补助视角,分析两者在上述正向激励作用中的调节作用。结果表明,对于融资约束小以及受到政府补助的家族企业而言,其受到经济政策不确定性的正向激励作用更显著,有助于其开展创新研发活动。结论不仅验证了经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新的激励作用,还揭示了融资约束以及政府补助的调节作用,可为政府制定相应补助政策,构建完善的金融市场提供理论支持和经验证据。     

转型时期家族企业治理模式选择的政治经济学

文章分析了中国转型时期家族企业治理模式的选择.家族企业究竟采用关系型治理还是采用规则型治理取决于其对两种治理模式的收益和成本的权衡,市场作用和地方政府作用会对这种权衡产生影响.我们在理论模型基础上的比较分析表明,在某些条件下地方政府的作用会使得家族企业在治理模式上更容易倾向于选择关系型治理,而在另一些条件下地方政府的作用会使得家族企业在诒理模式上更容易倾向于选择规则型治理,这反映了家族企业治理模式选择的政治经济学.     

地方政府在推动企业上市中的作用

企业上市是一项系统工程,离不开政府的规划、引导和扶持。在企业上市过程中,地方政府应该以服务企业为核心,为企业营造出良好的环境,推动企业上市,实现跨越发展,从而繁荣地方经济,促进地方的经济转型升级和可持续发展。本文针对这一问题简要分析了地方政府在推动企业上市过程中应发挥出的一系列作用及其相应措施。     

地方政府发展绿色环保企业的税收政策研究——以黑龙江省为例

文章主要研究在振兴东北老工业基地的国家宏观区域经济整体政策框架下,针对"哈大齐"——地方区域经济发展的重点地区,地方政府如何在节能减排方面做出更好的税收政策支持,以吸引更好、更多的绿色环保企业,进而促进地区经济沿着节能、环保、绿色的方向发展。     

地方政府经济干预行为的经济学解释

以往分析地方政府干预经济行为的研究较多关注于地方政府的意识形态偏好.文章通过构建以中央政府行为为外生变量的地方政府行为模型,对在中央政策给定的情况下,地方政府的种种政策选择做出分析.对地方政府以优惠政策招商引资、对垄断部门实施保护以及民营企业对地方官员的"公关"、民企参与国企改组迟缓等现象做出了解释.借助地方政府和中央政府的动态博弈模型,分析了中央政策对地方政府行为的影响.     

创始人特征、继承人培养模式与家族企业研发创新投资

文章基于2012—2019年A股上市家族企业的样本数据，深入探究创始人不同特征对继承人培养模式和企业的研发创新投资的影响。实证结果表明年龄越长、受教育水平越高以及拥有特定工作经历的家族企业创始人更多地选择对继承人进行外部培养。并且家族企业创始人的年龄越长，受教育水平越高以及拥有特定工作经历更愿意增加企业研发创新投入。进一步分析的结果表明继承人的外部培养模式有利于家族企业经营绩效的提升。研究结果对家族企业代际传承中的继承人培养模式和研发创新投资行为差异提供了拓展性的经验证据阐释。     

大数据精准赋能企业上市的创新与实践——以无锡市惠山区为例

推进和服务企业上市是各地调结构促转型、加快经济高质量发展的重要抓手。尽管各地方政府皆积极出台或加大相应扶持政策、提升政府服务水平,助力后备企业上市,但相关工作推进中仍出现了拟上市企业"找不到""找不准""找不全"的问题,极大地影响了该项工作的效率和成效。无锡市惠山区主动积极破题,运用大数据思维,突破体制障碍,探索出了建立健全企业上市精准培育机制。     

地方政府“招商引资”竞争策略与要素收入分配

自上世纪末期以来,我国国民收入初次分配中劳动份额大幅度降低,而资本份额却不断增加,本文试从政府政策的角度对此予以解释。财政分权和地方官员的晋升激励机制导致在争夺外来资本的过程中,地方政府更多地采取对投资者有益的政策,降低了劳动者收入。同时,政府的引资策略加重了资本深化,这也使经济增长的收益更多被资本获得,不利于劳动份额提高。     

转型经济中产业政策的有效性研究——基于我国各级政府利益博弈视角

文章基于我国各级政府利益博弈视角,考察了产业政策的有效性。研究发现:(1)限制性政策未能有效遏制特定产业的银行借款增长率,而鼓励性政策则能够使特定产业持续获得更多银行借款,尤其是长期借款;(2)即使受到产业政策的限制,地方政府仍给予了其控制且与当地经济增长联系紧密的企业较高的借款额度,而且市级政府(地级市、地区、自治州政府)和县级政府(县、县级市、自治县政府)控制的这类企业的借款增长率高于中央政府和省级政府控制的企业,说明政府层级会对产业政策有效性产生影响。     

房地产限购与企业负担——来自企业税负和罚款支出的证据

在“房住不炒”的总基调下,限购成为了地方政府稳定房价的重要政策工具选择。但这一从民生出发的政策却可能因影响了土地财政而导致地方政府将财政收入压力转嫁给企业,文章以企业税负和罚款支出为例对此进行了探讨。以各地限购政策为冲击,构建多点冲击双重差分模型检验发现：（1）限购政策增加了企业税负和罚款支出,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍成立。相比未限购城市,限购城市企业的整体税负平均增加6.25%,罚款则增加46.67%。（2）限购下的政府税收征管和罚款行为存在一定的策略性,在更易受地方政府直接影响（有政府补贴、地税局管理）的企业中,限购更多影响了税负;而在难以直接影响（无政府补贴）的企业中,限购更多影响了罚款。（3）进一步考察限购对政府财政收入结构的影响发现,限购政策降低了当地政府的土地财政收入,加大了财政缺口,但却增加了非土地财政收入,这从宏观上佐证了限购之后地方政府的替代性“创收”行为。（4）最后发现政府法治水平和纵向财政平衡等体制建设能够约束地方政府的策略性税费执法行为。文章从企业税负和罚款支出视角探讨了地方政府财政压力下的策略性执法行为及其治理机制,结论有助于更全面地理解限购政策的影响...     

"三分开"政策对董事会结构影响的实证研究

该文选用1998年以前上市 A 股公司作为样本,对"三分开"政策实施对董事会结构影响进行了研究.结果表明:(1)由于中央及部委所属的上市公司能够得到更多的资源和政策支持,因而选择执行"三分开"政策变更两职关系的可能性要明显的高于非中央企业;"三分开"政策颁布当年新上市的公司比颁布前一年新上市的公司变更两职关系的可能性更大;(2)选择执行"三分开"政策的公司在实施两职分离之后,内部人员担任董事人数显著下降;而大股东委派的董事人数和大股东董事长兼任上市公司董事长的可能性显著增加.     

The Manager as a Person

Abstract Professor John Roemer has defended a future market socialist order. His model would encompass an egalitarian coupon market for the ownership of firm shares, a private sector for firms below a certain size, a system of public bank loans for the raising of capital, and an industrial policy of differential interest rates for various economic sectors. This paper argues that such a model would generate perverse incentives for firms, shareholders, public officials, and private entrepreneurs. It also argues that Roemer's contention that such a model would produce a more environmentally sensitive polity is problematic.     

"三分开"政策对董事会结构影响的实证研究

本文选用1998年以前上市 A 股公司作为样本,对"三分开"政策实施对董事会结构影响进行了研究。结果表明:(1)由于中央及部委所属的上市公司能够得到更多的资源和政策支持,因而选择执行"三分开"政策变更两职关系的可能性要明显的高于非中央企业;"三分开"政策颁布当年新上市的公司比颁布前一年新上市的公司变更两职关系的可能性更大;(2)选择执行"三分开"政策的公司在实施两职分离之后,内部人员担任董事人数显著下降;而大股东委派的董事人数和大股东董事长兼任上市公司董事长的可能性显著增加。     

The role of Provincial Government Spending Composition in growth and convergence in China

China’s development policy since 1978 has differed across regions. With rapid aggregate growth has come widening regional inequality. The fiscal decentralisation reforms in 1994 shifted political pressure onto provincial officials to boost local growth through local public investments. These investments affect regional convergence by counteracting regulatory frictions in factor accumulation, and can also determine steady-state growth. However, the effect of public spending allocations across physical and human capital on growth and convergence processes is empirically unexplored for Chinese provinces. We take provincial time-series data on public spending by category, finding local public spending and its components augment convergence rates differently across regions. Spending on education and health contributes significantly more to growth and convergence than capital spending, confirming that the public capital-spending bias is not a local growth-optimising strategy. We suggest a policy of aligning local government promotion incentives to human capital targets to correct local resource misallocation.     

The effect of regulating political connections: Evidence from China's board of directors ban

There is a great deal of variation in how countries regulate the relationships between politicians and public-traded firms, but little evidence about how such policies affect firm performance. In 2013, China passed a new regulation that banned politicians from serving on the boards of directors of companies. Using a novel data set that links board members, government officials, and forced resignations, I estimate the effect of the policy on firm performance and stock returns. I find that the loss of a high-level politician significantly reduces a firm’s cumulative stock return and future profits. The effect is driven by officials from government-controlled public sectors and is larger when the firm is in low-marketized areas. The analysis provides important evidence about the efficacy of a commonly used policy tool for reducing political influence in the private sector.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

INDUSTRIAL LICENSING,BRIBERY AND ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY*

In less developed countries where an industrial licensing policy governs the entry of new firms, and when government officials awarding these licenses are corrupt, an incumbent firm may deter entry by bribing the official to deny the license. The paper demonstrates that such bribery can lead to the exclusion of more efficient firms from the market. This contradicts the established result that bribery does not affect allocation efficiency.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

Information acquisition, dissemination, and transparency of monetary policy

Abstract.  This paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary authority's policies. Each firm's payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions. The policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference. High-quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announcements. However, this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority.     

政策不确定性如何影响企业绩效——一项基于Meta分析的检验

企业发展与宏观政策环境密不可分,关于政策不确定性与企业绩效的关系仍有诸多未解之惑。根据企业绩效的具体内容将其细分为企业经营绩效、创新绩效以及投资绩效,采用Meta分析方法,揭示政策不确定性对企业绩效3个方面的不同影响,并分析二者关系的调节因素。结果发现：政策不确定性能够抑制企业经营绩效和投资绩效,但能够显著提升企业创新绩效。由于存在企业性质、企业规模、市场化程度和政治关联等调节因素差异,导致政策不确定性与企业绩效关系研究存在分歧。结论能够为政策不确定性环境下企业创新发展战略实施提供借鉴,并为地方政府官员更替、公共政策制定等提供参考。