Optimal monetary policy in a currency area

This paper investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a two-region general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. This framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that can be used to evaluate monetary policy in a currency area. If the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the terms of trade are completely insulated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic sizes of the region. If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a high degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

To be or not to be in monetary union: A synthesis

Monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks. But it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility, and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union. In this paper, we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements. We produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low-modest levels of inflation bias (2-3%) as long as business cycles are not too a-synchronized across countries.     

最优货币政策分析的一般框架理论综述

随着货币政策在宏观经济调控中的重要性日益提高,对于最优货币政策分析框架的研究也迅速兴起。从最优货币政策的目标出发,本文分析了货币政策的内涵、类型和最优货币分析框架的特征,及政策目标之间的相互关系,货币政策决策方式和几个典型的货币政策规则,特别是通货膨胀目标制及中国的最优货币政策设计,旨在为我国确立的最优货币政策框架提供参考。     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.     

Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. It shows that the utility-based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. The presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. The monetary authority sets a common interest rate for the union, whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. In the presence of country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities, the policy mix that is optimal from the viewpoint of the union as a whole requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, whereas fiscal policy has a country-specific stabilization role, one beyond the efficient provision of public goods.     

Managing an Economy Under EMU: The Case of Ireland

Ireland's experience of limited monetary independence within the EMS indicated that such independence was bought at the price of significant risk premia on interest rates. This experience informed its decision to join EMU, and membership has resulted in the expected credibility gain. Since the start of EMU inflation in consumer prices in Ireland has risen well above the EU average. However, this need not be a matter of concern within a monetary union. Instead, what should concern the Irish administration is a high rate of inflation in wage rates and domestic asset prices chiefly housing. While monetary policy is no longer available as an instrument of domestic policy, fiscal policy can still be used to effectively target these problems. The lessons of the first three years of membership is that the focus of fiscal policy within Ireland needs to change, and that the EU institutions also need to focus more clearly on the needs of the Euro area rather than on those of individual regional economies.     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.     

货币政策名义锚理论的发展与实践述评

实现物价稳定是世界各国货币政策的最终目标。名义锚有助于货币当局建立货币政策信誉,增强其控制通货膨胀的能力。汇率目标制、货币供应量目标制和通货膨胀目标制是三种主要的名义锚。名义锚的演变历程表明,名义锚的选择问题是一个不断变化的动态体系。随着经济的进一步开放,名义锚的选择更加关键和复杂。选择哪种名义锚在很大程度上取决于不同国家的社会经济金融状况和背景。     

通货膨胀目标制的政策内涵及其应用

本文从分析货币政策的规则和相机抉择之争入手，分析通货膨胀目标制作为名义锚在货币政策中的作用与政策含义，在此基础上探讨如何有效地设计和实行通货膨胀目标制。本文认为，我国货币政策在向通货膨胀目标制过渡过程中，要明确货币政策和汇率政策的主从地位，增强中央银行的独立性以及对宏观经济的分析和预测能力，解决中央银行承担最后贷款人义务而造成的通货膨胀隐患，建立核心通货膨胀指标。     

房价上涨、通货膨胀与货币政策的选择

在房价上涨助推通货膨胀理论分析的基础上,采取VAR和条件均值模型对房价上涨是否助长了通货膨胀以及货币政策的切入时机进行实证分析。结果显示,房价上涨通过影响总需求对通货膨胀有正向推动作用,房价上涨超过5%的6个月后存款准备金率上调,超过10%的12个月后利率上调。对此,提出积极调控房价并适时调整货币政策的建议。     

Exchange rate versus inflation targeting: a theory of output fluctuations in traded and non-traded sectors

This paper develops a basic model for output fluctuations in traded and non-traded sectors under two alternative monetary policy regimes; exchange rate targeting (or monetary union) and inflation targeting. The conventional wisdom from one-sector models says that inflation targeting gives better output stabilization than exchange rate targeting when demand shocks occur, but the opposite when supply shocks occur. In a model with a traded and a non-traded sector, we show that the conventional wisdom holds for the non-traded sector. However, for the traded sector, we show that inflation targeting destabilizes output compared with exchange rate targeting when both supply and demand shocks occur. The only shocks where inflation targeting provides the better output stability for the traded sector are shocks to world market prices. The two-sector structure introduces new mechanisms that may turn around earlier results for aggregate production. For instance, a demand shock may induce higher aggregate output fluctuations with inflation targeting than with exchange rate targeting. Furthermore, a positive demand shock may prove to be contractionary under inflation targeting.     

Inflation targeting rules and welfare in an asymmetric currency area

This paper studies the effect on monetary policy of differing degrees of competition and differing degrees of nominal rigidity between the members of a monetary union. In particular, we assess the welfare loss brought about by the use of a simple interest rate rule that does not take into account such structural differences. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, to maximize welfare the central bank should react more strongly to inflation pressure generated by the more competitive economies. Our work extends the results of Benigno [Benigno, P., 2004. Optimal monetary policy in a currency area. Journal of International Economics 63, 293-320] by showing that, if the degree of competition differs between countries, the optimal rule could involve placing a greater weight on the more “flexible” countries. Our study suggests that the size of the welfare losses generated by failure to take account of these asymmetries depends crucially on the actual combination of the various asymmetries. As a consequence, we show that, if the optimal weights are chosen under incomplete information regarding the extent and type of asymmetries, the resulting level of welfare could be lower than that produced by the symmetric rule.     

An information-based theory of international currency

This paper develops an information-based theory of international currency based on search frictions, private trading histories, and imperfect recognizability of assets. Using an open-economy search model with multiple competing currencies, the value of each currency is determined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country's goods. Strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements. While some inflation can benefit the country issuing an international currency, the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country. When monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game, the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman rule. The calibrated model can produce a welfare cost of losing international status for the issuing country larger than previous findings, though estimates depend critically on inflation rates and information costs.     

不完全汇率传递下的货币政策工具规则分析

本文尝试构建一个开放条件下的总供给-总需求模型,通过名义进口价格刚性在模型中引入汇率传递因素。模型对各种货币政策工具规则下社会福利损失函数进行比较,考察在不同的汇率传递程度下的各种货币政策工具规则。研究结果显示,社会福利水平随着汇率传递程度下降而提高;货币政策工具规则对消费者物价指数(CPI)上涨作出反应一定程度上优于对国内制造商品价格上涨作出反应,制定的货币政策工具规则应该以CPI为目标,以使社会福利损失最小。     

Monetary Policy Independence under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Illusion?

I analyse whether countries with flexible exchange rates are able to pursue an independent monetary policy, as suggested by traditional theory. I use data for three Latin American countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting and capital mobility – Chile, Colombia and Mexico – to investigate the extent to which Federal Reserve actions are translated into local central banks' policy rates. The results indicate that there is significant ‘policy contagion’ and that these countries tend to ‘import’ Fed policies. The degree of monetary policy independence is lower than what traditional models suggest.     

加拿大通货膨胀目标制政策效果的实证分析——兼论对我国的政策启示

通货膨胀目标制是20世纪90年代起在全球范围内兴起的一种新的货币政策框架,加拿大是其早期采用国之一。本文在对加拿大通胀目标制的主要内容作一简单介绍后,运用脉冲反应函数对此政策效应进行检验。研究结果表明,它对加拿大宏观经济运行态势的改善具有积极的政策效应:它有利于降低通货膨胀惯性、稳定通胀预期,熨平产出波动。最后,本文在结合推动我国经济发展方式转变的背景下,思考其对我国的政策启示。     

Inflation,uncertainty, and monetary policy

Low inflation likely reflects factors whose influence should fade over time. But many uncertainties attend this assessment, and downward pressures on inflation could prove to be unexpectedly persistent. My colleagues and I may have misjudged the strength of the labor market, the degree to which longer-run inflation expectations are consistent with our inflation objective, or even the fundamental forces driving inflation. In interpreting incoming data, we will need to stay alert to these possibilities and, in light of incoming information, adjust our views about inflation, the overall economy, and the stance of monetary policy best suited to promoting maximum employment and price stability. How should policy be formulated in the face of such significant uncertainties? In my view, it strengthens the case for a gradual pace of adjustment. But we should also be wary of moving too gradually. It would be imprudent to keep monetary policy on hold until inflation is back to 2%.