Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign's willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.     

Bond yields in emerging economies: It matters what state you are in

While many studies have looked into the determinants of yields on externally issued sovereign bonds of emerging economies, analysis of domestically issued bonds has hitherto been limited, despite their growing relevance. This paper finds that the extent to which fiscal variables affect domestic bond yields in emerging economies depends on the level of global risk aversion. During tranquil times in global markets, fiscal variables do not seem to be a significant determinant of domestic bond yields in emerging economies. However, when market participants are on edge, they pay more attention to country-specific fiscal fundamentals, revealing greater alertness about default risk.     

Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises

Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. The conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation, although there is no clear empirical evidence on “classic” default penalties. This paper emphasizes, instead, a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions: (i) government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default. In this context, external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties, and government default is countercyclical, triggers a liquidity crunch, and amplifies output volatility. In addition, a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately-sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments' access to foreign credit.     

Decentralized borrowing and centralized default

In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of government borrowing. However, private firms and individuals in developing countries now borrow substantially from foreign lenders. It is often asserted that this surge in private sector borrowing generates excessive borrowing and frequent sovereign defaults in developing countries. This paper analyzes the impact of decentralized borrowing using a quantitative model in which private agents decide how much to borrow and the government decides whether to default. Relative to a model in which the government determines both the level of borrowing and whether to default, decentralized borrowing drives up aggregate credit costs and sovereign default risk, and reduces aggregate welfare. Interestingly, decentralized borrowing may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium depending on the severity of default penalties.     

Immunity and infection: Emerging and developed market sovereign spreads over the Global Financial Crisis

We compare sovereign bond spreads during the international financial crisis across groups drawn from 43 countries, including 20 emerging economies. We extend traditional factor analyses and utilize propensity score matching to select a non-crisis sample for comparison with the crisis sample that is more robust to exogenous crisis dating. We find minimal changes over the crisis period in the average spreads of local-currency-denominated emerging market bonds. In contrast, the spreads of peripheral Eurozone sovereign bonds increased by large amounts and were subject to sovereign risk contagion.     

Sovereign default and debt renegotiation

This paper develops a small open economy model to study sovereign default and debt renegotiation for emerging economies. The model features both endogenous default and endogenous debt recovery rates. Sovereign bonds are priced to compensate creditors for the risk of default and the risk of debt restructuring. The model captures the interaction between sovereign default and ex post debt renegotiation. We find that both debt recovery rates and sovereign bond prices decrease with the level of debt. In a quantitative analysis, the model accounts for the debt reduction, volatile and countercyclical bond spreads, countercyclical trade balance, and other empirical regularities of the Argentine economy. The model also replicates the dynamics of bond spreads during the debt crisis in Argentina.     

Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation

In the period since 1990, sovereign debt renegotiations take an average of five years for bank loans but only one year for bonds. We provide an explanation for this finding by highlighting one key difference between bank loans and bonds: bank loans are rarely traded, while bonds are heavily traded on the secondary market. In our theory, the secondary market plays a crucial information revelation role in shortening renegotiations. Consider a dynamic bargaining game with incomplete information between a government and creditors. The creditors' reservation value is private information, and the government knows only its distribution. Delays in reaching agreements arise in equilibrium because the government uses costly delays to screen the creditors' reservation value. When the creditors trade on the secondary market, the market price conveys information about their reservation value, which lessens the information friction and reduces the renegotiation duration. We find that the secondary market tends to increase the renegotiation payoff of the government but decrease that of the creditors while increasing the total payoff. We then embed these renegotiation outcomes in a simple sovereign debt model to analyze the ex ante welfare implications. The secondary market has the potential to increase the government ex ante welfare when the information friction is severe.     

News and sovereign default risk in small open economies

This paper builds a unified model of sovereign debt, default risk, and news shocks. News shocks improve the quantitative performance of the sovereign default model in a number of empirically-relevant dimensions. First, with news shocks, not all defaults occur during downturns. Second, the news shocks help account for key differences between developing and more developed economies: as the precision of news improves, the model predicts lower variability of consumption, less countercyclical trade balance and interest rate spreads, as well as a higher level of debt in line with more developed economies. Third, the model captures the hump-shaped relationship between default rates and the precision of news obtained from the data. Finally, the news shocks have a nonmonotonic effect on welfare.     

新冠肺炎疫情后各国主权债务风险及其前景

新冠肺炎疫情及其经济冲击促使许多国家财政赤字率和政府债务率大幅升高,其影响程度超过了2008年国际金融危机。笔者既不赞成现代货币理论(MMT)的看法,也不认同悲观派的看法。从影响各国主权债务风险的几大因素看,一些新兴市场经济体尤其需要关注利率的3种风险溢价:通胀风险溢价、货币贬值风险溢价和信誉(违约风险)溢价。展望未来,发达经济体和新兴市场经济体将花费数年时间进行财政收支和政府债务调整,以渐进方式推进政府部门的去杠杆。     

Twin dollarization and exchange rate policy

This paper develops a small open economy general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities to study twin dollarization in East Asian economies, a phenomenon where firms borrow in US dollars and also set export prices in US dollars. In this model, we endogenize both the currency of liability denomination and the currency of export pricing. We show that a key factor that affects firms' dollarization decisions is exchange rate policy. Twin dollarization is an optimal strategy for all firms when exchange rate flexibility is limited, which implies that a fixed exchange rate regime may lead to an equilibrium with twin dollarization. Furthermore, we find that twin dollarization can reduce the welfare loss caused by the fixed exchange rate regime, as it helps to cushion the economy against domestic nominal risk.     

Von der Staatsverschuldung zum Staatsbankrott?

The increase of sovereign debt and the crisis in the Eurozone led to a public discussion about the possibility and the causes of a sovereign default. This paper shows by looking at the development in the Eurozone that for a government defaulting on its debt the amount of sovereign debt is not crucial; the essential question is whether a government is able to borrow in its own currency and — if that is not the case — the amount of international debt of the whole country. This leads to important conclusions for European economic policy.     

Gunboats, reputation, and sovereign repayment: lessons from the Southern Confederacy

Many states that formed the Southern Confederacy defaulted on sovereign debt sold in international capital markets during the 1840s. The Confederacy also elected President Jefferson Davis, who openly advocated the repudiation of U.S. states' debts while a member of Congress. Despite its poor credit record, the Confederate government managed to float cotton bonds in England that constituted under 2% of its expenditures. The bonds were largely issued to settle overdue debts with gun contractors who had cut off trade credit. The South serviced the bonds as late as March 1865, a time of domestic hyperinflation and weeks before the fall of Richmond. Although the Confederate experience shows that trade sanctions can promote debt repayment, the gunboat model can only account for a small amount of lending. A reputation or another type of sanction would be necessary to support higher levels of lending in international capital markets.     

Impacts of Emerging Asia on African and Latin American Trade: Projections to 2030

Rapid growth in Asia's emerging economies has boosted export earnings of resource‐rich economies over the past decade. Whether or not those high growth rates continue, how will structural changes in Asia alter the relative importance of their imports of primary products? This paper projects production and trade patterns of Africa and Latin America to 2030 under various growth and policy scenarios in Asia, using the GTAP model of the global economy. We compare a projection assuming relatively conservative economic growth in China and India with a projection in which those economies continue to grow rapidly (albeit slower than in the previous decade). We then compare our conservative growth baseline with two alternative scenarios: one assuming Africa and Latin America choose to invest more in public agricultural R&D to take advantage of Asian import growth; the other assuming China and India dampen that import growth by restricting their imports of key food grains (following the historical pattern of economies such as Japan and Korea). The final section summarises the results and draws out policy implications for Latin America and Africa.     

Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring

This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse recent proposals on restructuring of sovereign bonds. We find that collective action clauses (CACs) inserted in bonds resolve the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor coordination problems providing that all parties have complete information about each other's preferences. In such a world, statutory mechanisms, such as international bankruptcy courts, are unnecessary. This is no longer the case when the benefits from reaching a restructuring agreement are private information to the debtor and its creditors due to inefficiencies caused by the debtor-creditor bargaining problem.     

Global financial conditions,country spreads and macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging countries

This paper uses a panel structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model to investigate the extent to which global financial conditions, i.e., a global risk-free interest rate and global financial risk, and country spreads contribute to macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging countries. The main findings are: (1) global financial risk shocks explain about 20% of movements both in the country spread and in the aggregate activity in emerging economies. (2) The contribution of global risk-free interest rate shocks to macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging economies is negligible. Its role, which was emphasized in the literature, is taken up by global financial risk shocks. (3) Country spread shocks explain about 15 percent of the business cycles in emerging economies. (4) Interdependence between economic activity and the country spread is a key mechanism through which global financial shocks are transmitted to emerging economies.     

Accounting for sovereign tail risk in emerging economies: The role of global and domestic risk factors

This paper evaluates the role of global and domestic risk factors in explaining sovereign tail risk for 18 emerging economies. Sovereign tail risk is defined as the likelihood of a sharp rise in sovereign credit risk. We find that both global and domestic risk factors contribute significantly to sovereign tail risk, with explanatory power increasing with the severity of tail risk in a non-linear fashion. Indeed, their contributions have become stronger following the global financial crisis. In particular, global liquidity conditions, commodity prices and economic growth are ranked as the major risk factors for sovereign tail risk among the EMEs.     

How fiscal rules can reduce sovereign debt default risk

The economic literature has been forceful on the role of fiscal institutions in attenuating economic fluctuations. In particular, the implementation of fiscal rules has gained importance in the toolkit of macroeconomic stabilization policies. This paper studies the effect of fiscal rule implementation on sovereign default risk and on the probability of capital flow reversals for a large sample of countries including both developed and emerging market economies. Results indicate that fiscal rules are beneficial for macroeconomic stability, as they significantly reduce both sovereign risk and the probability of a sudden stop in countries that implement them. These results, which are robust to various empirical specifications, have important policy implications specially for countries that have relaxed their fiscal rules in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.     

Banking union with a sovereign virus

Despite the experience of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, European banks continue to hold large amounts of bonds from their home governments. This ties the fates of the sovereign and the banks together, leading to the disruptive self-reinforcing feedback loops that brought the euro area to the brink of collapse. This article addresses how banks can be weaned off of their massive investments in their home government’s bonds.     

Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs

The data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is small, intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors. The IFI loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them. Taking these contractual differences as given, this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of IFI loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the IFIs.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment

We introduce limited commitment into a standard optimal fiscal policy model in small open economies. We consider the problem of a benevolent government that signs a risk-sharing contract with the rest of the world, and that has to choose optimally distortionary taxes on labor income, domestic debt and international transfers. Both the home country and the rest of the world may have limited commitment, which means that they can leave the contract if they find it convenient. The contract is designed so that, at any point in time, neither party has incentives to exit. We define a small open emerging economy as an economy where the limited commitment problem is active in equilibrium. Conversely, a small open developed economy is an economy in which the commitment problem is not active. Our model is able to rationalize some stylized facts about fiscal policy in emerging economies: i) the volatility of tax revenues over GDP is higher in emerging economies than in developed ones; ii) fiscal policy is procyclical in emerging economies; iii) emerging economies may “graduate” from procyclical fiscal policy and adopt countercyclical policies in the long run.