Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU's Response to External Challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a ‘single undertaking’ in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi‐judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.     

Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?

This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.     

Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying Robert Hudec's Analysis to the Doha Round

In his 1987 Developing Countries in the GATT System, Robert Hudec concluded that the identity of developing countries in the GATT system was primarily a matter of their demanding non‐reciprocal and preferential treatment, developed countries responding grudgingly to those demands and that this situation had been unfruitful either to support developing country reforms or to discipline developed country restrictions aimed at developing countries. Hudec was pessimistic about the relationship becoming more productive, but his expression of despair offered a glimmer of hope: ‘There are those who believe that the GATT has become so committed to the current policy that the only way to change it would be to start a new organization’. A new organisation was started, the World Trade Organization, but has the WTO achieved what Hudec hoped a new organisation might? At the 1987–95 Uruguay Round, developing country leaders acted as Hudec had hoped. They used international rules and bindings as leverage to support their own internally‐driven reforms; to overcome generations of accumulated protection, to lock in reforms against the backsliding that had undone previous reforms. Dealing with the Uruguay Round's ‘unbalanced outcome’ and the overlapping ‘implementation problem’ have shaped the Doha Round, but the negotiations have misconceived and mismanaged both issues. Rather than seeking to identify their real economics, the negotiations have gone back to the traditional idea of special and differential treatment. Perhaps the largest cost of this mismanagement is that in many developing countries the unilateral momentum for liberalisation has waned. To the extent that the Doha negotiations have drawn attention away from the domestic issues that were the basis of developing country liberalisation – and enhanced the status of negotiators relative to the leaders who fought at home for reform – they have contributed to that waning.     

The ‘Real’ Impact of GATT/WTO – a Generalised Approach

Rose’s result in 2004 that GATT/WTO has no significant impact on bilateral trade triggered off a series of empirical studies. Each of those studies augments Rose’s paper in one specific methodological aspect with the general finding that GATT/WTO significantly fosters members’ trade, although the estimated impact varies between 2 per cent and 195 per cent of trade creation. We combine the methodological contributions of previous studies to overcome these isolated approaches, to account for possible interactions and to develop a more general view on the impact of GATT/WTO. In particular, we find that GATT/WTO promotes members’ trade by around 86 per cent.     

The Role of GATT/WTO as a Commitment Device in the Presence of a Time Lag: Free Trade,Time‐consistent Tariff Policy and Market Size

We consider whether a free trade policy is superior to tariff policies in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. We show that the preferable choice between a free trade policy and a time‐consistent tariff policy depends on the market size of the importing country. However, because a free trade policy itself is not necessarily credible in the presence of a time lag, the importing country requires an international organisation such as GATT/WTO as a commitment device. Accordingly, employing a non‐cooperative game approach, we analyse under what conditions becoming a member of such an international organisation is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and show that free trade under the GATT/WTO regime is Pareto improving for the importing and exporting countries.     

Dumping and Injury Margins in Markets with Horizontal as well as Vertical Product Differentiation

This paper examines the GATT/WTO rules for anti-dumping measures in a duopoly model with both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The GATT/WTO rules allow for anti-dumping measures if domestic producers, exposed to price discrimination, also demonstrate injury where price-undercutting is an important indicator of the latter. The paper shows that the procedure for calculating injury is flawed due to negligence of quality differences in the calculation of the margin of price-undercutting. This gives countries with high-quality producers an option to practice protectionism. This asymmetry between countries in ability to implement anti-dumping measures predominantly favors the developed countries which are specialized in producing high-quality products. The paper suggests an overall critical look at the lenient rules for implementing anti-dumping measures—especially the rules for injury determination—in order to restrict the use of such measures to a minimum and to move the world economy closer to free trade.     

WTO城堡必须经受南方国家挑战——读陈安教授《关于WTO法治、立法、执法、守法与变法之法理思考》有感

陈安教授在其论文中不仅直指GATT/WTO这一体制"堡垒"存在的某些重大结构性的政策问题,同时也科学地剖析和总结了60年来发展中国家为在这个国际贸易治理机制中获得平权地位和应有权益所进行的长期努力。故此文"应当成为所有发展中国家领导人及决策者必读和必学的主题文件","也应当成为发展中国家政府各部门、各所大学、高等研究机构培训有关干部的必修课的一部分"。历史显示:南方国家在GATT/WTO中发起的挑战,虽初见成效,前景光明,但发达国家一直抵制对其进行重大变革。然而事实证明,通过独立自主的南南联合自强,展示榜样的实力,通过建立"具有南南特色的经济秩序"和相互关系,南南"轴心"能够有效地改善和挑战寓于WTO之中的不公现状,能够有效地向北方国家施加压力。陈教授的文章呼吁推动国际经济法和国际经济秩序的除旧布新,这是若干主要发展中国家义不容辞的责任。今年5月初在多哈召开的UNCTAD第十三届大会所呈现的南北对峙态势、双方最终的妥协以及新的"多哈授权"(DohaMandate)的达成,再次印证了陈教授的上述学术主张和法理思考。     

The economics of trade agreements in the linear Cournot delocation model

Existing theories of trade agreements suggest that GATT/WTO efforts to reign in export subsidies represent an inefficient victory for exporting governments that comes at the expense of importing governments. Building on the Cournot delocation model first introduced by Venables (1985), we derive new results from this model and use these results to develop a more benign interpretation of efforts to restrain export subsidies in trade agreements. And we suggest that the gradual tightening of restraints on export subsidies that has occurred in the GATT/WTO may be interpreted as deriving naturally from the gradual reduction in import barriers that member countries have negotiated. Together with existing theories, the Cournot delocation model may help to provide a more nuanced and complete understanding of the treatment of export subsidies in trade agreements.     

The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly

This paper furnishes robust evidence that the WTO has had a strong positive impact on trade, amounting to about 120% of additional world trade (or US$ 8 trillion in 2000 alone). The impact has, however, been uneven. This, in many ways, is consistent with theoretical models of the GATT/WTO. The theory suggests that the impact of a country's membership in the GATT/WTO depends on what the country does with its membership, with whom it negotiates, and which products the negotiation covers. Using a properly specified gravity model, we find evidence broadly consistent with these predictions. First, industrial countries that participated more actively than developing countries in reciprocal trade negotiations witnessed a large increase in trade. Second, bilateral trade was greater when both partners undertook liberalization than when only one partner did. Third, sectors that did not witness liberalization did not see an increase in trade.     

Tracing the Effects of WTO Accession on Policy‐making in Sovereign States: Preliminary Lessons from the Recent Experience of Transition Countries

We examine in this paper the effects of WTO Accession on policy‐making and institutional reforms in transition countries. This is done by looking at the experience of those transition countries which are already Members of the WTO and/or which have recently acceded. We start by trying to distinguish between effects of accession negotiations and from those which are the results of autonomous policy initiatives. The areas of domestic policy‐making which are considered in the analysis include market access, governance, government budget, structural reforms, trade and investment arrangements with regional partners and macroeconomic management. We find that no precise blueprint of accession conditions can be ascertained and argue that the WTO played a role, albeit not an exclusive one, in the process of liberalisation. We also find that the costs of WTO Accession are not negligible, but that the benefits of WTO Membership are significant in terms of improved, more predictable, market access and its stability, improved governance and a recourse to better economic policies without significant loss to government revenues.     

Modelling the Extensive Margin of World Trade: New Evidence on GATT and WTO Membership

Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if membership includes non‐formal compliance. We review the literature to identify open issues. We then develop a simple extension of the gravity model that gives rise to an extensive country margin of trade separating positive trade from zero trade country pairs. The model is used to identify WTO membership effects at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Empirical estimation of this model, based on Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood methods with exporter and importer fixed effects, allows us to readdress the empirical issue of whether GATT/WTO membership does or does not promote trade. We find that GATT membership was successful on the extensive margin of world trade but not on the intensive margin. For the recent WTO episode (1995–2008), we find consistent and robust evidence for a substantial trade‐creating role of membership which is driven primarily by the intensive margin. WTO membership results in higher bilateral trade of about 40 per cent.     

The North’s intellectual property rights standard for the South?

We build a multi-sectoral North-South trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. By comparing the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard of the South (the developing countries) with that of the North (the developed countries), we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter. Moreover, we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This demonstrates the merits of multi-sectoral negotiations in the GATT/WTO.     

中国视角下的WTO总干事竞选

WTO总干事竞选,成为WTO及各成员2013年的重点关注。本次竞选候选人之多,选任程序之复杂,为历届之最。尤其是新兴发展中国家,积极参与竞选。对于GATT/WTO历年总干事的梳理以及竞选规则、总干事职责的详细分析,有助于全面认识这一选任过程。尽管入世以来,中国尚未提名自己的候选人,但是却可以积极争取副总干事的人选,并进一步增强中国在WTO事务中的参与能力,积极参与全球治理。     

Global Market Integration and National Sovereignty

In this paper, we first trace the evolution of the global trading system from the nineteenth century to the present‐day GATT/WTO arrangements, calling attention to the key roles of reciprocity and non‐discrimination, and we note how the system is now challenged by the new paradigm of global market integration. We then consider the recent plethora of free trade agreements (FTAs), including those between industrial and developing countries, and their uneasy relationship with a multilateral system based on non‐discrimination. Thereafter, we seek to identify the boundaries of the WTO and examine how the potential expansion of these boundaries may result in the over‐extension and weakening of the effectiveness and influence of the WTO.     

The WTO trade effect

This paper re-examines the GATT/WTO membership effect on bilateral trade flows, using nonparametric methods including pair-matching, permutation tests, and a Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis. Together, these methods provide an estimation framework that is robust to misspecification bias, allows general forms of heterogeneous membership effects, and addresses potential hidden selection bias. This is in contrast to most conventional parametric studies on this issue. Our results suggest large GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects that are robust to various restricted matching criteria, alternative GATT/WTO indicators, non-random incidence of positive trade flows, inclusion of multilateral resistance terms, and different matching methodologies.     

Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO

Does fairness matter in the hard bargaining and horse‐trading that is associated with trade negotiations? This paper presents a positivist analysis of the particular concepts of fairness that developing countries have appealed to in their trade negotiations within the auspices of the GATT and WTO, how these notions have evolved, and the impact that they have had on negotiated outcomes. Treating the concept of fairness as my central dependent variable, I argue that the notion of fairness can only be understood in terms of the institutional context it is embedded in, which includes institutional structure as well as the participatory processes that underlie it. I advance three hypotheses on the relationship between institutional context: the fairness discourse, and the influence and manoeuvre that member countries can have in shaping that discourse. Focusing on the role of fairness in the negotiation positions of developing countries, I explain its substance and evolution through learning and adaptation by these countries within the very particular institutions of the GATT and the WTO, and the coalitions they form a part of and interact within.     

The Effect of GATT/WTO on Export and Import Price Volatility

Despite much interest and discussion concerning the trade‐promoting effects of membership in multilateral trade agreements, little is known about the effect of membership on world trade prices. This paper fills this gap by studying the effects of membership on export and import price volatility. We document a surprisingly strong and robust empirical regularity: GATT/WTO membership reduces the volatility of prices over time for both import and export countries, with similar results found for free trade agreements. We show that results are not driven by sample selection or endogeneity concerns and that the effect is captured by members subject to rigorous accession procedures.     

GATT第20条争端案例下的碳关税征收合法性分析

文章援引GATT第20条豁免条款经典案例,将碳关税合法性纳入WTO争端解决机制"两步走"审核程序。通过剖析争端解决机制对案例的裁决,认为碳关税满足GATT第20条(g)款,同时通过与多边国家协商制定多方认可的碳关税征收的无歧视标准,可通过GATT第20条前言的要求,从而认为碳关税征收满足GATT第20条豁免条款,案例折射出WTO争端解决机制对可耗竭自然资源保护措施的态度由承认其重要性、到肯定再到鼓励,都增加了碳关税征收的可能性。