The dynamics of trade and competition

We estimate a version of the Melitz and Ottaviano [Melitz, Marc J. and Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2008, Market size, trade, and productivity, Review of Economic Studies 75(1), pp. 295-316.] model of international trade with firm heterogeneity. The model is constructed to yield testable implications for the dynamics of prices, productivity and markups as functions of openness to trade at a sectoral level. The theory lends itself naturally to a difference in differences estimation, with international differences in trade openness at the sector level reflecting international differences in the competitive structure of markets. Predictions are derived for the effects of both domestic and foreign openness on each economy. Using disaggregated data for EU manufacturing over the period 1989-1999 we find short run evidence that trade openness exerts a competitive effect, with prices and markups falling and productivity rising. The response of profit margins to openness has implications on the conduct of monetary policy. Consistent with the predictions of some recent theoretical models we find some, albeit weaker, support that the long run effects are more ambiguous and may even be anti-competitive. Domestic trade liberalization also appears to induce pro-competitive effects on overseas markets.     

Estimating the effects of free trade agreements on international trade flows using matching econometrics

This paper provides the first cross-section estimates of long-run treatment effects of free trade agreements on members' bilateral international trade flows using (nonparametric) matching econometrics. Our nonparametric cross-section estimates of ex post long-run treatment effects are much more stable across years and have more economically plausible values than corresponding OLS cross-section estimates from typical gravity equations. We provide plausible estimates of the long-run effects of membership in the original European Economic Community (EEC) and the Central American Common Market (CACM) between 1960 and 2000 and the estimates confirm anecdotal reports of these agreements' effectiveness.     

Buyer power in international markets

This paper investigates the implications for international markets of the existence of retailers/wholesalers with market power. Two main results are shown. First, in the presence of buyer power trade liberalization may lead to retail market concentration. Due to this concentration retail prices may be higher and welfare may be lower in free trade than in autarky, thus reversing the standard effects of trade liberalization. Second, the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization are weaker under buyer power than under seller power.     

In search of WTO trade effects: Preferential trade agreements promote trade strongly, but unevenly

The literature measuring the effects of WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose (2004) reports a wide range of empirical specifications that produce no WTO effects. Tomz et al. (2007) use Rose's data but include de facto WTO membership, to find positive WTO trade effects. Rose (2005) also produced positive WTO trade effects after accounting for the diverse trade effects produced by individual preferential trade agreements (PTAs). When Subramanian and Wei (2007) emphasize general equilibrium trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance, they find strong WTO trade effects only for industrialized countries. Subramanian and Wei (2007), however, account neither for unobserved heterogeneity among trading partners, nor for differences in trade effects across PTAs (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify the Rose, Tomz et al., and Subramanian and Wei specifications in one comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias to show that all specifications produce one consistent result: WTO effects on trade flows are not statistically significant, while PTAs produce strong but uneven trade effects. Extending the gravity model to address specific avenues in which WTO may have affected trade flows, we find that WTO membership boosts trade prior to PTA formation and increases trade among proximate developing countries (at the expense of distant trade). An augmented gravity model that accounts for WTO terms-of-trade theory shows that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions before WTO accession experience positive and significant subsequent WTO trade effects.     

Policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities

The paper considers a country (home) in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality. We analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly, in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies. In both cases, the equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility (in combination with either too much or too little trade) or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade. The paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the WTO legal system aimed at minimizing the trade-inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility.     

Strategic trade and delegated competition

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.     

Trade and imperfect competition in general equilibrium

This paper employs a multi-industry general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition, free market entry and trade in which capital is used to establish firms and labor is used for production. We show that both absolute and relative endowments matter for the pattern of trade. We demonstrate that market entry to each industry is either too excessive or too moderate while the effect on firm size is ambiguous. If countries are sufficiently symmetric, trade will increase the wage–rental ratio in both countries. Furthermore, trade will increase per-capita consumption in capital-intensive industries and reduce it in labor-intensive industries. Nevertheless, trade will be mutually welfare-improving under relatively mild conditions.     

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system

I evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. I use an oligopolistic-political-economy model where the external tariffs of FTA members, as well as the decision to form FTAs, are endogenously determined. In this context, I show that FTAs are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system. This conclusion is based, first, upon the finding that FTAs induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs, and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA members and non-members. While this ensures gains for the latter, in general FTA members may not gain. I show, however, that governments will endorse only welfare-improving arrangements, in spite of their political motivations; as a result, FTA members benefit from ratified arrangements as well. Finally, I find that FTAs, by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments' trade regime decisions, also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level.     

Market imperfections, wealth inequality, and the distribution of trade gains

Globalization increasingly involves less-developed countries (LDCs), i.e., economies which usually suffer from severe imperfections in their financial systems. Taking these imperfections seriously, we analyze how credit frictions affect the distributive impact of trade liberalizations. We find that free trade significantly widens income differences among firm owners in LDCs: While wealthy entrepreneurs are better off, relatively poor business people lose. Intuitively, with integrated markets, profit margins shrink — which makes access to credit particularly difficult for the least-affluent agents. Richer entrepreneurs, by contrast, win because they can take advantage of new export opportunities. Our findings resonate well with a number of empirical regularities, in particular with the observation that some liberalizing LDCs have observed a surge in top-income shares.     

On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size

In this paper, we analyze competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital through low taxes and public inputs that enhance firms' productivity. The competing jurisdictions are different in size and mobility of capital is costly. We find that for moderate mobility costs, small economies can attract foreign capital by supplying higher levels of public goods than larger jurisdictions, without practicing tax undercutting. The classical result that small jurisdictions are attractive because they engage in tax dumping is recovered only for high mobility costs of capital.     

International trade and unemployment: Theory and cross-national evidence

We present a model of trade and search-induced unemployment, where trade results from Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) and/or Ricardian comparative advantage. Using cross-country data on trade policy, unemployment, and various controls, and controlling for endogeneity and measurement-error problems, we find fairly strong and robust evidence for the Ricardian prediction that unemployment and trade openness are negatively related. This effect dominates the positive H-O effect of trade openness on unemployment for capital-abundant countries, which turns negative for labor-abundant countries. Using panel data, we find an unemployment-increasing short-run impact of trade liberalization, followed by an unemployment-reducing effect leading to the new steady state.     

Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high, domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.     

How often are propositions on the effects of regional trade agreements theoretical curiosa?

This paper uses computational techniques to assess whether or not various propositions that have been advanced as plausible in the literature on regional trade agreements may actually hold. The idea is to make probabilistic statements as to whether propositions of interest might hold, rather than to restrict assumptions so they unambiguously hold. Our aim is to blend theory and numerical simulation and go beyond the ambiguous analytically derived propositions that dominate the theoretical literature so as to assess the likelihood of propositions holding for particular model specifications.     

International trade with endogenous mode of competition in general equilibrium

This paper endogenizes the extent of intra-sectoral competition in a multi-sectoral general-equilibrium model of oligopoly and trade. Firms choose capacity followed by prices. If the benefits of capacity investment in a given sector are below a threshold level, the sector exhibits Bertrand behavior, otherwise it exhibits Cournot behavior. By endogenizing the threshold parameter in general equilibrium, we show how exogenous shocks such as globalization and technological change alter the mix of sectors between “more” and “less” competitive, or Bertrand and Cournot, and affect the relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers, even in a “North–North” model with identical countries.     

Corporate hierarchies and international trade: Theory and evidence

Corporate organization varies within countries and between countries. We develop a theory which explains the variation in levels of decentralization across firms and links it to the trade environment that firms face. We introduce firms with internal hierarchies in a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model of international trade. We show that international trade increases the conflict of interest between CEO/owners and middle managers within firms and these eventually lead to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We test the theory with original data on the internal organizations of 2200 Austrian and German firms and find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.     

Efficient barriers to trade: A sequential trade model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies the choice of tariffs and other type of consumption taxes and subsidies in a flexible price version of the Prescott [Prescott, Edward C., 1975. Efficiency of the Natural Rate. Journal of Political Economy 83, 1229-1236.] hotels model. It is shown that a country with unstable demand may benefit from a tariff on imports. More surprisingly, the exporting country may also benefit from the tariff. In general, I consider the problem of a world planner who chooses country specific consumption taxes and subsidies. I show that buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the high demand state should be taxed and buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the low demand state should be subsidized.     

World trade patterns and prices: The role of productivity and quality heterogeneity

This paper analyzes the role of product quality and labor efficiency in shaping the trade patterns and trade intensities within and across two groups of countries, the developed and richer North and the developing South. Recent empirical literature identifies two groups of evidence — the product lines evidence on different export strategies and sources of competitiveness across product groups and countries, and the aggregate trade flows evidence on a positive relation between the income per capita and both export and import prices (also conditional on the exporter). We attempt to provide a theoretical background for these findings and focus on the North–South productivity differences in a four country North–South trade model with two dimensions of firm heterogeneity. Differences in the firms' product quality and cost efficiency impose different competitiveness sources when entering more difficult markets and result in the observed export and import prices and consumption bundles across the rich and poor countries.     

New measures of trade creation and trade diversion

This paper estimates the effects of regional agreements on trade flows controlling for country pair, importer-year, and exporter-year fixed effects. These fixed effects capture the determinants of trade flows normally included in gravity model specifications and control for yearly shocks to countries' trade. Controlling for the fixed effects generally reduces the estimated trade impacts of regional agreements. The estimates reveal that regional agreements have significant anticipatory effects on trade flows and continue to affect trade for up to 11 years after they begin. The paper also presents estimated effects on individual countries' trade flows in year five of the agreements.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Managers' mobility,trade performance,and wages

Knowledge is key to the competitiveness and success of an organization and in particular of a firm. Firms and their managers acquire knowledge via a variety of different channels which are often difficult to track down and quantify. By matching employer–employee data with trade data at the firm level we show that the export experience acquired by managers in previous firms leads their current firm toward higher export performance, and commands a sizeable wage premium for the manager. Moreover, export knowledge is decisive when it is market-specific: managers with experience related to markets served by their current firm receive an even higher wage premium; firms are more likely to enter markets where their managers have experience; exporters are more likely to stay in those markets, and their sales are on average higher. Our findings are robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and, more broadly, endogeneity and indicate that managers' export experience is a first-order feature in the data with an impact on a firm's export performance that is, for example, at least as strong as that of firm productivity.