Strategic Trade Policy and Network Compatibility

We consider strategic trade policy for information and communication technology (ICT) product markets with international rivalry. Usually, ICT products exhibit network externalities and product compatibility (i.e., network compatibility). We demonstrate that the optimal strategic trade policy depends on the degree of network compatibility of ICT products. Furthermore, using an endogenous decision game for strategic variables (i.e., quantity and price), we consider the relationship between the optimal strategic trade policies and the endogenous mode of competition.     

竞争性战略联盟的结构选择模式研究

竞争性战略联盟是由竞争对手组建的企业战略合作关系,竞争性联盟分为规模型和互补型两种类型。研究联盟结构选择问题时,应注意到竞争性战略联盟中同时存在竞争与合作这一对反向作用力,选择恰当的治理结构有助于维持两者的平衡,因此,联盟结构模式的选择对竞争性联盟尤为重要,是保证联盟平稳运行并创造价值的主要途径。     

供应链联盟伙伴企业战略选择研究

在具有动态的强非线性网络组织结构特征的复杂供应链联盟巨系统环境中,供应链联盟伙伴企业选择什么样的战略,对企业的生存和发展至关重要。运用复杂系统工程的理论和方法从联盟的层次结构、组成成份、联盟的动态性、联盟的开放性、系统的演化、外部环境等方面研究供应链联盟系统的复杂性。利用系统工程的理论和方法,建立复杂供应链联盟系统中企业的战略选择过程模型。     

超越交易成本理论与企业战略联盟

交易成本理论只是从成本的角度来界定企业边界,对企业战略联盟这种中间组织的特征缺乏解释力,从投入角度对产出分析的交易成本理论只称得上半边理论。而超越交易成本理论,综合考虑了成本和收益双重因素,清晰地界定了企业战略联盟这种组织形态的特征,对快速发展的企业联盟这种组织形式更具有说服力,是大企业进行边界扩张而赢得市场的关键。     

论高新技术企业战略联盟

基于所讨论的高新企业战略联盟的作用、实现过程和中国现阶段高新技术企业的发展事例,作为一种新的竞争方式,一种新的管理创新,一种新的“互赢”规则,高新企业战略联盟应该成为中国高新技术企业,尤其是微小型高新技术企业壮大自己、发展自己、应对新世纪全球竞争的必经之路和发展方向。     

企业战略联盟的动态管理与关系管理

从企业战略管理的角度看战略联盟的动态本质,即企业战略联盟的动态管理具备结构性和时效性两个纬度。在评价现有战略联盟关系管理方法的基础上,采用了组合的动态联盟管理方法。以有限的企业资源和择优的资源分配方案,提高企业联盟总体绩效,是企业战略联盟动态管理的根本目标。     

Entrepreneurial Characteristics,Strategic Choice and Small Business Performance

Notions of entrepreneurship are central to accepted explanations of small business performance. The majority of studies exploring the growth implications of different entrepreneurial characteristics tend, however, to be partial or lack any formal structural framework. This leads to uncertainty concerning the mechanisms by which different entrepreneurial characteristics influence firm performance and the size of any effect.This paper develops a structural model of the relationships between entrepreneurial characteristics, firms' strategic choices and performance. The determinants of firms' strategic choices are then subjected to extensive empirical analysis. The results suggest a marked difference between the determinants of strategic initiatives related to management and control and those related to products, markets or managerial systems. Firms' propensity to make management and control initiatives depends almost exclusively on the characteristics of the entrepreneur. Firms' propensity to undertake initiatives related to new products, markets or management systems depends partially on the background of the entrepreneur but also reflects the firm's strategic targets, its market position and the likely operating environment.     

技术差异、关税选择和关税谈判中的福利分配

本文在一个政府-企业两期完全信息动态博弈的框架下,考察了存在技术差异的两国进行异质性商品贸易时的均衡关税选择,以及这种技术差异如何影响双边关税减让所释放的福利在两国间和各国内的分配模式。本文分析表明:当贸易品替代性较弱时,技术占优国家倾向于设置更低的关税;而当替代性较强时,结果则恰好相反。在一个商品间交叉价格弹性为零的条件下,双边关税同等减让会使由贸易自由化引致的福利增进向拥有技术优势的国家倾斜,而平衡减让则会使技术相对落后的国家获利更多。对特定国家而言,总体福利的增长总是以关税收入的减少为代价,而额外福利在企业和消费者之间的分配则由关税减让的方式和两国的相对技术水平共同决定。     

战略联盟的稳定与战略联盟合作伙伴的选择

战略联盟高失败率存在的现实，对联盟的成功实施和稳定持续发展构成了巨大的威胁，通过对传统战略联盟伙伴选择机制的不足、缺陷、及其对战略联盟稳定的危害的深入分析，提出一个战略联盟伙伴选择的新机制，以期推动战略联盟能够成功实施并且稳定持续发展。     

One‐Way Compatibility,Two‐Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two‐stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the converter (one‐way vs two‐way), the existence of property rights and the possibility of side payments. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network effects. In the case of a two‐way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium unless side payments are allowed and the network externalities are sufficiently low. When both firms can build a one‐way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary technical specifications, the unique equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each firm has property rights on its technical specifications, full incompatibility is observed at the equilibrium with no side payments; when these are allowed the entrant sells access to its network to the incumbent which refuses to do the same and asymmetric one‐way compatibility results in equilibrium.     

战略联盟的学习过程及其管理

随着商业环境的变化,战略联盟已成为企业提高竞争优势的有效途径,学习是企业参加战略联盟的主要动机。通过战略联盟学习类似于一种实物期权投资,在获取新知识和新技术方面将使企业更具有灵活性并能有效地控制投资风险。然而,战略联盟的学习过程比组织内部的学习过程存在更多的障碍。     

企业战略联盟中各种风险的分析

随着全球经济一体化的发展,战略联盟系互联网技术不断发展与运用的产物,在企业战略中的作用越来越重要,风险是战略联盟的一个固定属性,联盟失败的比率一直居高不下,给参加联盟的各方都带来了相当大的经济和战略方面的损失。因此,在联盟管理过程中,要正视与规避风险,以真诚的合作促使战略联盟的健康发展。     

基于网络分析法的R&V非竞争性战略联盟伙伴选择:以文化购物网联姻幸运甜饼为例

R&V非竞争性战略联盟为现实资源与虚拟资源的整合提供了创新性的商业模式。根据其非竞争性、用户共享、闲置资源互换等特征以及已有文献,R&V非竞争性战略联盟伙伴选择应包含4个因素,即兼容性、能力、互补性及其他,并可细分为19个评价指标,可以此构建出R&V非竞争性战略联盟伙伴选择的分析结构。     

企业集群与战略联盟的对比分析

通过国内外学者对企业集群与战略联盟各个时期的定义的集中论述 ,揭示出两者的不同内涵。对两者特点上的共性和差异性进行全面剖析和对比 ,明确两者的不同 ,避免混淆 ,从而有助于学者们针对两者各自特性提出有效建议 ,对促进企业集群和战略联盟的可持续发展具有一定意义     

国际营销的战略抉择

企业开展国际营销,首先必须解决国际营销的战略层面问题.本文就国际营销市场扩张模式、营销标准化与本土化、品牌战略模式的战略抉择问题进行了分析,并提出了战略抉择的建议.     

论纵向一体战略联盟

本文在阐述了产业链条中上、下游垄断企业实现纵向一体战略联盟重要性的理论意义的基础上,对纵向一体战略联盟的实施进行了可操作性的阐述,对纵向一体战略联盟的绩效进行了量化的分析。本文最后提出警示:要防止外国大跨国公司主宰我们的产业链条。     

基于战略联盟的企业效率改进方式

在当今激烈的竞争环境中,企业内部整合越来越雷同、内部改善的空间越来越小,越来越多企业把注意力转移到企业外部效率的提升,选择战略联盟竞争模式。从分析企业间合作的动因入手,以新兴古典经济学的角度来论证战略联盟有利于企业效率的提高,从而建立有效地战略联盟以改进企业效率。     

Distribution Channel Decentralization and Strategic Durability Choice

In a simple two‐period setting we examine a decentralized distribution (marketing) channel consisting of an up‐stream durable‐goods manufacturer and down‐stream retailer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the product’s durability while the retailer selects an output level. We show that in this setting, the profit‐maximizing manufacturer unambiguously selects a higher durability than the socially efficient (cost‐minimizing) level in both uncommitted sales and rental markets. We show this ‘reversed planned obsolescence’ result is due to the strategic benefit of durability in this double‐marginalization (double monopoly mark‐up) setting. This is in stark contrast to the usual integrated channel result where the profit‐maximizing manufacturer will select an efficient level of durability in rental markets and an inefficiently low durability in uncommitted sales markets (due to the selling firm’s commitment problem with potential buyers). Intuitively, with a decentralized distribution channel, the manufacturer faces potential commitment problems with both current buyers and its down‐stream retailer. We show, only in cases where both sources of commitment issues are removed (i.e. the manufacturer can credibly commit to both potential buyers and its retailer), will the profit‐maximizing durability choice be socially efficient.     

Special Research Forum Call for Papers: Strategic Alliance Formation,Use and Outcomes

Small Business Economics -