价格、时间敏感性供应链收益混合分配契约模型研究

供应链企业通过何种契约方式进行协同合作，以达到整体目标的最优，是供应链管理的一个重要研究课题。在一个两阶供应链系统中，面对价格和响应时间敏感性市场需求，文章通过引入供应商的激励——响应时间函数和市场关于价格和响应时间的需求函数，构建了供应链的收益混合分配契约模型，最后文章给出了算例分析，验证了该模型的可行性。     

价格、时间敏感性应链收益混合分配契约模型研究

供应链企业通过何种契约方式进行协同合作,以达到整体目标的最优,是供应链管理的一个重要研究课题。在一个两阶供应链系统中,面对价格和响应时间敏感性市场需求,文章通过引入供应商的激励—响应时间函数和市场关于价格和响应时间的需求函数,构建了供应链的收益混合分配契约模型,最后文章给出了算例分析,验证了该模型的可行性。     

初探苹果公司创新模式对企业产品创新的启示

产品创新对于企业来说是一件比较重要的事情,但也是比较困难的。企业自己的优势在哪里?市场的真正需求在哪里?市场非现实的潜在的需求在哪里?企业自己是否有足够的能力来进行产品创新以满足现实的或潜在的市场需求?这些都不是轻而易举能解决的问题。很多企业在产品创新上还存在不少问题甚至是难题,这也致使这些企业的产品不能满足市场、客户的现实需求或潜在需求,甚至由于资金、技术、人才等原因而无法作到产品创新,而导致企业产品销售不畅,企业缺乏活力。     

略述市场经济条件下的价格形成

从一定意义上说,价格是市场经济的核心内容。没有价格的放开和价格形成机制的完善,就没有市场经济。 市场经济条件下价格形成机制 总的来讲,市场经济条件下的价格形成,是由市场供求关系变化决定的。当某种商品市场需求趋旺时,价格就会上涨,从而带动和促进生产的发展;而随着生产的发展,某种商品市场需求趋于疲滞,价格就会下降,从而推动企业向新的生产领域转移,以此平衡市场供求关系和稳定市场价格。但研究市场经济条件下价格形成机制,只重视市场和价格规律还不够,还必须注意考察与之相关的其他方面。 第一,干预式的价格形成机制。这主要表现在政府直接、间接或指导性的干预。直接性的干预,如对交通、邮电、煤气、电力、用水、房租等公用事业的价格和收费由政府直接控制,这些项目的价格和收费,非经政府批准不能随意调整。间接性的干预,主要是通过税收政策、货币政策等间接地实现对价格的干预。指导性干预,主要是通过非官方机构的监督和舆论。这些非官方机构通常与政府各部门联系密切,并且在受理投诉、依法调解、提供咨询、质量检验、价格研究和普查等方面具有权威性,发挥对价格进行监督的作用,以协调和调整生产者、经营者与消费者的经济利益关系。 第二,协调式的价格形成机制。这主要表现在各行业     

靖江中小企业积极拓展市场新空间

在国际金融危机影响市场需求的情况下。靖江企业积极调整市场战略，更多地把目光瞄准铁路建设、海洋石油平台、核电建设等有发展潜力的领域。积极寻找市场新需求。     

企业供应链管理与业务流程再造的整合与超越

新经济的来临，使得企业面对的是一个竞争日益激烈、用户需求的不确定性和个性化需求增加、高新技术迅猛发展、产品寿命缩短和产品结构越来越复杂的环境。在这种环境下，企业以自身的资源进行自我调整的速度已赶不上市场变化的速度，无法响应市场需求，而企业内部按传统分工理论组建的组织结构，又使得企业显得更加僵化，     

企业主攻产品选择与评价体系优化研究

1、引言 市场形态由卖方市场向买方市场的转变,企业生产什么取决于市场需求;而市场需求的多样性、多变性、复杂性和竞争性直接决定了企业产品结构的非单一性、非固定性.企业能否生存与发展在于能不能及时向消费者提供个性化的、丰富多样的产品.多品种、宽系列的产品结构成为企业适应市场、分散风险的必然趋势.     

网络营销动态定价策略

价格是市场营销组合各要素中十分敏感而又难以控制的因素,它直接关系着市场对产品的接受程度,影响着市场需求和企业利润的多少,涉及到生产者、销售者、消费者等各个方面的利益。因此,定价策略成为企业营销组合策略中最重要的组成部分。网络营销由于     

写字楼表现良好 商铺租金仍下滑——2013年第三季度深圳物业市场回顾

写字楼市场方面，受企业注册手续简化及前海政策推动，市场需求活跃。优质商铺方面，零售市场出现调整，市场平均租金继续微幅下降。工业方面，新增供应持续紧缺但本地需求始终活跃，推动租金稳定增长。高档住宅方面投资性需求减少但改善型需求持续，高端住宅价格录得微幅上涨。     

农产品供求非均衡蛛网模型

经济学中的蛛网模型描述了单一产品市场中供求变化规律及其与价格的相互作用和相互调整过程。这一模型在分析农产品供求波动中应用十分成功。但是传统的蛛网模型建立在供给与需求均衡基础上,这一假设在我国农产品供求市场上是不成立的。在我国的不完善的农产品市场上,很难相信在每一时点上都能通过价格调整使产品完全出清。     

Price stickiness and markup variations in market games

In this paper, we show that the Shapley–Shubik market game model with production naturally generates an equilibration mechanism that can accommodate price stickiness arising from strategic interactions of firms. Unlike New Keynesian models that show similar price stickiness results, the market game model does not require enforcing menu costs or other additional restraints on price adjustment mechanisms in order to generate price stickiness. As such, we suggest that the market game model can provide a good micro-foundation for macroeconomic analysis. We then explicitly show the relationship between a typical firm’s markup of price over marginal cost and its market share.     

Why are gasoline prices sticky? A test of alternative models of price adjustment

Macroeconomic models of business cycles rely on the assumption that firms adjust prices infrequently to generate the short‐run non‐neutrality of money documented by the monetary transmission literature. They posit different mechanisms to generate price stickiness, with correspondingly different implications for inflation dynamics. Using an autoregressive conditional binomial model, we test which mechanism is most consistent with the pattern of price adjustment found in daily wholesale gasoline price data. Our results lead us to reject menu costs and information‐processing delays but suggest that strategic considerations related to the idea of ‘fair pricing’ play an important role in accounting for price stickiness. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem

We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers’ value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exist. The Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem’s projection on the firms’ price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers’ value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central solution concepts in cooperative game theory are (subgame perfect) equilibrium prices of our strategic game.     

Compositional change,aggregation, and dynamic factor demand. Estimates on a panel of manufacturing firms

Most empirical research on investment and dynamic factor demand has used aggregated data. The large number of authors who have cited this as a source of problems strongly suggests possible benefits from analyzing individual firm data. This paper presents an analysis of a panel dataset of US manufacturing firms. Several models, based on cost minimization and a three-factor Cobb–Douglas technology, are developed. The differences concern whether the technology varies across two-digit SIC industries, the presence of fixed adjustment lags, and the determinants of adjustment costs. Identification relies on the rational expectations hypothesis, and estimation on non-linear 3SLS. The estimates indicate that versions with the adjustment lag perform better than others. Conditional elasticities reveal that factor demand responds rapidly to anticipated changes in output and factor prices, a finding consistent with other recent work. It appears that the factor demand of large firms is more price sensitive and less sensitive to output than small firms, consistent with recent work on credit market imperfections. Comparison of the results based on the pooled and the industry varying technologies indicate that the use of aggregate data is indeed a source of problems.     

Understanding Price Stickiness: Firm‐level Evidence on Price Adjustment Lags and Their Asymmetries

We study the speed of price reactions to positive and negative demand and cost shocks. Our findings suggest that price adjustment lags vary in line with the predictions of optimal price setting models. Moreover, we find that the firms' reactions are asymmetric, and that these asymmetries cannot be fully explained by any single theoretical model of asymmetric price adjustment. Overall, these results suggest that the reaction to monetary policy shocks may depend on which firms or sectors are particularly affected by them and, therefore, that richer models are needed to fully understand the effects of monetary policy.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

A Theoretical Analysis of Liner Shipping Conferences and Strategic Alliances

We analyze the economic impacts of industrial organizational struggles on the international liner shipping market. Operating ratios of different markets are discussed by incorporating rate, service level, and other variables into a standard microeconomic model. If two different carriers agree on a shipping conference price and/or share a strategic alliance service level, and maximize consolidated profit, a member carrier finds it easier to make its operation profitable than the individual profit optimization case; other carriers are worse off in becoming profitable. If the carriers face inelastic demand, the price continues rising until demand becomes elastic enough for the equilibrium to be relevant. The conference is expected to play a coordination role so that the market does not become unsustainable in the adjustment process to reach equilibrium.     

Product Rivalry with multiple Strategic weapons: an Analysis of price and advertising Competition

A dynamic model of product rivalry is developed for a market in which firms choose price and advertising intensity. The model, a state-space game, is implemented using data that consist of weekly price, sales, and promotional activity for four brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small town. A number of questions can be asked of this data. First, is advertising predatory (merely changing market shares) or cooperative (shifting out market demand)? Second, are price and advertising own and cross-strategic complements or substitutes? And finally, do investments in stocks of goodwill and in price reductions make firms tough and aggressive or soft and accommodating?     

A heterogeneous agent model of asset price dynamics with two time delays

This study constructs a heterogeneous agents model of a financial market in a continuous-time framework. There are two types of agents, fundamentalists and chartists. The former follows the traditional efficiency market theory and has a linear demand function, whereas the latter experiences delays in the formation of price trends and possesses a S-shaped demand function. The main feature of this study is a theoretical investigation on the effects caused by two time delays in a price adjustment process. In particular, two main results are demonstrated: One is that the stability switching curves are analytically derived, and the other is that the stability losses and gains can repeatedly occur when the shape of the curves are meandering. Although it is well known that a time delay has a destabilizing effect, these results imply that multiple delays can stabilize and destabilize a market price generating persistent deviations from the stationary price.     

Competing for Consumers with Self‐Control Problems

I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies.