Streamlining inventory flows with time discounts to improve the profits of a decentralized supply chain

We consider a decentralized supply chain, whereby a supplier sells a product to a group of independent buyers, and develop a strategy for the supplier to offer an all-units price discount or cash rebate for orders that are synchronized with its replenishments. As synchronized orders can be met with inventory directly from receiving to shipping without warehousing, the proposed strategy streamlines system inventory flows to minimize inventory and, hence, the related costs. On the other hand, by increasing the replenishment interval of the supplier, the proposed strategy is able to induce buyers to order in large quantities and hence achieve the objectives of quantity discounts. We show that the proposed strategy can achieve nearly optimal (minimum) system cost, and is much more effective than the existing coordination strategies for decentralized supply chains in the literature.     

Non-cooperative strategies for production and shipment lot sizing in one vendor-multi-buyer system

The supply chain structure examined in this paper consists of a single vendor (or manufacturer) with multiple heterogeneous buyers (or retailers). A continuous deterministic model is presented. To satisfy buyers demands, the vendor will deliver the product in JIT shipments to each buyer. The production rate is constant and sufficient to meet the buyers’ demands. The product is shipped in discrete batches from the vendor's stock to buyers’ stocks and all shipments are realized instantaneously. Special production-replenishment policies of the vendor and the buyers are analyzed. That is, the production batch is transferred to each buyer in several sub-batches in each production distribution cycle (PDC).This paper offers game model without prices, where agents minimize individual costs. It is a non-cooperative (1+N)-person game model with agents (a single vendor and N-buyers) choosing numbers and sizes of transferred batches. The model describes inventory patterns and cost structure of PDC. It is proved that there exist Nash equilibria in several types of sub-games of the considered game.     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

On supply chain coordination for false failure returns: A quantity discount contract approach

A large proportion of consumer returns fall into the category of false failure returns, which refer to returns without functional defects. In this paper, we consider profits resulting from exerting costly effort to reduce false failure returns in a reverse supply chain. The supply chain as a whole has a strong incentive to reduce such returns for cost saving. However, retailers typically enjoy a full credit provided by suppliers for returns, so they may not have sufficient incentives to exert enough effort for supply chain profit maximization. In some scenarios retailers may even have the motivation to encourage such returns. We suggest using a coordination contract to resolve this profit conflict. We introduce a quantity discount contract which specifies a payment to the retailer with an amount exponentially decreasing in the number of returns. We present explicit forms of such contracts given different assumptions about the distribution of the number of returns. We also prove that the contract is Pareto improving. Besides, it is shown that when the contract is applied in a closed-loop supply chain, it can deter retailer's potential incentive to encourage returns. Moreover, some modifications of the contract can lead to easy allocation of supply chain profit.     

Business processes inter-operation for supply network co-ordination

In a global supply network, the overall improvement of operational efficiency and customer satisfaction can only be achieved through greater co-ordination and collaboration of all the network members. However, full benefits of close co-operation within a global supply network can only be achieved when the business processes of the individual companies can inter-operate. Currently available commercial solutions are inadequate in supporting full network co-ordination in terms of business process changes and technical arrangements. This paper proposes a system that aims to improve the co-ordination of production planning and control activities across the supply network. To achieve this, it is important to develop new business processes and principles for company collaboration and corresponding information systems. This process starts from the identification of business and system requirements, which underlie the general business solutions for network co-ordination, developing the guiding design principles and subsequent process design and system implementation.     

Applying activity-based costing in a supply chain environment

Traditional intra-firm cost accounting tools are not appropriate in the context of supply chain management, as there are no standards for the definition and composition of costs. This prohibits exchange and comparison of cost data among different supply chain members. Against this background, several activity-based costing models for inter-firm cost accounting have been proposed. Evaluating these models, a conceptual framework for activity-based costing in a supply chain has been developed. This also forms the basis for a single case study conducted at Europe's largest company for façade components. This demonstrates how significant inter-firm cost saving opportunities can be identified and offers a first step in assessing the suitability of the proposed model.     

USING RESERVE PRICES TO DETER COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT COMPETITION*

To enhance our understanding of collusion in procurement settings, this paper quantitatively evaluates how the buyer's choice of a reserve price influences the sustainability of two previously devised collusive schemes. If the buyer does not select its reserve price strategically, then collusion may be sustainable for a wide range of plausible discount factors. However, even mildly sophisticated reserve price selection can dramatically shrink the set of discount factors for which collusion is sustainable. These findings support existing arguments that buyers are vulnerable to collusion, but they also suggest that buyers possess tools that may profitably induce sellers to act competitively.     

Long‐Lived Consumers,Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion

In a repeated price game with long but finitely‐lived consumers, long‐term contracts facilitate collusion. Intertemporal bundling reduces the gains from business stealing but has little effect on the cost of the resulting price war. When consumers anticipate future price wars, the maximum deviation profit is a single period of consumer surplus per consumer. Hence long‐term contracts do not increase the incentive to deviate per consumer, but do reduce the the number of consumers currently in the market by locking them into past contracts, so tacit collusion is sustainable for a wider range of discount factors and market structures.     

A multi-objective robust optimization model for multi-product multi-site aggregate production planning in a supply chain under uncertainty

Manufacturers need to satisfy consumer demands in order to compete in the real world. This requires the efficient operation of a supply chain planning. In this research we consider a supply chain including multiple suppliers, multiple manufacturers and multiple customers, addressing a multi-site, multi-period, multi-product aggregate production planning (APP) problem under uncertainty. First a new robust multi-objective mixed integer nonlinear programming model is proposed to deal with APP considering two conflicting objectives simultaneously, as well as the uncertain nature of the supply chain. Cost parameters of the supply chain and demand fluctuations are subject to uncertainty. Then the problem transformed into a multi-objective linear one. The first objective function aims to minimize total losses of supply chain including production cost, hiring, firing and training cost, raw material and end product inventory holding cost, transportation and shortage cost. The second objective function considers customer satisfaction through minimizing sum of the maximum amount of shortages among the customers’ zones in all periods. Working levels, workers productivity, overtime, subcontracting, storage capacity and lead time are also considered. Finally, the proposed model is solved as a single-objective mixed integer programming model applying the LP-metrics method. The practicability of the proposed model is demonstrated through its application in solving an APP problem in an industrial case study. The results indicate that the proposed model can provide a promising approach to fulfill an efficient production planning in a supply chain.     

Optimal pricing and order quantity for the newsvendor problem with free shipping

To attract and keep customers, companies, especially those in e-business, are increasingly offering free shipping to buyers whose order sizes exceed the free shipping quantity. In this paper, given the supplier offers free shipping and the retailer faces stochastic demand, we determine the retailer's (i.e., the newsvendor's) optimal order quantity and the optimal selling price simultaneously. We consider two different ways in which price affects the demand distribution, namely price only affects the location or scale of the demand distribution. We explicitly incorporate the supplier's quantity discount and transportation cost into the models. The transportation cost function is very general, which includes those most commonly used in the literature. We numerically examine the impacts of free shipping, quantity discount, transportation cost, and demand variance on the retailer's optimal order quantity and pricing decisions. We find that even though the retailer faces uncertain demand, free shipping can effectively encourage the retailer to order more of the good and can benefit the supplier, the retailer, and the end customers. An increase in transportation cost or a decrease in purchase price will induce the retailer to order more of the good and decrease the retail price. With increasing demand variance, the retailer should order more of the good. We also find that the newsvendor can cope with demand variance by taking advantage of free shipping.     

Buyer confusion and market prices

We employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices. Each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences. Sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices. The number of attributes bears no cost to the sellers and does not affect the value of the good to the buyers but adds complexity to buyers’ evaluation of the goods. The experimental results indicate that the buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher. Moreover, prices and profits are higher than those in a benchmark treatment with perfectly rational (robot) buyers.     

Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets

This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from demand‐based price discrimination, cost‐based differential pricing shifts production efficiently. If total output (and consumer welfare) is weakly increased under differential pricing as opposed to uniform pricing, as is true for weakly convex final market demand functions, social welfare is strictly improved. The analysis is extended to the case in which both the upstream monopolist's cost to serve the downstream firms and the downstream firms’ cost to produce the final good differ.     

基于EVA的供应链融资模型与绩效衡量

供应链融资是近年来供应链管理研究领域一个较为新型的课题,是解决中小企业融资瓶颈的新型融资运作模式.结合供应链理论和财务指标的设置,文章拓展了供应链融资模型和关键绩效衡量维度,提出基于EVA视角下的供应链融资绩效衡量具有系统性、相对量的三个动态维度：业务融资周期率、资本融资率和成本盈利指数,使之更加适合国内供应链融资风险大、融资条件苛刻的经济环境.运用案例研究的方法,对成都某X石油贸易公司的案例进行分析,证实了上述提出的基于EVA视角的供应链融资三个维度的合理性,并得出研究的结论和启示.     

An integrated production-distribution model for a deteriorating inventory item

We develop an integrated production-distribution model for a deteriorating item in a two-echelon supply chain. The supplier’s production batch size is restricted to an integer multiple of the discrete delivery lot quantity to the buyer. Exact cost functions for the supplier, the buyer and the entire supply chain are developed. These lead to the determination of individual optimal policies, as well as the optimal policy for the overall, integrated supply chain. We outline a procedure for determining the optimal supply chain decisions with the objective of minimizing the total system cost. Our approach is illustrated through a numerical example.     

Closed-form solutions for Wee’s and Martin’s EOQ models with a temporary price discount

In this article, we use closed-form solutions to solve Wee and Yu (1997) deteriorating inventory model with a temporary price discount and Martin’s (1994) EOQ model with a temporary sale price. In Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin’s (1994), the benefits during the temporary price discount purchase cycle are represented by their objective functions. Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin (1994) only used search methods to find approximate solutions. Following the theorems we suggested, you can find closed-form solution directly when there are integer operators involve in an objective function. Using the data of Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin (1994), we can find the results are more quick and more accurate.     

分散决策下的双渠道供应链补偿策略——基于消费者渠道选择行为

为了有效解决由于对消费者的争夺从而引发的渠道之间关于定价、服务水平、利润等方面的冲突,基于消费者渠道选择行为,构建了网络直销市场与传统零售市场需求模型和双渠道供应链利润模型,运用Stackelberg模型,在制造商与零售商实施分决策时,通过制造商对零售商实施补偿激励前后的对比,分析了消费者渠道选择行为对网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道定价、制造商与零售商利润以及供应链总利润的影响,并求得最优定价及制造商的最优补偿额度和零售商的最优销售努力水平,进行了不同情况下的双渠道供应链利润的比较分析。结果表明,无论制造商是否实施补偿激励,都应随着网络消费者比例的增加而增加其网络直销价格;零售商的零售渠道价格应根据网络消费者比例的增加先降低到一定水平后再提升。当更多的消费者选择网络直销渠道时,制造商的补偿激励水平和零售商的销售努力程度均会下降。制造商应提高其补偿水平,进而激发零售商提高销售的努力水平,并使双方利润及供应链总利润最大化。研究结果为基于消费者选择行为的供应链补偿研究提供了新方法,对双渠道的供应链补偿研究有借鉴意义。     

Inventory management in supply chains: A bargaining problem

This paper is focused on supply chain management from the perspective of inventory management. The coordination of order and production policies between buyers and suppliers in supply chains is of particular interest. When a buyer of an item decides independently, he will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer's EOQ may not lead to a favorable policy for the supplier. A cooperative order and production policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the dominant position to impose his EOQ on the supplier, then consequently no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative policy. To induce the buyer to order in quantities more favorable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a cooperative policy associated by a side payment to the buyer. The research presented in this paper provides several bargaining models depending on alternative production policies of the supplier. With these bargaining models the offered cooperative policy and the offered side payment can be derived.     

Optimal replenishment policy for a deteriorating green product: Life cycle costing analysis

In the last few decades, enterprises are trying to recycle the used products to reduce the negative impact on environment. This results in the need for reverse supply chain model especially for deteriorating items. The proposed model considers vendor managed inventory strategy and conducts a life cycle cost and benefit analysis for green electronic products. The mathematical analytical approach is used to solve the proposed model. The results show that selling price, deteriorating rate, holding cost, product return rate, and remanufactured quality have a significant effect on the model. This study can provide managerial insights into improving the design of a green-supply chain.     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Price and quality discrimination in durable goods monopoly with resale trading

We examine a durable goods monopolist’s optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational and can trade used durables among themselves. In contrast to the usual credibility problem of the durable goods monopolist, intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time-inconsistency problem of not raising prices against high-valuation consumers who delay purchase for quality upgrades. Resale trading ameliorates this time-inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively price discriminate, especially when the buyers are patient. The monopolist’s optimal price and quality offers in the new good market exhibit complex dynamic patterns, and new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of entry threats or learning economies. Initial quality distortions are followed by steady-state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high-valuation buyers, but sometimes also for the marginal consumer-types. Both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods are driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.