Multiproduct two part tariffs

Two part pricing by a multiproduct monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly are examined and compared. Two part pricing policies are seen to depend on whether products are complements or substitutes and on whether or not the market is segmented. A principle result is that although competition tends to lower unit prices, there is no corresponding tendency for competition to reduce entry fees. The unit pricing rule is related to the Ramsey pricing rule. Oligopoly equilibrium unit prices equal marginal cost when there is one consumer type.     

A strategic approach to industrial product pricing: The pricing plan

Price planning is one of the most overlooked areas in industrial marketing. Traditionally, emphasis is placed on product development, advertising strategy, and distribution channel formation before any consideration is given to pricing. The result is that industrial pricing decisions are made quickly without the necessary market and cost factors included in the final decision. The pricing decision is at the core of every business plan and impacts directly on the critical components of a company's marketing strategy. In this article, the importance of price planning in industrial marketing is discussed including the major components needed to make an industrial pricing strategy successful.     

广东、广西天然气价格形成机制改革试点方案剖析

2011年底,国家发展改革委发出通知,决定自2011年12月26日起,在广东省、广西自治区开展天然气价格形成机制改革试点(简称天然气定价试点方案).天然气定价通常包括成本加成法、市场净回值法以及成本加成与市场净回值混合定价三种方法,国家发改委推出的天然气定价试点方案采用的是市场净回值法.天然气定价试点方案在定价方法、价格与市场的关系、价格与供需关系等方面取得突破,同时在省级管网定价、区域价格、LNG销售等方面面临挑战.为了促进我国天然气价格形成机制的不断完善,建议:1)坚定不移地推进我国天然气价格形成机制的市场化进程;2)在定价公式中设置“天花板价”和“地板价”,即形成S型价格曲线;3)未来适时增加一个或者两个市场中心;4)适时考虑将非常规气纳入天然气价格形成机制中;5)2015年前全面实施新的价格机制,2015-2020年进一步完善天然气价格形成机制.     

Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.     

Price behavior in tight oligopoly

The study examines price behavior in tight oligopoly. The investigation proceeds from the premise that tacit cooperation is the rational response of firms comprising tight oligopoly. The study’s thesis is that cooperative conduct in tight oligopoly will reflect one of two general pricing patterns: (1) shared monopoly pricing, or (2) mark-up pricing. A unique empirical test of this dual price hypotheses is developed. The test focuses on the nature of price responses to cost and demand changes as reflected in a price equation that is estimated for each of fifty four-digit SIC industries. The study’s results indicate infrequent, but still notable, instances of shared monopoly pricing. More common is evidence of mark-up pricing, a general category within which demand proved to be significant in roughly half of the industries examined. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency

We study the dynamics of pricing efficiency in the equity REIT market from 1993 to 2014. We measure pricing efficiency at the firm level using variance ratios calculated from quote midpoints in the TAQ database. We find four main results. First, on average, the market is efficient, with variance ratios close to one. However, in any given year, there is considerable cross‐sectional variation in variance ratios, suggesting at least some firms are priced inefficiently. Second, higher institutional ownership by active institutional investors is related to better pricing efficiency, while passive ownership does not reduce pricing efficiency. Third, REITs that are included in the S&P 500 and S&P 400 are priced more efficiently than other REITs. For the S&P 500 firms, we find evidence that this was purely driven by sample selection, while for S&P 400 firms, we find evidence that it is inclusion in the index that drives efficiency. Finally, we find evidence that firm investment, analyst coverage and debt capital raising activity can influence pricing efficiency.     

Personalized pricing and price fairness

Mobile web technology enables discriminatory, or personalized, pricing for many more consumer good categories than has traditionally been the case. Setting prices according to individual valuations, however, generates adverse consumer reaction unless consumers are invited to participate in the price-formation process. Consumer perceptions of price fairness are key to the sustainability of any discriminatory pricing regime. Perceptions of price fairness, in turn, are hypothesized to be shaped by “self-interested inequity aversion” in which prices tend to be regarded as unfair, and purchase probabilities fall, if others are perceived to pay a lower price, while prices tend to be regarded as more fair, and consumers more likely to purchase, if inequity is in the buyers favor. Our experimental data also shows that the implications of inequity aversion for sellers can be at least partially reversed if consumers are allowed to participate in the price-formation process by negotiating the price they pay. The primary implication of our findings is that, in order to be viable, any system of discriminatory pricing for consumer goods should invite consumers to have a stake in the price they pay. Such participatory pricing may provide one way out of the current trap of Hi–Lo, or promotional, pricing that neither retailers nor manufacturers regard as sustainable.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?

This paper investigates who wins and who loses when firms depart from a mass advertising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrimination one. Considering a duopoly market in which firms simultaneously compete in prices and advertising decisions, we examine the competitive and welfare effects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by comparing equilibrium outcomes under customized advertising/ pricing decisions to the results arising under mass advertising and uniform pricing. We show that, when both firms compete in both market segments, all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that, in the context of our simultaneous game, targeted advertising with price discrimination might boost firms’ profits in comparison to the case of mass advertising and uniform prices. The overall welfare effects of the personalized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall welfare, consumers might all be worse-off. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that have been raised regarding the firms’ ability to adopt personalized strategies to boost profits at the expense of consumers.     

中国天然气价格困局——天然气价格改革思考之一

中国天然气价格采用国家控制下的供应推动型顺价机制,建立在单一气源产业链模型基础上,分段管理,是基于平均成本和合理利润的政府定价。这一机制有效运行的两个基础条件是天然气产业比较简单和计划经济体制主导经济运行。产业规模快速扩大、同一市场多气源供气、供气主体复杂化、供气管道网络化、全国市场一体化、需求主体分散化的天然气产业新格局导致现行天然气价格体制有效运行的基础条件不复存在,由此使我国天然气产业在快速发展中产生重重矛盾。这些矛盾包括:产业规模快速扩大的趋势给政府定价增加技术难度;同一市场多气源在顺价机制下必然导致市场价格多轨;供气管道网络化趋势成为天然气顺价机制的最大技术障碍;供气主体复杂化趋势导致利益调节不均衡和越来越困难;气源加权平均定价严重阻碍天然气产业发展;全国市场一体化将彻底颠覆资源属地化和区域性的限制;天然气消费主体分散化趋势使计划经济条件下行政配置资源的做法难度加大。     

如何破解中国天然气价格改革困局——天然气价格改革思考之二

在天然气产业格局深刻变化和社会主义市场经济深入发展的背景下,天然气价格改革的指导思想不能偏离经济体制改革的总方向,不能背离天然气产业的基本属性,不能脱离天然气价格的历史现实。必须坚持市场化的改革目标,强化管输和城市燃气环节的管制,逐步到位分步实施。由价格调节供需变化、保证市场配置资源的基础性作用,尊重市场主体利益、保证市场机制有效,同时同地同质同价、保证市场竞争秩序,运费差决定异地价差、保证市场物流秩序,这四项基本原则是市场经济秩序的保障,也决定了在市场条件下天然气市场价格的功能定位、水平确定、价格关系（不同用户之间和不同地区之间）。对现行天然气价格体制的技术性完善无法解决根本问题,必须构建新的天然气价格机制,即天然气市场回价机制,彻底改变现行天然气价格的顺价机制。为此,提出天然气价格改革方案,包括回价建秩序、管制门站价、权衡定水平、逐步市场化、政策调利益。     

First Degree Price Discrimination Goes to School

Personalized pricing is widely discussed but seldom observed, making studies of its efficacy rare. Yet, first degree price discrimination is common in the pricing of higher education, and I use data on prices and the characteristics of students admitted to a professional graduate program at a public university to estimate a matriculation demand function. I then derive linear pricing functions that maximize revenue for a target number of students. By allowing these functions to depend on progressively richer sets of observables, I explore the effect of personalization of pricing on profit. Tailoring prices to a one‐dimensional measure of student quality would raise revenue by 2.2 per cent above the revenue with uniform pricing. Pricing based on both student quality and state residency raises revenue by 8.4 per cent, and further tailoring based on available observables raises prices 9.0 per cent above the maximum revenue under uniform pricing. Pricing that obeys current statutory tuition limits raises revenue less but still by just over half as much. I also infer the welfare weights that the pricing process implicitly attaches to student characteristics.     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Sustaining Collusion Via a Fuzzy Trigger

Probability theory is the standard economic representation of uncertainty, although it is not always an accurate one. Fuzzy logic is an alternative representation that does not require individual beliefs regarding the explicit functional form of uncertainty. This paper applies fuzzy logic to an oligopoly trigger pricing game. The fuzzy trigger pricing game reverses the standard cyclical price war prediction; collusion-sustaining price wars are most likely to occur during times of high demand. The fuzzy model also predicts that markets with relatively volatile prices are more likely to undergo collusion-sustaining price wars. The predictions are consistent with available empirical evidence.     

Pricing issues in industrial marketing

Developing an effective pricing strategy today is becoming a difficult task for industrial marketing managers. The failure of firms to totally understand the implications of their pricing decisions often leads to missed opportunities and eventually lowers profits. Price setting and implementation are multidimensional processes affecting customers, products, cost recovery efforts, produce margin levels, customer retention, market share, and domestic and international sales. This issue of Industrial Marketing Management provides some insights into the complexities of this process for managers by examining pricing on several levels, including the organizational influences on industrial pricing, the factors affecting international pricing, the importance of pricing in controlling supply chain costs, the influence of information on pricing decisions, the degree to which the Internet and reverse auctions are affecting customer relationships with their suppliers, and the importance of developing a strategic pricing plan.     

工程量清单计价与定额的适用性研究

工程量清单计价方法颁布后，规定了工程量清单的编制方法和计价的原则，但工程建设定额仍然是工程项目估价的重要依据。结合工程量清单项目内容，提出了用编制综合预算定额的方法编制企业定额，可以直接满足清单项目投标报价的需要，简化工程量清单计价过程；工程量清单项目的设置应该反映构成建筑物实体完整的结构构件价值，才能与工程实际相符合，和现行的概预算定额相适应。     

Marginal cost and second-best pricing for water services

This paper examines the pricing strategy of water services relative to marginal cost and second-best pricing rules, which is a principal concern of utility commissions. The water utility is viewed as a multiproduct firm providing residential and nonresidential services, and a translog multiproduct cost function is estimated for a cross section of U.S. water utilities. Marginal costs are estimated and combined with demand elasticities to simulate second-best prices for water services. Results show that while the existing price structure is quite different from the one suggested by marginal costs, it does not depart substantially from the second-best optimum.     

Mobile channel and channel coordination under different supply chain contexts

The paper proposes different supply chain contexts where one manufacturer sells the same product to two retailers, one traditional and one online. The first context is when two retailers are distinct entities and the second context is when a dominant manufacturer owns and controls the traditional retailer. In each context, we study a no cooperation scenario versus various cooperation strategies (namely the minimum pricing strategy, the whole channel price, and the revenue sharing cooperation). Besides, we investigate the use of a dual channel by the online retailer via a mobile channel and a computer channel. The online retailer could use the same price online or a price differentiation (called also personalized pricing) depending on where the purchase is done. Our results show the crucial role of the product compatibility to the web and the mobile baseline incremental sales in influencing the performance of each channel member.     

Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets

A common feature in two-sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other. We show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand. The most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price. Full participation of the high-elasticity, low-price side of the market attracts the other side. As this side is less price elastic, the platform is able to extract high prices.     

Pricing practices in two industries

Although a critical part of marketing decision making, very little has been written about industrial pricing policy and strategy. This article has three objectives: First, to report the pricing practices of the chemical and construction industries; Second, to compare their pricing policies; and third, to develop a simple pricing framework for industrial marketers. The results of this study are interesting and somewhat unexpected. The buyer and his behavior only play a small part in pricing policy. A pricing framework or model is presented in a logical and systematic way.     

Are pricing policies an impediment to the success of customer solutions?

In an era of declining pricing power and increased global competition, customized solutions appear to be an effective way to build competitive advantages without the debilitating effects of price competition. Solutions involve provision of an integrated combination of goods and services that are designed to meet a business customer's specific needs. Premium prices and higher margins can be extracted by solution providers, who now have considerable incentives to design and market innovative solutions for their customers. We examine the applicability of various pricing frameworks and pricing practices in the context of two industries — business process outsourcing and power generation equipments. Our interviews suggest that firms predominantly use traditional pricing strategies; new strategies for solution pricing are only emerging; and, successful firms are currently using hybrid pricing models. We find that the solutions that we observed among practitioners are not what theory would suggest as true solutions but what would be described by theory as bundled products. We also find that solutions are in the eye of the beholder, i.e., if customers can de-bundle offerings, they are not true solutions. We extend our findings to academic theory and to the practice of developing and pricing solutions.