Managerial economics: a forward looking assessment

We examine recent trends in managerial economics, particularly in relation to behavioral, experimental, global and organizational influences. Managerial economics shows healthy development over the recent decade and is still grounded in practical applications. Examples are given using recent articles from Managerial and Decision Economics. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial utility-maximizing operating decisions under compound demand risk

This paper examines the demand and cost conditions under which utility maximizing pricing-risk and advertising-risk relationships are determinate. The structure of the firm's demand uncertainty captures both uncertain customer arrivals and uncertain individual customer demand. In addition to standard demand restrictions and constant marginal cost, determinate results depend upon the degree of managerial risk-aversion, the correlation between individual demand and customer arrival disturbances, the firm's cost fixity, and bounded product differentiation effects of advertising. The symmetry between price-cuts and advertising as demand-increasing costs is extensively examined; firm equilibrium requires that price-cuts not be an inferior input for increasing demand.     

Managerial Efficiency,Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to create a measure of managerial efficiency in an attempt to reassess the conflicting theories concerning the impact of organizational performance on manager succession, and the counter-theories concerning the impact of manager succession on organizational performance. The analysis uses data for 147 college basketball teams from 1984 to 1991. The results indicate that winning, not efficiency, is the key criterion used in determining managerial retention. Yet when managers of losing teams are dismissed the teams tend to do even worse. If, however, the efficiency of the new manager is greater than that of the former, the disruptive effect of succession is minimized. Because administrators appear to focus on winning, not efficiency, they will often select new managers who are less efficient than departed managers. These results are unique to this literature and indicate promise for the use of DEA in analyses of the internal efficiencies of organizations. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial responsibilities and procedural justice

This article identifies managerial responsibilities associated with ensuring fairness in the implementation of decision-making procedures in organizations. These responsibilities include giving adequate consideration to employees' viewpoints, suppressing biases, applying decision-making criteria consistently, providing timely feedback, giving justification, being truthful in communication, and treating employees with courtesy and civility. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of this analysis for procedural justice in organizationsAs a manager, I make many decisions. It is my responsibility to make these decisions fairly. I try to be honest, consistent, and impartial. That's my, moral responsibility as a manager. If I don't fulfill that responsibility, I will lose their respect and support. It is as simple as that. (From an interview with the president of a division of a Fortune 500 consumer products company.)     

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.     

Managerial optimism and investment choice

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The production economics of economics production

How is new economic knowledge produced over time? That depends on how the expertise of authors is managed within economic journals. Using data from 41 major economics journals spanning 21 years (1994–2014), we find that both the intensive margin (article length) and extensive margin (article number) of the discipline have been growing. In particular, the extensive margin has outgrown the intensive margin, such that each article produces absolutely more but relatively less knowledge. This pattern is highly consistent with a model of within‐journal specialization. As predicted by the model, the share of an individual article shrinks less in general interest journals and in more prestigious journals, where expertise is less substitutable across topics.     

Managerial and supervisory custom and practice

The term ‘custom and practice’ is more usually associated with the behaviour of workers rather than managers and supervisors. In addition, previous studies have been of large plants with strong workplace organisation. Peter Armstrong and John Goodman discuss managerial and supervisory custom and practice in the context of a study in a medium-sized factory in England.     

Salvaging law and economics

Some of Law and Economics’ pivotal claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced so as to deprive incumbent CEOs of activists' support. This finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even in the case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social activist organizations and institutional shareholders are showing a growing support for each other's agenda.     

Managerial hedging ability and firm risk

Modern portfolio theory suggests that undiversified executives would choose to diversify their significant holdings of their firm??s stock if the opportunity was available. Recent work suggests that managerial hedging is more prevalent than in years past as more innovative hedging instruments have become available to executives. Typically, unrestricted shares are used in these hedging transactions whereas restricted shares are not. In this paper, I examine whether a CEO??s composition of firm stockholdings between restricted and unrestricted shares impacts the level of risk undertaken by the firm. I document a negative and statistically significant relationship between firm risk and the proportion of CEO total shareholdings that are unrestricted and this negative relationship holds for alternative measures of firm risk. This result supports the notion that the composition of a CEO??s portfolio of firm stock between restricted and unrestricted shares is a significant determinant of firm risk.     

Reputation and Managerial Truth-Telling as Self-Insurance

We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider cannot trade on or sell private information, but faces imperfectly hedgeable nonwage income shocks. When compensation depends on the current stock price, a partially revealing equilibrium may exist in which the manager manipulates his reports, and hence the stock price, to reduce consumption variance. Intuitively, the manager builds reputation in good times when honesty is affordable, and exploits reputation in times of need. Endogenous reputation for honesty thus follows from a self-insurance motive.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.     

“管理职责”理解与实施

领导者确立组织统一的宗旨及方向,他们应当创造并保持使员工能充分参与实现组织目标的内部环境。理解上述“领导作用”应当包括：确立好宗旨和方向;策划好未来（战略）;激励好员工;协调好各方面的活动;营造一个良好的内部环境（包括价值观、行为准则、道德规范、群体意识等）。     

Managerial Technologies, Ethics and Managing

ABSTRACT   This paper engages with a key element of Legge's work: the relationship between the technical and the moral in the application of managerial technologies, and how managers manage these different layers of meaning. Taking business planning and performance measurement as an example of managerial technologies, these are analysed for the extent to which they allow for an engagement with an ethical position, using Legge's (1978 ) characterization of the role of managerial technologies originally identified in Power, Innovation and Problem Solving in Personnel Management . The inter-related elements of the technical, the ethical and the practical are then used to explore how managers construct the meaning of management and their implications for Legge's more recent deontological and teleological ethical framework.     

Managerial Incentives for Takeovers

The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price Competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in the literature, and hinges on the fact that when managers are more aggressive, rival firms earn lower profits and thus are willing to sell out at a lower price. However, as a side effect of such a contract, the manager might undertake unprofitable takeovers.     

hayek's economics

The dispersal of information in the economy is the key to Hayek's analysis of economic planning, the trade cycle and entrepreneurship. Gerald Steele, a lecturer at Lancaster University, explores Hayek's analysis. The function of the market is to coordinate this dispersed information.     

election economics

Economic management is crucial to winning elections, Robert Lind of UBS Phillips and Drew reviews the prospects and outlines possible strategies for victory.