Ownership structure and firm performance in emerging markets: A comparative meta-analysis of East European EU member states,Russia and China

Using a total of 4425 estimates collected from 204 previous studies, this paper presents a meta-analysis performed to compare East European EU member states, Russia and China in terms of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The results indicate that, as the standard theory predicts, state ownership negatively influences the performance of firms the state invests in, while the presence of domestic outside investors and foreign investors as company owners positively affects firm performance irrespective of the difference in country/region. Furthermore, we also found that ownership of managers tends to exert a positive impact on the performance of their owned firms. Overall, however, the linkage between corporate ownership and performance is weak. This finding implies that, in comparison with advanced economies, management discipline by investors is less sufficient in emerging markets.     

MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS IN FAMILY FIRMS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Family firms play a significant role in the global economy. Although family firm literature has devoted much time and effort to investigating topics concerning corporate governance, leadership, ownership and succession, accounting issues have received relatively scant attention. In this paper, we assemble and critically review extant literature on the choice of management controls. This is an essential topic for firms as management control systems (MCS) are used to make sure subordinates behave in function of the goals of the firm. Family firms, however, have distinct features, such as differences in governance structures and goals, which can have a significant impact on whether and how MCS are used. We conclude this review paper by providing avenues for future research that can advance our understanding of both the determinants and the outcomes of the choice of MCS.     

Employee ownership and firm performance: a meta‐analysis

Employee ownership has been an area of significant practitioner and academic interest for the past four decades. Yet, empirical results on the relationship between employee ownership and firm performance remain mixed. To aggregate findings and provide potential direction for future theoretical development, we conducted a meta‐analysis of 102 samples representing 56,984 firms. Employee ownership has a small, but positive and statistically significant relation to firm performance ( = 0.04). The effect is generally positive for studies with different sampling designs (samples assessing change in performance pre‐employee–post‐employee ownership adoption or samples on firms with employee ownership), different performance operationalisation (efficiency or growth) and firm type (publicly held or privately held). Suggesting benefits of employee ownership in a variety of contexts, we found no differences in effects on performance in publicly held versus privately held firms, stock or stock option‐based ownership plans or differences in effects across different firm sizes (i.e. number of employees). We do find that the effect of employee ownership on performance has increased in studies over time and that studies with samples from outside the USA report stronger effects than those within. We also find little to no evidence of publication bias.     

The Relationship between Slack Resources and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms: The Role of Venture Capital and Angel Investors

In this study, we seek to further delineate factors that condition the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. To do so, we develop and test a model that establishes the role of venture capital (VC) and angel investors as powerful external stakeholders who positively moderate the slack–performance relationship. In addition, we provide more insight into this relationship by examining differences between these two types of private investors and by examining the role of their ownership stakes. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1215 private firms, including VC‐backed firms, angel‐backed firms, and similar firms without such investors. We find that the presence of VC investors positively moderates the relationship between both financial and human slack resources and firm performance, while angel investors only positively moderate the effect of human resource slack. Further, VC investors are only marginally better at helping entrepreneurs to extract value from human resource slack than angel investors and they are no better when it comes to financial slack. Finally, we find that the impact of financial and human resource slack on firm performance is more positive in VC‐backed firms when investors hold high ownership stakes, an effect which is significantly stronger than when angel investors hold high ownership stakes.     

Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions

Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership.     

Employee ownership heterogeneity and firm performance in China

Employee ownership (EO) has gained increasingly significant attention from both business practitioners and policy makers in China. Through the examination of the implementation of EO by China's listed firms from 1992 to 2017 with a total of 3,396 firms and 36,559 firm‐year observations, we explored the relationship between EO implementation and firm performance. In general, we found that over time, EO firms outperform non‐EO firms in China, and the influence of EO is only different in nuanced aspects in different time periods according to the change of policies. The data from the most recent period, that is, 2014–2017, indicate that EO adopters have higher performance than matched non‐EO firms both before and after adoption, but the relative performance does not increase after adoption. We further examined the interactive effect between EO and executive stock ownership (ESO) schemes and found that the adoption of ESO weakens the positive relationship between EO and firm performance. Regarding different types of EO, we found lower performance in companies with high return rights but no control rights, and we found better performance when high return rights are combined with control rights. We suggested policy and managerial implications on the basis of the findings.     

Ownership Concentration,Institutional Development and Firm Performance in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. We focus on private, non‐listed firms that have been largely neglected by the extant literature. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u‐shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non‐EU‐member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed institutional systems. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem with rising ownership concentration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?

This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results of the estimations, taking into account simultaneity and reverse causality, show that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value differs across firms belonging to the sector of innovative technologies and more ‘mature’ firms. The results give support to the hypothesis that ‘mature’ firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to perform better than firms with more dispersed ownership. In contrast, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge related activities, higher ownership concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust to various alternative specifications.     

Acquiring firms' stock returns: Methods of payment,change in leverage,and management ownership

This study examines the effects of the method of payment, change in leverage, and management equity ownership on the acquiring firm's stock returns around the initial announcement date of the merger. Results indicate that stockholders of mergers financed with stocks suffer significant losses. These losses are larger when management ownership is low and smaller in mergers that resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases. Stockholders of acquiring firms involved in cash mergers gain significant abnormal returns, provided that acquiring firms increase their leverage and that managerial ownership is high. When management equity ownership is low, leverage has no effect on stock returns. When management ownership is high, mergers which resulted in acquiring firm leverage increases have significant positive effects, and those which resulted in acquiring firm leverage decreases have negative but insignificant effects.     

How effective human resource management promotes corporate entrepreneurship: evidence from China

Strategic human resource management (SHRM) represents a set of HRM practices that are aligned with firm strategies. The relationship between SHRM and organizational performance has been extensively examined; however, whether and how SHRM influences corporate entrepreneurship remains unknown. Based on the resource-based perspective, this study examined a model linking SHRM with corporate entrepreneurship. The importance of HRM people's political skill for a firm's development of devolved management through SHRM implementation was also examined. Data from a survey of 201 Chinese manufacturing firms confirm a significant relationship between SHRM and corporate entrepreneurship and that the relationship is partially mediated by a devolved management style. The relationship between SHRM and devolved management was shown to be stronger for firms with more politically skillful HRM people.     

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

HRM retrenchment practices and firm performance in times of economic downturn: exploring the moderating effects of family involvement in management

A substantial number of studies have indicated a significant negative relationship between human resource management (HRM) retrenchment practices such as downsizing, and firm performance. However, a consideration of the potential effects of business family involvement in management is largely absent from the general employment restructuring literature. Using a sample of 218 Taiwanese publicly listed firms, this study seeks to further our understanding in this area by examining the moderating effects of family involvement in management on the relationship between the adoption of HRM retrenchment practices and firm performance during the period of global economic downturn that erupted in the middle of 2008. Data analysis reveals that HRM retrenchment practices had a negative influence on firm performance, and that the relationship between HRM retrenchment practices and firm performance was negatively and significantly moderated by family involvement in management.     

Theoretical implications from the case of performance-based human resource management practices in Japan: management fashion,institutionalization and strategic human resource management perspectives

In Japan, a new type of human resource management (HRM) practices called ‘performance-based HRM practices’ (seika-shugi in Japanese) emerged in the 1990s, and has been adopted by many Japanese firms. In this paper, I illustrate how these type of practices emerged as a management fashion, diffused across a large number of Japanese firms, and became institutionalized in the Japanese business context; and discuss the relationship between performance-based HRM practices and firm performance. This illustration is used to develop a theoretical framework to better understand the relationship between HRM practices and firm performance by integrating theories of management fashions, institutionalization and strategic HRM. Suggestions for future research are also discussed.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain

The ‘managerial’ and the ‘contractual’ theories of the firm imply different causes and consequences for the relationship between ownership and performance of firms. This paper provides a test of the two conflicting theories, using ownership and performance data from a sample of Spanish family- and non-family-controlled firms. We find evidence in support of the contractual theory of the firm, according to which firms choose their ownership structure maximizing economic value, net of contractual costs.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

How Domestic and Foreign Firms Differ and Why Does it Matter?

Abstract.  This paper reviews and summarises the results of selected studies on performance gaps between multinational enterprises and their domestic counterparts. Performance gaps arise in such fields as productivity, technology, profitability, wages, skills and growth. While these gaps are often attributed to foreign ownership of the affiliates, the theory of the Multinational Enterprise argues that these gaps are due to being a Multinational rather than the nationality of the firm. Empirical evidence on the existence of performance gaps between foreign and domestic firms is supportive of this view: foreign ownership turns out to be a much less important explanatory factor than normally assumed. Firm‐specific assets and firm characteristics like industry, size, parent country and multinationality per se are more important. Such results are broadly consistent with those derived in the literatures on ownership change, on foreign entry and on spillovers. We conclude that there is little case for foreign direct investment promotion policies to discriminate between firms on the basis of ownership.     

Strategic Staffing and Small‐Firm Performance

Although staffing can be a critical determinant of whether small businesses succeed or fail, there has been less research in this area than might be expected, given the large numbers of such firms. While there has been some research on specific recruiting and selection practices, there has been little attention to the strategic aspects of staffing. We investigated relationships between strategic approaches to staffing and small‐firm performance using lagged survey data from 139 founders and owners of small firms. Results indicate that recruiting approaches imitating the practices (processes) of larger businesses are positively related to a perceptual measure of firm performance. Selection approaches stressing a growth orientation are also positively related to firm performance. Finally, founders’ and owners’ perceptions of the strategic importance of human resources moderate the relationship of firm performance with imitative recruiting practices as well as with growth‐oriented selection practices. An important contribution of this article is that contextual knowledge facilitates our understanding of the performance implications of staffing practices in small firms. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Friend or foe? Employee ownership and CEO dismissal

This paper examines 2 research questions. First, does the level of employee stock ownership impact the likelihood of dismissing poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs)? Second, does the level of employee stock ownership affect the likelihood of appointing an outsider or an insider after the dismissal of an incumbent CEO? We suggest that employee stock ownership reinforces the firm performance—CEO dismissal link because employee shareholders' welfare consisting of fixed claims (wages, bonuses, etc.), residual claims (dividends, increase in stock value, etc.), and human capital (generic and idiosyncratic) are highly linked to their firm performance. Moreover, under conditions of poor performance, employee shareholders are likely to favor an outsider CEO because he or she is more likely to initiate and implement drastic changes to the strategy of the firm, and therefore, he or she is more likely to improve firm performance. Drawing on a longitudinal sample of French firms, we find that employee stock ownership strengthens the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal likelihood. We find also that the higher employee ownership, the more likely that the underperforming CEO is replaced by an outsider. In contrast, employee ownership has no moderating impact on the likelihood of insider CEO appointment.